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‘Intersex’ has always been a contested category, and hence providing a definition of 
the term and the concept is a challenging task. Intersex activist Michelle O’Brien 
contends that when speaking or writing about intersex, “the first thing that has to be 
understood is that the definition of intersex has changed and has become increasingly 
policed by people with medical, activist and academic careers” (O’Brien 2009). 
Morgan Holmes, intersex activist and scholar, likewise argues that “intersex is not 
one but many sites of contested being [that] is hailed by specific and competing 
interests, and is a sign constantly under erasure, whose significance always carries 
the trace of an agenda from somewhere else” (Holmes 2009: 2). The shifting 
processes of signification and resignification of ‘intersex’ that have occurred 
throughout the centuries, but most considerably in the last two decades, need to be 
taken into account and are indispensable for an adequate understanding of intersex. 
Yet in order for intersex individuals and (an) intersex collective(s) to become 
recognizable, to be socioculturally acknowledged, and to act as a political agent, 
intersex organizations have developed a working definition of intersex. The 
Organization Intersex International (OII)1 provides the following definition that is 
currently in use and widely accepted by global intersex activists, NGOs, and 
generally by other medical and political agents involved in intersex debates (although 
their own respective definitions of intersex may differ): “Intersex people are born 
with physical, hormonal or genetic features that are neither wholly female nor wholly 
male; or a combination of female and male; or neither female nor male” (OII 
Australia 2013).2 Implied in this definition is the acknowledgment that various forms 
of intersex exist, hence intersex is to be understood as comprising a spectrum of 
                                                             
1  The Organization Intersex International (OII) is currently the largest global network of 
intersex organizations with branches in a dozen countries on five continents. 
2  OII Australia references other international definitions of intersex formulated by the World 
Health Organization, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, and the 
Council of Europe (OII Australia 2013). 
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diverse variations in sex characteristics, rather than constituting a single category. 
For the purposes of my project, I adopt this working definition of intersex and the 
terminology promoted by the OII, being aware of the reductiveness of that definition 
and the historico-cultural contingency of the term.3 
While intersex refers to specific aspects of the sexed body, intersex cannot be 
understood outside the performativity of gender and the interrelation between a 
person’s sense of gendered self and sexed embodiment. Judith Butler, whose concept 
of gender performativity has played a significant role in understanding the 
constitution of gendered and sexed realities, contends that “‘gender’ includes the way 
in which we subjectively experience, contextualize, and communicate our biology,” 
whereby the extent to which “primary sexual characteristics signify gender more 
directly” varies individually (Butler, in an interview with Williams 2014). This sense 
of gendered self and embodiment is to be understood as referring to “an innate and 
subjective experience of having a body [...] with primary sex characteristics” 
(Williams 2014). OII activists Curtis E. Hinkle and Hida Viloria rectify the common 
misconception about intersex, that intersex is not about gender: “Intersex is not just 
about our bodies but also about how we perceive ourselves within those bodies and 
gender identity is a crucial part of everyone’s identity. To erase the importance of 
gender to the individual intersex person is to reduce that person to only the physical 
aspects of their body, neglecting the more important part of the equation, their own 
perception of that body and themselves, as opposed to how others perceive them” 
(Hinkle and Viloria 2012). The conditions of the intelligibility of intersex are 
contingent on the interrelatedness of perceptions of sexed corporeality and sense of 
gendered self and (normative) cultural notions of gender and sex. Since gender 
implies a subjective and situational experience of one’s sexed corporeality, 
experiences of intersex individuals necessarily differ from non-intersex persons’ 
experiences with their bodies (while experiences also vary among intersex persons): 
“Intersex is an experience, it is an experience of being different; that difference is in 
part to do with having genitals that are different, of having a sex that is not quite the 
same as other men and women,” and may or may not involve a range of experiences, 
desires and issues concerning one’s individual sense of self, sexed corporeality, and 
                                                             
3  I use the term intersex ‘variation’ rather than intersex ‘condition,’ as the latter implies a 
bodily ‘defect’ which is ostensibly medically ‘manageable.’ In 2006, the term ‘Disorders 
of Sex Development’ (DSD) was introduced to replace ‘intersex’ by former members of 
the Intersex Society of North America (ISNA) and representatives of the medical 
establishment. I reject the use of DSD to refer to intersex individuals for the same reasons 
pointed out by several activists of OII, for instance Tony Briffa, that DSD stigmatizes 
intersex persons, and that the “very term [DSD] turns intersex variations into diseases 
requiring medical intervention, and being a ‘disorder’ inherently puts the medical 
profession in the leading position as experts over intersex people” (Briffa 2014). 




sexuality (O’Brien 2009). Intersex intelligibility consequently necessitates different 
or alternative cultural, linguistic conditions than those currently available.    
Why is the theme of intersex so relevant at this very moment? In her introduction 
to Critical Intersex, a collection of essays scrutinizing the paradigms of contemporary 
intersex identity politics and clinical practices published in 2009, editor Morgan 
Holmes asks whether we have arrived at a ‘post-intersex’ moment by now, when the 
concept of ‘intersex’ as signifying bodies that are neither distinctly male nor female 
has become obsolete (Holmes 2009: 1). Current debates on intersex issues as human 
rights issues prove otherwise: The ethical relevance of ending the so-called medical 
‘normalizing’ treatment of infants and children born with an intersex variation still 
has the highest priority on intersex activists’ agenda on a global scale. Furthermore, 
current discussions in North America concerning legal regulations of (non- 
conformative) genders (registration of gender at birth), sexualities (access to 
marriage, adoption and social benefits for ‘same-sex’ couples), and embodiment 
(transgender rights, disability rights, reproductive rights) indicate ongoing issues of 
contestation about heteronormativity and (white, heterosexual, cis) male supremacy. 
Intersex exists at the intersection of varying and several of these concerns, which 
allows one to consider intersex as a critical intervention in normative forms of sexed 
and gendered modes of being: “‘Intersex [is] a powerful term whose historical, social 
and political import remains critical as a tool for interrogating heteronormative and 
bionormative presuppositions about proper embodiment,” Holmes argues (Holmes 
2009: 7). Intersex also implicates a level of self-reflexivity about its own efficacy and 
legitimacy: “Intersex also remains a critical site for our interrogation of the limits of 
its ability to speak of and to the experiences of self of those so labelled, and a critical 
site for the examination of scholarship on intersexuality” (Holmes 2009: 7). Intersex 
is so relevant, especially at this moment, because it signifies both the limitations of 
the conditions of intelligibility for non-normative sexed and gendered realities as well 
as their contestation, disruption and resignification. 
 
Intersex Narratives explores representations of ‘intersex’ – more specifically, of 
intersex persons, intersex communities, and intersex as a cultural concept and 
epistemological category – in North American literature and visual culture from 1993 
to 2014. The project starts from the observation that a significant paradigm shift in 
the narratives about and their representations of ‘intersex’ took place at the beginning 
of the 1990s, which resulted in specific cultural productions that have emerged in 
response to the need for new narratives on intersex. Prior to the organizing of intersex 
activism, which started on a larger scale with the founding of the Intersex Society of 
North America (ISNA) in 1993, the discourses on intersex were almost exclusively 
set within the medical context, which have constructed ‘the’ intersex body as a 
pathological body. This medical discourse on intersex, which has been prevalent 
since the late 19th century, has evolved into a hegemonic narrative with the 
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(epistemological) power and efficacy of a metanarrative or master narrative.4 
Individual intersex voices have been systematically erased by and within this 
hegemonic discourse. In the early 1990s, intersex individuals have begun to reclaim 
the definitory power over their bodies and their sense of self, which prompted the 
production of ‘alternative’ intersex narratives and thereby processes of the 
resignification of ‘intersex.’ The production of various ‘other’ intersex narratives 
primarily involves texts in which intersex activists formulate their criticism of 
medical practices, demands for human rights and self-determination for intersex 
people, and accounts of actual experiences of intersex individuals. Soon, literary and 
visual cultural representations of intersex emerged as a reaction to the paradigm shift 
of intersex discourses, and to the ethical questions that arose from the new discourses. 
The trajectory of the several narratives on intersex cannot be understood in a (strictly) 
chronological order, but as simultaneously progressing and inter-referential 
movements, as continuing processes of (re)affirmation, challenging and resignifi-
cation. 
Profound academic research on the shifting paradigms of contemporary intersex 
narratives and on the literary and cultural works that have been produced in response 
to these shifts is still lacking to date, both in North American literary and cultural 
studies and in gender studies. This book seeks to close this research gap by providing 
a cultural analysis of the resignification of intersex through the cultural production of 
fictional and non-fictional intersex narratives within the last twenty years, thereby 
focusing on the interrelatedness of hegemonic intersex discourses and ‘counter-
narratives.’ It interrogates the strategies of resistance against the dominant discourses 
on intersex and moments of productive incoherence within these narratives, which 
potentially provide the conditions of intelligibility for (their) intersex subjects.   
 
 
1.1 CONTEXTUALIZATION: INTERSEX AT THE INTERSECTION 
OF MEDICALIZATION, HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES, AND 
ETHICAL DEBATES 
 
From the end of the 19th century on until recently, discourses on intersex were 
dominated by the medical science and psychology. Physicians and psychiatrists were 
– and still are to a considerable extent – the principal actors in defining and managing 
‘non-normative’ or ‘ambiguously’ sexed bodies; thus, intersex variations have 
                                                             
4  In postmodern theory the terms ‘master narrative’ or ‘metanarrative’ refer to an abstract 
narrative that is considered as a comprehensive, totalizing explanation of historical 
knowledge and experiences by relying on a transhistorical and universal truth, and to be 
justifying the legitimacy of a culture’s authoritarian power (Lyotard 1984: xxiiif). 




subsequently been classified as pathological ‘conditions’ that need to be medically 
‘managed’ and ‘cured.’ The paradigm shift of intersex discourses at the beginning of 
the 1990s effected a de-medicalization of intersex to some extent; yet in a more recent 
(minor) paradigm shift, the North American medical establishment and medical 
associations such as the American Academy of Pediatrics reclassified intersex 
variations as ‘disorders of sex development’ (DSD) in their Consensus Statement on 
Management of Intersex Disorders (2006), providing the basis for the regulation of 
the medical management of intersex (the contested reclassifications of ‘intersex’ will 
be further discussed in chapter two).  
From the beginning intersex activism was concerned with promoting human 
rights policies and practice for all intersex people, “particularly the right to self-
determination and bodily integrity” (OII USA 2012). One of the most critical issues 
activists address is the medically unnecessary surgical alteration of intersex infants’ 
genitalia and the cultural premises on which medical intervention is based. Over the 
past years, intersex organizations and activists have made significant progress in 
advancing the human rights cause for intersex individuals, culminating to date in the 
United Nations’ acknowledgment of non-consensual medical ‘normalization’ 
treatment of intersex persons as human rights violations (Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, Juan E. Méndez, 2013). Already in 2005, the Human Rights 
Commission of the City and County of San Francisco (HRC) published A Human 
Rights Investigation into the Medical ‘Normalization’ of Intersex People, a r port of 
the public hearing by the HRC and the city and county of San Francisco which was 
held in May 2004. The San Francisco HRC has been working on important issues 
regarding intersex since 1998, together with intersex people, in an effort to address 
civil rights abuses. The hearing’s key issue were the ‘normalizing’ medical 
interventions being performed on intersex infants. In September 2011, the world’s 
first International Intersex Forum, an annual event organized, and later supported, by 
the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA), 
took place in Brussels, assembling 24 activists from 17 intersex organizations from 
all over the world. Its goal is to work towards ending the discrimination against 
intersex people and to promote the right of bodily integrity and self-determination.  
Work focused on ensuring human rights for intersex individuals on an 
international scale includes the German Ethics Council’s (Deutscher Ethikrat) expert 
report on the situation of intersex people in Germany in 2012, which had as its goal 
the reprocessing and improvement of the political, medical and judicial conditions 
for intersex people; the study “Human rights between the sexes” published by Dan 
Christian Ghattas of OII Germany, together with the Heinrich Böll Foundation 
(2013), which investigates the human rights status of intersex people in 12 countries 
around the world; and the Australian Senate’s report, “Involuntary or coerced 
sterilisation of intersex people in Australia” (published in 2013), which “raises major 
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concerns about medical ethics and the human rights of intersex people in Australia” 
(Carpenter 2013). In May 2014 the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human 
Rights has released the statement, “A boy or a girl or a person – intersex people lack 
recognition in Europe,” which presents the difficulties, legal issues, and human rights 
violations, such as medical ‘normalizing’ treatment, which intersex people face 
(Muižnieks 2014). The ongoing struggles and work that is still to be done regarding 
the human rights situation of intersex people demonstrate that non-consensual and 
(in most cases) unnecessary cosmetic genital surgeries on intersex infants continue 
to be performed in many countries – and that this violation of human rights has 
serious implications for all people, not only for those who are intersex. 
Current ethical debates do not only involve the attempted medical ‘normalization’ 
practices, including (non-consensual or forced) genital surgery, hormone treatment, 
and sterilization, but a multitude of related issues resulting from the medicalization 
of intersex. Among the recent points of contention is the question of the legal status 
for intersex (or trans, or gender nonconforming) individuals, especially concerning 
the gender entry on identity documents, which effects further legal issues such as 
eligibility for marriage, child adoption, as well as access to health care, jobs, housing, 
social benefits, etc. A recurring controversy concerns the classification of gender 
nonconformity (including intersex people) as a ‘mental disorder’ in the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), published by the American 
Psychiatric Association (APA). Intersex activists reject the inclusion of intersex into 
the DSM because the “classification of ‘gender dysphoria’ [is] problematic in the 
way it relates to intersex people who reject an arbitrarily assigned gender,” and its 
perpetuation of the pathologization of intersex as ‘disorders of sex development’ (OII 
Australia 2012).  
A major intersex-related theme of public interest is the issue of Olympic and 
professional sports sex testing. The most prominent case in recent sports history that 
gained wide international media attention in 2009 was the case of Caster Semenya, 
the former world-champion South African runner whose intersex variation has 
caused a stir far beyond the realm of athletics. The ‘Semenya case’ made intersex 
visible not only in sports but in society at large and opened up a public debate about 
intersex. The issue of sex testing of elite athletes is far-reaching and has tremendous 
consequences not only for individual athletes but touches on gender issues in sports 
on a more fundamental level. The International Olympic Committee’s (IOC) and the 
International Association of Athletics Federations’ (IAAF) new policies of sex 
testing that were reinstalled in 2011 (more than a decade after the IOC and the IAAF 
abandoned mandatory sex testing for all athletes), in response to Caster Semenya’s 
‘case,’ have been sharply criticized by experts such as medical anthropologist Katrina 
Karkazis and her colleagues, who argue that the proposed policies are scientifically 
and ethically questionable. In their article “Out of Bounds? A Critique of the New 
Policies on Hyperandrogenism in Elite Female Athletes,” published in The American 




Journal of Bioethics (2012), they argue that the IAAF/IOC’s new policies of sex 
testing are really a form of reinforcing gender policing in elite sports: “We cannot 
think about the Caster Semenya case or evaluate these new policies without careful 
attention to common assumptions about gender and its relationship to bodies. [...] 
‘Gender verification policies’ in elite sports are meant to distinguish competitors on 
the basis of sex-linked biology – that is, sex rather than gender” (Karkazis et al 2012: 
5).  
The history of IAAF/IOC sex testing exposes a double standard with regard to 
genders, as in the beginning only female athletes were subjected to sex testing, 
ostensibly “because concerns about ‘fraud’ and ‘fairness’ have centered on the 
possibility that males could unfairly outperform females” – a practice that, according 
to Karkazis et al, really translates as an “[a]nxiety about women competitors’ 
femininity” (Karkazis et al 2012: 6). They question the new policies’ “claim that 
atypically high levels of endogenous testosterone in women (caused by various 
medical conditions) create an unfair advantage and must be regulated” (Karkazis et 
al 2012: 3), pointing out the cultural and political implications related to the 
IAAF/IOC’s practices. The current policies in elite sports perpetuate normative 
cultural ideas and the scrutinizing and regulating of gendered bodies, specifically of 
bodies that vary from normative femininity: “We need to move beyond policing 
biologically natural bodies and the resultant exceptional scrutiny of extraordinary 
women” (Karkazis et al 2012: 14). The authors of the study “Out of Bounds?” have 
already pointed out that the policies of sex testing “require female athletes to undergo 
treatment that may not be medically necessary and may, in fact, be medically and 
socially harmful, in order to compete” (Karkazis et al 2012: 13).  Rebecca M. Jordan-
Young et al report in their study “Sex, health, and athletes,” published in BMJ (2014), 
on recent cases of several women athletes who have been forced to undergo ‘partial 
clitorectomies’ and ‘gonadectomies’ to be/come eligible for competing in the 
Olympic games (Jordan-Young et al 2014).  
The most recent ethical debate revolves around the genetic selection against 
intersex traits through the procedures of assisted reproductive technology such as 
preimplantation genetic diagnosis and other forms of testing. This issue has lately 
gained in urgency, since “diagnosis and testing are already possible for numerous 
intersex traits, such as Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome (AIS), Congenital Adrenal 
Hyperplasia (CAH), and sex chromosome differences such as 47,XXY and 45,X0” 
(Carpenter 2014). The de-selection of intersex pre-embryos or embryos perpetuates 
the physical and cultural erasure of intersex individuals, which is already in effect 
through the intended medical ‘normalizing’ of intersex subjects and the forced 
sterilization of intersex persons.  
In the light of the severe human rights violations intersex individuals are 
subjected to, the ethical implications of intersex representations in literature and 
(popular) culture cannot be ignored. My research does not take place in a historical, 
18 | INTERSEX NARRATIVES 
 
cultural, political and ideological ‘vacuum,’ but is located within a specific system of 
thought, within a regulatory system in which normative notions of gender and the 
sexed body are perpetuated. Hence I position my project with due regard to the ethical 
debates surrounding intersex; this implies that I seek to avoid the perpetuation of 
disrespectful (academic) representation, usage of hurtful terminology, and the 
objectification of and epistemological violence against intersex individuals, 




1.2 POSITIONING OF THE STUDY IN NORTH AMERICAN   
INTERSEX STUDIES 
 
The biomedicalization of intersex that has taken place since the late 19th century to 
the present day has recently been criticized by intersex activists and scholars alike. 
The early 1990s, when questions of the performativity of gender and its relation to 
sex differences became the state of the art of academic research, have witnessed the 
(relatively sudden) emergence of (theoretical) works that primarily focus on and 
argue against the current medical management of intersex and its underlying cultural 
premises. The (mostly) academic texts are interrogations of the classification of 
gender and sex nonconforming subjects at distinct historico-cultural moments, 
ranging from the 17th century to the present day. The most influential works on the 
histories of intersex include Alice D. Dreger’s groundbreaking work Hermaphrodites 
and the Medical Invention of Sex (1998) and Elizabeth Reis’ Bodies in Doubt: An 
American History of Intersex (2009), while works such as Suzanne Kessler’s Lessons 
from the Intersexed (1998) and Anne Fausto-Sterling’s Sexing the Body (2000) focus 
specifically on the more contemporary processes of the biomedicalization of intersex 
and their underlying cultural conditions. Works that negotiate more specifically the 
resignification of intersex as an identity category, representations of intersex, and the 
interrelations of different cultural narratives include Intersex in the Age of Ethics 
edited by Dreger (1999), Sharon E. Preves’ study Intersex and Identity: The 
Contested Self (2003), and Morgan Holmes’ Intersex: A Perilous Difference (2008). 
Critical Intersex (2009, edited by Morgan Holmes) is a collection of critical essays 
that interrogate the dominant paradigms of contemporary research and activism 
focused on intersex issues.  
Works on the histories of intersex, such as Dreger’s and Reis’ studies, are 
motivated by the desire to collect and reprocess the clinical case histories of intersex 
individuals, or of ‘hermaphroditism,’ a term often used at the outset of intersex 




research.5 The bulk of the works is informed by medical reports and court documents, 
dating back as far as the 17th century, and covers ‘extraordinary’ cases of variations 
in sex anatomy. Reis’ Bodies in Doubt investigates the history of sex 
nonconformative bodies from early America to the present, tracing the development 
of the category of intersex from being subjected to the (definitory) power of legal and 
clerical authorities to that of medical authorities. Alice Dreger’s book 
Hermaphrodites and the Medical Invention of Sex investigates a history of the 
relationship between intersex individuals and medical and scientific authorities in the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries. Both works seek to provide a critique of the 
dominant normative mechanisms at work in the construction of ‘ambiguously’ sexed 
bodies by arguing that the intersex body raises questions about all bodies and 
challenges normative notions of distinct sex and gender categories (Dreger 1998: 6). 
The books’ narratives, while they seem to claim some form of authority in redefining 
intersex by asserting that there is only one specific and linear history of intersex, 
challenge the idea of a coherent intersex history through their own strategies: The 
works’ references to other historical narratives, testimonies and autobiographies from 
intersex individuals and medical records that are supposed to additionally underpin 
their arguments simultaneously undermine the representations of a univocal, 
universally valid history of intersex. The fact that this history is made up of a number 
of (mostly) written records which appear to be fragmentary, contradictory and only 
loosely connected marks the ambiguity, fragmentation and inconsistency as 
constitutive of the history/histories of intersex.  
Research on intersex that interrogates the construction of intersex as a 
biomedical(ized) category turns its focus to the cultural premises that inform 
processes of biomedicalization, pointing to the interrelatedness between normative 
ideas of gender and the cultural construction of the sexed body. Suzanne Kessler’s 
Lessons from the Intersexed (1998), Anne Fausto-Sterling’s Sexing the Body (2000) 
and a multiplicity of other texts, most prominently written by Cheryl Chase 
(“‘Cultural Practice’ Or ‘Reconstructive Surgery?’: U.S. Genital Cutting, the Intersex 
Movement, and Media Double Standards,” 2002b), Morgan Holmes (“Queer Cut 
Bodies,” 2000), and Katrina Roen (“Clinical Intervention and Embodied 
Subjectivity,” 2009), postulate specific forms of ‘intersex embodiment,’ a gendered 
and sexed reality which is a result of an individual’s lived experience of having a 
body that does not conform to cultural/medical standards of male and female, which 
makes them subject to processes of ‘normalization’ – whether this experience 
                                                             
5  The term ‘hermaphrodite,’ which historically denotes individuals with differences in sex 
characteristics, has become outdated by now and its usage is generally rejected by intersex 
people and organizations. Some intersex persons choose the term to refer to themselves, 
however. For a discussion of the contemporary usage of the term ‘hermaphrodite,’ see 
Viloria 2013. 
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involves actual medical intervention or not. The texts’ criticism of the hegemonic 
medical narrative refers, perhaps inevitably, to medical parameters in order to 
develop an understanding of the concept of intersex. The implications of these 
theoretical claims are not unproblematic; hence they will be scrutinized in more detail 
in chapter two. Yet these texts and theories that conceptualize intersex as a 
biomedical category are quite influential and have produced a very specific intersex 
narrative that has shaped and continues to shape the cultural imaginary of intersex in 
its present state.  
Until the late 20th century, intersex first-person narratives were all but absent from 
the corpus of historical records of intersex ‘cases’ that were published or otherwise 
publicly articulated. One famous exception are the memoirs of Herculine Barbin 
(1838–1868), which were later republished and commented on by Michel Foucault 
(1980) and served as a relevant source for (mainly) academic works on intersex. 
Apart from the very few first-person accounts of intersex people, and apart from a 
couple of legal documents recording court decisions about the legal status of persons 
with ‘indeterminate’ gender, the corpus of historical intersex narratives is made up 
of primarily one type of narrative, i.e. scientific reports by medical authorities, which 
consequently produced a hegemonic discourse on intersex.6 At the beginning of the 
1990s, however, when intersex individuals gradually began to establish 
organizations, along with political activism came an increase in personal accounts of 
life stories in which the narrators sought to come to terms with their intersex 
corporeality and their often negative past experiences with the pathologization of 
their bodies. The scope within which these first-person accounts were published was 
rather limited, as they were printed primarily in organizations’ magazines and 
newsletters, and consequently reached only a very small and exclusive audience. It 
was nevertheless a first step towards breaking the silence about intersex and ending 
the invisibility of intersex individuals within society.  
The themes of the stories are closely intertwined with the efforts to challenge the 
medical practice of genital mutilation performed on infants born with ‘indeterminate’ 
genitalia. Thus, while the individual narratives are motivated by the need to fight 
against the medical establishment’s authority over their bodies and for the right of 
bodily integrity and self-determination, they at the same time iterate the medical 
discourse and the hierarchical power relations inherent in it. Intersex in the Age of 
Ethics edited by Dreger (1999), Sharon E. Preves’ study Intersex and Identity: The 
Contested Self (2003), and Morgan Holmes’ Intersex: A Perilous Difference (2008), 
among others, are works that take up this paradigm shift in intersex narratives and 
pay particular attention to the value of narratives about intersex individuals’ 
experiences that consists in the challenge and deconstruction of hegemonic medical 
                                                             
6  I delineate the corpus of historical intersex narratives as including narratives about real 
people, thus I exclude the mythological narratives about ‘hermaphrodites’ here.  




narratives, and hence contribute to a resignification of intersex as a self-affirmative 
concept. 
While the hegemonic medical narratives have recently been criticized and 
challenged by intersex activists and scholars, academic research on the paradigms of 
contemporary intersex (identity) politics is still scarce to date. Critical Intersex 
(edited by Morgan Holmes 2009) is a compilation of essays from international 
scholars that “challenge[...] the primarily North American and liberal humanist 
paradigm of intersex identity politics and clinical practices by explicitly adopting 
‘queer interventions’ to further discussion on an ontological phenomenon that can 
never be reduced to a pure, embodied state, nor to a simple cultural rendering in 
which ‘intersex’ is whatever we want it to be” (Holmes 2009: 2), and hence marks a 
crucial shift in intersex scholarship. As the collection intervenes not only in current 
medical practices and research, but also in the “hegemonized identity politic [sic] of 
liberal activism” (Holmes 2009: 5), it turns the focus on the ‘alternative’ discourses 
on intersex that have been produced since the 1990s. The self-critical approach of 
Critical Intersex displaces the current debates on intersex to a level of self-reflexivity 
about the intersex movement’s own practices and its reproduction of hegemonic 
claims on intersex. 
Due to the recency of the fictional and non-fictional literary and cultural 
narratives that focus on intersex experience, profound academic research on the 
cultural corpus of intersex works in North America is still lacking. This book is 
dedicated to this hitherto neglected type of narrative production that renders a 
resignification of intersex in the cultural imaginary possible. The academic 
negotiations of intersex have been taking place in the life sciences, gender studies, 
queer studies, and the emergent and still not clearly delineated branch of intersex 
studies, and, to a lesser extent, in North American literary and cultural studies. A 
research project about the shifting paradigms of intersex narratives in the North 
American context hence is necessarily an interdisciplinary project. For my analysis I 
draw on the contributions of gender, queer and trans studies for a new understanding 
of normative/non-normative genders and sexed embodiment, and on the 
contributions of literary and cultural studies regarding in particular the study of 
(textual/discursive) practices of individuals belonging to a marginalized group as 
constructing (a self-affirmative) selfhood, that challenges hegemonic accounts the 
author/speaker is subjected to. I hence position my work at the intersection of North 
American literature and culture studies and queer/gender studies. Issues of gender 
and/or sexual nonconformity have been discussed in North American literature and 
visual culture, including representations of ‘female masculinity’ (J. Jack Halberstam, 
Female Masculinity 1998), male homosexuality (Vito Russo, The Celluloid Closet: 
Homosexuality in the Movies 1981), and lesbian sexuality (Mary Ann Doane, The 
Desire to Desire: The Woman s Film of the 1940s 1987; Terry Castle, The 
Apparitional Lesbian: Female Homosexuality and Modern Culture 1993; Teresa de 
’
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Lauretis, The Practice of Love: Lesbian Sexuality and Perverse Desire 1994; Patricia 
White, Uninvited: Classical Hollywood Cinema and Lesbian Representability 1999) 
in film and television, and of transgender or genderqueer subjects in literature 
(Eveline Kilian, GeschlechtSverkehrt. Theoretische und literarische Perspektiven 
des gender-bending 2004).  
Yet, significantly, a thorough analysis of literary and visual cultural 
representations of intersex individuals and intersex themes is absent from this 
research area. I position my project roughly in the tradition of these works, aiming at 
a critical interrogation of the cultural mechanisms that produce the conditions of 
intersex intelligibility in the cultural imaginary. The fictional and non-fictional 
narratives about intersex experiences that have emerged within the past two decades 
in the North American context by now make up a small but fine corpus of narratives 
that necessitates a profound examination at this distinct historico-cultural moment, a 
task that my book willingly attends to. I argue that these specific intersex narratives 
have emerged not only as a critique of the hegemonic medical narratives but as a 
response to more general concerns of contemporary issues of gender nonconformity, 
sexed corporeality, human rights debates, and ethical debates on the constitution of 
humanness and citizenship, or cultural identity (who counts as human, as a person, 
as a citizen? Who can be a subject, i.e. both subjected to cultural/social mechanisms 
and a subject in the sense of an active maker and user of culture [de Lauretis 1986: 
10]?). I read intersex subjects as sites of contestation over ‘proper’ or normative 
embodiment, over normative gender identifications, and over humanness; therefore 
my analysis starts from the assumption of the cultural significance of intersex as 
indicating shifting paradigms of the conceptualization of normative/queer 
embodiment. I argue that accounts of intersex subjects challenge and deconstruct 
hegemonic narratives of sexed embodiment and their underlying cultural notions of 
corporeality, gender and sexuality, and produce alternative concepts of thinking 
about and understanding sexed bodily difference which are effected through, and in 
turn effect, processes of the resignification of intersex. My book’s contribution to the 
field of North American studies can hence be understood as a negotiation of not only 
the paradigm shift in the narratives about and their representations of ‘intersex,’ but 
as a renegotiation of the conditions of intelligibility for subjects whose gendered 
and/or sexed realities are located outside or at the margins of recognizability, and 










1.3 PRIMARY CORPUS AND STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
 
The fact that the number of contemporary North American literary and popular 
cultural negotiations of intersex is to date rather limited can be interpreted as resulting 
from the relative invisibility of intersex individuals (not only) within North American 
culture. However, that does not reduce the complexity of the existing works and their 
representations of intersex persons and themes. Despite the limited quantity of the 
works, they come in a variety of narrative forms: novels, short stories, 
autobiographies, essays, articles, television series, films, documentaries, docu-
fiction, photographs, comics, and others. Yet, the corpus of this book is not made up 
of an arbitrary compilation of seemingly unrelated texts, neither does it claim 
completeness. Rather, the selection is based on the interrelations among specific texts 
and the transference of knowledge about intersex between them. Of particular interest 
are the influences of autobiographical intersex accounts on mainstream popular 
cultural negotiations, and how these are in turn reprocessed by intersex authors. The 
texts selected allow for a comprehension of the paradigm shifts of intersex narratives. 
The processes of iteration cannot be understood chronologically, but need to be 
considered as correlative; it is apparent that the reproduction of knowledge about 
intersex has a circular and cross-referential quality. The principal line of argument is 
that these narratives are constituted through processes of reiteration, whereby specific 
discourses, motifs, strategies, and narrative plots are reiterated by and within the 
different narratives under consideration, which both produces particular 
representations of intersex subjects and at the same time opens the intersex subject 
up to the possibility of its destabilization and resignification (cf. Butler 1993: 10). 
The book consists of five main parts – one theory chapter and four analytical 
chapters – in addition to the introduction (chapter one) and conclusion (chapter 
seven). The second chapter elaborates the conceptual and theoretical framework for 
my analysis. This includes a clarification of my usage of terminology, specifically 
terms such as identity, subject vs. individual, sex and gender. The chapter continues 
with a discussion on intersex as a contested category, claimed by specific and 
competing interests of several groups, including the medical establishment, intersex 
organizations and activists, scholars of gender and queer studies, and others. Further, 
this section discusses Foucault’s theories on control mechanisms and his concept of 
the medical gaze, which crucially help to comprehend the power relations between 
intersex subjects and medical authorities, and the constitution of intersex 
embodiment through and against visualization practices. The central theoretical 
framework used for my analysis is Judith Butler’s theory of intelligibility, 
specifically her text “Doing Justice to Someone. Sex Reassignment and Allegories of 
Transsexuality” (2001). In the remainder of the chapter I will outline the usefulness 
of applying this concept to my analysis of intersex narratives, point out the limits of 
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the theory, and interrogate what the texts themselves can accomplish in terms of a 
new paradigm of intersex (narratives) through processes of reiteration and 
resignification.  
Chapter three comprises an analysis of short first-person accounts of intersex 
experience. Intersex voices were silent, or rather silenced, for the most part in the 
history of and within historical discourses on intersex. While the hegemonic medical 
intersex narratives seem to foreclose a positive reclaiming of intersex subjecthood 
and intersex intelligibility, the first-person accounts of intersex individuals have the 
potential, “as personal sense-making strategies,” to resist and subvert the dominant 
narratives (Bamberg 2005: 288). Thus, I seek to identify strategies of resistance or 
deconstructive moments within these narratives of intersex experience. The narrating 
of selves and personal experiences not only benefits the individual in that it allows 
them to develop a sense of mastery over their lives and their bodies and to reclaim 
the “right to determine the legal and linguistic terms of their embodied lives” (Butler, 
in Williams 2014) in a way different from that forced upon them by authorities. Butler 
argues that it is possible to resist or reject one’s initial sex and gender assignment 
(that are given to us by others), but for our ‘self-assigned’ sex and gender to become 
intelligible we need “a world of others, linguistic practices, social institutions, and 
political imaginaries in order to move forward to claim precisely those categories we 
require, and to reject those that work against us” (Butler, in Williams 2014).  
I argue that these narratives under consideration provide, while perhaps in a 
restricted way, such a cultural context, or space, from which to develop ‘alternative’ 
concepts of sexed and gendered modes of being, and to figure out the conditions 
required for different forms of intersex recognizability and intelligibility. These 
narratives hence can serve as points of reference for a cultural intersex collective. 
The Intersex Society of North America (ISNA) provided the superordinate narrative 
context in which many of the early first-person accounts of intersex individuals were 
embedded. Many of these narratives were published in ISNA’s newsletter 
Hermaphrodites with Attitude between 1994 and 2005, and in the special issue of 
Chrysalis, ‘Intersex Awakening’ (1997/1998). The main focus of these early personal 
accounts is the criticizing and challenging of the way narrators’ intersex variation 
was or is handled by medical practitioners and within society. Thus, medical themes 
and issues related to the consequences of medical ‘normalization’ procedures such as 
genital surgery and hormone treatment clearly dominate and structure these accounts. 
At the same time, the narratives convey a general tendency towards the formation of 
a new collective intersex identity which is based on shared experiences with the 
medicalization of their infant or child bodies.  
Chapter four provides a discussion of intersex writer and activist Thea Hillman’s 
autobiography Intersex (For Lack of a Better Word) (2008). Narratives of intersex 
experience written by intersex authors which exceed the length of essays or short 
stories are still rare to date. Hillman’s autobiography has received wider recognition 




on its release not only within the intersex communities but also within more 
mainstream popular culture, which is certainly due to the author being a prominent 
figure and having been a spokesperson of ISNA. Intersex addresses very personal 
and intimate aspects of and experiences with the author’s intersex corporeality, in 
particular themes of sexed embodiment, gender identification, sexual practices, and 
her relationship to family, lovers and friends. Her autobiography marks a significant 
departure from earlier intersex accounts in that she openly discusses issues which are 
considered off-limits in intersex discourses (both public and within intersex 
communities) by many other intersex individuals and activists. Her narrative 
moreover critically engages in discussions about intersex activism, the intersex 
communities and their relations to other communities of gender and/or sexuality 
nonconforming people, such as the queer scenes; hence creating moments of self-
reflexivity about her own positioning within current intersex discourses and cultural 
spaces.  
Chapter five focuses on the analysis of two novels, Jeffrey Eugenides’ Middlesex 
(2002) and Kathleen Winter’s Annabel (2008). Both novels focus on their respective 
intersex protagonists’ childhood and adolescence, beginning with their births in the 
1960s, unfolding their trajectories that involve struggles with their birth gender 
assignments, dealing with the threat of or actual medicalization of their bodies, and 
their eventual (attempted) emancipation from the confines of the restrictive contexts 
which regulate their sexed embodiment and gender. Middlesex and Annabel share a 
particular understanding of what it means, or can mean, to be born and to live with 
an intersex variation, of how the category of intersex has been produced by specific 
hegemonic discourses, and of the problematic implications of this production. The 
two novels are to date the only book-length fictional narratives in the North American 
context, which are commercial enough to attract a larger readership. This 
circumstance is however only one factor in my decision to add the two novels to my 
corpus. Apart from the fact that the scarcity of these sorts of texts on intersex bestows 
upon Middlesex and Annabel a literary hegemony of intersex representations to some 
degree, the significant temporal gap between the two publications allows for an 
analysis of the interdependencies of non-fictional texts of intersex experiences and 
current activist accomplishments in medical, legal and political matters, and fictional 
cultural imaginations of the category of intersex at distinct historico-cultural 
moments. I discuss the representations of intersex protagonists and intersex-related 
themes in the two works in due consideration of the potential contributions and 
limitations of fictional texts when it comes to contemporary cultural negotiations of 
intersex. Fictional narratives can offer, in contrast to non-fictional and/or 
autobiographical narratives, a more flexible spectrum of possibility for the 
reimagination of intersex lives, as they are not restricted by the realities intersex 
people face. Nevertheless, literary representations of intersex necessitate a critical 
and self-reflexive stance towards existing discourses and narratives on intersex, both 
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non-fictional and fictional. I seek to interrogate how the novels’ reiterations of 
specific intersex narratives and discourses, of particular motifs, narrative strategies, 
and plots reaffirm hegemonic narratives on intersex and at the same time open 
‘intersex’ up to processes of destabilization.  
The sixth and last analytical chapter is dedicated to the interrogation of intersex 
representations in visual popular culture, namely in four medical television series. I 
discuss the mainstreaming of intersex themes and the problematic aspects and 
potential benefits of bringing intersex to the attention of a mainstream audience, 
mediated by medical drama fiction and focalized through intersex individuals as 
‘patients’ or, rather, subjects of medical treatment and procedures of medicalization. 
The fact that the theme of intersex is not only featured in all major popular medical 
series, but almost exclusively in medical series, signifies the close relatedness and 
association of intersex with medical issues. However, this can also be read as cultural 
negotiations of not only the medicalization of intersex but of the criticism of and 
ethical questions arising from medical practices. The latter argument is closely 
connected to the question whether a (commercial and extremely popular) television 
program has an educational ‘mandate,’ or the responsibility to inform the public 
about intersex themes, which inevitably raises issues of accuracy and fair 
representation.   
Four of the most popular American medical drama television series each have 
featured one episode dealing with the theme of intersex: Chicago Hope (1996), 
Emergency Room (1998), House (2006), and Grey’s Anatomy (2006). The Chicago 
Hope episode “The Parent Rap” is the only episode in the selection that focuses on 
the birth of an infant with indeterminate gender, and on the parents’ difficulties in 
deciding how to deal with their child’s intersex variation; a scenario that is supposed 
to represent a ‘classical’ situation of an ‘intersex birth.’7 The other three episodes, 
“Masquerade” (Emergency Room), “Skin Deep” (House), and “Begin the Begin” 
(Grey’s Anatomy) respectively feature a storyline about a teenager who was assigned 
female at birth and has been raised as a girl, but in whom undescended testicles are 
discovered during adolescence. Despite the similar initial situation, the series’ 
                                                             
7  The American medical drama television series Emily Owens, M.D., which was running for 
one season from 2012-2013 before it was cancelled due to low viewer ratings, features one 
episode about a baby whose intersex variation is discovered a few months after its birth 
(“Emily and... the Question of Faith,” season one, episode 6, originally aired November 
27, 2012 on The CW Television Network). While this episode is definitely interesting for 
an analysis of how current ethical debates are negotiated in a fictional popular visual 
cultural production, especially in the light of the time span of almost two decades between 
the Chicago Hope and the Emily Owens, M.D. episodes, my study concentrates for now on 
the more commercially successful television series, which have attracted an extremely 
large audience. 




approaches to the issue in terms of narrative strategies, visualization, plot 
development and, specifically, the iteration of particular discourses and medical 
ethical questions vary considerably. This section of my book interrogates how the 
narrative shifts in intersex representation and current debates on intersex themes 
intersect with fictional popular culture formats’ negotiation of intersex themes and 
discourses, and the intricate ways in which cross-referential and intertextual 
processes reaffirm, criticize, or challenge hegemonic narratives on intersex. My 
analysis will demonstrate that temporality is not the only factor that determines the 
mutual influences between narratives, but that other interests and concerns can be 
equally relevant.  
The study concludes with the summing up and evaluation of my findings 
regarding the shifting paradigms of intersex narratives within the last two decades. I 
assess the significance and the validity of the results of my analysis of how intersex, 
as a contested category, has been undergoing processes of signification and 
resignification, which have occurred through chronological, achronological or 
circular, cross-referential, interdependent, and both predictable and spontaneous 
movements. I try to answer the question of whether we can ever arrive at a ‘post-
intersex’ moment, and what the different narratives and discourses on intersex have 





2. Approaching Intersex  




My book’s analysis of the representations of intersex (i.e. intersex individuals and 
intersex as a cultural concept) in North American autobiographical texts, literature 
and visual culture from 1993 to 2014 necessitates a preliminary outline of its 
conceptual and theoretical framework. I regard my considerations here and the 
referenced theoretical texts as providing an adequate theoretical understanding of the 
structural conditions of narrative and cultural intersex representations, and thus as 
the theoretical underpinning of my work, rather than as a comprehensive explanation 
of the primary works’ intersex representations and the shifts in narratives. I approach 
the autobiographical, literary and visual cultural narratives with questions concerning 
the accomplishments and contributions of the texts themselves. I ask which new 
knowledge about or paradigms for understanding intersex they produce and how they 
effect processes of resignification of intersex. Thus I claim the usefulness of the 
selected concepts and theories to my analysis of intersex narratives, while I also 
acknowledge the limitations of what they can account for. I begin the outlining of my 
theoretical and structural framework with a clarification of my understanding of the 
concepts of identity, subject vs. individual, sex and gender. I will proceed with the 
discussion on intersex as a contested category and the claims made about intersex by 
specific groups and stakeholders, which have resulted in competing and at times 
conflicting narratives on intersex. I continue with an outline of Foucault’s theories 
on mechanisms of power and control and on the medical gaze, and how I apply them 
for theorizing the power relations between intersex individuals and medical 
authorities, and the constitution of intersex corporeality through and against 
hegemonic visualization practices. My central approach to the intersex narratives 
involves their production of the conditions of intelligibility for intersex (i.e. their 
intersex protagonists/characters, and intersex as a category of knowledge within the 
narratives), for which I reference Judith Butler’s theory of intelligibility as discussed 
in “Doing Justice to Someone. Sex Reassignment and Allegories of Transsexuality” 
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(2001) and Undoing Gender (2004) in order to comprehend the processes of 
intelligibility of sexed embodiment and gender on a structural, systematic level. 
 
 
2.1 CONCEPTS AND TERMINOLOGY 
 
In the following, I clarify how I define and work with the concepts of identity, subject 
vs. individual, sex and gender within the scope of this study. I want to point out that 
my usage of terminology might differ from their usage by persons I quote in my work, 
hence the concepts as they occur in the quotes do not necessarily reflect my own 
understanding of them (I comment on the discrepancies if relevant). My 
understanding of the concepts in question is based on social construction theory, 
although I need to specify what I mean by ‘social construction theory’ as there are 
various ways of understanding the notion of ‘social construct,’ as well as different, 
conflicting uses of the theory and its assertions. I reject an understanding of social 
construction as a basis on which to discredit an individual’s sense of gender, its felt 
relation to their sexed embodiment, and their sense of lived reality as something not 
‘real.’ When I speak of identity, gender, sex, and even intersex as socially, culturally, 
discursively, or medically constructed, I refer to the mechanisms of social 
institutions, linguistic practices, and political and legal regulations that constitute the 
referential framework within which we are situated and to which we have to relate in 
order to become intelligible. I do not intend to imply that a subject is ever fully 
predetermined, or a ‘victim’ of a construction; such a notion of social constructs, 
Butler argues, and I agree with her, 
 
“does not acknowledge that all of us, as bodies, are in the active position of figuring out how 
to live with and against the constructions – or norms – that help to form us. We form ourselves 
within the vocabularies that we did not choose, and sometimes we have to reject those 
vocabularies, or actively develop new ones. For instance, gender assignment is a ‘construction’ 
and yet many genderqueer and trans people refuse those assignments in part or in full. That 
refusal opens the way for a more radical form of self-determination, one that happens in 
solidarity with others who are undergoing a similar struggle.” (Butler, in Williams 2014)  
 
According to this concept of constructivism (as formulated by Butler), social and 
cultural constructions both impose specific gender assignments on subjects but 
simultaneously provide the conditions for rejecting and challenging these 
assignments, and even for articulating new terms which are more adequate for 
articulating the subject’s sense of self. 
I understand the concept of ‘identity’ in the terms of social construction theory as 
outlined. I see identity neither as a radical ‘choice’ nor as an essential and firmly 




fixed inner ‘core’ in an absolute sense. I rather consider identity as a complex 
interplay between a person’s sense of self based on several interrelated signifiers 
(including not only gender but ‘race,’ class, age, ability, etc.), whose perceived 
relevance varies individually and contextually, the interdependencies between self-
perception and how a person is perceived by others, and the linguistic and cultural 
terms and conditions available for conceptualizing one’s identity at a particular 
historico-cultural moment. My understanding of identity as intersectional draws 
primarily on Audre Lorde’s work, in particular her essays in Sister Outsider, in which 
she claims that “[t]here is no such thing as a single-issue struggle because we do not 
live single-issue lives” (Lorde 2007: 138). Lorde’s critical reflections on personal 
experience as shaped by different interdependent social aspects of one’s life, which 
make a person subjected to intersecting forms of oppression, have crucially 
influenced my way of thinking about ‘difference,’ but also about questions of 
privilege. My conceptualization of identity, however, is not exclusively informed by 
theoretical work, but has been influenced by several queer and trans, of color and 
white, activists, poets, performers, and writers. Leslie Feinberg’s and Janet Mock’s 
writing and activist work have particularly shaped my comprehension of the 
intersections between queerness/trans, ‘race,’ and class, of the implications of gender 
misrecognition and ‘passing,’ and of the real-life consequences for gender 
nonconforming individuals.  
Regarding my analysis of specific intersex narratives, I acknowledge and respect 
that intersex authors’ and/or protagonists’ sense of identity might be based on 
different premises; yet their identities are narrative constructions in the sense that 
they do not ‘exist’ outside the context of the narrative – that is, while real intersex 
people who are the authors of certain narratives do of course exist outside the context 
of their texts, we only have access to them and their identities through the texts. I will 
further discuss the implications of specific intersex identity claims in the ensuing 
section.  
I delineate my usage of the terms ‘individual’ (and ‘person’ or ‘people’) against 
the term ‘subject,’ as far as that is possible and reasonable. I largely understand the 
term subject in the terms of the constructivist conception of persons as classified 
according to a regulatory system of norms. Hence when I speak of intersex subjects, 
I refer to an instance that is less about a particular intersex person, but one where this 
intersex subject is subjected to a specific process of regulation and constraint in which 
their subjecthood is at stake (in regard to their intelligibility). The term ‘intersex 
subject’ moreover has a certain dehumanizing, or depersonalizing effect; thus my 
usage of the term already implies a criticism of its conventional usage. I speak of 
intersex individuals or persons when I refer to actual, real intersex people. However, 
the usage of the two terms ‘individual’ and ‘subject’ cannot always be clearly 
distinguished, and they are correlative in some contexts.   
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I conceive of the relationship between gender and sex, or sexed embodiment, as 
interrelated and complex processes that constitute one’s sense of gendered and sexed 
realities, where “‘gender’ includes the way in which we subjectively experience, 
contextualize, and communicate our biology” (Butler, in Williams 2014). The extent 
to which bodily characteristics signify gender for an individual can vary, and the 
ways in which their felt sense of gender affects the individual’s perception and 
experience of their body are equally complex. While a person’s sense of gendered 
and sexed realities cannot be disputed and delegitimized as ‘unreal’ or as ‘fictional,’ 
the way one articulates and communicates this sense of self to oneself and to others 
takes place in reference to a cultural discursive system. Butler argues that  
 
“some subjective experiences of sex are very firm and fundamental, even unchangeable. They 
can be so firm and unchanging that we call them ‘innate.’ But given that we report on such a 
sense of self within a social world, a world in which we are trying to use language to express 
what we feel, it is unclear what language does that most effectively. [...] And yet, sometimes 
we do need a language that refers to a basic, fundamental, enduring, and necessary dimension 
of who we are, and the sense of sexed embodiment can be precisely that.” (Butler, in Williams 
2014)  
 
I want to point out that in some interpretations of, and in fact in earlier claims made 
by Butler in her theory of gender performativity, the significance of a person’s 
experiences of their corporeality for their sense of gender, in fact for their sense of 
self, was/is largely ignored, if not disputed. This has been an issue particularly in the 
context of debates around transgender/trans and intersex. A comprehensive 
discussion about this controversy would exceed the scope of the chapter, and indeed 
the scope of my work, so I am content here with reiterating a point I made in the 
Introduction, that an adequate understanding of intersex needs to take into account 
both intersex’s particular aspects of the sexed body, and questions of gender and the 
interdependencies between a person’s sense of gendered reality and sexed 
embodiment. As Katrina Roen argues, “the embodiment of the [intersex] subject is 
not simply about having particular anatomical features and being raised in a particular 
way but, rather, is a lifelong process of becoming” (Roen 2009: 21).   
The significance of the interrelatedness and interdependencies between 
perceptions and experiences of gender and sexed embodiment for the discussion of 
intersex themes becomes particularly clear when considering the processes of 
enforced medical ‘normalization’ and their underlying cultural premises. Moreover, 
the reasoning inherent in ‘normalization’ processes with regard to the production of 
the intersex individual’s gender intelligibility through the (surgical, hormonal) 
construction of a body that is supposed to conform, more or less, to the demands of 
normative femininity and masculinity, and the outcome of these attempted 
‘normalizations,’ often conflict with an intersex person’s own perceptions and 




experiences of themselves and of how their sexed corporeality pertains to their sense 
of gendered self. These conflicting notions and desires and the intricate interrelations 
between gender and sexed embodiment are central aspects negotiated in and by the 
intersex narratives that are investigated in the present study. 
 
 
2.2 INTERSEX AS A CONTESTED CATEGORY 
 
Autobiographical narratives have over the past several decades come to be conceived 
as narrative or discursive productions of selves, as constructions of personal lives that 
claim an ‘authenticity’ of their representations, rather than as accounts of a ‘reality’ 
of selfhood that pre-exists its narrative construction.1 With regard to personal 
accounts conveyed by intersex persons, Sharon Preves notes: “By speaking out and 
externalizing their reality, individuals take an active role in reframing and 
transforming their identities. This is especially significant for those who take personal 
action to transform an oppressive reality, such as ending a lifetime of silence, secrecy, 
and isolation. [...] telling one’s story to others is a narrative form of restoration” 
(Preves 2003: 118). She further argues, in a social constructivist mode, that 
“externalizing one’s identity by verbalizing it results in feelings of internal legitimacy 
and validation” (Preves 2003: 119). But how are these intersex identities that are 
subjected to processes of “reframing and transformation” to be theoretically 
apprehended, and what is the trajectory of these transformations? Which are the 
identitarian claims at stake in this narrative “restoration”? How do processes of 
achieving both internal and external legitimacy and validation work through the 
personal narrating of selves? 
My study’s focus on intersex narratives necessitates a preliminary discussion of 
the various identity claims made about intersex by different groups and from different 
perspectives and the theoretical premises on which these claims rest. An analysis of 
contemporary intersex discourses in North American culture demonstrates that the 
narratives about intersex have undergone substantial shifts during the last twenty 
years. While before, medical narratives produced a pathologized intersex subject in 
interrelated processes of medicalization and normalization, the emergence of intersex 
autobiographical accounts has challenged this long-lasting hegemonic narrative and 
partly effected a demedicalization of intersex. The recent trend of a remedicalization 
of intersex, with the commitment to a ‘disorders of sex development’-based intersex 
redefinition, however demonstrates that one, seemingly obsolete intersex narrative 
has not simply been replaced by another, more progressive one. Rather, at the 
                                                             
1  The concept of identity as constructed through narrative emerged as a part of the 
discussions related to the ‘narrative turn’ within multiple disciplines, particularly the 
humanities and the social sciences, circa four decades ago. 
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moment it makes more sense to speak of a “plurality of narratives,” as Iain Morland 
suggests (2009: 196), which do not simply coexist but which, in very specific ways, 
reproduce, reaffirm, counter or reject each other. As Morgan Holmes has further 
noted, the discrete disciplinary fields, including “the medical, political, 
anthropological, identity-based, feminist, and ethical” disciplines which inform the 
discourses on the cultural category of intersex, the intersex body, and the intersex 
community are not only at various points interdependent; moreover, each discipline 
generates not a single narrative but several narratives which “may have multiple and 
overlapping starting points” (Holmes 2008: 21). As such, “intersex is not one but 
many sites of contested being [...]. [It] is hailed by specific and competing interests, 
and is a sign constantly under erasure, whose significance always carries the trace of 
an agenda from somewhere else” (Holmes 2009: 2). 
I will briefly outline and discuss the vested interests different groups have in their 
respective intersex (identity) claims, as well as the rationales behind and the 
implications of these claims. A clear-cut differentiation of these claims proves to be 
difficult at best, since the discursive strategies which produce the specific categories 
of intersex at times overlap and are under constant revision. The principal agents 
occupied with this contested intersex category are activists and activist groups, 
medical professionals, and gender or queer theorists. While their interests and the 
theoretical reasoning at times seem to be crucially incompatible, a careful 
consideration reveals conspicuous moments of convergence which need to be 
scrutinized in the following.     
Those involved in pioneer intersex activism, most notably intersex individuals 
who organized around Cheryl Chase’s newly-founded Intersex Society of North 
America (ISNA) in 1993, initially sought to utilize the propositions introduced by 
queer theory for their agenda to question and challenge the medical practice of 
normalizing intersex bodies and its underlying normative notions of binaries of 
genders and sexual difference.  
  
“The emerging intersex community [...] is composed of a diverse group of people who have 
examined the cultural and medical definitions of gender and found them to be inadequate. 
Intersexuals are beginning to assert our right to keep the bodies with which we were born, and 
to choose or reject surgery and hormones to any extent that we feel is appropriate.” (Nevada 
and Chase 1995: 1) 
 
Intersex activism has positioned itself right from the beginning within the historical 
tradition of civil rights struggles in the 20th century, following the civil rights 
movement, feminism, gay and lesbian liberation and the transgender movement. As 
such, activists have adopted much of the rhetoric of other minority groups in the early 
stages of their struggles, like demanding to be heard, acknowledged and taken 
seriously by their ‘oppressors’ and claiming the right of self-determination. The use 




of slogans addressed at their ‘oppressors’ like “HEY AAP [American Academy of 
Pediatricians]! Get Your Scalpels OFF Our Bodies!!” and the proclaiming of a 
collective identity as “Hermaphrodites With Attitude” in public protests at medical 
practitioners’ meetings demonstrate the radicalness with which early activism was 
carried out.2 In one of ISNA’s first issues of its newsletter Hermaphrodites with 
Attitude the editors announced their determination to group together in order to fight 
for what they considered as their civil rights, namely bodily integrity: “The newly 
emerging intersexual minority carries the battle [of civil rights struggles] to the 
ground of embodiment” (Nevada and Chase 1995: 1). The relationship between 
challenging the medical establishment’s treatment of intersex bodies and the 
construction of a new identity category is apparently a causal one in that the latter 
claim results from the former. As such, this specific intersex identity seems to have 
been predicated on a conversion of the materiality of a body which is considered to 
be ‘deviant’ or ‘pathological,’ into an embodied self. Morgan Holmes considers this 
shift in the signification of ‘intersex’ as a principal issue on the early intersex 
movement’s agenda:  
 
“The mobilization of ISNA in particular – and of those who would come to the more broadly 
defined movement – around the term ‘intersex’ was then very much a search for autonomous 
self-identification, a reclamation and wresting away of meaning and power of medicine, and 
the terms under and through which intersex would signify. In short, the movement’s trajectory 
was away from a stigmatizing and medicalized view and toward a valuing of embodied 
difference.” (Holmes 2009: 5) 
 
The radicalness of this reclaimed intersex self-identification, contrary to what might 
have been expected, lay less in a challenging of cultural notions of gender as a binary 
or of a biological determinist coherence of sexes and genders. A radical intersex-as-
queer identity, as has been proposed by some intersex activists and queer theorists, 
would replace an invariable relationship between the sexed body and the self with 
multiplicity and uncertainty, and refer to an identity which is “ongoing, provisional, 
transformative and transforming, its meaning always being made and remade, done 
and undone” (Cornwall 2009: 237), thus eluding any claims to a stable intersex 
identity position. In an ideal (probably utopian) scenario, such an intersex-as-queer 
identity would be irreducible to any identity claims, and not be exploited by any 
“agenda from somewhere else.” Yet in its challenging of medical practices 
‘inscribed’ into intersex bodies, the term intersex as reclaimed by early activists 
                                                             
2  The first public demonstration by intersex activists was held at the American Academy of 
Pediatricians’ (AAP) annual meeting in Boston, 1996 (Chrysalis 1997/98: 1). 
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seems to have lapsed into the very same naturalistic3 reasoning of asserting a 
‘naturally given’ sex as distinct from culturally constructed genders which it was 
supposed to elude, a point that will be elaborated in more detail below. 
The new conceptualization of intersex proposed by early activists, or rather the 
theoretical and practical implications of this reclaimed intersex identity, have not 
gone unchallenged, for at least two reasons. First, this identity or category, despite its 
attempts to effect the contrary, was itself based on biomedical, or biosocial premises. 
Second, it was rejected by many intersex individuals – both non-activists and later 
some of the very activists who had a stake in its construction – in favor of a non-
intersex identity that needs to be considered as separate from a body defined by 
biomedical parameters. What seems to be paradoxical in fact makes it clear that these 
two objections and the rationales behind them cannot be disentangled from each 
other, and hence must be considered as being interdependent.  
Early activism challenged the medical practice of the unnecessary surgical 
altering of infants’ genitals which do not meet (con)temporary standards of male or 
female sexes on the grounds that its goal was to ‘normalize’ these bodies to conform 
to a dichotomous cultural model of genders and sexual difference, and thus deprived 
these infants of their potential autonomy, an intact sexed body and a future adult 
sexuality. It was not, at least not primarily, the implication that these infants were 
denied a future as (potentially) intersex individuals, i.e. individuals who identified as 
intersex rather than as female or male, which was considered as a relevant argument 
against the normalizing surgical procedures. ISNA’s then-board members Cheryl 
Chase and Alice Dreger actually militated outright against assigning an intersex 
infant an ‘intersex gender,’ or a ‘third gender,’ in their view a gender category “that 
in essence doesn’t exist” (Dreger, quoted in Holmes 2008: 59). Instead, they 
advocated that intersex newborns should be given a female or male gender 
assignment (Chase 1999: 148).4 Holmes, who is an intersex activist and scholar and 
                                                             
3  Naturalism here refers to the belief that everything in the world is governed exclusively by 
‘laws of nature,’ implying a biological determinist viewpoint on the human condition. For 
a critical discussion of the construction of sexual difference and the sexed body as ‘natural’ 
and its basis for the construction of the gender binary and heterosexuality as likewise 
‘natural,’ see Butler (1990: 128-141 and 1993).   
4  Consider also ISNA’s recommendations for the treatment of intersex infants on its 
homepage, “What does ISNA recommend for children with intersex?” (available at 
http://www.isna.org/faq/patient-centered). The phrase “newborns with intersex should be 
given a gender assignment as boy or girl” (emphasis added) strongly suggests that the 
bodily ‘condition’ (intersex) must be considered as distinct from a gender (male or female), 
and moreover that assigning the child an unambiguously female or male gender is a social 
imperative rather than an option, since “assigning an ‘intersex’ gender would unnecessarily 
traumatize the child” (http://www.isna.org/faq/gender_assignment).  




herself was part of ISNA’s pioneer intersex activism, points to clinicians’ common 
and repeated misunderstandings of ISNA’s and other activist groups’ agenda for 
changing the medical treatment standards. She argues that  
 
“The approach many [intersex activists] now advocate neither subverts the notion of individual 
identity nor questions the limits of free will. Rather, by extending those ideas, the most active 
groups propose to reorient treatment to focus on the consumer demands of individual 
intersexuals. [...] Suggesting that early cosmetic surgery should be postponed is not equal to 
arguing that children should be raised as radical gender experiments. The necessity of a clearly 
defined social role is not at issue. The medical insistence that the gender assignment of the 
intersexed children has to be sutured down surgically is, however, very much at issue.” 
(Holmes 2008: 138) 
 
Thus, while early activism advocated the acceptance of bodily difference and bodily 
integrity within medical discourses and the realm of medicine, more substantial 
cultural claims of gender definitions remained largely unaffected. In fact, and quite 
ironically, the reappropriating and reclaiming of the term intersex was not, unlike 
some theorists like Alyson Spurgas have interpreted it, intended to be as “a positive 
marker of non-normative and queer identity, rather than as a medicalized term 
denoting pathological or disordered status” (Spurgas 2009: 98), and consequently 
failed as an “embrace of radical intersex identity” (Spurgas 2009: 99). 
If the reclaiming of the term intersex was not directed towards establishing a 
socially viable gender identity category, the claims on which the intersex ‘identity’ 
implicit in the activists’ intersex politics rests have to be found in a shared history of 
medicalization. Some gender theorists have pointed to the dynamics between 
biomedical premises and identitarian politics. One crucial argument is that the 
medical diagnosis and consequent surgery produce ‘intersex’ as an ‘identity.’ This 
specific intersex ‘identity’ is here understood as both being erased and generated by 
genital surgery: surgery removes bodily parts that are culturally considered as 
‘intersex’ body parts in an effort to remove the traits that signify intersex from the 
person operated on. At the same time, this procedure inscribes the signs of intersex 
on these bodies – through the specific kind of genital mutilation – and so creates a 
postsurgical intersex ‘identity.’ 
This is not to say that a specific kind of body or a body that was molded in a 
particular way is the essential or inevitable cause or the origin of a specific ‘identity.’ 
Judith Butler has convincingly claimed that “once ‘sex’ itself is understood in its 
normativity, the materiality of the body will not be thinkable apart from the 
materialization of that regulatory norm” (Butler 1993: 2). While I agree with her 
assessment that whenever one talks about the sexed body, normative imperatives for 
a given body to conform to are always already implicit – which means this is in fact 
a discussion about gender –, and that the way one understands, perceives and moves 
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one’s body are highly cultural activities, I would like to extend her notion of the 
materiality of the body by conceiving of the body as a site where subjective 
experience is constantly renegotiated.5 Thus it is rather, to argue in this spirit, the 
experience of living in this special kind of body, of having their body severely altered 
and hurt, which produces a post-surgery intersex identity, or in Holmes’ terms “an 
erased but ever-present identity” (Holmes 2008: 164, fn2). Holmes maintains that the 
experience of invasive medical treatment relating to their sexed bodies and the 
manner in which their intersex variation and its medical management was dealt with 
by parents might be crucial factors for developing this specific intersex identity: “It 
may be that awareness of one’s surgery produces those feelings, or that family 
reactions to the diagnosis and its management create the context for those feelings to 
develop” (2008: 109/164, fn2).  
Lena Eckert takes a more drastic stance when she refers to this process as 
“intersexualization,”  
 
“the process of pathologization that goes hand in hand with the construction of intersexuality. 
[...] one could also argue that intersexuality is actually an identity based on the experience of 
medical treatment in the West. This is to say that intersexuality is a medical category which 
does not have any meaning outside a specific medical framework.” (Eckert 2009: 41) 
 
This kind of reasoning suggests that early intersex activism not only operated within 
an already existing medical context – which was largely a product of the hegemonic 
medical discourses and practices – but moreover reproduced a very specific medical 
framework which was to legitimate their identity claims. Suzanne Kessler argues that 
 
“The intersexed identity is not adopted for political reasons but is a direct outgrowth of surgical 
experience. [...] For some intersexuals, genital surgery creates rather than erases their 
intersexuality. [...] Chase concurs: ‘What we share is an experience [...] of object [under the 
knife]. [...] We need to assert [...] an intersex identity in order to [...] protest the way that we 
have been treated, to expose the harm done to us and to try to prevent it from continuing to be 
done to those intersexuals who come after.’” (Kessler 1998: 86) 
  
While Kessler’s interpretation of Chase’s statement seems to be accurate with respect 
to an intersex identity based on a shared surgical experience, her conclusion that this 
intersex identity is not adopted for political reasons needs more careful consideration. 
                                                             
5  In a recent interview with Cristan Williams for TransAdvocate (2014), Butler has clarified 
her theory of sexed embodiment and gender as involving a person’s subjective experience 
and articulation of their corporeality, which goes more in the direction of how I 
conceptualize the relationship between gender, or one’s (gendered) sense of self, and sexed 
embodiment. 




Rather than arguing that an identity based on biomedical premises necessarily 
precludes the formation of a political intersex identity, in the face of early activism’s 
identity politics it makes more sense to consider the adoption of a political intersex 
identity as a site from which to both articulate and validate the claims of this 
biomedically grounded identity.  
The construction of an intersex identity upon a surgically mutilated sexed body, 
or rather body parts (“object under the knife”), has proven to be susceptible to various 
kinds of criticism and to have severe conceptual shortcomings. Kessler stresses the 
limitations of this intersex identity in that genitals are given “primary signifying 
status,” which makes it “difficult to accept the argument that the intersex category is 
legitimate and that genitals do not or should not matter” (Kessler 1998: 90). In this 
sense, activism’s production of an intersex identity mirrors the mechanisms by which 
the medical establishment produced its intersex category:  
  
“Like the mainstream culture that created the diagnostic category, this use of intersex as an 
identity category retains the synecdochic sign of genitals that cast women as those who lack, 
or who are their reproductive capacity, and men as those who possess the phallus. The 
signification of the subject through presumed genital attributes, whether one accepts this as real 
or symbolic, remains unchallenged in the current signification of the term ‘intersex.’” (Holmes 
2008: 125) 
 
The alignment of genitalia with identity in both the medical practice and the politics 
of the contemporary intersex movement obscures to some extent the cultural 
variability and historical contingency of ‘identity,’ failing to fully apprehend that the 
intersex category as a product of diagnostic practices does not remain the same 
category when intersex activism and/or queer theory turn their foci on it. Through the 
mechanisms of criticism and renegotiation, at the very moment the medical intersex 
category becomes a subject of activism’s agenda and queer theory’s studies, this 
intersex category is necessarily altered. In a slightly different manner, yet relating to 
the notion of intersex as a contested identity category, Eckert argues that “the move 
to draw on bio-medical categories to argue for the historical and social validity of 
this identity position” is “problematic” for it prompted western scholars to use 
intersex subjects as the ‘ideal’ site for their studies on the continuity between what is 
considered as biological sex and gender, without critically addressing the underlying 
assumptions of that continuity (Eckert 2009: 49). Either way, intersex as an identity 
is commonly and oftentimes too uncritically treated as a transhistorical identity 
category; a critical understanding of intersex as identity, or rather, identities, requires 
a full realization of identity formation as a culturally and historically contingent 
process that constructs and differentiates subjects as individuals or specific 
collectives. 
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Intersex activism’s initial efforts to establish a new collective intersex identity 
came to be rejected by many intersex individuals, most of whom were not activists, 
on the grounds that such a group identity’s “potential for essentialism” (Preves 2003: 
147) would lead to exclusions, assimilationist politics, and the repression of 
difference. It therefore fails to be representative of intersex persons who do not 
conceive of their intersex variation as an identitarian trait but “simply view 
themselves as men or women with a specific medical condition which may manifest 
itself in some unusual anatomy” (Cornwall 2009: 216f) and as such have experiences 
which profoundly differ from most activists’ experiences. Holmes alludes to many 
queer or gender theorists’ and activists’ privileging of an intersex individual to adopt 
a critical stance towards normative notions of sex/gender and to proudly assert an 
intersex identity in order to challenge these norms. But not all persons who were 
diagnosed or identified as intersex by medical power do accept that label as the 
accurate one for themselves, reject heterosexuality, or “maintain a critical 
relationship to the operation of gender norms or of heteronormativity” (Holmes 2008: 
15). There appears to exist a prevalent and implicit imperative for intersex persons, 
as they seem to be predestined on the grounds of their sexed bodies that defy 
normative notions of sexes and genders, to “willingly and gladly inhabit a space of 
resistant unintelligibility” (Holmes 2008: 16). Yet this imperative to elude or refuse 
a stable, normative gender identity demands a great deal: “living at the forefront of a 
politics geared toward making (gender) trouble is exhausting, and while we may be 
able to embrace the task sometimes, the point is not to live perpetually where it is 
troubling to deal with the body, but to get to a place where there can be some 
breathing room for difference” (Holmes 2008: 15f).  
Issues of recognition arose within the intersex community in its earlier stages, 
including various self-help groups for specific intersex variations, regarding the 
question of who counted as intersex, and what ‘proof’ was required to legitimate 
one’s belonging to the group of intersex subjects. It was common practice that 
prospective members were asked, by activist leaders, organizers, or other community 
members, to disclose their medical records or at least their medical diagnoses which 
should validate their intersex status. Quite ironically, and contrary to most activist 
groups’ designated goal to challenge the medical appropriation and pathologization 
of their intersex corporeality, their own practices reproduced the strategies in 
question and thus were to some extent complicit in the perpetuation of biomedical-
based intersex conceptions and the denial, or exclusion of intersex difference. On the 
basis of her personal interviews with intersex persons, Sharon Preves observes that 
when questioned about their own definitions of their intersex identity,  
 
“Participants’ tales of what it means to be intersexed and how one goes about proving their 
authentic intersexed identity made this issue of exclusivity especially apparent. This was most 
notable regarding the issue of medicalization as a defining characteristic of intersex identity. 




[...] those participants who did not undergo medicalization questioned the validity of their 
membership in intersex groups that were so heavily focused on recovery from medical trauma. 
Their doing so supports the notion that claims to an intersex identity are strongly tied to a 
history of medical trauma and social pressure to conform to a dichotomous understanding of 
sex and gender.” (Preves 2003: 148) 
 
The intersex identity as claimed by early activism thus appears to be normative and 
operates through very specific strategies of inclusion and exclusion.  
Consequently, the themes which were given priority on organizations’ agenda, 
i.e. themes addressed at internal meetings, discussed with physicians and politicians, 
and released publicly, were necessarily selective and biased. Voices from intersex 
persons who could not, or did not want to relate to ISNA’s and other intersex groups’ 
intersex narratives remained silent/silenced, and lacked a narrative space where they 
could articulate their specific experiences. When personal accounts of intersex 
individuals eventually came to be considered as sources of authoritative knowledge 
about intersex, the reliance on a relatively small group of intersex persons posed new 
serious problems. Research that focused on counter-perspectives to the hegemonic 
medical perspective on intersex tended to repeatedly draw on the same populations 
for the provision of personal insights. As a result, the emerging ‘counter-narrative’ 
fostered the perpetuation of similar beliefs and a very restricted and one-dimensional 
kind of knowledge production. These select populations were mainly made up of 
members of the gradually growing intersex community, which was primarily 
virtually situated in its initial phase, and still remains largely virtual, i.e. internet-
based, today. This is to say, the selection process was based on both expediency and 
self-selection: “Those who make themselves available for interviews, who write their 
own materials and who participate in lobbying efforts to change medical practice and 
popular perception, tend to share attributes such as similar levels of education and 
similar commitments to social and political change” (Holmes 2008: 119).  
What is more, experiences of intersex persons, which include both an intersex 
person’s sense of their sexed embodiment and their experiences with the medical 
establishment, vary not only individually but also according to their class, ‘race,’ age, 
ability, and other aspects. Yet, the differences in how one experiences being intersex 
as resulting from one’s belonging to specific and intersecting social and cultural 
categories have been rarely discussed within activist contexts (in contrast to queer 
and trans community contexts, where intersectionality has been increasingly 
thematized in recent years). The most obvious explanation for the lack of 
intersectional discussions with regard to intersex themes is the predominance of the 
issue of human rights violations, in particular nonconsensual or forced genital 
surgery, which seems to subordinate most other aspects of intersex persons’ lived 
realities. Intersections do not only play a significant role with regard to (normative) 
notions of sexed corporeality, but also concerning access to information about 
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intersex variations, medical and otherwise, where questions of education and 
economic possibilities come into play. North American intersex activism has been, 
when taking into account the most visible and active members, while not entirely 
white middleclass, at least white and/or middleclass dominated. Hence, in many 
intersex narratives, negotiations of the various intersections and their consequences 
for different intersex experiences are conspicuously absent. In fictional, especially 
popular cultural works, the issue of underrepresentation of specific groups (persons 
with disabilities, persons of color, aged people, queer people) is an additional factor 
contributing to this absence. The disregard for intersections with intersex issues has 
led to a further perceived homogenization of a cultural intersex collective, and of 
cultural intersex narratives.  
While the move to draw on first-person accounts of intersex persons’ personal 
experiences for a differentiated perspective on the medical treatment and cultural 
conceptions of intersex can be undoubtedly considered as an improvement, relying 
on experience as a legitimation of knowledge production has its limitations not only 
with regard to conveying an accurate representation of the overall intersex 
population’s positions and needs concerning medical treatment and cultural 
conceptions of intersex. Knowledge that is limited and biased in such a way may not 
be accepted as authoritative by medical practitioners and can easily be dismissed as 
not being representative. Holmes cautions:  
 
“what is left unresolved is the tension between a movement to reexamine standard practice and 
the medical establishment that discredits the movement as a small group of dissatisfied patients 
who do not represent the majority of patients – a majority whose very absence from the 
conversation is held up as the proof that they have ‘blended in’ successfully with the rest of the 
global population of typical men and typical women.” (Holmes 2008: 119) 
 
Arguably, as a reaction to these tensions, activists, in particular the former leading 
figures of ISNA and some of its members, began to revise their strategies and to foster 
viable and fruitful working relations with the medical establishment. Many of the 
most active and visible personalities of the intersex movement have come to realize 
that clinicians, pediatricians, and healthcare providers need to be considered as allies 
rather than opponents in the advancement of the intersex agenda to change medical 
treatment standards. As ISNA activists had been formerly discredited as radical 
“zealots” by some renowned physicians (Holmes 2008: 61), their move to find 
recognition as serious and authoritative stakeholders in the medical intersex discourse 
is comprehensible, yet this new alignment necessarily takes its toll.  
Hence, the last decade has witnessed a rejection of “being categorized as queer 
and even being aligned with queer movements and politics at all” (Spurgas 2009: 
100) by many members of the intersex community and activists – ironically the very 
same activists who had promoted a non-normative understanding of intersex before. 




This shift of paradigms was largely effected by, and manifested itself in the tentative 
replacement of ‘intersex’ by the term ‘disorders of sex development’ (DSD) in 2006. 
Several contemporaneous proposals to adopt DSD, and hence to reclassify intersex 
variations as ‘conditions’ related to the appearance of ‘atypical’ sex characteristics, 
were made by groups of intersex activists (mostly board members of ISNA/Accord 
Alliance),6 pediatricians, surgeons, and bioethicists.7 The term DSD was proposed by 
Dreger, Chase and their allies to “label the condition rather than the person” (Dreger 
at al., quoted in Spurgas 2009: 101), thus working against earlier intersex identity 
politics and notions of intersex as an identity category: 
 
“The discursive shift to DSD signifies not only the distancing of intersex from radical GLB, 
trans and other queer identity movements, it also heralds a new mode of association and identity 
around the medicalized body and a new way of understanding and way of living in the body 
itself. [...] under this model, people with DSDs are simply men and women who happen to have 
genital birth conditions; they are not intersex individuals or intersexuals.” (Spurgas 2009: 104) 
 
This identitarian shift, from a formerly medicalized intersex subject position, to a 
partly demedicalized and political collective identity category, to a dismissal of 
intersex as endowing individuals with a sense of identity, seems to signify the end of 
‘intersex,’ the arrival at a ‘post-intersex’ (Holmes 2009: 7) moment, where the 
discussion about intersex supposedly has become obsolete and displaced by a 
                                                             
6  ISNA closed in 2008 but its board members supported and continued their work with 
Accord Alliance, a national group of health care and advocacy professionals. Accord 
Alliance is strongly committed to improve DSD-related health care and to promote 
collaborations between persons with DSD and their families, activists and medical 
stakeholders (see accordalliance.org). It is no coincidence that ISNA’s board members 
decided to close the organization and to resume their work with a new organization, just at 
the time when they moved towards a DSD-based politics. On the insight that ISNA’s earlier 
positions were considered as too ‘radical’ or ‘biased’ by many medical professionals, 
parents, and mainstream healthcare system funders, board members were concerned that 
ISNA would consequently not be able to authentically sell their paradigm shift to a 
remedicalization of intersex (see ISNA’s farewell message, www.isna.org/farewell_ 
message). Thus, the strategic move to a medicalized DSD politics required dismissing an 
organization that not only had the ‘I,’ standing for intersex, in its name, but that was 
associated with a challenging of the medical establishment – which was now desired as an 
ally by ISNA’s former board members.  
7  Consortium on the Management of Disorders of Sex Development, Clinical Guidelines for 
the Management of Disorders of Sex Development (2006); Lee et al, in collaboration with 
the participants in the International Consensus Conference on Intersex, “Consensus 
Statement on Management of Intersex Disorders” (2006). 
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refocusing on affirming the sex and gender binaries. This affirmation is accomplished 
through conceiving of an individual ‘with intersex/DSD’ “as a patient and more 
specifically as a patient of normative binary gender identity who happens to have a 
treatable (yet never fully curable) disorder” (Spurgas 2009: 103), thus resorting to a 
conception of the intersex subject of traditional medical discourses. The circular 
character of this shift however does not imply a mere reproduction of the former 
medical hegemony over intersex subjects, but takes disciplinary power to a new level. 
As the last twenty years in intersex history have witnessed a realization of the 
potential of intersex bodies to challenge cultural notions of dimorphic sexual 
difference, and the radicalness with which self-determined identity and bodily claims 
have been asserted, the need to extinguish this new spirit has become even more 
urgent for at least some medical stakeholders and those who have an interest in the 
perpetuation of a clearly defined sex/gender system: “This biopolitical shift [...] is an 
attempt to control, discipline, render vulnerable and manageable the intersex body, 
an attempt to make the edgy body less troubling, to keep it before the law” (O’Rourke 
and Giffney 2009: xi).   
To clarify the point, all of the abovementioned movements’ respective identity 
claims about intersex are normative and generate intersex as a biomedical, or 
biosocial construction. Whether it is intersex “identity politics movements creat[ing] 
a new kind of nationalism, in that identity-based social movements serve to erect 
artificial boundaries and borders” (Preves 2003: 147), or a form of “sexual 
citizenship,” where intersex individuals have the responsibility to follow the regimes 
of normative gendered self-production, or else will be denied claims to full, 
heteronormative citizenship and the rights and benefits that come with it (Spurgas 
2009: 118), any intersex identity claim situates the intersex subject within a biosocial 
context of disciplinary power and contestation:  
 
“Biosocial bodies, which constitute populations, become the loci of social knowledge and 
identity truths. [...] The intersex/DSD body is a site of biosocial contestation over which ways 
of knowing not only the truth of sex, but the truth of the self, are fought. Both intelligibility and 
tangible resources are the prizes accorded to the winner(s) of the battle over the truth of sex.” 
(Spurgas 2009: 117) 
 
Hence, in the face of the current paradigm shift from intersex to DSD, from a refusal 
to be ‘normalized’ to an attempted ‘renormalizing’ of bodies which signify 
ambiguously, it seems as if the battle over this knowledge, what Lyotard termed the 
fight for control over an “informational commodity indispensable to productive 
power” (1984: 5), has resulted for the time being in a winner. One response to these 
reactionary tendencies might be to consider this as a worst-case scenario, a setback 
for intersex as a site of critically interrogating, or queering, cultural notions of sexed 
embodiment and gender. 




Yet the heralding of a ‘post-intersex’ turn certainly does not render the discussion 
about intersex outdated. Quite to the contrary, intersex now more than ever signifies 
as 
 
“a powerful term whose historical, social and political import remains criti cal as a tool for 
interrogating heteronormative and bio-normative presuppositions about proper embodiment. 
Intersex also remains a critical site for our interrogation of the limits of its ability to speak of 
and to the experiences of self of those so labelled, and a critical site for the examination of 
scholarship on intersexuality.” (Holmes 2009: 7) 
 
Proceeding in the spirit suggested by Holmes, in grasping intersex as “many sites of 
contested being” and as (a) critical site(s) for scrutinizing its own intelligibility and 
legitimacy, the following chapter on intersex first-person narratives (chapter three) 
will turn its focus on the representations of intersex in the narrating of personal 
experiences with the medicalization, the de- and, in some cases, the remedicalization 
of their bodies. Thus I not only investigate the available first-person narratives about 
intersex, my analysis also reconsiders the conditions under which these kinds of 
narratives have been produced, both within medical discourse that constructs intersex 
as a medical(ized) and diagnostic category, and by recent discourses of queer theory 
and activist politics that have constructed and are constructing intersex as a critical, 
non-/normative ‘identity.’ The ensuing chapters focus on literary and visual cultural 
reiterations and negotiations of the first-person, autobiographical accounts of intersex 
experience, and of the specific discourses that have produced intersex as a contested 
category. I interrogate the ways in which the fictionality of the popular cultural 
productions allows for a reimagination of intersex, and how they contribute to the 
resignification of intersex within mainstream culture. 
  
 
2.3 THE IN/VISIBILITY OF INTERSEX: VISUALIZATION 
PRACTICES, THE MEDICAL GAZE, AND THE 
BIOPOLITICAL REGULATION OF INTERSEX BODIES 
 
Questions of visual representation, processes of regulating intersex bodies through 
visualization practices, and processes of rendering intersex bodies and subjects 
‘invisible’ within society are deeply integrated in intersex history. Elizabeth Reis 
notes that even in 17th century America, way before medical practitioners achieved 
the status of authority they did from the 19th century onwards, the legal status of 
intersex persons was primarily based on their genital characteristics (Reis 2009: 8ff). 
Although the classification systems of sexes according to which certain individuals 
were classified as intersex have varied throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, genitals 
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were and still are given primary significance for defining sex. Intersex individuals 
have been subjected to the ‘medical gaze’ for centuries; hence, the way their bodies, 
in particular the characteristics involved in sexual reproduction, look is the basis on 
which medical authorities make claims about the person’s sexed embodiment. These 
claims, however, do not only involve the person’s corporeality but have implications 
for the person’s gender assignment and hence legal status. The person’s legal, or 
cultural status in turn leads to the coercive medical (surgical, hormonal) ‘alignment’ 
of their corporeality in supposed conformity with their normative male or female 
gender assignment. In short, visual presentation, the physical appearance of specific 
bodily characteristics, becomes the basis for cultural claims, i.e. how to classify the 
body according to a normative, binary gender system. This, in turn, serves as the basis 
on which to reconsider the visual presentation, i.e. ‘adjusting’ the intersex body to 
the assigned normative gender. This logic has intersex individuals caught in a 
machinery of ‘normalization’ processes which are triggered by how their bodies look. 
Given the significance of bodily appearance, visualization practices and the 
hegemonic medical gaze in defining and regulating intersex subjects, I turn to Michel 
Foucault’s theoretical negotiations of the power of the ‘gaze’ to control and discipline 
people in order to provide a theoretical framework for my interrogation of the 
negotiation of visualization practices in the specific intersex narratives.  
Most of Michel Foucault’s works center on scrutinizing the role of vision in our 
culture, indicating the ocularcentrism in history, the “almost exclusive privilege [of] 
sight” (Foucault 1973b: 133). In The Order of Things (1966, English translation 
1973) and later in Discipline and Punish (1975, English translation 1977), he argues 
that the mode of vision in a culture has always been hegemonic and serves the desire 
for power. Succeeding the sovereign gaze of the classical period, the gaze of the 
modern period is characterized by its disciplinary modes: “The fundamental codes of 
a culture – those governing its language, its schemas of perception, its exchanges, its 
techniques, its values, the hierarchy of its practices – establish for every man, from 
the very first, the empirical orders with which he will be dealing and within which he 
will be at home” (Foucault 1973b: xx). Against the hegemonic gaze, Foucault 
theorizes an ‘anarchic gaze’ which can take on multiple perspectives from any 
possible position, thereby effecting a decentering of the gaze. Implicit in this 
conception of a deconstructive or subversive gaze is the notion of knowledge as 
perspective. This gaze, due to its positions on the margins and on the borderlines, can 
serve not only to expose the invisible power mechanisms at work in our society, but 
to subvert the hegemonic vision (Levin 1999: 438f).  
Michel Foucault develops his concept of the gaze in The Birth of the Clinic (1963, 
English translation 1973), in which he examines the ‘medical gaze’ and the re-
organization of knowledge in the late 18th century. The Birth of the Clinic provides a 
critique of modern medicine which he methodologically reprocessed in The 




Archaeology of Knowledge (1969, English translation 1972) by using an 
archaeological approach. In Gutting’s phrasing: 
 
“The premise of the archaeological method is that systems of thought and knowledge 
(epistemes or discursive formations, in Foucault’s terminology) are governed by rules, beyond 
those of grammar and logic, that operate beneath the consciousness of individual subjects and 
define a system of conceptual possibilities that determines the boundaries of thought in a given 
domain and period.” (Gutting 2003) 
 
But the archaeological method was not sufficient to provide a substantial socio-
ethical critique of the institution of modern clinical medicine. In Discipline and 
Punish Foucault deploys the method of genealogy for an intense social critique. The 
primary objective of his genealogical analysis is to demonstrate that a system of 
thought is the result of historical practices, and to elaborate the role of institutions in 
producing modern systems of disciplinary power. Foucault claims that the new mode 
of punishment exercised by the authorities is used as a model of control and the 
‘normalizing’ of a society. The ‘inspecting gaze’ of the authorities, therefore, is 
related to power. He contends that power and knowledge are interrelated insofar as 
knowledge both produces power and is produced by power; hence, power must be 
conceived in terms of a “productive network” which pervades the entire social body 
(Foucault 1979: 36). He amplifies this idea in The History of Sexuality (1976, English 
translation 1988-90), where he reconceptualizes sexuality as a discursive production 
and thus as a cultural category which is the effect of power and power relations.   
The concept of the gaze as elaborated by Foucault in Discipline and Punish 
exposes the processes of power relations and disciplinary mechanisms in a society or 
system of thought. Foucault identifies three central techniques of control that inform 
modern ‘disciplinary’ society: hierarchical observation, normalizing judgment, and 
the examination (Foucault 1977: 170). “To a great extent, control over people 
(power) can be achieved merely by observing them. [...] A perfect system of 
observation would allow one ‘guard’ to see everything [...]. But since this is not 
usually possible, there is a need for ‘relays’ of observers, hierarchically ordered, 
through whom observed data passes from lower to higher levels” (Gutting 2003). 
Normalization processes are enforced by the system when an individual fails to 
comply with the system’s imperative rules, or norms. This ‘disciplinary control’ is a 
tool of power that is applied to correct ‘deviant’ behavior. These normalization 
standards infiltrate the whole system by regulating all of its institutions, including the 
medical establishment. The gaze, according to Foucault’s theories, is a tool to exert 
power over individuals in a society, in particular those who are transgressive of the 
normative system of rules, by observing, i.e. controlling them and attempting to erase 
any deviance from the norms. So, “to gaze implies more than to look at – it signifies 
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a psychological relationship of power, in which the gazer is superior to the object of 
the gaze” (Schroeder 1998: 208). 
The theorizing of visualization practices, or the gaze, in the intersex narratives 
deals with the interrelations between textual practices, psychological processes, and 
social/historical contexts. The main focus of my analysis will be on perception, 
particularly on the gaze, i.e. modes of looking, subjects that look and objects that are 
looked at, and the power mechanisms involved in visualization practices that operate 
in these works. I will discuss how the cultural and historical traditions of the gaze, 
the question of who is entitled to the gaze, and who is destined to be looked, or stared 
at, and the cultural and political implications of possessing and controlling the gaze 
are renegotiated in the specific narratives under consideration. Visualization practices 
will be considered as sites of conflict, drawing on feminist and queer film theory’s 
assumption of ‘the gaze’ as controlling and objectifying characters belonging to 
minority groups. The concept of the ‘male gaze’ has been a central idea of feminist 
film and media criticism, mainly coined by Laura Mulvey’s essay “Visual Pleasure 
and Narrative Cinema” (originally published in 1975), one of the most influential 
articles in contemporary film theory. In the tradition of early psychoanalytic film 
theory, Mulvey identifies “the way film reflects, reveals and even plays on the 
straight, socially established interpretation of sexual difference which controls 
images, erotic ways of looking and spectacle” (Mulvey 2004: 56), arguing that the 
structuring of the filmic gaze is male and organized by the ideological patriarchal 
operations of society. Thus, the term ‘the gaze’ refers to the power divide between 
the dominant, active male viewer-subject and the passive female to-be-looked-at 
object. The principles of the dominant ideology that controls narrative structure 
represents the man as the bearer of the look of the spectator, and the woman as the 
spectacle.  
Since the ‘inspecting gaze,’ according to Foucault, is related to power, my project 
aims at working out how it can be utilized for processes of ‘self-invention’ and the 
resignification of intersex. One crucial question in discussing the (in)visibility of 
intersex (i.e. both intersex bodies and individuals) in the narratives is how the 
visualization practices of the medical hegemony, which inform and are informed by 
cultural/medical discourses on sexed embodiment and gender, are negotiated, 
reiterated, deconstructed, challenged, or subverted in/by contemporary counter-
narratives, and how they are produced by, and involved in effecting the paradigm 
shifts of intersex narratives.  
Intersex bodies are constituted in paradoxical interrelations between invisibility 
and high visibility. The processes of the regulation of (in)visibility are inextricably 
linked with definitory power. Definitions of what constitutes a non-normative 
embodiment are installed by institutionalized authority rather than by citizens or a 
group of individuals. From the 19th century on, the chief authorities in defining 
intersex bodies as such were natural or medical scientists, as they had almost 




exclusive insight into ‘non-normative’ genitalia and gonads on which the intersex 
status was primarily based. The public could make assumptions about the sex/gender 
of an individual on the basis of visible secondary sex/gender characteristics such as 
facial and body hair, height, figure etc.; the defining power, however, was held by 
those who possessed the clinical gaze.   
Intersex bodies are strikingly visible because they challenge cultural notions of 
normative femininity and masculinity, and as such disrupt a fundamental structuring 
principle of western cultures and societies, i.e. the gender binary. Ironically, it is this 
heightened visibility of intersex bodies that entails their invisibilization. Intersex 
bodies have been ‘erased’ by medical technology in order to establish and maintain 
the borders of the ‘normal’ and predictable. This erasure of bodies and identities that 
do not fall into a gender binary has a social function, namely maintaining gender 
divisions which legitimate the ideological basis of western societies. The practices of 
constituting sexed corporeality as non-normative results in the invisibility of intersex 
subjects within society, effected not only by an attempted ‘normalizing’ of intersex 
bodies, but also by the consequent secrecy imposed on intersex individuals and their 
families.8 These mechanisms constitute what Foucault refers to as ‘disciplinary 
control’ that are enforced to punish and/or ‘correct’ intersex subjects’ perceived 
‘deviance’ from a bodily and gender norm. The medical establishment is hereby both 
regulated by the system’s normative workings and reinforces and perpetuates the 
normalization processes. 
Alice Dreger asserts in Hermaphrodites and the Medical Invention of Sex that 
“[t]he history of hermaphroditism is largely the history of struggles over the 
‘realities’ of sex – the nature of ‘true’ sex, the proper role of the sexes, the question 
of what sex can, should, or must mean” (Dreger 1998: 15). Sexed bodies are in the 
center of the narrative and visual representations of intersex subjects. Perspective is 
a crucial mechanism in the construction of intersex bodies: a focus on genitalia 
detached from the rest of the body, refusing a view on the body in its entirety, makes 
intersex bodies appear fragmented. The question of who has the defining power 
within the dominant discourse is decisive for whose perspective is privileged over 
other perspectives regarding sexed subjects. The institutionalized hegemonic medical 
gaze constructs an intersex body that is defined by its ‘deviant’ body parts, which 
means that its pathologized genitalia become representative of the whole body. 
Medical discourses reinforce these depersonalizing and dehumanizing processes by 
                                                             
8  The invisibility/invisibilization of intersex (bodies) is not to be confused with the 
invisibility of sexed embodiment that results from its classification as normative and hence 
is unmarked. I refer to unmarked sexed embodiment here as an embodiment that is not 
perceived as ‘disruptive’ of normative notions of female or male biology and physical 
presentation. Non-intersex bodies are, of course, also marked by gender and other factors 
including ‘race,’ class, age, ability, and illness. 
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disregarding the individual person, defining them as ‘patient’ or ‘subject of study,’ 
and overemphasizing the performative aspects of the sex characteristics, genitals in 
particular. The medical ‘management’ of intersex bodies is determined mainly by 
two interrelated factors: how the sex organs perform, and how they look.  
However, the recent paradigm shift of intersex discourses involves a 
renegotiation of hegemonic visualization practices and the power relations that 
organize these processes, opening the visualization processes up to the chance of 
resistance against their dominant images of intersex. My analysis of the visual 
representations of intersex subjects in the narratives under consideration concentrates 
on modes of visibility and the gazing relations between subjects and objects of the 
gaze. It becomes clear that a dichotomy of intersex individuals as objects to be looked 
at and medical authorities as exclusive bearers of the gaze is not tenable. Hegemonic 
and ideologically organized gazing relations and visualization practices always 
already entail the possibility of their refusal, challenge, disruption, and even 
subversion. The hegemonic medical perspective is confronted with the counter-
perspectives of intersex individuals. This ‘intersex gaze,’ due to its position at the 
limits of intelligibility, can “offer[...] a perspective on the variable ways in which 
norms circumscribe the human” (Butler 2001: 635), by positioning itself in critical 
relation to these norms. This change of perspective allows for ‘alternative,’ self-
affirmative intersex conceptions, contributing to a multilayered image of intersex. 
Whether the specific intersex narratives can possibly present viable alternative 
intersex subjectivities depends of their ability to resist or challenge the dominant 
discourse’s construction of intersex. A deconstruction of the hegemonic medical 
intersex narratives has to be realized within the frame of this discourse which implies 
referring to and using its terminology, calling for a critical attitude towards its 
historical and conventional usage. I will interrogate how selected first-person 
accounts of intersex individuals renegotiate the hegemonic visualization practices, 
how fictional literary narratives take up these renegotiations and use them for their 
own narrative strategies, and how fictional visual cultural productions renegotiate 




2.4 THE DILEMMA OF INTELLIGIBILITY AND STRATEGIES OF 
SURVIVAL: INTERSEX BETWEEN ‘NORMALIZATION’ AND 
RESISTANCE 
 
My analysis of the narratives by and about intersex individuals and of the literary and 
visual cultural negotiations of intersex is crucially based on theoretical considerations 
of the conditions of intelligibility, in particular Judith Butler’s discussions of 




intelligibility for subjects with non-normative gender and/or sexed embodiment. For 
a thorough comprehension of the constitution of the category of intersex, of the 
recognizability and knowability of intersex subjects, I consider it necessary to 
develop an understanding of how the conditions of intelligibility work for intersex 
persons, and how these conditions are produced, but also contested, by, through and 
within specific narratives and discourses. Therefore I will now provide an outline of 
Butler’s considerations of intelligibility, its problematic implications, and its 
potential for resisting norms of gender and sexed embodiment on the basis of her 
essay “Doing Justice to Someone: Sex Reassignment and Allegories of 
Transsexuality” (2001) and her collection of essays Undoing Gender (2004), in 
particular the “Introduction: Acting in Concert.” Thereby I will explicate how I utilize 
her theory for the purposes of my analysis, and point to the theory’s limitations of 
accounting for the constitution of intersex intelligibility in the autobiographical, 
literary and visual cultural texts under consideration.  
In her reflections on the possibilities and limitations of “what we can be [...] given 
the contemporary order of being” (Butler 2001: 621), Butler outlines the conditions 
of our being as follows: “When we ask what the conditions of intelligibility are by 
which the human emerges, by which the human is recognized, by which some subject 
becomes the subject of human love, we are asking about conditions of intelligibility 
composed of norms, of practices, that have become presuppositional, without which 
we cannot think the human at all” (2001: 621). These conditions are indispensably 
related to the “genesis and knowability of the human”: “it is not just that there are 
laws that govern our intelligibility, but ways of knowing, modes of truth, that forcibly 
define intelligibility” (2001: 621). For individuals who are not easily recognizable by 
reference to prevailing cultural norms, the conditions of intelligibility pose a dilemma 
that can become a matter of life and death; at stake is their cultural, linguistic and, in 
fact, their physical survival. This dilemma ensues when a person feels unrecognized 
or misrecognized by the categories available to them, on which their intelligibility – 
and hence their survival – depends, but feels their survival depends as well on the 
rejection of these categories, as they constitute unacceptable constraints for the 
person: “I may feel that without some recognizability I cannot live. But I may also 
feel that the terms by which I am recognized make life unlivable” (Butler 2004: 4). 
Butler conceives of several possible solutions to this quandary, that is, how one can 
avert the threat of becoming unintelligible without having to compromise one’s sense 
of lived reality. I will discuss these options further below. 
The usefulness of Butler’s reflections on the conditions of intelligibility for my 
analysis of intersex narratives lies specifically in their capacity to theoretically 
account for the quandary of intelligibility that many intersex individuals experience. 
Intersex bodies are bodies that do not conform to the cultural and medical norms of 
male and female bodies, are positioned outside, at the margins of, or in conflict with 
these norms, and are hence not recognizable as pertaining to a clearly demarcated 
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gender. Intersex individuals are rendered unintelligible, or are threatened with 
becoming unintelligible, as they do not seem to have a place in the contemporarily 
valid order of human beings classified by gender/sexed corporeality (and they further 
disrupt an assumed biologist-essentialist continuity between gender and sex). Since 
intersex variations are often apparent at birth, intersex individuals are at risk of losing 
their intelligibility as a human in the moment they come into being – as newborns, or 
now even as embryos or pre-embryos, since prenatal and preimplantation genetic 
diagnosis are able to detect some intersex variations in utero or prior to 
fertilization/implantation. Intersex newborns are in a state of ‘emergency’ that is not 
a medical but a strictly social one, yet their intelligibility as gendered beings can be 
‘restored,’ or rather produced – this is the basic argument of medical practice for 
interventions of ‘normalization.’ The processes of ‘normalizing’ intersex infants 
translate as the attempt to medically (surgically, hormonally, etc.) impose gender 
norms on the intersex subject in an attempt to create a coherently gendered subject, 
female or male, where the ‘normalization’ is considered as ‘successful’ when the 
subject conforms to their gender assignment.  
In the face of the many accounts revealing the tremendous harm inflicted upon 
intersex persons’ bodies and psyches, it becomes obvious that such a ‘normalization’ 
can only ever be an ‘attempt,’ and never be realized as it is intended: “Indeed, is the 
surgery performed to create a ‘normal’-looking body, after all? The mutilations and 
scars that remain hardly offer compelling evidence that this is accomplished. Or are 
these bodies subjected to medical machinery that marks them for life precisely 
because they are ‘inconceivable’?” (Butler 2001: 626). Intersex individuals seem to 
be confronted with having only two options left: keeping their bodies as they are and 
defining their gender according to their sense of self (although intersex individuals 
under the age of consent do hardly have a choice in that matter), and consequently 
being potentially misrecognized and/or socially ostracized, or compromising one’s 
bodily integrity, possibly non-consensually, in an effort to become recognizable as a 
male or female subject. Both options can result in an ‘unlivable life.’ 
Each of the narratives about and written by intersex individuals and the literary 
and visual cultural narratives about intersex negotiate the quandary of intelligibility 
and its implications for their intersex authors, protagonists, and characters, and the 
consequences of the enforcements of gender intelligibility though practices of 
‘normalization.’ My analysis starts from the following premises: first, intersex 
intelligibility has to be renegotiated in every text, and while these renegotiations take 
place in relation to existing paradigms of intelligibility for intersex subjects, it has to 
become clear how intelligibility is understood in a specific narrative, how it pertains 
to the intersex author’s/character’s self-perception and self-identification, and how 
conflicting perspectives on the desirability of being/becoming intelligible are 
reconciled within the narrative. Second, I interrogate on a structural level how the 
narratives themselves, self-reflexively, produce the conditions for intersex 




intelligibility, by employing specific narrative strategies, motifs, plots, and 
intertextual references. 
The narratives under consideration moreover offer potential solutions to the 
dilemma of intelligibility, some of which are in line with Butler’s suggestions. Others 
take a different approach, but all of them recognize and interrogate the limitations of 
the norms which threaten to undo the intersex subject. Butler argues that there are 
situations in which it can be preferable for an individual to reject being/becoming 
fully intelligible in compliance with social norms: “if my options are loathsome, if I 
have no desire to be recognized within a certain set of norms, then it follows that my 
sense of survival depends on escaping the clutch of those norms by which recognition 
is conferred. It may well be that my sense of social belonging is impaired by the 
distance I take, but sure that estrangement is preferable to gaining a sense of 
intelligibility by virtue of norms that will only do me in from another direction” 
(Butler 2004: 3). Resistance to this kind of intelligibility requires “develop[ing] a 
critical relation to these norms,” which depends both on the ability to maintain a 
distance from them, “even as there is a desire for norms that might let one live,” and 
on “a capacity, invariably collective, to articulate an alternative, minority version of 
sustaining norms or ideals that enable me to act” (2004: 3). When an individual 
chooses to keep a certain distance from and to position themselves in a critical 
relation to the norms by which they are constituted, they achieve a certain 
“desubjugation,” as Butler argues, as their intervention “puts into play the operation 
of critique itself, critique that, defined by Foucault, is precisely the desubjugation of 
the subject within the politics of truth. [...] [they] emerge[...] at the limits of 
intelligibility, offering a perspective on the variable ways in which norms 
circumscribe the human” (Butler 2001: 635). 
My analysis of the intersex narratives’ production of the conditions of 
intelligibility for their intersex subjects, as well as their imagined possibilities of a 
refusal to accept its terms, intends to demonstrate that an intersex individual’s 
acceptance of or resistance to the terms of intelligibility cannot be easily framed as a 
mutually exclusive either/or option, and that resistance to normative ideas of gender 
and/or sexed embodiment does not necessarily have to entail or lead to a rejection of 
being/becoming intelligible. The various ways in which the intersex protagonists deal 
with the contradictions between their self-perception and how they are perceived by 
others (doctors, family members, friends, and social surroundings), between what 
they want to be or become and the norms that regulate and restrict or prohibit their 
options, and with the consequences of the violent enforcement of bodily and gender 
norms upon them, are too complex to be reduced to a theoretical solution. Moreover, 
intersex individuals who had to undergo forced, nonconsensual medical treatment 
and surgery, whose bodies are “bodies in pain, bearing the marks of violence and 
suffering,” and in whom “the ideality of gendered morphology is quite literally 
incised in the flesh” (Butler 2004: 53) have profoundly different lived embodied 
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realities than intersex individuals who were not subjected to invasive medical 
treatment.  
Intersex persons might act in ways that seem to be inconsistent with or contradict 
the theoretical propositions of resistance, yet they find a way to survive anyway, they 
find a mode of living that neither involves a subjugation to norms nor a compromising 
of their felt reality, against all odds. Their survival has to be understood on several 
levels: as a survival in a literal, physical sense that involves issues of surgical 
alteration of the genitals (i.e. genital mutilation), hormonal interference with the 
body’s biochemical processes and physical appearance, and the abortion of (pre-) 
embryos with intersex traits, in short, human rights issues; as a survival in economic 
terms, that includes the ability to get employment or not lose employment, access to 
housing, health care, etc. in a context where discrimination based on gender is still 
widespread and not even entirely illegal in many states in North America; and as a 
survival on a cultural and linguistic level. These forms of survival are necessarily 
interrelated. The protagonists in the narratives under discussion have to deal with all 
of these aspects of survival in at times similar, at times different ways. 
As discussed earlier, Morgan Holmes has pointed out that the imperative for 
intersex individuals to “willingly and gladly inhabit a space of resistant 
unintelligibility” (Holmes 2008: 16), i.e. to defy normative notions of sexed 
embodiment and gender, or as Butler puts it, to live as a “human [...] which we do 
not yet know how to name or that which sets a limit on all naming” (Butler 2001: 
635), primarily comes from a position where non-intersex persons develop strategies 
of resistance that can work in theory, but often fail to take into account the realities 
of intersex persons’ lives. Living under the constant threat of cultural and/or physical 
erasure, of unviability, is exhausting and sometimes not possible; yet too often 
intersex persons’ choices to live as a clearly defined male or female gender, and/or 
to ‘pass’ as non-intersex, are delegitimized as ‘assimilationist,’ and as a ‘voluntary’ 
subjugation to gender and sexed bodily norms. I want to reiterate Holmes’ argument 
that “the point is not to live perpetually where it is troubling to deal with the body, 
but to get to a place where there can be some breathing room for difference” (Holmes 
2008: 15f), and take it as the proposition on which I base my analysis of the selected 
intersex narratives. I will look exactly at these spaces that allow for “breathing room 
for difference” that the specific narratives under consideration provide, or fail to 
provide, and at the texts’ contributions to the development of a new paradigm of 
intersex intelligibility where theory has its limits. 
 
 
3. The Intersex Movement of the 1990s 




3.1 THE PARADIGM SHIFT FROM MEDICAL NARRATIVES TO 
NARRATING PERSONAL EXPERIENCE 
 
Intersex voices had been silent (or rather, silenced) for the most part in the history of 
intersex. The end of the 20th century however marked a change in intersex 
representations: autobiographical accounts of intersex lives, conveyed from the 
perspective of intersex individuals, have appeared in considerable numbers and 
produced a new discursive space that has challenged the monolithic medical 
discourse on intersex. Several factors have contributed to the emergence of first-
person accounts of intersex experiences. First, the civil rights movement, feminism 
and sexual minorities movements have paved the way for all kinds of minorities 
whose voices had been considered as nonauthoritative and consequently been 
suppressed within mainstream cultural discourses. The gradual emancipation from 
dominant cultural notions about sex, gender, sexuality, ‘race,’ class, etc. has opened 
up possibilities for marginalized identity groups and individuals to represent their life 
stories, or their selves from their own perspectives and to gain access to and inclusion 
into a cultural collective.   
Second, the emergence of illness narratives in postmodernism, written or told by 
people who suffer from some disease or are in one way or another recipients of 
medical treatment, has been considered as a form of resistance to medical authorities’ 
appropriation of patients’ bodies and autonomy. As Alice Dreger observes, “the 
modernist conception of the active physician-hero – a strictly rationalistic, brave, 
selfless savior who treats a silent, passive, unambiguously grateful patient – has given 
way to postmodernist challenges of the doctor-patient balance of power and to 
challenges to the ‘doctor as savior’ motif” (Dreger 1998: 172). Through the narrating 
of their own experiences with illnesses or other conditions affecting their bodily 
integrity, the ‘patient’ (an identity category itself produced by medical discourses) no 
longer remains in the role of the powerless ‘victim’ of medicine but can develop a 
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sense of mastery over their body and gain in confidence and self-determination. 
While many intersex individuals today do not consider their bodily variations as a 
medical condition, a large number of intersex persons have undergone 
(nonconsensual or forced) medical treatment related to their intersex variation at 
some point in their lives and as such were subjected to medical authority over their 
bodies. In fact, most intersex first-person accounts that were produced in the 1990s 
heavily criticize the medical establishment’s practices performed on them, and on 
intersex individuals in general.  
Third, the postmodern critical attitude towards master narratives and the 
postmodernist theoretical conception of identity, gender, and corporeality as 
constructions contingent on cultural, historical, social and linguistic contexts have 
enabled intersex persons to reclaim both the definitions of their identities and bodily 
self-determination. The first-person intersex narratives constitute legitimate 
alternative or counter-narratives to hegemonic medical narratives and to other 
dominant narratives about sexed embodiment and gender, and thus challenge the 
notion of one ‘truth’ regarding intersex. The quest for ‘truth’ and authenticity 
regarding one’s own corporeality and sense of gender is a structuring principle of 
many intersex narratives. While notions of truth and authenticity are problematized 
in the individual narratives, these narratives nevertheless refer back to the idea of a 
‘true self’ which has been appropriated or corrupted by medical and other authorities.  
A number of other factors can be identified that have benefitted the rise of 
individual intersex voices and the emergence of an intersex cultural collective. The 
internet plays a crucial role in distributing multi-perspective information about 
intersex, in connecting with other intersex individuals and in organizing, and in 
accessing historical archives of knowledge on intersex that have been digitalized and 
made available online (although the process of selecting what information is worth 
being digitally stored is itself problematic). Moreover, the academic and activist work 
of and about genderqueer, transgender and other gender-nonconforming individuals 
and groups has provided a ‘queer space’ in which identities and bodies that do not, 
or do not want to, conform to cultural sex and gender standards get a platform to live 
out their own sense of (gender) realities (within and against the normative gender and 
sex constructions and the vocabularies that are available). While there are themes and 
needs that are specific to intersex persons and cannot be appropriated or ignored by 
an umbrella category of gender nonconformity, many intersex people have found 
support and a small space for themselves within various queer or trans communities. 
The initial increase in personal intersex accounts, however, can be largely attributed 
to the foundation of the Intersex Society of North America (ISNA). 
ISNA was the first intersex organization that operated on a larger scale in North 
America. Cheryl Chase founded ISNA in 1993 with the declared goal of “systemic 
change to end shame, secrecy, and unwanted genital surgeries for people born with 
an anatomy that someone decided is not standard for male or female” (isna.org). 




ISNA provided the superordinate narrative context in which many of the early first-
person accounts of intersex individuals were embedded. Many of these narratives 
were published in ISNA’s newsletter Hermaphrodites with Attitude between 1994 
and 2005 (in 2001 the title was changed to ISNA News) and in the special issue of 
Chrysalis, ‘Intersex Awakening’ (2.5, 1997/1998), whose guest editors were Chase 
and Martha Coventry and which “reflects the groundbreaking work of ISNA” (Denny 
1997/98: 3).   
Most of the stories claim to represent authentic experiences of the narrators; some 
pieces of fiction and poetry were also featured. While the majority of the narrators 
are intersex persons, there are a few stories narrated by partners of intersex persons, 
effecting a shift in perspective. Beside the first-person narratives, HWA contained 
articles primarily about ISNA’s work and medical themes, and occasional texts about 
intersex-related support groups, media coverage on intersex, and book reviews. The 
bulk of the personal narratives in the newsletter was published in the first four issues 
between 1994 and 1996. As a consequence, the scope within which these narratives 
were published was rather narrow, and the audience addressed highly selective: the 
newsletter was distributed among allies of Chase and other people who were more or 
less familiar with the issue of intersex, and the readership consisted mainly, while not 
exclusively, of intersex people (Chrysalis addresses readers with all sorts of 
“transgressive gender identities”). Since ISNA served as an important point of 
reference for a (very specific and young) cultural intersex collective in 1990s North 
America, many of the early first-person narratives reflect their agenda.  
The publication of works on intersex as experienced by intersex persons 
themselves, as opposed to medical accounts of intersex, can be considered as a first 
and crucial step towards ending the silence of intersex voices and the invisibility, or 
erasure, of intersex bodies within society, and as a form of resistance to the medical 
establishment’s authority over their bodies and lives. The personal narrating of selves 
and experiences provides the intersex individual with a sense of mastery over their 
life which was often taken away from them by authorities (medical doctors and/or 
parents), and enables them to come to terms with their often traumatic bodily 
experiences. The editors of HWA describe the personal motivation for coming out as 
intersex via the writing in a public forum as the anger about the social and medical 
violation of their bodies and their self-determination: “Most of us [...] feel rage over 
how we have been treated. At times it is hard to know where to focus this anger. Our 
common enemy is the society that denies the individual the right to decide for 
themselves who they are and how they want to live their life” (Nevada and Chase 
1995: 11). Moreover, the individual, personal motivation is transformed into a 
political force in this process, and the forming of community structures and 
communication networks based on a shared experience is crucial for the development 
of an intersex collective: “Finding others serves to contextualize intersexuals’ 
medical experiences as social, rather than individual problems. Learning that others 
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had undergone similarly alienating medical procedures led to an ability to recast the 
personal as political, rather than as an individual failing” (Preves 2003: 123). 
Reclaiming the power of language can serve as a tool to rearticulate one’s own sense 
of self; however, almost all narratives reiterate in some way the medical discourse 
and its hierarchical power relations. I argue that these narratives can nonetheless 
possibly contribute to a deconstruction of hegemonic intersex narratives as they 
contain inherent moments of resistance and expose internal contradictions and 
inconsistencies within the medical narratives. 
The sample of intersex narratives under consideration in this chapter comprises a 
total of sixteen pieces of writing, ten published in Hermaphrodites with Attitude, five 
in Intersex Awakening and one in Genderqueer (eds. Nestle et al 2002), an anthology 
of essays about gender nonconforming lives. Out of these, twelve are narrated by 
intersex individuals and three by partners of intersex persons. One is a fictional short 
story. Several interrelated major themes can be identified which the narratives under 
consideration negotiate: medicalization and pathologization; ‘normalization’ 
processes involving genital surgery (mutilation) and hormone treatment, resulting in 
sexual dysfunction; mental health issues; invisibility, silencing, erasure and negation; 
the gender/sex dichotomy and biologist-essentialist accounts of sex and gender; and 
organizing and/or sharing individual experiences. There is hardly a story in HWA or 
in IA that does not address one (or in most cases, several) of these themes. I argue 
that the reiteration of the specific discourses, motifs, strategies, and narrative plots 
by and within these narratives both produces very particular representations of 
intersex subjects and at the same time opens the intersex subject up to the possibility 
of its contestation and resignification (to borrow Butler’s phrasing, Butler 1993: 10). 
My selection of the texts is based on the following thematic aspects of lived intersex 
realities, according to which the particular narratives are categorized in my analysis 
(of course, these aspects are interrelated, and the selected narratives often discuss 
several aspects, thus the categorization was based on the particular narrative’s main 
focus): the ‘normalizing’ of intersex bodies, the medico-cultural erasure of intersex, 
and the refusal to accept the terms of recognition provided by medical discourses; the 
cultural/medical construction of genitals through visualization practices, normative 
notions of sexuality, and the counter-gaze claimed by intersex narrators for processes 
of self-invention; the problematic aspects of sexual experiences of intersex 
individuals who had undergone nonconsensual genital surgery, and the redefining of 
sexual pleasure; narratives from partners’ perspectives; and the role of an intersex 
community for a collective cultural rearticulation of intersex.  
Despite their different foci, the narratives generally follow a similar plot. A 
‘typical’ story is structured as follows: it begins with the narrator’s early feelings of 
not fitting into the sex/gender dichotomy, memories of some surgical intervention or 
other medical treatment during their childhood and/or adolescence, the subsequent 
silencing of the existence of an ‘atypical’ body, later the gradual realization of being 




intersex and, quite often, the development of mental health issues in reaction to it, the 
mourning of sexual dysfunction, and finally the awareness of the existence of ‘other’ 
intersex individuals and a possible emancipation from dominant (medical) 
discourses, often combined with deep gratefulness toward ISNA for publicly 
articulating intersex issues. While many of the narratives adhere to this storyline, 
there are other stories that involve single themes, the primary issues being the 
medicalization and ‘normalization’ of intersex bodies. In HWA and IA there exists 
virtually no single narrative that does not deal with medical issues. 
At first glimpse, most narratives seem to tell a similar story about a medicalized, 
postoperative, genitally mutilated intersex body. The relationship between intersex 
patients and medical doctors is central to the medicalization of intersex: this specific 
relationship is simultaneously produced by the medical discourse on intersex and 
functions as the major structuring principle and affirmation of that discourse. The 
discursive power mechanisms at work within this narrative construct intersex persons 
and physicians as ‘patient’ and ‘doctor,’ respectively. Previous to the emergence of 
personal intersex narratives which produced intersex counter-discourses, medical 
practitioners have been considered as the chief authorities in regulating sex 
‘transgressive’ bodies. Their authority over ‘deviant’ bodies is exercised mainly by 
surveillance: hierarchical observation, normalizing judgment and the examination are 
the means by which the intersex body is subjected to disciplinary control (Foucault). 
The hegemonic gaze possessed by medical authorities has been inextricably involved 
in the processes of the ‘normalizing’ of sex or gender ‘deviance.’ There is a risk of 
conceiving of the intersex narrators of individual stories as already ‘constructed’ by 
this hegemonic medical narrative even before they are constructed through their 
individual narratives. The narrators’ perpetuated references to the medical narratives’ 
conception of ‘the’ intersex body as a pathological body renders a counter-discourse 
to the dominant medical discourse on intersex problematic. Since the medical 
narratives on intersex seem to motivate the majority of individual intersex narratives, 
how is it possible to talk about intersex without resorting to medical terminology?  
In the ensuing chapter, “Fragmented Bodies, Fragmented Realities: First-Person 
Narratives of Intersex Lives, 1994-2002,” I interrogate the paradigm shift in the 
narratives about and their representations of ‘intersex’ (i.e. intersex individuals, 
intersex collectives, and intersex as a cultural category) that took place at the 
beginning of the 1990s, which was effected by the personal narratives of intersex 
individuals or activists that have emerged in response to the need for alternative 
narratives on intersex. Thereby I interrogate the processes of reaffirmation and 
challenging of hegemonic conceptions of intersex and the resignification of intersex 
through the autobiographical narratives and their intertextual references and 
interaction not only with medical discourses, but with other cultural discourses, 
including human rights and ethical debates, discussions about gender, sexed 
embodiment, and sexuality, and activism. I argue that these autobiographical texts 
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renegotiate intersex subjects as sites of contestation over normative sexed and 
gendered modes of being, and over the constitution of humanness and cultural 
identity. I analyze the strategies of resistance to the hegemonic discourses on intersex 
and moments of (productive) indeterminacy within the first-person narratives under 
consideration, and their production of a narrative/cultural space from where to 
collectively “articulate an alternative, minority version of sustaining norms or ideals” 
(Butler 2004: 3) that provides the conditions for intersex subjects, with their diverse 
forms of intersex embodiment, to be/come recognizable, and hence intelligible.  
 
 
3.2 FRAGMENTED BODIES, FRAGMENTED REALITIES: 
FIRST-PERSON NARRATIVES OF INTERSEX LIVES, 
1994-2002 
 
3.2.1 ‘Normalizing’ Intersex Bodies: The Medico-Cultural Erasure 
of Intersex and the Renegotiation of ‘Loathsome Options’    
of Recognition  
 
The first-person narrative of ISNA founder Cheryl Chase’s “Affronting Reason” 
(originally published in 1998, reprinted 2002) can be considered as an ‘archetype’ 
first-person account of intersex experience, in particular with regard to the narrative’s 
negotiation of the historical invisibility of and the conditions of intelligibility for 
intersex. Chase’s narrative is constructed through the interrelations between her 
embodied experience and the cultural production of sexed bodies, genders, and 
sexualities in accordance with prevailing social norms. Within an extremely narrow 
space, “Affronting Reason” renegotiates basically all negative signifiers that renders 
intersex unintelligible, in an effort to dismantle or challenge the hegemonic medical 
narrative’s intersex construction. This intersex narrative seems to be defined by 
negativity, lack and absence, it connotes an ‘impossible’ narrative: “It’s not possible, 
I thought. This cannot be anyone’s story, much less mine. I don’t want it. Yet it is 
mine,” Chase comments on her intersex narrative (Chase 2002: 205). Her own 
narrative intersex construction is predicated on a paradox of presence/absence, its 
very coming into existence already entails a deconstructive moment. By telling and 
writing down her story, she makes this ‘impossible’ story ‘real.’ “Affronting Reason” 
begins with the establishment of Chase’s corporeality as intersex by medical 
authorities:  
 
“‘It seems that your parents weren’t sure for a time whether you were a girl or a boy,’ Dr. 
Christen explained as she handed me three fuzzy photostats. I was 21 years old and had asked 
her to help me obtain records of a hospitalization that occurred when I was 1 ½. I was desperate 




to obtain the complete records, to determine who had surgically removed my clitoris, and why. 
‘Diagnosis: true hermaphrodite. Operation: clitorectomy.’” (Chase 2002: 204) 
 
“Affronting Reason”’s intersex narrative constitutes a narrative of negation that 
operates on several levels. To begin with, Chase denotes the story of her childhood 
as “a lie” (2002: 205): the identity of “Charlie,” the baby born as a “true 
hermaphrodite,” was erased and replaced by the identity of “Cheryl,” a surgically 
constructed “girl.” The medicalization and mutilation of intersex bodies are 
interrelated with the invisibility and silencing of intersex individuals within the story. 
All evidence of intersex existence is virtually annihilated. In the medical texts, 
intersex objects are deprived of their individuality, subjectivity and humanity by 
blacking out their eyes and only exhibiting their genitalia. The prevalent images of 
intersex subjects are constituted by fragmented bodies and mutilated body parts: “The 
only images I found were pathologized case histories in medical texts and journals, 
close-ups of genitals being poked, prodded, measured, sliced, and sutured – full body 
shots with the eyes blacked out” (Chase 2002: 206). Here, intersex denotes not a 
viable, whole and real mode of being, but is defined by its sexed body parts, and 
moreover, its pathologized genitals, so that the intersex body becomes not only 
fragmented but is made up entirely by the pathologized sexed body fragments. The 
medical gaze produces a mutilated, fragmented and dehumanized intersex subject, 
claiming this to be the only intelligible intersex subject position, which is however 
“socially unthinkable” in our culture (Chase 2002: 207). 
This invisibility and social silencing renders intersex bodies ghostlike, and an 
intersex subject position is problematized. The absent, lacking corporeality is 
reinscribed into Chase’s intersex body, and she experiences a bodily dissociation in 
the interaction with others: “my perception of myself is as a disembodied entity, 
without sex or gender” (2002: 213). The medical and social rendering of intersex 
individuals to a ghostlike, “disembodied entity” and Chase’s initial subjection to it 
constitute intersex as an unintelligible mode of being, and the intersex narrative as an 
impossible, “unthinkable” narrative that negates its own existence through its 
narration. This repeated paradox of narrative presence/absence deconstructs the 
narrative’s negation of its existence as the storytelling itself simultaneously 
presupposes and produces the presence of a narrative voice. In her theory of the 
performativity of gender and the sexed body Butler conceives of gender as the 
persistent repetition of cultural conventions on the body which is not an individual 
choice but operates within an already existing cultural and historical framework. The 
body, however, is not a site passively inscribed with cultural codes (Butler 1997a: 
411f). Chase’s constant reiteration of the medical and cultural conventions of 
‘normalization’ constitute her intersex reality as an absence, i.e. an absence of these 
normative conventions. Her narrative constructs her intersex body as the non-female 
body through the absence of normative ‘female’ genitalia, thereby simultaneously 
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perpetuating and challenging the medical narratives’ naturalistic notions of sexed 
embodiment which imply a sex binary and coercive heterosexuality.  
Genitalia are the primary signifiers that connote a sex, and the lack or mutilation 
of genitalia disqualify a sex from being intelligible: “my genitals were missing parts” 
(Chase 2002: 210); “I now assert both my femininity and my intersexuality, my ‘not 
female’-ness. This is not a paradox; the fact that my gender has been problematized 
is the source of my intersexual identity” (2002: 211). Chase’s refusal to accept the 
medical gender assignment allows for a change in perspective within this narrative 
and functions as a moment of intersex subject formation that deconstructs the 
hegemonic intersex narratives’ assertion of distinct, binary sex and gender categories: 
    
“What do I see when I look in the mirror? A female body, though scarred and missing some 
important genital parts. [...] My body is not female, it is intersexed. Nonconsensual surgery 
cannot erase intersexuality and produce whole males and females; it produces emotionally 
abused and sexually dysfunctional intersexuals. If I label my postsurgical anatomy female, I 
ascribe to surgeons the power to create a woman by removing body parts. I accede to their 
agenda of “woman as lack.” I collaborate in the prohibition of my intersexual identity.” (2002: 
213)  
 
A possible interpretation of these passages is ambivalent. Chase’s own conceptions 
of ‘female’ and ‘intersex’ bodies and her self-perception as female and/or intersex 
are contradictory: she perceives her body as a scarred and ‘deficient’ female body but 
immediately rejects this female embodiment in favor of an intersex embodiment. This 
intersex body, however, is a violated and ‘deficient’ body as well; yet she chooses to 
reclaim this intersex body. Both corporealities, according to her reasoning, are not 
viable corporealities. The narrative problematizes Chase’s intelligibility as a sexed 
(and gendered) subject, for she cannot be a ‘woman’ (as her intersex corporeality 
cannot be ‘made’ into a ‘whole,’ i.e. viable, female body), and although she can 
define herself as ‘intersex,’ ‘intersex’ is not an intelligible mode of being. Chase faces 
the dilemma of intelligibility, as her “options are loathsome”: she has “no desire to 
be recognized within a certain set of norms” (Butler 2004: 3), i.e. the doctors’ 
“agenda of ‘woman as lack,’” and for her self-chosen ‘intersex identity’ no category 
of recognition exists. On the other hand, Chase’s rejection of the medical construction 
of her intersex body as ‘female minus relevant sexed body parts’ “opens the way for 
a more radical form of self-determination” (Butler, in Williams 2014) and allows her 
to reclaim the authority to define her body as intersex. In asserting both her intersex 
corporeality and identification and her femininity, she challenges cultural notions of 
distinct, normative genders and sexed embodiment. Moreover, in asserting her 
lesbianism she undermines the medical agenda to produce heterosexual subjects and 
disputes the ostensible ‘success’ that was to be achieved by surgically making her a 
(heterosexual) woman.  




The primary motivation for many narratives is a previous negative experience 
with the medical establishment, mostly during infancy or adolescence. It is above all 
the perceived powerlessness towards medical authorities and feelings of being at their 
mercy that cause feelings of distress and rage in the narrators. In addition, many 
narrators express their anger about both doctors’ and parents’ lies about medical 
interventions, followed by a silence maintained about the intersex state of the child’s 
body. In most cases, no explanation was given by doctors about surgical interventions 
and their long-term consequences. Many intersex narrators feel deprived of complete 
control over what had happened to their bodies and of the choice in determining what 
their sex should be. Some feel that their parents were complicit in the doctors’ 
decisions, some find the behavior of their parents excusable. In her narrative about 
her experiences as an intersex child at Buffalo Children’s Hospital as a response to 
an article by a medical doctor featured in HWA (fall/winter 1995/96), “Physically 
Screwed by Cultural Myth: The Story of a Buffalo Children’s Hospital Survivor,” 
Heidi Walcutt directs her anger towards the practitioners at Buffalo, whom she 
accuses of a complete disregard of her needs and feelings and of constructing her 
whole medical history around silences and lies: 
 
“I can’t tell you what my diagnosis was – because no one ever told me. But I do know that I 
was raised as a girl, and first admitted to Buffalo at age 5 in 1966, where surgeons operated on 
my enlarged clitoris. In my recollection, it was a fully-formed, functioning penis. [...] No one 
explained anything to me before or immediately after the surgery [...] And, based on my reading 
of some of John Money’s books, and ISNA literature, I now suspect that I have androgen 
insensitivity, that surgeons at Buffalo Children’s removed my testes, and that all the staff there 
conspired to lie to me, telling me that I was female, but my (nonexistent) ovaries and uterus 
were ‘underdeveloped.’” (Walcutt 1995/96: 10) 
 
Walcutt begins her story with a sense of uncertainty about her sexed body. She 
conceives of this uncertainty principally as the doctors’ distorted presentation of her 
medical diagnosis. Her narrative seems to be informed by the quest for her ‘true’ 
diagnosis, rather than her ‘true’ sex or gender. She attributes this uncertainty, and in 
particular her previous inability to speak about her intersex body, to the doctors’ 
behavior and actions at Buffalo Children’s Hospital. Not only did the medical 
authorities exclude her from any decision-making process regarding the treatment of 
her sexed body and thus denied her informed consent and self-determination. What 
is more, the doctors’ definition of her sex conflicts heavily with her own perception 
of her sexed reality, hence she perceives their treatment as fundamentally wrong since 
her “fully-formed, functioning penis” was made into a flawed “clitoris.” Her 
perception of her surgically created ‘female’ organ as not (entirely) ‘functioning’ is 
articulated in terms of sexual availability: although she has some clitoral sensation, 
she is not sure whether she is orgasmic, and her vagina is “just a pocket, about half 
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an inch deep, with flaps of skin on either side” (Walcutt 1995/96: 10), and as such 
not deep enough for being penetrated. The fact that she, as a lesbian, is not interested 
in having “normal sex with [a] husband” (1995/96: 10) – the doctors’ reason for the 
planned surgery which was intended to increase the depth of her vagina – causes her 
disinterest in a vagina ‘made’ for heterosexual intercourse. So while Walcutt seems 
to be deeply annoyed with the children’s hospital’s misrecognition of her intersex 
variation and her exclusion from the decision-making processes regarding her sexed 
body, she manages to reclaim the defining power for herself. She educates herself 
about intersex with various sources, including not only medical textbooks but also 
works which convey the perspectives of intersex individuals, and arrives at her own 
diagnosis: androgen insensitivity. At this point in her narrative, her quest for her 
‘true’ diagnosis – i.e., a diagnosis that she herself arrived at and that she can accept 
as being ‘true’ – is completed. However, Walcutt is not content with arriving at her 
own conclusions about her sex. She states that she “feel[s] in between male and 
female” (1995/96: 11) and identifies as “entirely lesbian” (10) – her new diagnosis 
changes neither her gender identification nor her sexuality. The main reason for her 
rage against the medical establishment is her exclusion from the discourse about her 
sexed body, her gender, and her sexuality, which has led, for her, to the inability to 
express her feelings about these issues. The counseling at Buffalo was exclusively 
controlled by a psychologist, and Walcutt had to submit to the rules of the medical 
discourse: 
 
“The counselors just laid out for me what was going to happen to me, but I really couldn’t talk 
about how I felt, or ask them questions. I was always uncomfortable in the counseling sessions, 
I would tell them almost anything so that I could just get out of there. [...] those sessions always 
followed the counselor’s agenda. She would just explain what was going to happen to me. 
Occasionally she would tell me, ‘we want to know what you’re experiencing, what you’re 
feeling.’ But there just wasn’t a space there to talk about these kinds of things.” (1995/96: 11) 
 
Walcutt is neither legitimated to participate in the medical discourse about intersex, 
nor has she the ability, at this moment, to produce a discursive space for herself in 
which she would be allowed to speak. The medical discourse on intersex in this 
narrative in fact both conceives of and consequently marks intersex as unintelligible 
by referring to sex only in terms of male vs. female sexes. This intersex discourse is 
marked by absence, or erasure, and the intersex individual has no discursive 
possibilities to articulate her sense of being intersex as an intelligible mode of being. 
The only thing she can do is tell them what they want to hear – i.e. use the language 
of the authorities. Her own voice is silenced and her feelings stifled. Her personal 
experiences have no validity since her voice – like the voices of all ‘patients’ – is 
considered as non-authoritative within the hegemonic discourse. Since the 
‘correction’ of ‘deviance’ from the norm is its structuring principle, Walcutt’s 




intersex embodiment is subdued by femaleness and her lesbianism by hetero-
sexuality. Neither could she talk with her parents about her feelings, as they were 
conservative Christians. Consequently, she was never able to develop her own voice 
and to find the adequate words for her intersex embodiment and her gendered sense 
of self: “I kept things to myself. Questions. Problems. Shame. I’ve spent my whole 
life with my feelings so bottled up, it’s really hard to change now” (1995/96: 10). 
However, Walcutt finds a way out of her silence when she learns about ISNA, and 
reclaims her voice by writing and publishing her letter in HWA, in which she is able 
to produce a counterpoint to and articulate her own feelings about the medical 
establishment. Thereby, she emerges as an intelligible intersex (and lesbian) subject, 
by refusing the gender assignment made by medical authority and positioning herself 
in a critical relation to the norms that constitute the conditions of her intelligibility 
(see Butler 2004: 3). 
That the exclusion of intersex individuals from medical discourses and the denial 
of their intersex variation will almost inevitably lead to the persons’ feelings of 
shame, fear, isolation and emotional as well as bodily suffering becomes apparent in 
a number of other intersex narratives. In “In Amerika They Call Us Hermaphrodites” 
(IA 1997/98), Angela Moreno writes about her personal experiences with the medical 
establishment and the consequences of the violation of her bodily integrity. Moreno, 
who was assigned female and raised as a girl, underwent a clitorectomy at twelve, 
but was neither informed by the doctors nor her parents about the details and the 
consequences of this surgery. At the hospital, the doctors “didn’t mention the part 
where they were going to slice off my clitoris. All of it. I guess the doctors assumed 
I was as horrified by my outsized clit as they were, and there was no need to discuss 
it with me. After a week’s recovery in the hospital, we all went home and barely ever 
spoke of it again” (Moreno 1997/98: 11f). A follow-up counseling for her or her 
parents was discouraged by the doctors, denying them any further chance of 
participating in the medical discourse.  
The doctors’ normative judgment is expected to be tacitly consented to by the 
patient. Moreno did not have a say whatsoever in this decision regarding her genitalia. 
While she herself refers to her clitoris as “that wonderful location of pleasure for 
which I had no name but to which I had grown quite attached” (1997/98: 11), her 
own assessment of her bodily and sexual well-being was subdued by the doctors’ 
normative ideas of sex and gender and their arrogant and paternalistic attitude 
towards the patient. The power relation between ‘doctor’ and ‘patient’ becomes 
obvious in the doctors’ strategy of hierarchical observation: their assessment of what 
size of a sex organ is to be considered as ‘adequate’ for males and females defines 
any person’s genitalia as either ‘normal’ or ‘deviant.’ This judgment can only be 
made by doctors for they, as authorities, have both the almost exclusive view into 
people’s genitalia and the defining power to which the patient has to submit 
unconditionally.  
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While the doctor-patient relationship has slightly shifted by now, in the 1980s 
when Moreno’s surgery was performed, this relationship was still relatively strictly 
organized, in particular with regard to intersex ‘patients.’ While the surgeon who 
performed Moreno’s clitorectomy “summarized the outcome as ‘tolerated well,’” 
Moreno herself conceives of the clitorectomy as “the unspeakable assault that I 
experienced under the guise of medical treatment” (Moreno 1997/98: 12). The 
medical records, of course, convey only the perspective of the doctor, while Moreno’s 
perspective is completely absent. Consequently, the removal of the clitoris is defined 
as a successful medical outcome and the patient’s personal negative experiences 
dismissed as irrelevant. Thirteen years after the clitorectomy she writes: “I am 
horrified by what has been done to me and by the conspiracy of silence and lies. I am 
filled with grief and rage” (1997/98: 12).  
As a result of her treatment, she has developed serious mental-health problems 
including eating disorders, depression, and intense body-hatred. She considers her 
bulimia as representing her attempts to express the fear, shame and rage caused by 
this assault on her bodily integrity, for which she has been lacking the language. Her 
medical records were at first incomprehensible for her – the medical terminology 
again excluded her from participating in the discourse surrounding her intersex 
variation. Knowledge becomes power here quite obviously: those who possess the 
relevant knowledge are all powerful (medical authorities), those who do not are 
powerless (intersex patients). However, Moreno was no longer willing to submit to 
her perceived powerlessness towards the medical establishment and asked her 
gynecologist to explain her records to her. When she could finally make more sense 
of the confusing medical verbiage, she started to feel more confident that someone 
had taken her questions seriously and that she was now able to take part, though still 
restrictedly, in the medical discourse about her body. Yet while she was not 
completely powerless anymore, she still lacked her own voice to productively cope 
with her situation and her intersex corporeality.  
Towards the end of her narrative, Moreno, like other intersex individuals who 
begin to narrate their personal experiences, learns about ISNA and other intersex 
people who might share her experiences. She realizes that she is “not the only one” 
(Moreno 1997/98: 12), and this new awareness and the change in perspective, 
through reading articles written by intersex persons and by ISNA, also lead to her 
own self-diagnosis, “Partial Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome.” This diagnosis still 
refers to a term that had been produced within medical discourses and is a 
construction by medical authorities. Moreno’s reappropriation of this term, however, 
changes its meaning for her, for two reasons: first, her diagnosis is for the first time 
clearly articulated and her intersex variation, about which the doctors had kept silent 
before, acknowledged. Second, her diagnosis is the result of her own research, which 
does not primarily rely on the medical records but on ‘alternative’ knowledge 
provided by first-hand accounts of other intersex persons with whom she can identify. 




Butler argues that “all of us [...] are in the active position of figuring out how to live 
with and against the constructions – or norms – that help to form us.  We form 
ourselves within the vocabularies that we did not choose, and sometimes we have to 
reject those vocabularies, or actively develop new ones” (Butler, in Williams 2014). 
Thus, while Moreno needs to refer to medical terminology to articulate her sense of 
self, and cannot articulate her intersex embodiment ‘outside’ of the medical 
discourse, she is finally able to create a discursive space within, yet in critical relation 
to, the dominant discourse that challenges dominant normative notions of sex and 
gender and thus enables a viable, intelligible intersex subject position that was 
previously not possible. 
In his personal journal, which was in part published in the first issue of HWA 
1994 under the title “I Am Not Alone!” David writes about the erasure, silencing, 
and invisibilization of intersex by medicine and culture: 
 
“It is a terrible perversion of the healing arts to attempt to destroy the unique gender identity of 
intersexual infants – to instill fear and shame in them by considering them to be some sort of 
sexual freaks to be tampered with. And, considering the cultural taboo of not talking about 
sexual differences, we surround hermaphrodite children with the poison of secrecy about 
themselves and what has happened to them.” (David 1994: 5) 
 
To him, intersex is nipped in the bud for its visibility entails its own undoing or 
erasure. Since a person’s intersex corporeality is nullified most often in infancy, their 
intelligibility as intersex can never reach a viable adult status but is suppressed by a 
culturally enforced gender assignment (either male or female). This enforcement is 
carried out through instilling shame and fear in the “helpless infant” (David 1994: 5) 
– a shame and fear experienced by the family and society –, in order to ensure the 
child’s assimilation to their assigned normative gender. David experiences these 
practices as “legally and scientifically sanctioned traumatic sexual abuse” (1994: 5) 
and himself (and by extension, other intersex individuals) as a victim who is at the 
mercy of the abusive powers that “manipulat[e] our bodies to meet its own needs of 
conformity” (1994: 5). Abuse is conceived as both the manipulation of intersex 
bodies and gender identities and the displacement of intersex to the realm of non-
existence.  
David’s narrative ends with a determined announcement and a challenge to 
medicine and society: “It really pisses me off. I will not be silent about this!” (1994: 
5). In fact, his narrative itself already contributes to the resistance to medical and 
cultural practices of erasing intersex subjectivity: his realization that he is not the 
only intersex person and that there are many others who share his experiences 
undermine the medico-cultural claim that intersex people do not exist. With the 
publishing of his personal journal, he breaks the taboo and secrecy about himself and 
other intersex persons which was imposed on him as an infant. David not only 
68 | INTERSEX NARRATIVES 
 
manages to emancipate himself from this taboo but is also working towards a viable 
adult intersex identity.  
Jane Carden’s personal story “Learning to Speak at 36” (HWA 1995) revolves 
around secrecy and her attempts to overcome the silence maintained about her 
intersex variation. Her narrative, too, starts with a sense of her sexed body as an 
‘unreal’ corporeality: “Twenty five years ago [...] I was told a lie. [...] From that day 
forward, no one in my family has ever again spoken to me about my medical 
condition” (Carden 1995: 2). Like in Moreno’s and David’s narratives, Carden 
conceives of the secrecy and fear about her intersex body as really being the doctors’ 
and parents’ fear imposed on her: “Not once was I asked how I felt about any of what 
had transpired. I was a patient with a terrible secret that even the doctors and my own 
mother couldn’t or wouldn’t discuss” (1995: 2f). Carden is denied any possibility to 
either participate in the medical discourse or express her own feelings about her 
intersex corporeality. She cannot participate in the medical discourse because she 
does not have the authority to do so and lacks relevant knowledge. Intersex simply 
does not exist within this discourse, only in the form of an unspeakable absence.   
At age 20, however, Carden begins to do her own research in an effort to resolve 
the secrecy about her sex. She reads medical texts in the medical school library and 
finally comes up with the diagnosis “testicular feminization,” about which her parents 
had lied to her. From the medical books she learns that she is a “male pseudo-
hermaphrodite.” Again, her self-identification relies on the terms which the medical 
discourse provides for her. At this moment, she still cannot identify as a ‘real’ 
intersex person but must be content with being ‘pseudo,’ not ‘authentic,’ and not 
really existing. The search for her own ‘true’ sexed ‘reality’ ends for the moment in 
an identificatory dead end, the repeated negation of her intersex body. The only thing 
affected by her discovery is the subsequent cessation of medical care, which she finds 
unnecessary due to the new information regarding her genital surgery. When she 
decides to resume medical care, she is again confronted with prior lies about her 
medical treatment and the ignorance of medical practitioners regarding her bodily 
condition. The perpetual lies and silence about her intersex variation and the resulting 
inability to talk openly about her intersex body drive her into isolation and cause 
mental-health problems. At 36, she still needs to “learn to speak,” in her own voice 
with her own words. However, by refusing to accept the silence about her intersex 
variation, and hence positioning herself critically towards the medical and social 
practices of rendering intersex (subjects) unrecognizable, Carden recognizes and 
points to the unrecognizability of intersex and thereby (temporarily) “emerges at the 
limits of intelligibility, offering a perspective on the variable ways in which norms 
circumscribe the human” (Butler 2001: 635). Carden is still in a process of 
rearticulating her (sense of) self, which (can) entail(s) both the rejection of the terms 
that define her (against her will) and the development of new terms. While she still 
needs to “figur[e] out how to live with and against the constructions – or norms – that 




help to form” her (Butler, in Williams 2014), Carden’s intervention into the doctors’ 
and her parents’ agenda of ‘intersex as non-existing’ is a crucial step towards 
constituting intersex not only as existent, but, eventually, as recognizable and an 
intelligible way to live out her sense of sexed reality. 
“Finding the Words” is also Martha Coventry’s designated goal in her narrative 
with the same title (IA 1997/98). When she was six years old, she underwent a 
clitorectomy, and the loss of the clitoris is followed by a silence that lasts for twenty-
five years:  
 
“Not a word of explanation was ever given for the surgery, and when they cut out my clit, they 
cut out my tongue. I could not cry out to save myself, and that stifled scream wedged in my 
throat, blocking my voice. Endless fears about who and what I was took the place of words and 
they settled like darkness over me.” (Coventry 1997/98: 27) 
 
The ‘unspeakability’ of intersex, i.e. the unintelligibility of intersex, translates quite 
literally as the excision of sexed body parts classified as intersex. The juxtaposition 
of cutting out her clitoris (physically) and her tongue (symbolically) signifies the 
inextricable interdependency of social and corporeal constraint that delegitimizes 
intersex as real and constitutes the basis for the attempted ‘normalization’ of intersex. 
The secrecy maintained about Coventry’s clitorectomy and her intersex variation had 
a devastating effect on her whole life throughout childhood, adolescence, and 
adulthood. Her constant struggle with her sexed body and her gender identity used to 
be defined by insecurity, shame, denial, and pretending. Her permanent feelings of 
being not ‘authentic’ as a woman haunt her and cause nightmares that last for years: 
“When I was growing up, and well into adulthood, I used to have a waking nightmare 
that a squad of men in uniforms would arrive at my door, take me into the night and 
execute me for not being a real woman. In my mind, they were always justified and 
I never raised my voice in protest” (1997/98: 27). Even in her dreams, she is unable 
to break the silence about her sex or to articulate her own sense of self. The nightmare 
mirrors her feelings of being completely powerless against the authorities in her real 
life – both the medical authorities and her parents – and of being forced to submit to 
their judgments about her body and identity. They have the legitimation to define her 
sex and assign her a gender, while she feels she has no (defining) power. The 
hegemonic construction of her sex/gender as female clashes heavily with her 
perceived sex and gender; however, her own judgment is informed by normative 
cultural notions of maleness and femaleness, which results in her perception of 
herself as being “in drag” and “a fraud” (1997/98: 28). Her fear of completely losing 
her identity causes Coventry to stop asking questions for the moment and 
“frighten[...] [her] back into total and terrified silence” (28). What follows is a 
continued odyssey of doubts and emotional break-downs, an unsuccessful marriage 
and perceived “sexual failure[s]” (1997/98: 28), and isolation.   
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At some point in her life, close to self-destruction, Coventry begins to love herself 
and her body and to gradually embrace her difference. A short time later, the death 
of her father enables her to live her own life independently from his defining power 
over her sexed embodiment – by deciding to erase her intersex corporeality in favor 
of a female sex and to withhold this truth from her – and to finally come to terms 
with her intersex body and her sexual desires. She explores her medical records 
together with a gynecologist in order to understand the full dimension and the 
meaning of the surgery and begins to write down her own experiences of growing-
up and her sex and gender struggles. Moreover, she finally acts out her lesbianism 
which she has suppressed since adolescence. Like virtually all intersex narrators 
under discussion here, she ultimately realizes the existence of other intersex people 
who share her experiences, and begins to find her own words for her intersex 
embodiment: “I will never find the words of my six-year old self, and that is fitting. 
Today I have the reasoned and educated voice of a grown woman who knows harm 
when she sees it and is increasingly growing strong enough to name it and try to stop 
it” (29). Coventry manages to emancipate herself from the authorities’ power over 
her and to resist their normalizing judgments about her sexed body and her sexuality 
by finding her own voice. This voice is authoritative, grown-up and educated, hence 
powerful, in contrast to her infant voicelessness and powerlessness. 
The analysis of intersex narratives demonstrates that most narrators’ negative 
experiences with medical authorities are a direct result of a perceived powerlessness, 
a lack of mastery over their own lives and bodies, and the lies about medical 
treatments and the silencing of their intersex corporeality. Joan W. writes in a letter 
addressed at her doctor who treated her as an intersex child, “Dear Dr. M” (published 
in HWA 2001), about doctors’ dismissal of patients’ experiences as irrelevant for 
studies on the results of genital surgery: “The few studies that have been done have 
emphasized the cosmetic result; the physical and emotional impact on the patient is 
given little consideration” (W. 2001: 4). The intersex ‘patient’ has no right to speak 
within medical procedures and is relegated to “assuming the role of a research 
subject” (4).   
Intersex individuals are made objects within the medical discourse not only by 
denying them an active role in the process of subject formation and the autonomy 
over their bodies, by excluding them from the dominant discourse on intersex. 
Equally important are the visualization practices through which the intersex body is 
constructed as ‘pathological’ and the medical perspective affirmed as the (only) 
legitimate perspective. The intersex narratives negotiate the hegemonic gaze of 
medical authorities, which serves the control and the ‘normalizing’ of sex or gender 
‘deviance.’ The questions of who possesses the gaze within a specific narrative and 
how the privilege of being in the active gazing position is used play major roles in 
the construction of intersex bodies and subjects (and other subject positions such as 
medical doctor). Visualization practices can be detected within the narratives that 




resists, challenge or subvert the hegemonic gaze. These processes involve a 
reclaiming of an ‘anarchic,’ or deconstructive gaze, which is opposed to the 
hegemonic gaze, by intersex individuals who previously were not authorized to 
possess the gaze, thus effecting a decentering of the gaze. I will now analyze how the 
gaze is utilized for processes of self-invention and the rearticulation of intersex 
subjecthood, and how specific strategies of visualizing in the intersex narratives 
refuse or challenge hegemonic medical visualization practices. 
 
3.2.2 Medical Gaze vs. Visual Self-Invention: The Performativity of 
Genitals and the Construction of Sexuality 
 
The stories primarily revolving around representations of genitalia make up the bulk 
of all narratives in HWA and IA and include, beside non-fictional and fictional 
accounts, medical photographs of genitalia. A ‘normalizing’ of ‘ambiguous’ genitals 
is identified as the main – in fact the only – reason for genital surgery. Normalizing 
judgments passed by doctors, informed by cultural ideas about bodies and genders 
which are translated into standard medical practice, are an integral technique in the 
process of hegemonic gazing. The intersex infant’s precarious state, the threat of 
being/becoming unintelligible, is determined by the appearance of the genitals in the 
first place – which really means, not by the appearance of the genitals per se, but by 
their ‘inconceivability,’ their claimed disruption of normative binary notions of sexed 
embodiment: 
 
“Physicians whose careers are dedicated to erasing intersexuality (by performing invasive 
medical procedures on non-consenting infants) characterize the birth of an intersexual infant as 
a ‘social emergency,’ and a traumatic emotional shock for the parents. In fact, by their own 
admission, plastic surgery on intersexual infants’ genitals is a form of psychosurgery.” (Chase 
1994: 6) 
 
The notion of indeterminate sex in the newborn as a “social emergency” is firmly 
established in the treatment protocol: in instructional texts and articles on intersex 
produced primarily by surgeons in the 1980s and 1990s, doctors declare a state of 
emergency when they fail to immediately determine whether the infant is a girl or a 
boy. This perceived threat to the gender binary urges them to seek a ‘remedy’ for the 
‘problem’ as quickly as possible, to reassure the parents that their child’s sex will be 
‘unambiguous.’ The coercive measures are often executed without sufficient 
consultation with the parents, and always without the consent of the patient (Fausto-
Sterling 2000: 45). In his personal journal, intersex narrator David writes: “we 
somehow terrify and threaten the culture to the extent that we are almost universally 
destroyed as infants. ‘Fixed’ and made to fit in” (David 1994: 5). This ‘fixing’ is 
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implemented in response to the perceived threat to the culturally established strict de-
marcation between male and female genders, and thus to compulsory heterosexuality:  
 
“Because our society demands a world in which heterosexuality is the norm and there are only 
two possible sexes, those born intersexual must be considered pathological. Medical procedures 
which remove perfectly functioning body parts (i.e., mutilation) can thus be justified by the 
insistence that it is a ‘cure.’” (Holmes 1994a: 5) 
 
In the 19th century, doctors’ most important justification for genital surgery 
performed on an intersex individual was the patient’s future marital prospects. The 
primary goal of the surgery was to make the person ‘marriageable,’ i.e. making 
female sexual organs fit for being penetrated (through the creation or dilation of a 
vaginal opening) or male sexual organs fit for penetrating, as Elizabeth Reis notes: 
 
“In deciding the sex of their patients, doctors sought [...] happy endings, hoping to see their 
patients embrace at least one element of womanhood (or manhood): marriage. The early cases 
of interventionist surgery on genitalia were designed to make the genitals serve the doctor’s 
perception of patients’ sexual and marital requirements.” (Reis 2005: 432) 
 
Doctors’ considerations concerning the desired surgical outcome generally privileged 
a ‘normal’ appearance of genitalia over the person’s sexual desires and genital 
sensation. Normal-appearing genitalia would ensure that the person, at least visually, 
would be able to meet the sexual requirements vis-à-vis prospective sex partners – 
who should be, of course, persons belonging to the ‘other’ sex (depending on the 
doctor’s own estimation of the person’s ‘true’ sex). Medical practitioners were 
usually worried about the intersex person’s (potential) development of homosexual 
desires and considered it as their duty to prevent the person from pursuing sexual 
partners of the ‘same’ sex through surgical interventions. If this implied a damaging 
or even destruction of the person’s genital sensation or sexual satisfaction, doctors 
expected the patient to tacitly consent to the intervention for the sake of their 
marriageability. As expected, there was a gender bias inherent in this practice: 
women’s sexual desires were by far less appreciated or even acknowledged than 
men’s, so that as a result doctors’ (who were almost exclusively male) contemplations 
of genital adjustment dismissed female sexuality as irrelevant when a certain case 
required the doctor’s decision about whether to make the intersex person a sexually 
dysfunctional ‘man’ or a sexually mutilated ‘woman.’ This practice seemed to 
suggest, “[b]etter a woman with no sexual desire than a man unfulfilled” (Reis 2005: 
433). 
In the 20th century, the gender binary has not lost its importance as a, or maybe 
even the, keystone of modern and contemporary culture. Thus, the decision of 
whether to assign an intersex infant as a girl or a boy is a process heavily informed 




by cultural conceptions of maleness and femaleness. Whereas maleness is linked to 
“proper penile function” and phallus size, femaleness is defined by its “reproductive 
function” (Fausto-Sterling 2000: 59), which led to the following common rule within 
medical practice of managing intersex in the 1990s: “Genetic females should always 
be raised as females, preserving reproductive potential, regardless of how severely 
the patients are virilized. In the genetic male, however, the gender of assignment is 
based on the infant’s anatomy, predominantly the size of the phallus” (Donahoe et al. 
1991: 527). In short, intersex males need a penis that is large enough both to compete 
with non-intersex boys/men and to vaginally penetrate a woman during sexual 
intercourse. Intersex females should be able to bear children. The emphasis in the 
case of male sexuality is on appearance and performance, the emphasis in the case of 
female sexuality is on procreation.  
This unequal disposition regarding female and male sexuality reveals a lot about 
the perceived (ir)relevance of women’s sexual desires in American culture. For 
intersex women in particular, their reproductive capability is considered the crucial 
factor of ‘real’ womanhood. In her attempt to trace the ‘truth’ about her sex, intersex 
narrator Martha Coventry is confronted with common stereotypes about gender and 
sexuality that are inherently misogynist. The answer she receives from both her father 
and her male gynecologist can be summarized as, “I had children, wasn’t that proof 
enough?” (Coventry 1997/98: 28). As both male authorities define her femaleness, 
and by extension her female sexuality, in terms of fertilization, which ostensibly 
requires heterosexual intercourse, they justify the clitorectomy performed on her as 
harmless to her sexuality. Her subsequent inability to experience clitoral pleasure and 
her potential homosexuality are ignored. While in the 1950s clitorectomies were 
performed relatively frequently on intersex infants with an ‘enlarged’ clitoris, 
suggesting that “female orgasm was vaginal rather than clitoral” (Fausto-Sterling 
2000: 61), from the 1960s on, medical doctors have gradually revised their ideas 
about female sexuality and acknowledged the clitoris as a relevant part of female 
sexual pleasure. This shift of cultural notions about female sexuality affected the 
surgical treatment of intersex infants assigned as girls, and replaced the clitorectomy 
(i.e. the complete removal of the clitoris) with clitoral reduction or recession (i.e. the 
clitoral shaft is downsized or hidden under a fold of skin). Additional surgeries that 
are also quite frequently performed on female-assigned intersex infants include the 
construction or widening of a ‘vagina’ and the reduction of the labia (Fausto-Sterling 
2000: 60f). Although medical practice has changed to less radical methods, 
contemporary treatment is still generally motivated by cultural notions about gender 
stereotypes. Women’s genitalia should be designed to both visually and physically 
please a male sex partner: their vagina should be able to be penetrated by a penis (i.e. 
to guarantee heterosexual intercourse and male sexual satisfaction) and both their 
clitoris and their labia should be petite enough not to resemble the male phallus or in 
any other way be obstructive to penile penetration.  
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In a recent medical study about variations in female genital appearance, surgeons 
comment on non-intersex women’s putative reasons for surgically altering the 
appearance of their genitalia: 
 
“implicit in a woman’s desire to alter genital appearance may be the belief that her genitals are 
not normal, that there is such a thing as normal female genital appearance, that the operating 
surgeon will know what this is, that he or she will be able to achieve this for her and that this 
would somehow improve her wellbeing or relationships with others.” (Lloyd et al 2005: 643)  
 
Lloyd et al attribute women’s embarrassment about their genital appearance and 
concern about their partner’s reaction primarily to the pervasiveness of cultural 
misconceptions of normative genital appearance via the media, particularly 
pornography: “With conspicuous availability of pornography in everyday life, 
women and their sexual partners are increasingly exposed to idealized, highly 
selective images of the female genital anatomy” (2005: 645). As a result, these 
idealized images have also informed surgeons’ and other doctors’ notions of what 
normal genitals are supposed to look like and consequently affected the treatment of 
persons whose genital development is considered unusual, i.e. intersex infants first 
and foremost. Recent studies have found that generally, information on clitoral size 
and vaginal length, labial size or other aspects of female genitalia is far from 
exhaustive. Descriptions of ‘normal’ female genitalia are poorly documented in 
medical literature (compared to the relatively vast availability of medical 
measurements for male genitals). Quite the contrary, the study conducted by Lloyd 
at al demonstrates wide variations relating to the external appearance of female 
genitals, including labial and clitoral size and vaginal length. These findings have 
important implications for the treatment of intersex persons, which has constantly 
been aiming at creating a ‘normal’ genital appearance via surgery. Lloyd at al contend 
that “given the variety of normal female genital appearance and lack of normative 
data, it can be surmised that decisions regarding the amount of reconstruction needed 
are entirely subjective. It is therefore surprising that surgeons feel confident that 
surgery has the potential to achieve a ‘normal’ female genital appearance” (2005: 
645). 
Quite a few intersex first-person narratives address this problem that many 
intersex individuals are faced with, namely, the fear of being rejected by a sex partner 
because they feel that they cannot measure up to the demands of normative looking 
genitalia. Joan W. holds her clitorectomy responsible for her failed sexual 
relationships, as the surgery damaged her clitoral sensation and mutilated her 
genitalia: “I have never enjoyed sexual or romantic intimacy in my life, with men or 
with women. I believe that this is a direct result of my treatment. The clitoral surgery 
that was performed on me damaged my ability to experience sexual pleasure and it 
failed in its putative purpose of creating ‘normal’ appearing genitalia” (W. 2001: 4). 




Her reasoning relates to two distinct aspects: what or how she feels (or does not feel), 
and how she looks. While the first aspect is primarily self-referred, the second one 
involves also others, particularly prospective sex partners. Joan W. perceives her 
discomfort regarding her genital appearance as a result of the normalizing judgments 
made on her sexed body inherent in the medical gaze which she was subjected to as 
a child. Many intersex individuals who were assigned female at birth refer to the 
relations between the clitorectomy/clitoral reduction performed on them and a social 
‘normalizing’ of their sexuality in their narratives. In stark contrast to doctors’ and 
parents’ assessments of what is for the child’s own good, almost all narrators are 
deeply troubled by the consequences of genital surgery.  
Many intersex narrators have undergone repeated medical examinations of their 
genitalia as children and adolescents. These examinations are experienced by all 
intersex narrators as humiliating, traumatizing and confusing, as they are 
unprotectedly subjected to the medical gaze. In many cases, the young ‘patients’ are 
confronted not with the gaze of one, but a group of doctors who are curious to see an 
‘extraordinary’ case, a medical ‘spectacle.’ As Angela Moreno recalls it, “my doctors 
made a traumatizing hospitalization even more traumatizing by putting me on show 
for parades of earnest young residents with ‘you’re-a-freak-but-we’re-
compassionate’ grins on their faces. This, all without nurses or my parents anywhere 
around” (Moreno 1997/98: 12). This hegemonic medical gaze was especially in the 
past predominantly male; nurses (who are traditionally mostly female), even if they 
were/are present in the examining situation, did/do not possess the hegemonic gaze. 
The procedures of medical inspection of intersex genitalia always involve 
doctors’ judgments based on normative notions about sex organs, which define the 
intersex body as ‘deviant’ and thus ‘pathological.’ Joan W. experiences the 
examinations following the clitoral surgery performed on her as being on trial, with 
medical authorities judging her sex and convicting her of failing to meet their 
normative standards of sexed corporeality: “The inspection of my genitals at each 
checkup was hard enough to endure, but having groups of doctors, interns and 
medical students present at those examinations made it quite clear to me that I was 
not and would never be like other girls” (W. 2001: 4). The presence of interns and 
medical students strengthens the conception of the intersex child as a study subject, 
and above all, a rare study subject that cannot be withheld from the sight of inquiring 
practitioners and experts. Joan’s perception of her sexed body is conflicting with the 
image of her body as deviating from ‘normal’ girls’ bodies, which is mediated 
through the medical gaze. While she feels that her clitorectomy “damaged [her] 
ability to experience sexual pleasure and [...] failed in its putative purpose of creating 
‘normal’ appearing genitalia,” her doctors consider her surgery as a “success” (4). 
Joan now positions herself in a critical relation to the doctors’ perception of her body 
as an abhorrent condition that justifies even an unsatisfying treatment, a perception 
that she herself had internalized as a teenager: “I must have been truly repulsive to 
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my parents and doctors if the result of the surgery performed on me could be 
considered an improvement” (4). For her environment, a damaged female body still 
seems to be preferable to an intact intersex body.  
Joan later eludes the medical gaze by refusing to participate in a follow-up 
interview in order to avoid repeated humiliation, and thus resists the perpetuated 
objectifying and normalizing judgments about her body. By refusing the medical 
interrogation that seeks to define the terms of her sexed embodiment and her 
sexuality, and to render her own sense of sexed and gendered reality irrelevant and 
unintelligible, she eludes being “fully recognizable, fully disposable, fully cate-
gorizable” by the medical hegemonic power, and by this elusion, her “humanness 
emerges,” according to Butler’s reasoning (Butler 2001: 634). However, she does not 
fully manage to create a positive body image on her own terms. She is still trauma-
tized by her treatment and as a result suffers from depression and suicidal feelings. 
However, her narrative conveys a flicker of hope, as she can at least openly articulate 
her counter-perspective to the medical establishment by writing a letter to her doctor. 
Although ‘Dr. M’ neither has to meet nor is directly subjected to her gaze, he or she 
becomes Joan’s ‘study subject’ in her own examination of him and his colleagues’ 
practices. 
Quite often medical judgment is rendered without words. In fact, nonverbal 
judgments are all the more indicative of a perceived bodily ‘deviance.’ The intersex 
person is confronted with the result of an examination of their body that is not 
explicitly spoken out; as a result, the patient is not able nor authorized to respond to 
the doctors’ statements. The communication process is one-sided as the doctors draw 
their conclusions through observing the patient, but a patient’s counter-gaze that 
wields the same power is not possible in the examination situation. This power divide 
within medical visualization practices is amplified by medical photographs of 
intersex study subjects. Morgan Holmes describes her experience with the hegemonic 
gaze as extremely imbalanced and objectifying: 
 
“I’ve seen quite a few such photographs in medical texts on intersexuality. They are usually 
extreme closeups of genitals, or full body shots with the eyes blacked out. How many doctors, 
med students, and archivists have been able to inspect my genitals without having to confront 
my gaze because my eyes were conveniently blacked out of the photo?” (Holmes 1994a: 6) 
 
The medical perspective produces a depersonalized, almost dehumanized intersex 
subject, by crossing out their eyes, erasing the intersex person’s individuality and 
humanity. As a consequence, doctors can treat intersex persons as study subjects and 
disregard their personal feelings, needs, and opinions. Moreover, they can con-
veniently stare at the intersex object and make their judgments without reciprocation.  
It seems paradoxical that the medical perspective is quite frequently appropriated 
by intersex persons for their own conceptualizations of their intersex corporeality. In 




an effort to find out the ‘truth’ about her sex that has been obfuscated by both her 
parents and doctors, Jane Carden uses medical photographs of other intersex persons 
to define her bodily variation: “After several weeks of poring over medical texts and 
comparing the appearance of my body with the clinical photographs, I reached a firm 
diagnosis: testicular feminization” (Carden 1995: 2). Not only does she refer to the 
visual markers of intersex as produced by medical practices but also to medical 
terminology as she conceives of her corporeality in terms of a pathological condition.  
Medical visual accounts of intersex bodies are often reappropriated by the 
intersex narrators in order to reclaim their preoperative, intact body: “My medical 
records refer to a clinical photograph before the surgery. I have tried to obtain it, but 
the clinic insists that it was destroyed. [...] If I had the photograph it would be a way 
for me to re-member my stolen body” (Holmes 1994a: 6). While this photograph of 
the uncorrupted infant’s body is likewise taken from a medical perspective, it is 
understandable that Holmes wants to take hold of this picture, as it refers back to her 
bodily state prior to medical intervention. What is more, the change in perspective 
produces a radically different meaning: through the doctors’ gaze, the preoperative 
intersex infant body is constructed as a “pathological condition” which justifies the 
subsequent clitorectomy as a necessary “cure” (Holmes 1994a: 5). In contrast, for 
Holmes this very same body signifies a viable corporeality and the removal of 
“perfectly functioning body parts” a “mutilation” (5). Holmes’ medicalized infant 
body may not cease to exist or not even be replaced by her humanized infant body 
construction, but the medical construction of her body is at least challenged by her 
counter-gaze.  
The hegemonic gaze inherent in the medical intersex narrative becomes 
destabilized by first-person narratives’ change of perspective, which allows for 
alternative intersex conceptualizations and the resignification of intersex bodies. In 
her personal narrative “My Beautiful Clitoris” (IA 1997/98), Annie Green turns the 
medical perspective on her clitoris completely upside down. As a child she underwent 
a clitorectomy, which she experiences as a deprivation. Because she was too young 
to be able to recall her preoperative body, she has to rely on a medical report to know 
what her clitoris looked like: 
  
“I have only one connection to the clitoris that I was born with: a pathologist’s report on the bit 
of tissue the surgeons sent him for analysis: 
The specimen consists of a soft pinkish piece of tissue measuring 2.8 cm in length and 
approximately 1 cm in average outside diameter. The distal 1.2 cm. of the specimen is covered 
with wrinkled, pinkish tissue resembling prepuce. Section shows the specimen to consist of 2 
soft, pinkish-white, somewhat shiny, half cylinders, each outlined by a thin rim of shiny whitish 
tissue and entire complex is covered by a thin rim of soft, shiny, pink tissue.” (Green 1997/98: 
12) 
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Through the pathologist’s gaze, the clitoris is made a disembodied object (“speci-
men”) rather than a viable body part belonging to a human being. The measuring 
hints at the relevance of the size of the genital as the primary signifier for a distinctive 
male or female sex. In the last thirty years, common medical practice for the treatment 
of infants and children with ‘ambiguous’ genitalia has strictly regulated ‘acceptable’ 
clitoris/penis sizes: “Medical standards allow penises as short as 2.5 cm to mark 
maleness, and clitorises as large as 0.9 cm to mark femaleness. Infant genital 
appendages between 0.9 cm and 2.5 cm are unacceptable,” as Suzanne Kessler sums 
it up (quoted in Laurent 1995/96: 12).1 Despite the existence of medical studies that 
show clitoris/penis size at birth as a continuum, rather than two constants, many 
physicians rely on their personal ideas, informed by their cultural background, about 
the ‘appropriate’ appearance of female and male genitals and then seek to surgically 
adapt the sex organ to their ideas – rather than the other way around.2   
In the pathologist’s report, only implicit assumptions about gender can be 
identified, through the emphasis on the phallus’ size. The organ is not even referred 
to as “clitoris” but as “specimen”; it is described in technical terms and framed within 
a medical context. Both the circumstance that the organ is dead tissue, as it was 
amputated, and a pathologist’s examining of the amputated organ mark it as 
pathological and useless. The report’s deliberately clinical tone adds to its extremely 
dehumanizing effect. This dehumanizing process however is undone in the very next 
sentence following the quote, by Green’s own commentary: “It sounds beautiful, 
doesn’t it?” (Green 1997/98: 12).  
She does not have many choices other than to refer to the pathologist’s words (his 
quote makes up one third of Green’s text) to talk/write about her clitoris. But her own 
interpretation of his words establishes a new perspective on the object and constructs 
it as (her) “clitoris.” She appropriates the report’s terms and claims and thus reclaims 
both the defining power of the object in question and her subjective bodily 
experience, thereby effecting a re-humanizing discursive moment: “I imagine it, my 
clitoris, lying in the cold metal specimen tray. I can’t help but think how sad – such 
an alive, vascular, beautiful, sensitive organ, removed from the warm body of this 
precious child. My body” (12).  
                                                             
1  In consequence, ‘clitorectomy’ in this context denotes the removal of the sexual organ 
considered to be too large for a clitoris and too small for a penis; while the differentiation 
between an ‘enlarged clitoris’ and a ‘micropenis’ is not clear-cut, it however hints to the 
naturalistic, dichotomous notion of sex since ‘enlarged clitoris’ takes as a basis a female 
and ‘micropenis’ a male person, and signifies the ‘inappropriateness’ of the genitalia – the 
size of the external genitalia is the primary signifier that connotes a distinctive sex.  
2  See Fausto-Sterling (2000: 56ff) for a detailed discussion of doctors’ decision-making 
processes for assigning gender and the prenatal, surgical and psychological ‘fixing’ of 
intersex infants. 




Green’s subversive discourse operates on two strategies. First, her reinter-
pretation of the medical text alters the relation between signifier and signified. The 
same text can radically change its meaning when the privilege of possessing the gaze 
is appropriated by a narrator who was not authorized to gaze before and the dominant 
perspective thus becomes decentered. “The specimen” becomes “my clitoris,” 
(claimed) objectivity becomes subjectivity, a dead, pathologized “bit of tissue” 
becomes an “alive, vascular, beautiful, sensitive organ” in its original state prior to 
the wrongful deprivation. The clitorectomy is experienced as a grievable “loss” (12) 
rather than a medical/cultural necessity or even a favor. While the medical text 
directly follows the clitorectomy, and thus cannot refer to the tissue as “clitoris” since 
the tissue did not qualify as a “clitoris” (otherwise it would not have been amputated), 
Green seeks to reimagine an intact body with the organ that qualified as a clitoris for 
her, thereby relating to her preoperative infant body: “Every day my thoughts touch 
on what it would be like, what it would feel like, what it would look like, if this had 
not happened to me” (12). As the narrative is conveyed from the intersex individual’s 
perspective, the medical text itself is subjected to an ‘intersex gaze,’ its underlying 
assumptions are challenged or rejected and the medical practices it articulates under 
scrutiny. The traditional gazing positions – active medical gazer, passive gazed-at 
intersex object – are reversed.  
Second, Green constructs a counter-perspective on her child self in retrospect, by 
using the third-person narrative perspective to refer to herself as a child. The gaze of 
the medical authorities constructed her child self as a ‘patient’ with a medical 
‘condition’ that needed to be ‘cured’ with the help of surgery. Her body was 
considered as deviant, pathological and abhorrent, so that leaving the body in this 
state was not an option. Her own experiences and wishes as a child were not 
(culturally/medically) relevant to the doctors – and obviously, neither to her parents 
– and consequently could be ignored. From the hegemonic perspective, cultural 
conventions were more ‘precious’ than the child herself and her bodily integrity. 
Green reclaims her child body by reappropriating the third-person perspective on 
“this child” and making it her own. Her child self is no longer a depersonalized 
medical study subject but becomes a “precious child,” an individual, and an 
intelligible human being (12). Green considers the child’s clitorectomy and her future 
prospects after the medical treatment as “sad,” “tragic,” and “heartbreaking”: “so 
many years of this child’s life would be filled with anguish, confusion, and shame,” 
“this little child would grow into a sexual being who will never know orgasm” (12).  
At the time her story was written Green, as an adult, already knows that these 
anticipations will be fulfilled. By pointing out the devastating impact, she comments 
on the medical authorities’ neglect to pay attention to the personal, possibly negative, 
consequences for the child’s mental and bodily health and her future life, who instead 
categorically promote medical treatment as a social necessity. At first glimpse, 
Green’s narrative creates the impression that she considers her own life as miserable, 
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due to medicine’s violation of her child body and the deprivation of her adult 
sexuality, and that her future will be consumed with grief. However, she does not 
remain in the role of medicine’s helpless, silent victim and resists the medical power 
over herself and her intersex body. She autonomously reappropriates the privilege of 
the gaze and uses it for a rearticulation of her own intersex sense of self and even 
manages to retrospectively create an image of the child Annie as a precious little 
being. She has authorized herself to recreate her own narrative by resignifying the 
terms available to her. Green’s concluding remarks on having found ISNA moreover 
suggest that she is now able to share her experiences with other intersex people and 
to overcome her feelings of being alone with her struggle.  
The ‘constructivity’ of sexes becomes apparent in the narratives’ recounting of 
doctors’ attempts to make a distinct male or female sex. Born with an intersex 
variation and having been raised as a male, Sam, the narrator of “Becoming totally 
gendered” (HWA 1995), experiences a confusion about his sex and (gender) identity, 
which first causes much distress for Sam and is then followed by various medical 
interventions:  
 
“All I knew was that I was different and very ashamed socially about the way I looked 
physically. I knew I was O.K. with how I looked and felt. But externally I was and am fearful 
about how others would judge me: Am I a man? What am I? I felt and feel primarily male, but 
the parameters for being male excluded me. For years I lived in fear of being ‘found out.’ [...] 
I was given hormone injections, which I still take, which produced a deep voice, muscle mass, 
and facial hair. At age eleven surgeons implanted prosthetic testes, which the doctor told my 
parents ‘would make me look more male in the locker room.’” (Sam 1995: 3) 
 
The explanation for this gender dysphoria given by the narrator is ambivalent: the 
excluding “parameters” for being male certainly refer to cultural standards for 
maleness, and the expressions of his feelings such as being ashamed socially, the fear 
of being detected as being not ‘really’ male, being “terrified of being shamed in the 
locker room” (1995: 3) and not being able to meet societal expectations of a ‘normal’ 
male appearance, suggest the narrator’s dependence on others’ judgments and a 
strong desire of being accepted in his gender. While Sam states that the surgery to 
construct testes “did not make me feel or look more male” (1995: 3), he expresses an 
ambiguous feeling towards surgery, as the subsequent reduction of his breasts 
enabled him to “pass for a ‘normal’ male” (1995: 3). Thus, societal pressure and both 
parents’ and doctors’ willingness to find a ‘remedy’ for Sam’s struggle with his sexed 
embodiment and his sense of gender in surgery can be identified as the main reasons 
for the narrator’s distress with his intersex corporeality. The normalizing judgment 
usually made by medical authorities, in order to control and correct ‘deviances’ from 
the norm, is (to some extent) adopted and consequently integrated into the intersex 
person’s sense of sexed and gendered reality.  




For Sam, a ‘successful’ performance of his sexed body and, consequently, his 
gender is measured by how others perceive him: vis-à-vis his male schoolmates (in 
the locker room – a highly gendered space), his genitalia need to look like theirs in 
order to qualify as male, vis-à-vis female sex partners, his genitalia need to be fit for 
(hetero-)sexual intercourse. However, in the end it is not the surgeries which provide 
Sam with a sexed and gendered mode of being he feels right for himself: although 
Sam is able to pass as a male, he still feels “socially isolated” (1995: 3) and misses a 
sense of belonging to a community whose members share his bodily and gender 
experiences. His identificatory process is triggered by a sudden awareness of the 
existence of other intersex people, and his love for himself and his embracing of being 
intersex is achieved through the identification with the intersex community.    
Most intersex narratives that negotiate the narrators’ experiences with medical 
interventions, in particular surgery, represent the intersex person as having been 
subjected to the treatment by authorities, i.e. their parents and doctors. The decisions 
concerning their body, gender, and sexuality were made by others, and the intersex 
person was not authorized or able to give consent to or to reject treatment. In some 
cases, however, intersex individuals who underwent infant genital surgery damaging 
their ability to experience clitoral sensation, orgasms and sexual pleasure consider 
additional surgery for ‘undoing’ this damage. IQ’s narrative “Thinking of more 
surgery?” (HWA 1995), explicitly addressed at other intersex people and ISNA 
members, negotiates her experiences with seeking a way to restore her sexual 
sensation through surgery. At one moment in her life, she no longer wants to resign 
herself to her perceived sexual dysfunction: “I decided that there must be some way 
to get back what had been robbed from me. Perhaps the sort of microsurgical 
techniques used to reconnect fingers severed in industrial accidents could restore the 
sensation of my clitoris” (IQ 1995: 9). Her desire for self-determined genital surgery 
is not only sparked by the prospect of improving her sexuality, but also motivated by 
regaining a sense of mastery over her body. The process which follows her decision 
demonstrates how dominant medical practices are simultaneously reiterated and 
challenged. To begin with, IQ initiates this process by gathering information about 
the prospects and the feasibility of such a surgery and locating a surgeon apparently 
qualified for the operation. She is also an active, and at first glance equal agent in the 
medical communication process with the surgeon, being able to discuss the chances 
of success and most importantly, the risks. Moreover, IQ herself decides to become 
his patient, and allows him to examine and photograph her, precisely those acts 
usually carried out by medical authorities without the intersex person’s consent and 
even against their own will.   
IQ’s reclaiming of this active role in the medical process effects a shift in the 
traditional doctor-patient relationship and its underlying power mechanisms. 
Relevant, i.e. medical, knowledge ceases to be a doctor’s exclusive privilege and can 
also be accessed by the patient. The patient can at any point during the process opt 
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out or opt for a different treatment. The doctor is bound to provide truthful and 
detailed information about the treatment. At least theoretically, the patient is 
equipped with more power and autonomy within this relationship; as a result, the 
dominant medical discourse on intersex is undermined, or challenged.  
However, while IQ’s narrative constructs her as this active agent, and thus resists 
her perpetual subjection to medical powers, her narrative also reveals the limitations 
of a radical subversion of the hegemonic medical intersex narrative. The major 
discursive strategies of this narrative are replicated in the process related to by IQ. In 
the majority of cases where an intersex child is born, both the child and the parents 
are isolated from other intersex children and their parents, and are basically alone in 
dealing with the child’s intersex variation. Also in subsequent treatment, not many 
doctors encourage patients and their parents to consult with other intersex children or 
adolescents, or with their parents, respectively. In many intersex narratives, narrators 
remember their feelings of being “the only one in the world” as intersex children 
(Walcutt 1995/96: 11).  
In IQ’s narrative, her surgeon claims to have performed the desired surgery on 
several other intersex women who also underwent a clitorectomy as infants. IQ is 
delighted at the prospect of meeting other women who share her experiences: “I 
would get [this surgeon] to introduce me to them! No longer alone in the world!” (IQ 
1995: 9). However, she is again purposely isolated from other intersex persons, in 
this case because the surgeon finally has to admit that he has never done a surgery to 
restore the clitoris of a clitorectomized intersex woman, and hence does not know 
any other adult intersex individuals. Moreover, she is confronted with obfuscating 
and contradictory information concerning the possibilities of success and the risks 
involved in the planned surgery. Many intersex narratives represent the concealment 
of relevant information and incomprehensible medical verbiage as a ‘typical’ strategy 
employed by medical authorities to maintain their power position towards the patient.  
Taking all negative aspects into account, IQ concludes that she will not have 
another surgery and closes her narrative with rather bleak prospects: “In the end, I 
decided that the likelihood of improving my erotic sensation by surgery was minute, 
and that there was a good chance of doing more harm. I have abandoned the idea of 
surgery, and know that I must live all my life without learning what a clitoris feels 
like” (1995: 9). IQ’s attempt to have her clitoral sensation surgically restored has 
failed in the end. In the process of pursuing the desired surgery, she is faced by 
challenges that are evocative of dominant medical practices regulating the treatment 
of intersex infants and children. Her faith in the medical establishment is ultimately 
destroyed, as her advice to other intersex people who might consider surgery to 
restore sensation makes quite clear: “you are probably better off not letting a surgeon 
touch you again” (9).  
Yet her narrative also demonstrates that an adult intersex person can free herself 
from being subjected to medical powers and might choose surgery on a voluntary 




basis, and more importantly, opt out of surgery if they like. IQ’s decisions to both 
pursue and finally reject the surgery are based on knowledge she was able to gather 
and on a relatively equal, however biased, relationship with her doctor. Her final 
dismissal of medical treatment can also be read as a liberation from medicine’s 
defining power of her sexed embodiment and her sexuality. Although she contends 
that she will never know clitoral sensation in her life, in dealing with the subject in a 
productive way – by calling on the very same practice that harmed her previously 
and seeking to utilize its potential for repairing the loss –, she manages to overcome 
both her perceived dependence on surgery/surgeons and many years of denial and 
emotional crises. IQ’s narrative thus can be read as a form of resistance against 
surgical practices and as providing a counter-narrative to traditional narratives on 
genital surgery performed on intersex individuals. 
 
3.2.3 Making Up for the Absence: Redefining Sexual Pleasure   
and the Challenging of Heteronormative Ideas of           
Gender and Sexuality 
 
Sexuality and sexual relationships and their often problematic implications for 
intersex persons are negotiated in some narratives. To date, the sex/gender 
(re)assignment performed on the infant or child is almost unanimously considered as 
‘successful’ by both doctors and parents when the person forms heterosexual 
relationships as an adult. Joan W. addresses the relationship between genital surgery 
and homophobia in a letter to her former pediatrician:  
  
“I have taken the time to discuss these issues with other women born with genital ambiguity, 
and with parents. I have found many women who, like me, never formed the heterosexual 
relationships that their parents desired and that doctors implied would be one of the benefits of 
trimming an unacceptably large clitoris. I have noticed an undercurrent of homophobia in some 
of the comments of parents who defend their decision to allow surgery on their infant daughters. 
I have spoken with many women who resent the surgery that was performed on them.” (W. 
2001: 4) 
 
If parents and doctors do not seek to prevent homosexuality from the outset by means 
of surgery or other medical interventions, the possibility of the child becoming 
homosexual in adult life is basically ignored. Genital surgeries, hormone therapy, and 
psychological counseling both assume and are targeted at the production of a 
heterosexual subject. The sexed bodily characteristics are scrutinized with regard to 
their potential to perform heterosexual intercourse, thereby referring back to 
normative notions of heterosexual practices and the active/passive divide between 
male and female partners (i.e. the man penetrates, the women is penetrated). Medical 
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and psychological treatments of the intersex patient involve normalizing judgments 
about their actual or prospective sexuality. Heidi Walcutt experienced her treatment 
at Buffalo Children’s Hospital as largely ignorant of or even hostile towards 
questions of sexuality. Due to her early genital surgery, she feels her ability to 
experience sexual pleasure and orgasms to be severely limited, but the practitioners 
at the hospital kept silent about these issues: “I don’t believe that anyone at Buffalo’s 
Children ever spoke to me about genital sensation, orgasm, or masturbation” (Walcutt 
1995/96: 10). Her treatment is directed towards ‘normalizing’ her as a girl/woman, 
taking physical functions of the sexual organs as the main basis for defining 
(normative) femaleness: “She [the psychologist] told me that I was female, but my 
ovaries and uterus had been ‘underdeveloped,’ and that I would need to take pills 
prescribed by Buffalo physicians if I wanted to have puberty like other girls” (10).   
The psychologist’s statement seems to suggest that in order to function as a ‘real’ 
woman, the intersex girl needs to have fully developed reproductive organs (size and 
function both matter here) – and since these aspects are not ‘naturally’ given in 
Walcutt’s body, the cultural demands on femaleness need to be simulated via 
medicine. In particular with regard to her future sexuality and marital prospects, 
medical treatment is aimed at simulating ‘appropriate’ female sexual functions, i.e. 
surgically creating a ‘vagina’ fit for performing heterosexual intercourse. Since 
Walcutt’s vagina which the doctors created through a first vaginoplasty is not deep 
enough for penile penetration, she would need to have another surgery “if [she] ever 
want[s] to have normal sex with [her] husband” (10). Walcutt’s supposed 
heterosexuality is never questioned and the assumption that all heterosexual women 
want to marry a man and be penetrated by a penis goes completely unchecked. The 
second planned vaginoplasty is cancelled, but Walcutt does not seem to be bothered 
by her small vagina since she is a lesbian. She also relies on normative notions about 
both hetero- and homosexuality in saying that “if I were interested in sex with men, 
I might feel differently” about her impenetrable vagina (10). This statement, together 
with the reason she gives for not regretting the cancellation of her vaginoplasty, i.e. 
her lesbianism, are based on the assumption that all heterosexual women want to be 
penetrated while homosexual women always and universally reject being penetrated. 
At age 27, she had never formed sexual relationships with another person because of 
her inability to accept her attraction to women. Although she attributes her past denial 
of her lesbianism largely to her parents, who, as conservative Christians, condemned 
homosexuality, her closetedness might be in part a result of the homophobia inherent 
in her medical treatment (“I hoped to marry, adopt children, as the counselors at 
Buffalo Children’s suggested” [11]). 
Narratives that deal with an intersex person’s sexuality and sexual relationships 
are strongly linked to the destruction, or at least impairment, of their sexuality due to 
genital surgery. A significant structuring principle of these narratives is absence: the 
removal of the clitoris, the lack of sensation, the inability to orgasm, unfulfilled 




sexual pleasure, and sexual dysfunction. For sexuality and sexual experience to be 
considered satisfying it has to realize specific culturally established standards 
defining a normative sexuality. This normative model of sexuality relies on 
compulsory heterosexuality and the assumption that men gain sexual pleasure by 
penetrating and women by being penetrated. The fulfillment of sexual experience is 
very often measured in terms of the ability to reach orgasms. In heteronormative 
notions of female sexuality, it is the ability to have vaginal orgasms that defines 
sexual pleasure for women; however, in many intersex narratives, clitoral orgasm 
becomes the central signifier of sexual pleasure, and consequently the inability to 
reach clitoral orgasm is perceived as a failure to achieve sexual pleasure at all. Many 
narratives at first glance seem to deny intersex persons a satisfying sexual experience 
that derives its fulfillment from sexual stimulation other than (clitoral) orgasm. The 
absence of a clitoris is always conceived of as a wrongful deprivation executed by 
medical doctors in order to create ‘normal’ appearing genitalia, and its brutal loss 
inevitably leads to psychosexual damage and mental-health issues: 
 
“As a consequence of ‘reconstructive genital surgery’ during infancy, I have no clitoral 
sensation, and have never been able to experience orgasm. After many years of denial, I had a 
severe emotional crisis, with suicidal feelings. I decided that there must be some way to get 
back what had been robbed from me.” (IQ 1995: 9) 
 
“Thirty-two years have passed since my clitoris was taken from me. Though I was too young 
to be able now to recall the event, I feel that I will be grieving the loss for the rest of my life. 
Every day my thoughts touch on what it would be like, what it would feel like, what it would 
look like, if this had not happened to me. [...] How tragic that this little child would grow into 
a sexual being who will never know orgasm. How heartbreaking that so many years of this 
child’s life would be filled with anguish, confusion, and shame.” (Green 1997/1998: 12) 
 
In relation to sex partners, quite a few of these narrators perceive their intersex body 
as dysfunctional since it cannot measure up to the cultural demands of a fulfilling 
sexual experience, and a satisfying sexual performance is not only determined by the 
sexual pleasure experienced by the intersex person but also by her sex partner. As 
Cheryl Chase concedes in “Affronting Reason”: “As a woman, I am less than whole. 
[...] I lack important parts of my genitals and sexual response. When a lover puts her 
hand to my genitals for the first time, the lack is immediately obvious to her” (Chase 
2002: 211).   
For a sexual performance to be successful it has to meet specific culturally 
established requirements, thereby taking the bodily experiences of ‘others,’ i.e. male 
or female but not other intersex individuals as the basis for one’s own bodily 
experience: “I knew that I had been mutilated by the clitorectomy, deprived of the 
sexual experience most people, male and female, take for granted. What would my 
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life be had I been allowed to keep my genitals intact?” (Chase 2002: 206). This 
narrative does not allow for an intersex person to experience her own sexual pleasure, 
since sexual pleasure is assessed exclusively in terms of the ability to have clitoral 
orgasms. Chase does not use the term “clitoral orgasm” explicitly, but she insists in 
making a distinction between various forms of orgasms like “vaginal orgasm” and 
“full body orgasm” and seems to privilege “clitoral orgasms” over other forms – 
which cannot be realized (without a clitoris due to clitorectomy): “If I persist in 
asserting my sexual dysfunction, many patronize me” (2002: 206).  
Moreover, the constant infantilization of intersex bodies problematizes an adult 
intersex mode of being. The intersex body exists in its original form only in the 
preoperative newborn’s body and ceases to exist after genital surgery performed on 
the infant. Since intersex signifies an absence, the postoperative body is signified by 
absence too, since it cannot possibly assume an intersex/absent sex. The construction 
of the sexed body repeatedly and exclusively relies on genital signifiers, taking infant 
genitals, ‘uncorrupted’ by cultural conventions, as the original signifiers for a 
‘natural’ sex: “In a sex-repressive culture with a heavy investment in the fiction of 
sexual dichotomy, infant genitals are for discriminating male from female infants. It 
is very difficult to get parents or even physicians to consider the infant as a future 
adult sexual being” (Chase 2002: 209). Although Chase’s narrative criticizes the 
medical establishment’s and the parents’ ignorance with regard to the intersex 
person’s future adult sexuality and their ability to experience sexual pleasure, and 
thus provides a counter-perspective on matters of sexuality, it fails to construct a 
positive, pleasurable intersex sexuality. Chase seems to reject alternative options to 
reclaim her sexual pleasure, and the narrative ends without a hint that this will change 
in the future. 
Chase’s narrative of her personal experiences with her sexuality provokes a 
juxtaposition with one of her fictional narratives that allows for an intersex person to 
experience her own sexual pleasure. In Chase’s short fiction story “(Not) Another 
Clit Story” (IA 1997/98), the sexual experience of a female-identified intersex person, 
Karen, is juxtaposed to that of an African woman, Zara, who both underwent a 
clitorectomy as infants. The narrative seeks to resist the dominant narrative of 
intersex sexuality by rejecting accounts of sexual dissatisfaction and painful 
intercourse. Against this dominant narrative, Chase seems to construct a sexual 
narrative that has a positive outcome in terms of sexual pleasure. A positive 
reclaiming of intersex sexuality is complicated by the narrative’s own discursive 
strategies. The sexual encounter between the two women is problematized from the 
start by the narrative’s introduction of the protagonists as genitally mutilated. The 
juxtaposition of the mutilated body and the eroticized body structure the whole 
narrative, and sexual pleasure is inextricably intertwined with an effort to compensate 
for the perceived lack:  




“Gradually Karen’s tears subsided, she pushed her grief back down to its usual hiding place, 
and another feeling rose up in its place. She rubbed her cheek against Zara’s, pressed her lips, 
moist and swollen from crying, against Zara’s. [...] Now Karen ran her tongue down the crease 
between belly and thigh, used one hand to urge Zara’s thighs apart wider. Avoiding the broad 
pad of scar in the center, she lapped along the sensitive flesh outside what remained of Zara’s 
lips. A moan escaped from deep inside of Zara, and Karen pressed on, down and back, tonguing 
the intact flesh behind her vaginal entrance as she brought both hands under buttocks and 
around hips, stroked the other woman’s belly. [...] She slid a finger at the same time gently into 
Zara’s vagina, pressed and swirled it, careful to avoid too much pressure against the scarred 
entrance.” (Chase 1997/98: 32) 
  
At first glimpse, this sexual experience seems to revolve around an absent clitoris, 
and as a result the clitoris is very present, symbolized by the scar, hinting at 
something that once was there, and still should be there, but is not anymore. The 
narrative’s construction of the sexed body again relies on genital signifiers, and since 
the loss of the clitoris signifies an absence, this sexed body is marked as unintelligible 
and therefore a viable intersex sexuality is rendered problematic. However, the 
narrative enables alternative sexual experiences to be satisfying for clitorectomized 
women and intersex persons. During the sexual act, other body parts are eroticized 
and pleasure is achieved through sexual practices other than clitoral stimulation. A 
focus on the clitoris as the exclusive source of sexual pleasure becomes decentered 
and the sexual attention is instead refocused on the whole body, not only on the 
genitals. The sexualization of the lovers’ bodies is not simply a result of sexual 
intercourse but of the way in which their bodies are constructed through each other’s 
touch and perception. The narrative follows the exploration of their bodies through 
the perspective of the lover – mostly through Karen’s perspective on Zara –, the body 
materializes before the lover’s and the reader’s eyes by tracing the contours of its 
flesh with the lover’s own hands, tongue, and other body parts, thereby bestowing a 
new meaning on them. Each body part is given special consideration, which first 
effects a fragmentation of the bodies and then a recomposing of the fragments to a 
new bodily wholeness.  
The better part of the short story is dedicated to the course of lovemaking and the 
de- and reconstruction of the sexed bodies involved in it. By projecting the intersex 
woman’s experience of sexuality onto the African woman and vice versa, both 
Karen’s and Zara’s bodies not only become whole again in the end, but moreover 
“[t]heir bodies intertwined” (Chase 1997/98: 32), both undone and reunited by their 
shared sexual experience. This narrative not only challenges notions of intersex 
sexuality (and by extension, any clitorectomized person’s sexuality) defined by lack 
and hurt. While the story begins with a reference to the loss of genital parts, this loss 
becomes incorporated into the narrative and into the sexual encounter, and is finally 
resolved into a sexual gain. Moreover, its representation of lesbian sexuality resists 
88 | INTERSEX NARRATIVES 
 
conventional cultural notions of sexuality and undermines the inherent hetero-
normative basis of medical treatments of intersex individuals, exposing the intended 
‘corrective’ surgery as a failure. The narrative achieves a reclaiming of an intersex 
woman’s sexuality as pleasurable, and thus stands in contrast to Chase’s non-fictional 
account of how she experiences her sexuality.  
The different ways to experience and to reclaim a fulfilling sexuality Chase seems 
to reject in her real life are tried out in her fictional narrative, which gives her more 
space for the construction of a desired intersex experience than a non-fictional 
account. Thus, while Chase does not seem to experience a satisfying sexuality at the 
time “Affronting Reason” was written – this remains speculative, however, as we 
have only been given fragments of her sex life –, a fulfilled sexual experience seems 
at least imaginable for her, despite her clitorectomy. The question of representation 
is also a question of activist and political strategies. While “(Not) Another Clit Story” 
appeared in the Chrysalis special edition about intersex, which was intended to raise 
intersex voices to empower other intersex people, an empowering account of intersex 
sexuality, even if fictional, can help others who have similar experiences with their 
sexuality as a result of a clitorectomy to reimagine their own sexual pleasure. In 
contrast, communicating toward the public (and especially toward the medical 
establishment and policy makers) that a person who underwent nonconsensual genital 
surgery can nevertheless experience sexual pleasure involves a certain risk, as such 
positive accounts can potentially be interpreted as an affirmation of (the ‘success’ of) 
the medical practice of ‘normalizing’ treatment. This aspect might also be a reason 
why intersex persons are, and especially were at the outset of intersex activism, 
cautious in which way they communicate their sexual experiences. 
However, some non-fictional first-person accounts represent an intersex person’s 
love and sexual relationships in positive terms, allowing for a satisfying sexual 
experience. Martha Coventry’s sexual trajectory takes her from compulsory 
heterosexuality and her self-perception as a “sexual failure” (Coventry 1997/98: 28) 
to sexual fulfillment in lesbian sexuality. Sexuality has always played an important 
role in her life, and has been intimately involved in her struggles with her sense of 
gender. Her first orgasm at age eleven or twelve triggers her quest for her ‘true’ sex, 
when her clitorectomy had previously confined her to silence and fears about who 
and what she was: “Perhaps it was this new and powerful experience of pleasure from 
a place that held so much pain that made me determined to find out the truth about 
my body” (Coventry 1997/98: 28). Although she does not receive an answer at this 
point, she continues exploring her sexuality as a teenager. Her perceived genital 
‘deviance,’ however, results in a disturbed adolescent sexuality: “wreaking havoc 
with my budding sexual self was the constant reminder that I was a freak. I was not 
right in the place where everyone else was perfect. I wanted to be normal. I wanted 
to fuck” (28). She subsequently avoids sexual encounters out of a fear that sex 
partners would find her mutilated genitals repulsive.  




Coventry’s self-perception as a woman relies on normative cultural gender 
notions, and her ideas about a fulfilled sexuality depends increasingly on hetero-
normative imperatives, both interrelated social requirements she is not able to meet. 
She then falls in love with a man whom she later marries, but self-doubts about her 
body and normative ideas about heterosexual intercourse make it impossible for her 
to enjoy her sexuality. Although she and her husband find other ways than vaginal 
penetration to be sexual, she cannot deal with her perceived “sexual failure” as a 
woman: “in this society, and in my mind, it was the old in-and-out that counted. It 
was my measure of a woman and I was lousy at it. My vagina was shut tight and there 
was nothing that could be done about it. Not even my children could pass easily 
trough that opening” (28). Her failure to sexually satisfy her husband is juxtaposed 
to her failure to give vaginal, i.e. ‘natural,’ birth to her children. Coventry has so 
deeply internalized society’s misogynist conceptions of female sexuality as restricted 
to reproduction and pleasing men that she is devastated by shame for not being able 
to live up to the ideas of normative womanhood. She considers her life up to this 
moment as a pretense and a continual failure of being ‘normal,’ holding her 
difference responsible for her inability to pursue a fulfilled (love) life.  
Her ideas of sexuality seem to be informed by the idea of a gender coherence 
involved in compulsory heterosexuality. She suppresses her early discovered and 
constant desire for women because she fears that her attraction to women would mean 
that she was really male, and even when finding out about the existence of lesbians, 
she cannot identify with them since they have ‘normal’ female bodies, in perceived 
contrast to hers. Her subsequent living in denial of her own sexual needs finally leads 
to an emotional breakdown. This crisis, however, marks a radical turning point in 
Coventry’s life: she ends her marriage and begins to rediscover herself, finding a 
new, strong voice, as well as her body and her sexuality, exploring new ways of 
getting sexual pleasure. The reclaiming of her sexed body and her sexuality enables 
her to redefine her sexual self, and above all, her intersex self. Interestingly, her 
separation from the two most important men in her life – the breakup with her 
husband, the death of her father – cuts her loose to finally live her own life, allowing 
her to act out her lesbianism and to embrace her intersex embodiment. She now has 
arrived at a point where her life is coming full circle:  
 
“All the queerness I felt growing up finally had a home. Being a dyke fits my strangely 
hermaphroditic self so comfortably, so wonderfully. It feels totally and deeply right. Embracing 
my love for women not only makes me happy, it is the thing that I had been waiting for to give 
me the courage to look at my body, and at who and what I truly was, without turning away. I 
could never have found my intersexual self until I had found and loved my sexual self.” 
(Coventry 1997/98: 29) 
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Coventry now resists the demands of a coherent, stable gender/sex and sexuality 
confined to normative parameters enforced by authorities; yet her own desire for an 
‘authentic’ gender/sex – intersex signifies both her embodiment and her gender 
identification to her – points to a “basic, fundamental, enduring, and necessary 
dimension of who we are” (Butler, in Williams 2014), that cannot be reduced to a 
biologist-essentialist idea of sexed embodiment and its determinist relation to gender 
and sexuality. While the primary motivation of her narrative is the quest for her ‘true’ 
gender/sex and sexuality within a normative framework of legitimate alternatives 
offered by society, this quest for ‘authenticity’ can also be interpreted as a striving 
for liberation from normative categories of sexed, gendered, and sexual modes of 
being none of which seems to fit her sense of self.  
Coventry’s intersex narrative demonstrates that overcoming normative ideas of 
gender and sexuality is a process that requires making concessions and more often 
than not involves painful struggles. Eventually, her narrative subverts the hegemonic 
medical intersex narrative’s inherent heteronormative demands on intersex persons’ 
sexuality, which defines the ‘success’ of a sex and gender assignment in terms of a 
heterosexual outcome. Coventry’s embrace of both her intersex and her lesbian self 
and her sexual fulfillment in lesbian practices reject the hegemonic narrative’s 
heteronormalizing processes and expose its assertion that an intersex person’s 
emotional well-being depends on their heterosexuality as not sustainable. Her 
redefinition of her sexed and gendered reality does not take place ‘outside’ cultural 
discourses that produce the conditions of intelligibility, but within or at the limits of 
these discourses, and hence of intelligibility. She achieves a ‘different’ kind of 
intelligibility, one that emerges as a result of her ability to “articulate an alternative, 
minority version of sustaining norms or ideals that enable [her] to act” (Butler 2004: 
3) in reference to cultural collectives, i.e. an intersex collective and lesbians/lesbian 
communities.  
 
3.2.4 Intersex in the Eyes of Lovers: Overcoming Sexual Trauma 
and the Eroticizing of the Intersex Body  
 
The intersex narratives discussed so far have been exclusively conveyed from the 
perspective of intersex narrators, representing love and sexual relationships from an 
intersex point of view. Many of these accounts convey a rather pessimistic attitude 
towards a viable relationship and a fulfilled sexuality. Quite often, sexual and 
intimate relationships are complicated by the intersex narrator’s previous traumatic 
experiences and fear of rejection by a partner, thereby largely omitting the partner’s 
point of view in the narratives. However, a few first-person accounts were published 
in HWA and IA whose narrators are partners of intersex persons. These accounts, 
though barely representative due to the scarcity of the texts, are particularly 




interesting since they allow for a change in perspective and demonstrate how intersex 
is constituted, neither through an intersex person’s perspective nor a medical gaze, 
but a personalized third person’s gaze. Those few narratives center on closely 
interrelated themes like intimate relationships between the narrator and an intersex 
person, sexuality, and struggles with the intersex partner’s mental-health problems. 
The relationships are presented as problematic, and the intersex partner’s difficulties 
related to their intersex embodiment also affect the narrator. Sexuality is often the 
crux of the matter. As previously discussed, particularly in relation to sex partners, 
quite a few intersex narratives represent the intersex body as sexually dysfunctional 
since it cannot realize the cultural demands of heteronormative sexual experience, 
i.e. fails to sexually satisfy the other. In one of the partners’ narratives, “The healing 
journey” (HWA 1995), Saraswati comments on “how deeply the wound of genital 
mutilation” of her partner impacts her life and her own sexuality. At times, the sexual 
loss of the intersex person becomes the loss of her sex partner:  
 
“I felt so vulnerable exposing my orgasm when my partner could not have orgasm. Sometimes 
my orgasms reminded her of what had been taken from her [...] Sometimes I feel sorrow at 
what has been robbed from her, robbed from us. Sometimes I wish so much she would feel 
desire for me, that I could see her coming to orgasm at the tip of my finger. That was taken 
away from me, too. It is not her wound only, I now live with it as well.” (Saraswati 1995a: 8) 
 
Sexual and emotional wounding, as a result of genital surgery, structure both the 
relationship and the narrative. While having sex, “[p]ain, grief, rage appear, the 
surgeons intrude into our private space, together with the isolation, the loss of 
parenting” (1995a: 8).   
However, the narrative deals with this wounding in a productive way, in 
conceiving of it as the point of origin for a process of healing. For Saraswati, pain, 
healing, and sexual activity are strongly interrelated, as sexuality is both the source 
of the wound and the way out of it. The sexual healing is pursued in terms of a 
journey. Saraswati’s initial function as “the sex teacher, the rescuer” (1995a: 8) of 
IQ, her future intersex partner, in using her sexual skills to provide IQ with a space 
to express her troubled feelings, moves into a different direction very fast when she 
becomes IQ’s life partner. At first she manages to assume the role of the “healer” for 
her partner. Lovemaking as the cure for physical and emotional pain involves the 
reclaiming of a sexuality that was previously a place of shame and frustration on the 
intersex partner’s side: “So many partners in her life had wanted her to make love to 
them, but could not or would not spend the time it takes for her to get aroused” 
(1995a: 8). In contrast, in this process of their healing journey, the couple works out 
alternative ways of finding sexual pleasure other than clitoral stimulation: “I had to 
understand that for us, making love was about giving her pleasure, regardless of what 
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it might look like. It was not easy to remember sometimes that simply stroking her 
feet and shoulders for an hour might be just what she needed” (1995a: 8).  
Saraswati’s narrative moreover provides a partner’s perspective on intersex 
genitalia, a perspective that is rarely found in intersex literature: “I like IQ’s genitals, 
because they are hers. It was the first time I had seen female genitals without a clitoris. 
I like the way they get wet, it is my cue to know that somewhere there is arousal 
happening. They reassure me” (1995a: 8). This statement has several implications. 
First, it constitutes a counter-perspective to the medical gaze. The medical gaze on 
intersex genitals is strictly depersonalized, since the genitals belong to a patient (to 
whom a doctor usually has no personal relationship) but are at the same time detached 
from the rest of the body and consequently from the person as a whole, effecting a 
dehumanizing of the intersex person and also of the genitals. In addition, the intersex 
genitalia become pathologized through the medical gaze, and need to be surgically 
altered to make them ‘appropriate,’ as they were considered ‘deviant,’ and hence 
undesirable, in their original state. In most cases, the surgery’s consequences for the 
intersex person’s sexual pleasure have been ignored. Neither is true for the 
representation of intersex genitals through the partner’s gaze. The partner, Saraswati, 
has an intimate and sexual relationship to the intersex person, IQ, and is interested in 
her as a person, as a life partner, and in her sexual pleasure. For Saraswati, IQ’s 
genitals are desirable because she desires and loves IQ, and they are special because 
they belong to the beloved person.  
Second, the partner’s perspective also establishes a counter-perspective to the 
intersex person’s own perception of her genitals. As already pointed out, many 
intersex persons perceive their postoperative genitals as sexually dysfunctional since 
they do not meet cultural criteria of normative sexes and ostensibly fail to perform 
satisfyingly during sexual intercourse. In contrast, Saraswati emphasizes the sexual 
functioning of IQ’s genitals as she is able to get wet and experience sexual pleasure 
even without a clitoris. Moreover, her narrative constantly affirms her desire for IQ, 
their mutual lust for each other, and the great passion involved in their lovemaking. 
Saraswati’s definition of sexual pleasure, however, remains ambivalent. While she 
claims that for her and IQ, sexual stimulation can be achieved by various means and 
thus proposes a decentering of the (absent) clitoris, she simultaneously refocuses on 
clitoral orgasm as the exclusive way to be orgasmic, as her comment above indicates. 
In doing so, she denies IQ the experience of having other than clitoral orgasms, or to 
define ‘orgasm’ for herself. This perpetual reference to absence and lack – of a 
clitoris, of the ability to orgasm – in combination with her own desire inevitably leads 
Saraswati to an eroticizing of IQ’s pain, something she was trying to avoid: “A part 
of me had been seeing IQ as broken, in need, with few social skills, and I was getting 
off on it. I realized that I had fetishized her as being broken” (1995a: 8).  
Her function as a “healer” for IQ increasingly poses a challenge for her and the 
relationship. Focusing her attention exclusively on her partner’s wound and at the 




same time holding her own wounding at bay, Saraswati is soon confronted with her 
own rage and shame. She starts to articulate her own wound, questioning her own 
sexuality and sense of her gender. From her narrative it does not become clear 
whether Saraswati herself is intersex. She writes about her own wounding, “I believe 
that only a person who has been deeply wounded can understand the depth of the 
affect of sexual wounding and hang out in the well of emotions that can surface” 
(1995a: 8). This sexual wounding does not necessarily refer to negative intersex 
experiences. While there are no direct references in the text that she underwent 
genital surgery – apart from the statement “the surgeons intrude into our private 
space” during sexual activities with IQ, but this could also be related to IQ 
exclusively – the only hint she gives is that she had never seen female genitals without 
a clitoris and is able to experience (clitoral) orgasm. That does not mean, however, 
that a genital surgery has not taken place, but only that Saraswati chose not to be 
explicit about it or her possible intersex corporeality.  
The healing journey, however, also becomes her journey of coming to terms with 
her sexual issues. Previously, “being highly sexual has been [her] survival tool” 
(1995a: 8); dealing with her wounding causes her sexual desire to vanish and thus 
threatens her sense of self. Sexuality was a means by which she had held her emotions 
at bay, but through her relationship with IQ she is finally able to take her sexuality to 
a level of deeper intimacy and love. At the end of her narrative, their relationship 
seems to be more balanced and the intersex partner, IQ, is no longer considered as 
the needy, passive part. In her second narrative “The gift of gentle healing” (HWA 
1995), Saraswati calls her partner a “fierce warrior” and expresses her admiration for 
her courage: “When she decides to change something, she is relentless about it. She 
will put herself through the most intense fire” (1995b: 8). Now, she even 
acknowledges IQ’s determination to learn how to be orgasmic, a possibility she 
previously had denied her intersex partner. Only a couple of months later (the first 
narrative appeared in spring 1995, the second one in summer 1995), the roles seem 
to be, if not reversed, at least much more equal. The text represents the intersex 
partner as a brave, powerful person with a strong will. IQ seems to have emancipated 
herself from both medical authorities’ power over her body and her sexuality – in 
reclaiming her sexual pleasure – and the needy position within an unbalanced 
intimate relationship.  
Within the framework of Saraswati’s two narratives, IQ is constructed first as a 
broken person who needs to be ‘rescued’ by her partner and then as a warrior figure. 
Although Saraswati qualifies the latter attribute by suggesting a more gentle approach 
to challenges than “tak[ing] a big hammer and destroy[ing] it”, i.e. a problem she is 
confronted with (1995b: 8), the two identities constructed for IQ represent 
remarkable extremes and provoke the question of the narrator’s underlying 
motivation. A possible reason might be Saraswati’s growth in love for IQ which 
causes a shift in her perspective on IQ. Another reason is certainly her own healing 
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process that is accompanied by pain and difficulties and makes her vulnerable, so that 
in contrast, IQ appears to be less vulnerable than before. The narrative also suggests 
that Saraswati’s initial perspective on IQ as needy was informed by her own “need 
to have a partner whom I could control” (1995a: 8). IQ’s identity is thus an 
ambivalent construction within her partner’s narrative accounts and would remain 
even more speculative if IQ herself had not published a narrative in HWA (“Thinking 
of more surgery?”, discussed above).  
Tamara Alexander’s narrative “Silence = Death” (IA 1997/98) is likewise a story 
conveyed from the perspective of an intersex person’s partner. Similarly to 
Saraswati’s narratives, this narrative interrelates the themes of a problematic 
sexuality and healing, and describes how a relationship is affected by an intersex 
partner’s troubled psyche and her partner’s struggle to save her. The love story 
between the narrator and Max begins with Max’s struggles with her lesbianism and 
her escape first into and then out of heterosexual marriage. A statement from a 
previous female lover during sexual intercourse, “Boy, Jude, you sure are weird,” 
causes her to abandon lesbianism because women “would know how her body was 
different,” and to subsequently marry a man “because men were just less sensitive to 
the subtleties of women’s anatomy” (Alexander 1997/98: 48). This single judgment 
about her genitalia made by a former lover has such a deep effect on Max that she 
forces herself to repress her own desires for women and to marry in pretense.   
The fact that one comment about Max’s genitals drives her into a self-imposed 
compulsory heterosexuality hints at how deeply troubled and fragile her emotional 
and psychosexual condition really is. However, Max ends her marriage and begins a 
love relationship with the narrator, Tamara. Max finally confesses to her that she is 
intersex: “‘When I was born, the doctors couldn’t tell whether I was a boy or a girl.’ 
She dictated the speech as if she’d told it many times before and all of the emotion 
had fallen right out of her” (48). So, Max’s early and by now internalized definition 
of her intersex body depends in large part on the medical doctors’ judgment. In this 
narrative, Max’s own definition of her intersex corporeality is never explicitly 
articulated, but only mediated, or constructed by others: the doctors (who pathologize 
her), a female lover (who interprets her body as non-normatively female), her 
husband (who seems to be ignorant about her sexual needs), and her new female 
partner, Tamara, who is not “horrified, repulsed, or anxious” about her genital 
appearance, as Max had feared (48). When asked by Max what she expected her body 
to be like, she answers: “‘I thought it would be mysterious and wonderful. [...] And 
it was’” (48). For the first time, Max’s body is constructed as desirable through her 
partner’s gaze. When they have sex for the first time with Max being fully naked, 
Tamara’s sexual desire for her intersex body becomes even more explicit: 
 
“She was terrified, and I was aware of her fear and the cost of offering herself up to me in that 
moment. I have never wanted to pleasure someone, never wanted to offer my hands and my 




fingers to heal and to love and to delight... I have never been so awed by the feeling of touching 
as I was that night. I wanted to stroke and explore and learn and know every inch of her, her 
large and proud clit, the lines and crevasses from scars and healings, the tight cavern of her 
cunt which held my fingers so tightly.” (48)  
 
The partner’s eroticizing of the violated intersex body renegotiates its prior 
signification as a deficient, deviant, and pathologized corporeality. While Tamara’s 
eroticizing of Max’s pain seems to be more subtle than in Saraswati’s narrative, their 
sexuality is still built around Tamara’s healing of her intersex partner’s sexual 
wounding. Her sexual desire for Max mingles with her desire to make up for her hurt 
and perceived losses: “I wept for the loss of what she hadn’t had and the lovers who 
hadn’t reveled in the wonder of her body, wept for what I hadn’t had before I held 
her in love” (48). She is the active part in the relationship and also during sexual 
intercourse, eager to reassure Max that her intersex body is worthy of being desired. 
Max’s perpetual suspension of completely open lovemaking only fuels Tamara’s 
desire for her:  
 
“I asked: please. Please let me touch you. Please don’t shut me out. Please just lie back and let 
me love you, the way I want to, the way you deserve to be loved. Let me know you. Let me 
look. Let me run my tongue into the places you haven’t let me before. Let me celebrate you, 
because I love this, and this, and this. I don’t love you despite your differences, I love you 
because of them. I want you to be this way. I want to enjoy your being this way, because it is 
good, lovely, delicious. Let me.” (48) 
 
The construction of intersex is ambivalent in this narrative. Through the lover’s gaze, 
the intersex body becomes precious and desirable, and its differences, which have 
previously led to (self-) abhorrence and/or erasure, are rearticulated as positive 
markers. In this process, earlier perspectives are challenged and rejected: the intersex 
body is de-pathologized, normative notions of femaleness are abandoned, and the 
body’s special sexual needs are handled with great care. However, such a 
representation ignores that all individuals and bodies react differently to sexual 
stimulation and certain sexual practices. The narrative seems to suggest that only 
intersex persons and bodies need special attention in sexual situations, and hence 
constructs the intersex body as a non-normative body in terms of sexuality, relying 
on a heteronormative and very problematic notion of sexuality per se. The intersex 
body’s perceived differences are reinscribed into Max’s body, again marking it as 
non-normative.  
The shift in focus is also problematic in another way: Max remains completely 
passive in the rearticulation of her intersex embodiment, and the reclaiming of a self-
affirmative conception of her body fails. As much as their shared sexuality has been 
problematic from the start, it remains so during the course of events, despite Tamara’s 
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constant affirmation of her love and acceptance. Max becomes depressive and 
attempts suicide, caused by her perception that “she was a monster and she just 
shouldn’t be here” (Alexander 1997/98: 49). At this point, Tamara has to face the fact 
that her attempt to heal Max through her unconditional love has failed: “I could not 
erase thirty years of grief and doubt about her worth and her place in the world. [...] 
I had still to learn that sometimes shame and blatant evil can be stronger. I might love 
her with all my heart, but that was one small glow against the bitterness and dark of 
the rest of her experiences” (49).   
The narrator attributes this failure to the medical treatment Max has undergone 
and both her mother’s and her own shame about Max’s intersex body. However, as 
long as the defining power over Max’s intersex embodiment remains within the gaze 
of others and she does not manage to reclaim this power for herself, it is doubtful 
whether she can ever overcome her self-loathing. Still, at the end of the narrative, 
Max gradually recovers and starts to fight, together with her partner, for her survival 
“between the worlds set up by a gender-dichotomous society” (49), slowly starting 
to embrace her intersex self. Tamara’s narrative demonstrates that a patronizing of 
the intersex person by medical authorities will likely be reproduced by a partner’s 
acting as the active, dominant part towards the intersex partner, thus hazarding their 
self-determination in regard to their body and self. Moreover, a dichotomization of 
the intersex body in terms of sexual dysfunction/function perpetuates normative 
cultural demands on bodies’ unconditional sexual availability, as well as ableist 
conceptions of sexed bodies. Then again, a desiring and loving gaze can also produce 
an intersex body as a site of pleasure, constructing a counter-gaze to the desexualizing 
medical gaze, and empowering the intersex person in their desirability. The three 
narratives conveyed by partners of intersex persons discussed here provide 
interesting insights into intersex persons’ lived love and sexual relationships as 
experienced from the partners’ point of view and present alternative, though 
ambivalent, images of intersex individuals and bodies. 
 
3.2.5 “Sharing Our Stories, Our Lives, Our Anger”: Ideas of  
Community and the Collective Rearticulation of Intersex 
 
The intersex narratives discussed in this chapter evidently represent an overall 
narrative structure that seems to be coherent in some aspects, disruptive in others. 
What virtually all of these narratives have in common is the narrator’s motivation for 
giving an account of their experiences, and the conclusions their narratives draw. One 
major observation that can be made about the narratives in HWA and IA is the relative 
homogeneity of intersex experience, as those intersex persons who are satisfied with 
the surgical outcome and/or their sex and gender assignment (initially) did not feel 
the need to share their experiences. Apart from that, a lot of people born with an 




intersex variation either do not know that they are intersex, or perceive their sexed 
embodiment as either male or female and cannot, or do not want to relate to their 
intersex corporeality. Consequently, early intersex narratives do not negotiate such 
experiences but concentrate on a possible emancipation of intersex subjects from both 
the state of invisibility and subjugation. This emancipation was strived for through 
publicly sharing their experiences and organizing with other intersex individuals. 
Their narratives construct ‘intersex’ as ambiguous, fluent, and contingent on 
perspective, as opposed to the seemingly stable intersex representations within the 
dominant medical narratives. Beyond that, they have worked together to produce a 
contextual (i.e. North America in the mid-1990s) cultural intersex collective.   
In the welcoming column of the first issue of Hermaphrodites with Attitude, chief 
editor Cheryl Chase calls for contributions from intersex readers “so that the next 
issue can be even more of a collaborative effort” (Chase 1994: 1). She also explains 
her choice of the magazine’s title and its reference to the word hermaphrodite. For 
many intersex persons, the term hermaphrodite “is one which has been [...] associated 
with deep pain and stigma” (Chase 1994: 6); it moreover denotes an image of intersex 
which belongs to the realm of mythology and is consequently rejected by many 
intersex people as a present-day intersex mode of being. Chase, however, considers 
a possible reclaiming of ‘hermaphrodite’ intelligibility, setting the tone for the 
subsequent intersex narratives covered in HWA with the goal to establish (a) (united) 
counter-voice(s) to the medical discourse:  
 
“I believe that it is time for us to counter physicians’ assertion that life as a hermaphrodite 
would be worthless, by embracing the word and asserting our identity as hermaphrodites. This 
is the way to break the vicious cycle in which shame produces silence, silence condones 
surgery, and surgery produces more shame.” (Chase 1994: 6) 
 
Although the tone is set, it is yet worth noting that barely a narrator refers to 
themselves as hermaphrodite, most prefer the term intersex. Chase herself negotiates 
the meanings and uses of the two terms in “Affronting Reason”’s narrative of intersex 
subject construction. At the beginning of her process of coming out as intersex, a 
reclaiming or at least a positive acceptance of the terms ‘hermaphrodite’ or ‘intersex’ 
is rendered problematic. For Chase, the mythologization of the term hermaphrodite 
disqualifies it as a viable subject position as it evokes the notion of the hermaphrodite 
as a fantasy, a stigmatized, unreal subject. The term even has the power to affect her 
emotional integrity: “The word hermaphrodite was horribly wounding and drove me 
to the brink of suicide” (Chase 2002: 205). The potential of hermaphrodite or intersex 
as an identity is at first abandoned on the basis of its connotation of the “monstrous,” 
the “Other,” and the “freakish,” a “medical anomaly, patched up as best as the 
surgeons could manage” (Chase 2002: 211).   
98 | INTERSEX NARRATIVES 
 
Chase’s initial rejection of an intersex identity is the result of the medical 
authorities’ power over the term, and the subject position it connotes. This 
medicalized subject category is occupied by ‘unreal’ subjects, depersonalized and 
dehumanized entities who moreover are so rare that their existence becomes almost 
abstract, a hypothetical construct of the medical discourse (Chase learns about other 
‘true hermaphrodites’ only from a medical article). In an effort to find a solution to 
her struggles with a positive reclaiming of a viable intersex identity, she relates to her 
earlier coming-out process as a lesbian: “The way out of this pain was to reclaim the 
stigmatized label, to manufacture a positive acceptance of it. This second coming out 
was far more painful and difficult. [...] There was a community where my lesbianism 
would be understood, would be welcomed. No such help was available to reclaim my 
intersexuality” (Chase 2002: 205f). A self-determined development of a positive 
intersex identity fails at first because she is not able to relate to a cultural intersex 
collective consisting of ‘real’ individuals. The only images of intersex subjects she 
has had access to are the ones construed as pathological by a medical gaze. However, 
in her determination to prove the medical construction of intersex as disease to be 
inherently oppressive, Chase begins to assert her intersex identity (2002: 211). 
Eventually, a community of real-life intersex individuals, which has formed within 
the new activist movement in the 1990s, acts as a support for this autonomous 
reclaiming and the resistance against medical hegemony: “My ability to embrace the 
term hermaphrodite, however halting and uncertain at first, has grown in depth, 
conviction, and pride as I have met other intersexuals. Together we have shared our 
stories, our lives, and our anger” (2002: 208). At the end of her narrative, she 
describes her healing as a continual process that is facilitated primarily through 
articulating and sharing personal experience with others. 
Breaking the silence by finding their own voices and healing through sharing 
experiences are the structuring principles of each story. The narratives can be read as 
quests for finding ways to articulate their sense of their lived sexed and gendered 
reality, starting from genital surgery in early childhood, passing through emotional 
crises, problematic relationships, and disturbed sexuality during adolescence and 
adulthood, constantly accompanied by silence and shame. However, the journeys 
generally end with a sense of a new awareness, which is sometimes followed by pain, 
but always results in a sort of healing. The writing of the narrative itself is both the 
starting point and the result of articulating a new sense of intersex self. Kira Triea 
describes this process as an “awakening” in her narrative with the same title (HWA 
1994). This awakening passes through several stages, in the process of which her 
knowledge produces her sense of self, which is always contextual and dependent on 
the source of knowledge: “Some time before the onset of memory, I awakened to the 
knowledge that I was different; when I was thirteen I learned that I was not ‘a boy’… 
I was actually ‘a girl.’ Now I know that I am an intersexed person” (Triea 1994: 1).   




The final affirmation of her intersex embodiment is both the result of her 
“awakening” and the point of departure for her narrative; her narrative both begins 
and concludes with the affirmation of her intersex sense of self, and above all, of her 
own intelligibility: “My name is Kira Triea. I am intersexed, my karyotype is XX, 
and I was raised as a male until age thirteen” (1994: 6). The juxtaposition of her name 
and her intersex variation personalizes and individualizes intersex and thus works 
against the depersonalizing and dehumanizing medical discourses that produce 
intersex as a medical category. Triea considers her realization of being intersex as a 
“constructive breakdown” (1994: 1) that threatens her sense of self at first but then 
leads to her searching for and connecting with other intersex people. In this process, 
her sense of self shifts from a vague feeling of being ‘different,’ a confusion about 
her sex, to a self-defined intersex identity within the context of an intersex collective.  
Triea’s story exemplifies the trajectory of most intersex narrators in the specific 
context under consideration. An assumed shared history and shared experiences 
formed the basis of this cultural intersex collective that became gradually organized 
through intersex activism. This new cultural identity needed to be articulated by a 
united voice, speaking up for intersex rights and against the authoritative medical 
voice. Individual voices merged into this collective voice: 
 
“My words escape me now, my universe is slowly turning, tipping up on its head, right before 
my very eyes. [...] There are others who feel as I do, who cry out against the torment and the 
unjust persecution we suffer by those who see us as freaks and monsters to be ‘fixed’ out of 
existence. My own very private little world is about to have guests, [...] long forgotten family 
who speak in my native tongue.” (David 1994: 4) 
 
David’s identification with the emerging intersex community, which he embraces as 
“family” who speak in the same language as he does, hints at a desire for belonging 
on the basis of a shared experience. Prior to organizing, intersex individuals have 
been “left to wonder and to search for the truth in utter silence and isolation” (Chase 
2002: 211). Quite a few narratives seem to propose an organizing in the form of social 
bonding. The organization, which mostly refers to ISNA in this context, is conceived 
as a homogeneous group with common interests. Some organizations go so far as to 
demand a medical diagnosis from their members in order to legitimate their affiliation 
to the exclusive group of intersex persons. The organizing of intersex individuals 
seems to have their subjugation by authorities (doctors, parents) as its founding 
principle. Chase seems to speak for, or rather – as ISNA’s spokesperson – on behalf 
of, all intersex persons when she claims that “[w]e grow up with so much shame that 
as adults we are not able to discuss our experience openly, and the phenomenon of 
intersexuality remains invisible” (2002: 213, emphasis added). Through the 
appropriation of others’ experiences individual, subjective experience becomes 
consequently a ‘standardized’ experience, thereby producing a temporary intersex 
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cultural collective based on a shared, intersubjective intersex experience: “our 
experiences are surprisingly coherent: Those of us who have been subjected to 
medical intervention and invisibility share our experience of it as abuse” (Chase 
2002: 216).   
This assumed shared experience has ultimately produced a new dominant intersex 
narrative by the late 1990s in the North American context, which has denied a space 
for ‘other’ intersex experiences, intersex experiences that deviate from the norms 
established by this dominant activist narrative. While the narratives present 
organizing as a strategy of resistance against the dominant (medical) discourse on 
intersex, at the same time they risk reproducing the very same mechanisms of 
appropriation, exclusion, and silencing or erasure of intersex subjects and 
perspectives that do not conform to their own intersex narrative. However, for 
political reasons the leaders of ISNA and other activist groups considered it necessary 
to speak with a unified voice in public so as to present a consistent agenda of this 
newly emerging intersex community. Conflicting views on how to approach intersex 
themes in conversations with medical and political representatives were initially 
considered as counterproductive, so the intention was to act in unison. 
To conclude my analysis, this early intersex collective and the (shifts in) 
narratives it has produced can be claimed to have functioned as a space of alternative 
intersex ‘realities,’ a testing ground on which the narrators were able to construe and 
act out their sense of sexed and gendered self, and largely elude mainstream cultural 
notions of gender and sex as binaries. Questions of ‘truth’ and ‘authenticity’ with 
regard to sex and gender are recurring motives. Yet this new conceptualization of 
intersex is complex, multilayered, and at times ambiguous:  
 
“What I am now more able to do is to say ‘yes’ to my intersexuality without having to say ‘no’ 
to other aspects of my reality, other aspects of myself. [...] I am saying ‘yes’ to intersex, ‘yes’ 
to my masculinity, and ‘yes’ to the fluid and receptive femininity that has enriched my life with 
its non-linearity and intuition. And this has given me an ease and comfort that did not seem 
possible when I tried to deny any of these parts.” (David 1995: 5) 
 
“If you are intersexed, listen to your heart – slowly you will emerge. It takes commitment and 
courage, it is frightening, but not nearly as frightening as that monster you created all those 
years out of your own sweet body. As you tell your story, and tell it again and again, a sort of 
transformation takes place. You start to speak for all intersex people who have ever lived and 
are yet to be born. Your intensely personal story drops into the background, and what comes 
forward is your story as myth, as a kind of transcendent truth. Try to love yourself enough to 
free your hermaphroditic voice, so we can all claim our lives, and the bodies we deserve to 
celebrate.” (Coventry 1997/98: 29) 
 




The collective rearticulation of intersex both within and against the hegemonic 
medical discourse, the forming of intersex within and against the terms (initially) not 
chosen by intersex persons but by medical authorities, and the rejection of the 
medical, negative connotation of these terms, “open[...] the way for a more radical 
form of self-determination, one that happens in solidarity with others who are 
undergoing a similar struggle” (Butler, in Williams 2014). The continuous 
reiterations of personal, individual intersex stories not only effect a resignification of 
intersex for the individual person, but for (an) intersex collective(s). As Audre Lorde 
suggested with regard to the Black women’s movement, “the transformation of 
silence into language and action” (Lorde 2007: 40) has likewise proven to serve as a 
power tool for intersex individuals, as the discussion of the early intersex first-person 
accounts in HWA and IA has aptly demonstrated. This process is often accompanied 
by pain, a threat to one’s sense of self since it almost always involves “an act of self-
revelation” (Lorde 2007: 42). It results in the formation of one’s own, self-determined 




4. Challenging Dominant Narratives From Within  
     Autobiography as a Critical Reflection on the Paradigm Shift        




4.1 COMING OUT AS INTERSEX – AND WHAT NEXT? 
INTERSEX AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL WRITING AGAINST    
THE LIMITS OF REPRESENTATION 
 
The collections of first-person intersex narratives discussed in the previous chapter 
can be conceived as the first stage in the emerging counter-discourses on intersex 
since the 1990s. Within the last twenty years, these counter-narratives have 
undergone a certain development concerning the narratives’ motivations and 
objectives, but also with regard to their strategies of dealing with, reproducing, and 
subverting hegemonic (medical) intersex narratives. The main focus of the early 
personal accounts was the criticizing and challenging of the way narrators’ intersex 
variations were or are handled by medical practitioners and within society. Thus, 
medical themes and themes related to the consequences of genital surgery and other 
medical treatment clearly dominate and structure these accounts. At the same time, 
the narratives conveyed a general tendency towards the formation of a new intersex 
collective, which was based on shared experiences with the medicalization of 
individuals’ infant or child bodies. While these narratives are rightfully claimed to 
have served as an emancipatory strategy employed by intersex individuals who 
became pioneer activists, in the course of time the ways in which intersex is 
narratively represented have shifted. This is not to say that the intersex movement at 
this particular time has arrived at the point where it can finally be dismissed as what 
Morgan Holmes has called “a utopian project which can envision its own 
obsolescence” (quoted in Kessler 1998: 90, fn35). Yet it is important to understand 
that the 1990s first-person accounts had their specific meaning and value at a 
particular moment in intersex history, and with the cultural and political changes 
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these narratives have effected, the narratives themselves became, while not quite 
obsolete, certainly subjected to substantial revisions.   
Intersex narratives written by intersex authors which exceed the length of essays 
or short stories are still rare to date. Reasons for the scarcity of book-length intersex 
autobiographies can at best be speculated about. A likely reason would be a 
reluctance of many individuals who were defined or identify themselves as intersex 
to disclose not only very intimate parts of their lives regarding aspects of their 
intersex corporeality, but to lay open their whole lives to be judged by readers who 
might or might not be familiar with intersex themes. For many, it might be a 
difference between coming out as intersex and articulating their traumatic 
experiences within a confined narrative space, such as intersex newsletters or 
websites dedicated to intersex issues and maintained by intersex persons, and talking 
about their private lives beyond that scope. Moreover, with the accomplishment of 
coming out as intersex and coming to terms with the consequences of genital surgery 
and other medical treatment, the narrating fulfilled its task and thus ceased to have 
an immediate relevance. Other intersex individuals who recognize the relevance to 
publicly discuss intersex prefer to write and publish academic work on intersex, 
taking sociological, ethical, or gender theoretical approaches to the topic. These 
works are addressed at a broader readership, with the intention to reconsider intersex 
on a theoretical and/or ethical level or to educate about intersex rather than coping 
with personal experiences.  
Yet one book-length autobiography written by an intersex author who has been 
active in the North American intersex movement from its beginnings in the 1990s 
until now made it to a publication: Thea Hillman’s Intersex (For Lack of a Better 
Word) (2008), which is in the center of this chapter’s analysis.1 Hillman’s 
                                                             
1  I originally intended to include Hida Viloria’s autobiography Born Both: An Intersex 
Memoir in my analysis, which has been in the making for some years at this point. 
Unfortunately, her book has still not been published at the moment of the completion of 
my book, and hence cannot be included. It is however noteworthy that the author of this 
autobiography has a similar social and activist background as Hillman: Viloria is the 
chairperson of the Organization Intersex International (OII) and the Director of OII USA. 
Like Hillman, she has an academic background and holds a long list of public lectures 
where she has extensively spoken on intersex issues, particularly at universities all over the 
US. Her public and media appearances also include popular culture broadcast shows and 
documentary films. In recent years, Viloria has come to be considered as an authority on 
intersex issues beyond popular culture and the intersex communities. Hence, Viloria’s 
standing within the intersex communities and her authority in political and medical 
decision-making processes regarding intersex issues are relevant aspects of the conditions 
of the production of intersex autobiographies, concerning questions such as, who has the 




autobiography has received wider recognition on its release not only within the 
intersex communities but also within more mainstream popular culture. This is 
certainly due to the author being a prominent figure and spokesperson of intersex 
activist groups and her contributions to political work on intersex issues. Hillman 
served as the chair and board member of ISNA. She has an academic education, has 
produced national performance events including mainly intersex and genderqueer 
performances, such as ForWord Girls, Shameless, Rated XXXY and Intercourse: A 
Sex and Gender Recipe for Revolution, and published both fiction and nonfiction in 
various newspapers, magazines, and on the internet. She also offers informational 
talks and spoken word performances about intersex issues at conferences and schools 
(Intersex 159). She was also actively involved in the San Francisco Human Rights 
Commission’s investigation of “the medical ‘normalization’ of intersex people,” 
where she testified as a representative of intersex persons during the hearing in 2004 
(see Human Rights Commission of the City and County of San Francisco 2005). 
Hillman’s standing within the intersex communities and the political and medical 
stakeholders’ acceptance of her authority with regard to intersex issues are pivotal 
factors in the production of her as a ‘poster child’ of the early intersex movement. 
The fact that the only published intersex autobiography written by a North American 
author to date is narrated by a renowned and visible personality of the intersex 
communities contributes to conceiving her narrative as “an authoritative treatise on 
being intersex,” as Matthue Roth suggests in his interview with Hillman on the 
release of Intersex (For Lack of a Better Word) (Roth 2008). Hillman rejects this 
view on her narrative as being authoritative and claiming an objective perspective on 
intersex, and instead insists on regarding it as “just one person’s version” of intersex 
experience, as “just the first of what will be many books by intersex people about 
their intersex experiences” (Hillman, in an interview with Roth 2008). While the 
author claims Intersex to be a purely subjective, personal account of being and living 
as intersex, the narrative cannot entirely elude criticism of being appropriative to a 
certain degree. When asked about whether she “[felt] pressure to be authoritative, or 
to exclude certain stories because they didn’t feel, like, indicative of intersex, or what 
intersex should be” (Roth 2008), Hillman admits a certain ambiguity with regard to 
the appropriation of the meaning of intersex her narrative potentially conveys: “It 
was tricky writing about intersex and wondering when to explain things and when to 
let them stand on their own. I knew book couldn’t stand and shouldn’t stand as 
authoritative. [...] I also had to be careful not to tell other intersex people’s stories, 
even if my intentions were to educate and inspire less informed readers” (Hillman, in 
Roth 2008).  
                                                             
power to speak, whose voice is considered relevant, and whose experiences are represented 
within and beyond intersex collectives.  
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The use of the rather unusual form for Hillman’s narrative, whereby elements of 
several genres are mixed or juxtaposed, can be considered as a comment on 
traditional narrative forms’ failure to ‘authentically’ convey personal, individual 
intersex experiences. The hegemonic intersex narratives, in particular medical texts 
on intersex, have not only been heavily criticized with respect to their content and its 
political and cultural implications, by both intersex persons and gender theorists. 
Moreover, the intersex narratives written and produced by intersex persons challenge 
the medical narratives on a structural level, claiming that the traditional, scientific 
text forms deny narrative spaces for subjective intersex experiences and 
representations, and consequently are not eligible for producing ‘accurate’ accounts 
of intersex. At the same time, intersex autobiographies claim their own intersex 
representations to be (more) ‘authentic,’ replacing the hegemonic narratives’ 
constructions of intersex with their own constructions of selves. What needs to be 
understood, however, is that the reader has always only ‘access’ to Hillman (as the 
protagonist of her narrative) in a limited way, which means, we get only selected 
fragments of Hillman and her life. The intersex subject’s (Hillman) intelligibility thus 
depends on the intelligibility of the story itself, however fragmentary it is.  
Roth comments in his interview with Hillman on the freedom on the 
autobiographer’s side to bend the laws of ‘truth’ and still claim their account to be an 
‘authentic’ representation of their experiences:   
 
“There’s a certain kind of safety in writing memoir – if people want to say, ‘I don’t believe the 
narrator would say that,’ or even, ‘That was a dumb thing to do,’ it’s like – too bad, I frickin’ 
did it. And then, at the same time, you can be laying your most closely-guarded emotional 
experiences out for the world to see.” (Roth 2008) 
 
The narrative’s authenticity is derived from the form of narration, i.e. the specific 
genre of autobiography, and hence is legitimated on the basis of the narrator’s 
authority over giving an account of their own life. This kind of authority seems to be 
incontestable and the author to be beyond reproach for what they are writing. When 
Hillman asserts that “for me, letting that book out in the world is the most vulnerable 
thing I’ve ever done” (Hillman, in Roth 2008), what she is referring to is certainly 
not the risk of being criticized for bending the ‘truth’ about her life, but to the 
circumstance that she puts herself, i.e. her life story, on the line to be judged by her 
readers, and to the risk of her life (story) being appropriated by others for their own 
agendas (including fiction writers, journalists, and medical researchers and doctors). 
Intersex (For Lack of a Better Word) “chronicles one person’s search for self in 
a world obsessed with normal” (Intersex back cover). The narrative creates “moments 
of productive undecidability” (O’Rourke and Giffney 2009: xi) and seems to be 
driven by an impulse best described in the spirit of Judith Butler’s notion of ‘making 
trouble.’ Butler contends that “the prevailing law threatened one with trouble, even 




put one in trouble, all to keep one out of trouble. Hence, I concluded that trouble is 
inevitable and the task, how best to make it, what best way to be in it” (Butler, quoted 
in O’Rourke and Giffney 2009: xi). Hillman’s narrative consists of a series of short 
stories, each dealing with the most personal and intimate aspects of being intersex, 
such as questions of sexed embodiment and gender, sexual experience, and the 
relationship to her family and friends. By addressing issues which are commonly 
considered as being off-limits in public discourse, like linking experimental sexual 
practices to sexual trauma, she is breaking quite a few taboos and thus resists a 
cultural imperative for intersex persons to be reserved about their sexual matters and 
their intersex bodies. In engaging critically in discussions about the intersex and/or 
queer communities and spaces and her own positioning within these communities, 
her “brave and fierce vision for cultural and societal change shines through” (Intersex 
back cover). Hillman’s narrative has the ambition to present a counter-narrative to 
hegemonic intersex narratives, by the protagonist’s embracing her intersex sense of 
self and by a refusal to accept an identification with a clear-cut female or male gender, 
thus working against the invisibility and the unrecognizability of intersex. 
I begin my analysis with the observation that Hillman’s intersex autobiography 
constitutes a relevant milestone in the gradually emerging literary/cultural corpus of 
intersex works in North America (and beyond), as it provides a self-reflective critical 
(at times meta-critical) commentary on the paradigm shift of intersex narratives, and 
renegotiates the earlier intersex first-person accounts’ representations of intersex. I 
interrogate how Intersex takes up the discourses, narrative strategies, motifs and plots 
of previous intersex narratives, and reiterates, reaffirms, challenges, and/or rejects 
them in ways that allow Hillman to construct her own (narrative) version of intersex, 
but always in reference to already existing narratives. The narrative moreover 
contains intertextual references to discourses about normative and queer notions of 
gender, sexed corporeality, and sexuality, intersex activism, discussions within and 
surrounding diverse communities (including intersex, trans, queer communities), but 
also medical discourses and human rights and ethical debates. I investigate how 
Intersex uses and reappropriates these intertextual references for its own 
resignification of intersex, and the challenging of and resistance to hegemonic 
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4.2 THEA HILLMAN’S “SEARCH FOR SELF IN A WORLD 
OBSESSED WITH NORMAL”:                                
INTERSEX (FOR LACK OF A BETTER WORD)  
 
Most published information about intersex deals with 
it from a safe distance, an ethical, medical, or 
anthropological perspective. What my book does is 
deal with most personal aspects of being intersex, 
from my very singular perspective. I wanted it to 
answer the questions that people ask me all the time.  
THEA HILLMAN, IN AN INTERVIEW WITH ROTH 2008  
 
How far we have to travel to see ourselves reflected.  
How far we have to travel from ourselves. 
THEA HILLMAN, INTERSEX 
 
Thea Hillman’s memoir Intersex (For Lack of a Better Word) (2008) is the first book-
length autobiographical intersex narrative that was published in North America. The 
author calls her book a memoir, a subclass of the autobiography, employing the 
memoir’s main strategies of focusing on specific aspects of the writer’s life and the 
development of her personality, rather than encompassing her entire life span. 
Intersex is written from the first-person point of view, with several chapters 
employing a second-person narrative mode, albeit with different purposes and 
varying persons being addressed. The narrative consists of 47 exceptionally short 
chapters, each only a couple of pages long and headed by single-word titles. Most 
chapters are written in prose, while a few chapters are written in a poetic style or a 
mixture of prose and poetry.  
Intersex’s narrative structure is roughly chronological, as the first chapters deal 
mainly with Hillman’s childhood and adolescence while the better part of the 
narrative focuses on her adult life. Yet Intersex’s composition primarily seems to 
follow the principle of a “free-association order,” oscillating between a deliberate 
narrative structure and “brief peaks of emotion” (Roth 2008), and thus refusing to 
submit to a more traditional narrative idea of the autobiography. Intersex is neither a 
conventional coming-of-age story, although readers will witness a process of the 
protagonist’s maturing in certain ways. Hillman explains her book’s rather 
unconventional narrative form and style by considering the traditional 
autobiographical form as failing to capture her life story in an adequate way: “At first 
I tried writing a traditional memoir with a very traditional writing style with an 
initiating incident and climax, but my story didn’t quite fit that model and somehow 
the way I interpreted that style of writing wasn’t very alive” (Hillman, in Roth 2008). 




With a clear-cut, chronological structure missing, what can be traced as the thread 
running through the narrative, what is the leitmotif connecting the chapters? As the 
back cover of Intersex aptly indicates, Intersex “chronicles one person’s search for 
self in a world obsessed with normal” (Intersex back cover). Hillman’s memoir 
revolves around one central aspect of her life, namely the question, what is intersex? 
In seeking to answer this and related questions, Hillman guides her readers through 
her trajectory of bodily, sexual, and community experiences that reach back as far as 
her early childhood and accumulate throughout her young adult life. As various as 
the incidents appear at times and as unrelated as some chapters seem to be, the 
narrative never loses track of the author’s own sense of ‘non-normalcy,’ of queerness, 
which is attributed to her being intersex. The questions of ‘normalcy’ and intersex 
are interwoven and dealt with in a series of recurring themes, most notably Hillman’s 
experiences with doctors and the medicalization of her own and other intersex bodies, 
notions of sexed embodiment, her sexual experiences and sexuality, intimate 
relationships, sexual abuse, gender assignment and self-perception, the 
dis/continuities between various communities and spaces (queer, intersex, and trans 
communities), and intersex activism – all aspects that are renegotiated as the defining 
parameters of Hillman’s identity. While most of these themes have been prevalent 
motives in earlier (short) intersex narratives, Hillman manages to interrelate these 
themes within a wider narrative space, and addresses issues which have been avoided 
as they seemed to be too off-limits to be openly discussed.  
In Intersex, Hillman’s construction as an intelligible intersex subject is constantly 
negotiated and renegotiated by and through others (family members, lovers, friends, 
activists, other intersex individuals, doctors) and within different social spaces 
(including her family, intersex, trans and queer communities, the S/M scene, activist 
groups in/and San Francisco). Still her narrative recognizes the need, or rather the 
inevitability for her to construct an intelligible self. The central question of the 
following analysis consequently focuses on how, in telling her story, Hillman finds 
recognition, or perhaps different forms of recognition, as an intersex subject – and 
whether the memoir’s project of establishing the narrator’s intelligibility as intersex 
can be achieved at all. I investigate how the different parameters available to Hillman 
produce the conditions for her being recognized as intersex, and how the ways in 
which she is (mis)recognized according to these parameters and their norms 
correspond to or conflict with her own perception and experience of her sexed 
corporeality and her sense of gendered self. The crucial parameters under scrutiny 
are the medicalization of intersex and its appropriation for establishing legitimacy in 
intersex activist contexts; intimate relationships and acts of queer sexuality as refusals 
to heteronormativity; and the queer, intersex and trans communities and their 
mechanisms of inclusion/exclusion. I will begin my analysis with the act of 
storytelling as an act of coming out as intersex and an act of resistance against 
hegemonic representations. 
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4.2.1 Storytelling as a Coming Out Process: The Violence of 
Representation and the Struggle for Recognition 
 
Intersex is a narrative about narration, where the act of storytelling itself comes under 
scrutiny and is negotiated within the narrative. At some instances, Hillman explicitly 
comments on the way she uses language and words, thereby directly or indirectly 
addressing the reader. Her commentaries provide a meta-discussion on the conditions 
of telling her story, reflecting on her function as a writer-activist and the trans-
formative power of language. The chapter “Trade” includes one of the few moments 
in Intersex when Hillman directly addresses her relationship to the practice of writing 
itself:  
 
“I hate writing. Unfortunately, it’s not only what I do for a living, but also what I do for activism 
and performance. I don’t write in a journal or even have any kind of regular writing practice. I 
write for release, for intimacy, for a change, for deadlines. Mostly deadlines I set for myself. 
To save myself some pain down the line.” (Intersex 47)  
 
She conceives of writing not as an exclusively private act, and neither as exclusively 
motivated by monetary or ideological considerations. Writing, to her, is a method to 
bridge the private and the public/political, and a way to relate her individual intersex 
experiences to a collective cultural context. The process of writing serves as a catalyst 
for coming to terms with the difficulties she experiences with being intersex and 
provides a space for reflection. At the same time, her writing establishes an intimate 
bond with people who are mostly strangers. It therefore possibly opens up a larger 
space for collective negotiations and the articulation of a ‘common voice’ of the 
intersex movement, particularly in consideration of Hillman’s relative prominence 
and authority within the intersex community, and beyond. 
I will now, however, focus more closely on another level of storytelling. The 
process of Hillman telling her story, i.e. the story about her being intersex, is at issue 
several times in Intersex. Narrating her story both constitutes the narrative of Intersex 
and manifests itself as repeated acts within the narrative, for instance when Hillman 
talks about intersex at queer conferences or in activist and community contexts. The 
narrator also comments on the conditions and implications of these acts of intersex 
storytelling. In the following, the act of Hillman telling her intersex story within the 
narrative will be under closer consideration. The doubling of this intersex narration, 
in that talking about her intersex issues both structures her memoir’s narrative and 
repeatedly manifests itself as acts on the content level of the narrative, has crucial 
implications for the narrative representation of intersex and the narrator’s 
construction of an intelligible intersex self. The processes of narrating intersex are 
accompanied by Hillman’s commentaries on their circumstances and repercussions, 




both in private contexts and within the intersex community, as well as in larger 
societal contexts. The act of storytelling thus can be considered as signifying the act, 
or process, of coming out as intersex. 
The first time Hillman implicitly and semiconsciously tells others about her 
intersex body occurs when she is in fourth grade. She remembers telling other kids a 
joke about an instance of sexual ambiguity, where “a woman goes to the doctor” and 
tells him about her confusing sexual anatomy (Intersex 12). Hillman is indirectly 
referring to herself by telling this joke as a child, but providing the other kids with 
implicit information only, as if to test their reaction to the issue of sex ambiguity: “it 
makes me wonder what I was doing in telling this joke, what kind of information I 
was trying to give these kids about me, about my body, without flashing anatomy or 
telling them something they didn’t ask about or want to know” (Intersex 13). This 
strategy of using and even hiding behind humor when giving implicit information 
about herself obviously serves to save herself the potential pain of negative reactions 
from others, but also to put her own experiences with her body into perspective or 
even to emotionally distance herself from them. It is striking that sex ambiguity is 
inevitably related to a medical context. The connection between sex ambiguity and 
the medical establishment is a reference to the narrator’s experiences with doctors 
and can be interpreted as a strategy of coming to terms with her trauma of the 
medicalization of her body. It is also a reference to the theme of experiencing 
repeated medical examinations as a form of sexual abuse, an issue that comes up at a 
later point in the narrative in the chapter “Out,” which will be discussed in more detail 
below.   
Her emotions involved in the instance of telling the ‘joke’ are conspicuously 
linked to a sense of sexuality and sexual experience: “I remember how I felt telling 
this joke: mature, like I had something on the other kids, some privileged information 
about what adult bodies are like; and naughty, like I knew something I wasn’t 
supposed to know, some privileged information about what adult bodies are like” 
(Intersex 13). Hillman’s retrospective reflection on this moment in her childhood are 
reminiscent of another instance in the narrative, where she recalls an incident at 
which she, as an adolescent, was feeling “dirty and too experienced for my age” for 
not being scared in a situation of gynecological examination at a hospital, as a result 
of repeated genital examinations “since I was a very little kid” (Intersex 111). While 
she at some point in her memoir states that she cannot recall ever having been scared 
of medical examinations as a child, she later admits that she has really repressed her 
anguish and as a child could not understand, let alone articulate her feelings about 
what was happening to her. Humor then becomes, unconsciously, a survival strategy, 
by which she can articulate yet also displace her emotions. Her first effort of publicly 
telling her intersex story is fraught with shame, secrecy, and a sort of emotional 
dissociation from the story’s relatedness to herself, and thus from her intersex 
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corporeality; her coming out as intersex consequently does not take place for the time 
being. 
The first instance in which Hillman explicitly comments on the conditions of 
speaking about intersex, in a chapter meaningfully titled “Telling,” is provoked by 
the publication of Jeffrey Eugenides’ novel Middlesex and Hillman’s reaction to the 
literary and cultural handling of the intersex theme. Narrating intersex here becomes 
closely interrelated to the narrative construction of corporeality, suggesting that 
intersex, like all forms of sex, is a site of narrative or cultural instability and 
contestation. “Telling” begins with the narrator’s cautious approach to a lover’s body 
in the course of a sexual encounter, who obviously had a breast/chest surgery a while 
ago, with regard to the potential sensitivity of the operated body parts. The lover’s 
response to her cautiousness establishes an apparent paradox of feeling/unfeeling, or 
pain/numbness, yet simultaneously dismantles these paradoxes: “You tell me that it 
doesn’t hurt, but there are places that are numb. You poke around to feel the places 
that don’t feel” (Intersex 24). Obviously, seeking to reconcile one’s perceived 
discontinuities between body and gender, thereby troubling cultural imperatives of 
conformity, takes its toll: the side effect will be either numbness or pain, or possibly 
both. If embodiment is understood, as Katrina Roen has argued, not as a static matter, 
a “passive surface on which meanings can be inscribed” (Roen 2009: 20), but rather 
as an “event” (Shelley Budgeon, quoted in Roen 2009: 20), a “process of becoming” 
(Rosi Braidotti, quoted in Roen 2009: 20), surgery – often (mis)understood as “one 
of a number of technologies for moulding the embodied self” (Roen 2009: 15) – 
hence cannot simply alter or transform the body to conform to a subject’s perceived 
or assigned gender. The embodiment of the subject, as Roen conceives it, is rather 
produced through a “lifelong process of becoming” (2009: 21), and is a site of 
convergence “between the physical, the symbolic and the material social conditions” 
(Braidotti, quoted in Roen 2009: 20).2 
This introductory incident’s function is to set up a juxtaposition of surgery on the 
gendered body and its consequences for bodily sensitivity to the act of telling one’s 
story about intersex and its consequences for one’s emotional state: “The thing about 
activism, about telling your story, is you don’t know it’s going to hurt; there’s no 
sign, no warning” (Intersex 24). This comparison is further qualified by the specific 
kind of sensation involved in this process: “And even though there’s no sign, 
sometimes when someone wants me to tell my story, wants me to tell them about 
intersex, there’s this raw aversion. It’s not numbness. It’s just this odd feeling, this 
quiet no” (Intersex 24). This statement suggests that for the narrator, the need to be 
cautious about telling one’s intersex story is even more imperative than having to be 
                                                             
2  The cultural production of an embodied subject is contingent upon several interrelated 
cultural factors, including gender, ‘race,’ ethnicity, ability, class, religion, education, and 
other factors. 




cautious about a postoperative body. With the body, one can slowly proceed with 
trying out whether a touch hurts or not, whether a specific area of the body is sensitive 
or not; but there is no way to anticipate the pain involved in narratively touching on 
the intimate matter of the intersex body. The rhetorical juxtaposition of the intersex 
body as a seemingly ‘fleshy’ matter and the narrative representation of intersex 
effects a materialization of the (narrative) intersex self and at the same time undoes 
the binary of body/self, or of sex/gender.3 
A more explicit negotiation of telling, or rather not telling, the refusal or 
prohibition to tell her intersex story, takes place in the context of a discussion about 
Middlesex and its cultural impact. In the course of this process, the narrating of 
intersex from an intersex person’s point of view is repeatedly suspended or inhibited. 
The actual event which prompts Hillman to question the way information about 
intersex is conveyed in public is the release of Middlesex and her mother’s request 
that Hillman speaks in her book group about the novel. Hillman declines her mother’s 
request without providing her with an explanation. Her self-censorship in form of 
repeatedly asserting her inability, or unwillingness to give her mother an explanation 
for her refusal to talk about intersex in the book group, “I couldn’t explain,” or “I 
couldn’t tell her” (Intersex 24f), hints at a deeper insecurity with regard to talking 
about her own intersex experience and reproduces her involuntary silence maintained 
about intersex. While she provides reasons for her difficulties in articulating her 
position on intersex, she also has difficulties in openly addressing her concerns: 
  
“I couldn’t begin to explain what it had been like when Middlesex was first published. How I 
had been in touch with the editor of The New York Times op-ed page; how, when the book came 
out, I spent every minute for a week trying to write the perfect op-ed about the intersex response 
to Middlesex; and how, after writing nine versions, consulting with famous writers and 
journalists about the piece, and submitting two to this op-ed editor, the piece didn’t get 
published.” (Intersex 24f)  
 
Hillman’s difficulties in adequately responding to the novel’s intersex 
representations and in giving an ‘accurate’ account of intersex are reproduced in the 
failure to make her ‘intersex voice’ publicly heard, or read.  
While an intersex perspective is, for the time being, denied public representation, 
the voice and the perspective of Middlesex’s Pulitzer Prize-winning author Eugenides 
– a white, upper-middle class, heterosexual, non-intersex male – are the dominant 
ones in the public discourse on intersex. His power position within the cultural and 
                                                             
3  Butler argues that “if gender is the cultural significance that the sexed body assumes, and 
if that significance is codetermined through various acts and their cultural perception, then 
it would appear that from within the terms of culture it is not possible to know sex as 
distinct from gender” (Butler 1997a: 407). 
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public sphere conditions the stylization of him as an ‘expert’ on intersex. Eugenides 
steps into the position of the medical doctor as an authority on intersex, and while 
authority shifts from a medical to a literary discourse, this authority still operates 
within the hegemonic cultural discourse. This shift, however, is not to be understood 
as a replacement of medical by literary authority; in fact, the two discourses become 
intertwined in this process, as the novel is both informed by and renegotiates medical 
intersex discourses, and the medical discourses are reproduced and (at least to some 
extent) affirmed in this process. The mutual affirmation of the medical and literary 
discourses on intersex, as Hillman experiences it, serves the legitimization of 
hegemonic intersex narratives, the reproduction of authorized knowledge about 
intersex, and hence the production and reproduction of the ‘intersex subject’ as an 
object of study, as a mystified or fetishized object. 
Hillman experiences a powerlessness and a silencing, as she is not able to respond 
to Middlesex’s representations of intersex people, neither by speaking up at 
Eugenides’ reading at Books Inc., nor by a publication of her article conveying her 
point of view: 
 
“I started crying [...] because Eugenides, who’d never actually talked to an intersex person 
before he published the book, had access to so many millions of people, and that I couldn’t get 
an op-ed published. Crying because I sat there while he read from his book and while he 
answered questions as if he were an expert, as if he knew about intersex, and I sat there, an 
expert, silent and fuming and hot with shame as he called me and people I love 
hermaphrodites.” (Intersex 25) 
 
Both the situation of the public reading and the medium that decided on her 
publication, The New York Times, are contexts highly charged with the workings of 
ideology and power. Within these contexts, the power relations seem to be 
hierarchically organized, which makes it difficult if not impossible to articulate a 
counter-perspective to the hegemonic narratives that are (re)produced within the 
context of Middlesex’s release. Implicit in Hillman’s representation of hegemonic 
power is a critique of the lack of recognition on the part of Eugenides and The New 
York Times with regard to their institutional privilege, which enables them to speak 
from an authoritative position, indicating an inseparability of the social dimension of 
discourse – the position a subject speaks from – and the discursive acts. Power is 
exerted either directly, by the editor’s refusal to publish an intersex (counter-) 
narrative, or indirectly, by the reading’s hierarchical and intimidating setting, unequal 
distribution of speaking time, and educational or class differences.  
When Hillman sits “silent and fuming and hot with shame” (Intersex 25) at the 
reading because the author calls her a ‘hermaphrodite,’ it becomes obvious that this 
term is apparently so powerful it could physically affect her, so that she is verbally 
and bodily paralyzed and as a consequence can neither stand nor speak up to him. In 




Excitable Speech, Butler argues that by “claim[ing] to have been injured by language, 
[...] [w]e ascribe an agency to language, a power to injure, and position ourselves as 
the objects of its injurious trajectory” (Butler 1997b: 1). Butler however asserts that 
being called a name is not always only injurious but also conditions the constitution 
of a subject in language (Butler 1997b: 2), whereby this linguistic constitution 
depends on the subject’s recognizability: “the address constitutes a being within the 
possible circuit of recognition and, accordingly, outside of it, in abjection. [...] One 
comes to ‘exist’ by virtue of this fundamental dependency on the address of the Other. 
One ‘exists’ not only by virtue of being recognized, but, in a prior sense, by being 
recognizable” (1997b: 5). The cultural/linguistic ‘survival’ of a subject is put at risk 
by violent and exclusionary mechanisms of/within language, most notably by what 
Toni Morrison has called “the violence of representation,” asserting that 
“[o]ppressive language does more than represent violence; it is violence; does more 
than represent the limits of knowledge; it limits knowledge” (Morrison 1993). 
It is exactly this “violence of representation” Hillman suffers from when she feels 
misrepresented by Eugenides calling her ‘hermaphrodite,’ and which threatens her 
survival as an intelligible (intersex) subject. Yet, Eugenides’ call holds the potential 
for Hillman to counter his defining power in that it constitutes her as a linguistic 
being: “the injurious address may appear to fix or paralyze the one it hails, but it may 
also produce an unexpected and enabling response. If to be addressed is to be 
interpellated, then the offensive call runs the risk of inaugurating a subject in speech 
who comes to use language to counter the offensive call” (Butler 1997b: 2). This 
exercise of a linguistic counter-force becomes obvious in the narrative’s 
de/construction of expertise, the question of who counts as an ‘expert,’ and the 
conditions under which experts become authorized as such. Hillman makes it quite 
clear that she disagrees with how the authorization of ‘experts’ in the intersex 
discourse, which is at stake in Intersex at this point, is established.  
Her strategy of delegitimizing Eugenides’ authority relies on questioning his 
knowledge and on exposing the alleged fraud on which his expert claims rest. She 
denies him medical knowledge since he does not have a medical degree (“he spoke 
as if he were a doctor, using the phrase ‘5 Alpha Reductase syndrome’ in place of a 
medical degree he doesn’t have,” Intersex 25); she points to his usage of 
inappropriate terminology (“he used the word ‘hermaphrodite’ instead of ‘intersex,’ 
as if it were appropriate,” Intersex 25); she blames him for exploiting artistic freedom 
as an excuse for shameless intersex representations and profiting by it (“calling on 
artistic license as an excuse for exoticizing his dream hermaphrodite, for being yet 
one more person profiting off the selling of intersex people as freaks of nature,” 
Intersex 25); and finally, she discredits his authority because he “never actually talked 
to an intersex person before he published the book” (Intersex 25). Hillman’s 
dismantling of Eugenides’ knowledge, and hence authority, is accompanied by a 
discursive construction of herself as an expert, while expertise is juxtaposed to 
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influence: “Eugenides [...] had access to so many millions of people, and [...] I 
couldn’t get an op-ed published. [...] I sat there while he read from his book and while 
he answered questions as if he were an expert, as if he knew about intersex, and I sat 
there, an expert, silent and fuming and hot with shame” (Intersex 25, emphasis 
added). She formulates the disparities between knowledge and expertise and between 
expertise/knowledge and influence/power in terms of blatant injustice.  
What becomes obvious is that she considers the qualifications for being an 
intersex expert predominantly as being intersex. She does not further elaborate on 
why exactly she qualifies as an intersex expert, but her statement “everyone talks to 
me about Middlesex” (Intersex 24) in a way anticipates the information, which she 
will give at a later point in Intersex, that she not only identifies as intersex but at the 
time of Middlesex’s release has already become an intersex activist. All the reader 
can know at the moment, unless they know Hillman before reading her memoirs, is 
that she has some bodily ‘condition,’ or a diagnosis, as she herself refers to it, usually 
related to intersex. Thus, this instance of claiming expertise at the same moment 
functions as an assertion of herself as intersex in the narrative. This consolidation of 
her intersex self through a discussion about a fictional narrative becomes even more 
explicit in the subsequent chapter “Opinion”: 
 
“People keep asking me about Jeffrey Eugenides’ new novel Middlesex because the main 
character is considered a hermaphrodite. But really, neither of us are. Outside of myth, there 
are no hermaphrodites. [...] But you can be born with a mix or blending of male and female 
parts, known as ‘intersex,’ and indeed this is what Eugenides’ protagonist Cal and I have in 
common.” (Intersex 27) 
 
It seems peculiar that Hillman uses a comparison between herself and a fictional 
character in a novel for her own narrative representation of herself as intersex. 
However, this juxtaposition serves to account for her own intersex story, in that she 
seeks to explain the difference between the ‘mythological hermaphrodite’ and ‘real 
intersex people’ by reference to the fictional character Cal, and hence to dissociate 
herself from the mainstream cultural notion of intersex people as mythic creatures. 
Hillman’s following elaboration on intersex takes on an educational tone and 
positions intersex within a medical discourse, providing information on intersex and 
on the medical treatment of people considered intersex. The chapter “Opinion” 
originally appeared in the spring 2003 issue of ISNA News (formerly Hermaphrodites 
with Attitude) under the title “Middlesex and the Limitations of Myth.” At this point, 
Hillman was still board chair of ISNA, which makes her aim to educate people about 
intersex and the references to a medical construction of intersex seem plausible. Her 
reference to the commonly accepted definition of intersex, “[p]eople with intersex 
conditions are those who were born with sexual anatomy that someone else decided 
isn’t ‘standard’ for males and females” (Intersex 27), along with a listing of medical 




diagnoses intersex can refer to, initially reproduces the medical concept of intersex 
as a medical ‘condition.’ 
Her attempt to deconstruct the medical notion of intersex relies on several 
strategies and proves to be ambivalent. She refers to the constructive character of the 
cultural, and specifically medical, conceptions of intersex by exposing them as 
fictions, as “myths,” “illusions,” “fantasies,” and “mysteries” and opposing them to 
“real” stories of “real” people: “Intersex bodies are considered freakish because 
society has fallen prey to the myth that humans are sexually dimorphic [...]. Problem 
is, that’s just not what happens in real life” (Intersex 27, emphasis added); “many 
people, including physicians who treat intersex, remain under the illusion that 
technology can and should fix everything, and that anything that’s different should 
be corrected, regardless of risk. This belief keeps them from listening to real people 
with intersex conditions, many of whom challenge unnecessary surgeries” (Intersex 
28, emphasis added); “Sometimes I think they just don’t want to hear the real stories. 
I get cynical and think, who wants the everyday details of someone’s life when you 
can use people with intersex to fulfil erotic fantasies, narrative requirements, and 
research programs?” (Intersex 28, emphasis added). Hillman’s strategy of 
dismantling the hegemonic intersex narratives has several implications. First, there 
exists a dichotomy of fact and fiction, or real stories and mythologies, in which the 
respective former terms are attributed a positive, the latter ones a negative value. 
Second, there are narrators of intersex stories who are eligible to tell intersex stories 
(intersex people) and there are narrators who are not (doctors, novelists, researchers). 
Third, the legitimation of a narrator is based on their sexed corporeality. Forth, 
intersex bodies are “naturally occurring variations” (Intersex 28) of sexed 
corporeality which are ‘naturally’ explicable, while medical treatment is a violation 
of this ‘natural state.’ Lastly, intersex people are just ‘ordinary’ people and not 
spectacles or mythological figures such as “scientific specimens, teaching models for 
medical students (naked, of course), literary metaphors, gags for popular sitcoms, and 
[...] circus freaks and peep show attractions” (Intersex 28).   
Hillman’s deconstructive strategy reverses the premises of hegemonic intersex 
narratives in a specific way. In these narratives, medical authorities are considered as 
the (only) eligible narrators of intersex narratives, while intersex people are denied 
the authority to speak and are consequently silenced. Medical doctors are legitimized 
as ‘experts’ because they hold relevant knowledge, i.e. medical knowledge, which 
intersex people (supposedly) do not have; instead they used to be confined to the 
position of the ‘patient.’ Sexually dimorphic and ‘unambiguously’ male or female 
sexed bodies were (and still are) considered as ‘natural’ sexes, while intersex 
variations were (are) considered ‘unnatural’; hence surgery and other medical 
interventions have been socially and medically justified in order restore the ‘natural 
order.’ Through this rhetorical move of reversing the dichotomies, by changing the 
paradigms of the legitimation of knowledge and of narrative eligibility, Hillman takes 
118 | INTERSEX NARRATIVES 
 
the defining power away from the authorities and bestows the very same power on 
intersex people, who previously were culturally delegitimized. While this strategy 
undermines the hegemonic narratives’ knowledge claims on which their power and 
their legitimization rest, and simultaneously establishes an intersex authoritative 
voice by asserting knowledge claims based on personal experience, the binary of 
‘acceptable’ and ‘unacceptable’ knowledge itself, however, stays intact.  
What also goes more or less unchallenged are the biological determinist, and to 
some degree essentialist, premises inherent in Hillman’s narrative reconstruction of 
the intersex subject. Her argumentation strongly relies on biologistic assumptions, 
borrowing from medical discourses and terminology: “In real life, variations in genes, 
hormones, and maternal environments mean that some boys are born with very small 
penises or undescended testes, and some girls are born with enlarged clitorises or 
without a vagina. More and more people – including parents and doctors – are 
learning that our intersexed bodies are just naturally occurring variations” (Intersex 
27f). The uncontested acceptance of the criteria on which her knowledge claims rest 
poses another serious problem. Quite obviously for Hillman, being intersex makes 
her an ‘expert’ on intersex issues. To assert one’s personal experience as the sole 
basis of authority is not only potentially dangerous for the production of cultural 
knowledge about intersex, as Morgan Holmes has noted: “to be something, to claim 
an identity as a member of a group and to have common experiences with others in 
the group do not provide an adequate place from which to build knowledge, because 
having experiences does not guarantee any access to larger, critical awareness” 
(Holmes 2008: 120). It is moreover a move of appropriating or universalizing intersex 
experiences, a process which ironically reproduces intersex people’s appropriation 
by medical authorities.  
A different strategy of deconstructing hegemonic intersex narratives is the 
narrating of an intersex story itself, from the perspective of an intersex person. The 
intersex narrator not only becomes empowered by the reclaiming of the authority to 
speak; this narrative potentially provides the conditions for the narrator to be/come 
an intelligible subject, and hence individualized. The depersonalization and 
dehumanization of intersex subjects in medical discourses is largely a result of the 
politics of ‘normalization’ underlying the medical rhetoric and the treatment of 
intersex bodies. As discussed previously, intersex bodies are conceived as disruptions 
of the culturally legitimate sex/gender dichotomy, and hence are immediately 
sanctioned for their transgressiveness and are consequently erased in an effort to 
‘adjust’ them to normative sex/gender standards, and to consolidate the ideological 
framework of the dominant culture. As Hillman puts it, “our intersex bodies have 
become collision sites for Western society’s obsession with sex and fear of 
difference” (Intersex 27), and the obvious answer to resolve this tension is “that 
anything that’s different should be corrected” (Intersex 28). The notion of intersex 
variations in infants as a “social emergency” and the surgical fixing as a “form of 




psychosurgery” (Chase 1994: 6), which was already at issue in early intersex first-
person accounts and was discussed in depth in chapter three, is readdressed by 
Hillman, who exposes this medical standard protocol as a “myth” and hence denies 
it credibility and the legitimacy to function as a valid intersex narrative in the late 
20th and early 21st centuries: “It’s standard operating procedure to treat an intersex 
birth as a psychosocial emergency and to perform cosmetic sexual surgery as early 
as possible. There’s another myth that intersex will go away with ‘corrective’ 
surgery. It doesn’t. But sensation often does” (Intersex 28). In the process of violently 
‘fixing’ individuals, by surgically cutting any traits of genital ‘transgressiveness,’ 
intersex individuals are dehumanized, marked as “non-human, sub-human or pre-
human” (Dreger, quoted in Sullivan 2009: 323), and denied the human right of bodily 
integrity. 
The narrative restoration of intersex intelligibility is effected by the narrating of 
an intersex story from an intersex point of view whereby silence is “transform[ed] 
[...] into language and action,” as Audre Lorde has proposed in a feminist context 
(Lorde 2007: 42). Hillman comments on the recent increase in public interest in 
intersex themes as a result of intersex activism, and asserts that while “Eugenides and 
others are now realizing how compelling the idea of intersex is” (Intersex 28), they 
neglect communicating with intersex people and acknowledging what they have to 
say. This ignoring of intersex voices is countered by Hillman’s claiming of a narrative 
subject position: “But we’ve been here all along and we have plenty to tell. What we 
have to say may shock and surprise you: We’re not actually all that different” 
(Intersex 28). Her statement expresses the assumption that intersex people are just 
‘ordinary’ people like everyone else, and that an undoing of perceived differences 
between intersex and non-intersex persons would inevitably unsettle people’s beliefs 
in their own normalcy. In an attempt to dismantle the persistent notion of intersex as 
the site of sex transgressiveness, and to replace this notion with a more humanized 
image of intersex people, Hillman refers people to personal intersex accounts for 
obtaining authentic information: 
 
“We like to decide what happens to our bodies and like to be asked about our lives, rather than 
told. We’ve told our own stories in books, websites, newsletters, and videos. I can promise you 
they are far more compelling and exciting, moving and powerful than any fictionalized account. 
While the myth of Hermaphroditus has captured the imagination for ages, it traps real human 
beings in the painfully small confines of story. Someone else’s story.” (Intersex 29) 
 
Again, Hillman’s deconstructive narrative strategy renegotiates the demarcation 
between authenticity and fiction, whereby authenticity is (exclusively) derived from 
and produced by an intersex perspective. Her reference to the variety of narratives 
conveying the experiences of intersex people states the existence of a (counter-) 
archive of intersex stories that has been developing since the early 1990s, and at the 
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same time marks a point of reference for a cultural intersex collective. In the process 
of telling one’s own story, the intersex narrator can possibly overcome these 
“painfully small confines of [...] [s]omeone else’s story” (Intersex 29) and emerge as 
an intelligible subject. While Hillman felt herself, and others, “trapped” in a 
mythology, now, with the writing and the publication of her memoir, she can 
articulate her position on these fictionalized intersex stories, such as Middlesex, in 
retrospect. 
Yet the narrating of one’s personal story does not come without cost. As Lorde 
has noted, one particular aim of reclaiming and rearticulating one’s own sense of self 
through speaking out is to overcome one’s fear of visibility (Lorde 2007: 42). This 
process is accompanied by uncertainty and vulnerability, as the sudden recognition 
is necessarily a “self-revelatory” moment (2007: 42). Not only Hillman herself, but 
also her mother experiences this specific kind of vulnerability when being confronted 
with her own story and her daughter’s intersex story: 
 
“When I asked [my mom] what she thought [about Middlesex], she said, ‘Oh my God, it was 
us. It was your story. It was my story. And there’s no way I want to talk about it in my book 
group. It’s too personal.’ I felt that my mom really understood how I felt, that it seemed 
impossible and too intimate to sum up our story within the space of a book group and the 
confines of the ‘intersex’ label.” (Intersex 25) 
 
“[My mom] said to me, ‘In the book, the parents of the intersex person talk about it, but it 
wasn’t that way for me, I never talked about it. I never cried about it.’ Thirty years later, she 
finally did, sensation coming back to parts of her heart that had been numb for years, tingling 
in a sleepy limb. There’s a cost to telling your story, a cost to no longer being numb.” (Intersex 
25f) 
 
Interestingly, a piece of fiction, Middlesex, serves as a catalyst for the articulation of 
‘real’ personal experiences, but at the same time both Hillman and her mother 
dissociate themselves from the novel’s fictionalized account. While a novel can be 
publicly discussed, personal experiences are apparently too intimate to be exposed to 
an audience. 
The juxtaposition of body and narrative is a striking and repeated strategy in 
Intersex. When Hillman asserts that “[w]e like to decide what happens to our bodies 
and like to be asked about our lives, rather than told” (Intersex 29), she challenges 
the power relations and the violence inherent in both surgical interventions and the 
hegemonic intersex discourses, and reclaims the power which defines her and others, 
discursively and physically. The experience of powerlessness is a recurring motif in 
intersex first-person accounts, above all the specific kind of powerlessness towards 
the medical establishment and its treatment protocol. Violence committed against the 




body is experienced as the constraint of (narrative) subject construction and vice 
versa, as language and corporeality are inextricably linked with each other. 
Hillman’s reflections about the politics of narrating intersex and her self-
positioning within these politics leave two questions open so far: to what extent is 
she appropriating or universalizing intersex experiences, and how does Intersex 
represent her own coming out as intersex? The first time she tells her personal 
intersex story in front of an audience is negotiated in the chapter “Present,” 
approximately halfway through her memoir. Hillman’s memoir is daring in that it 
conveys an intersex person’s experiences of the conditions and the constraints of 
identifying as intersex within the intersex community, an issue which is rarely 
addressed openly. Quite often, the fear of exclusion and disagreement restrains 
members of intersex communities from voicing any criticism of community 
conventions. Questions of recognition within an intersex space play a significant role 
in the production of intersex intelligibility. If “intelligibility is understood as that 
which is produced as a consequence of recognition according to prevailing social 
norms” (Butler 2004: 3), what happens when this question of social survival is 
displaced to a context that defies prevailing social norms? How are the conditions of 
intersex intelligibility produced in an intersex, or queer space; what are the norms 
and practices at work in the regulation of intersex intelligibility within this space? 
The context in which Hillman’s intersex story becomes public is a queer anarchist 
conference, Queeruption, where Hillman is co-leading a workshop on intersex. Her 
conference entrance starts with introducing herself as intersex, a strategy to position 
herself within the queer community context in the first place: “I say it like my number 
at the gym, knowing it’ll gain me entrance, instant cred in a discussion I barely have 
the words for, within a larger society that allows me to pass often and with ease. I 
don’t know why I introduced myself that way. I guess I needed it, a reason to be 
there” (Intersex 89). Due to her gendered appearance – high femme – she can easily 
be misperceived as a cis/non-intersex woman, so in order to be acknowledged by 
others, in this case queer/trans/intersex community members, it necessitates an 
unequivocal statement about her being intersex. Her constitution of an intersex self 
is effected verbally, as appearance fails to convey valid information about her being 
intersex. She is invisible as queer or intersex within a context where recognition 
depends to a great extent on visual representation. As a consequence, Hillman sees 
her credibility questioned by others within the community, so she needs to affirm her 
belonging, her right to be there, before this right can be challenged. Both her 
credibility and her legitimation for participating in a queer conference are based on 
her ability to embody, or perform intersex. Her cautiousness shows that she is well 
aware of the exclusionary mechanisms within the community: only those persons 
who qualify as ‘members’ and who can prove their eligibility can participate in the 
discourse and gain the power to speak. This strategy of discursively asserting her 
intersex self does nothing to challenge the inherent normativity of the community. 
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Rather, she submits to community rules and regulations in order to be recognized and 
accepted by other members, and while she is vaguely aware of the implications of 
her strategy, she is too insecure to not blend in.  
The moment she tells her story for the first time occurs at a workshop she co-
leads with two other intersex activists, Hida (probably referring to Hida Viloria) and 
Xander. The workshop’s title, ‘Born Queer: Intersex: Fucking with the Sex and 
Gender Program,’ initially irritates Hillman and seems to make her feel 
uncomfortable about the associations surrounding intersex: “I don’t know who came 
up with the title. I understood it, but at the time I might have called it something more 
like, ‘Intersex Awareness & Activism’” (Intersex 90). Her reluctance to identify with 
the concept of intersex represented by the workshop’s title is however not openly 
articulated: “At Queeruption, I was too nervous to assert much of anything” (Intersex 
90). Her fear of being denied credit, of being rejected by the community members, 
goes so deep as to compromise her ability to speak out unrestrictedly: “At the time, I 
just knew that [...] I could say the wrong thing at any moment, something that would 
expose me as not what I was claiming to be, or something that proved I wasn’t all 
that radical. Which, in comparison to my peers on the workshop, I wasn’t” (Intersex 
91). The pressure to assimilate and to live up to the community’s expectations of her 
as an intersex person, in constant comparison to the others, is strongly related to the 
legitimization strategies inherent in the discursive constructions of intersex. For 
Hillman, the telling of personal intersex stories becomes a power play in which the 
valid defining parameters of intersex are contested. Narrations of personal 
experiences are displaced to a political and activist, i.e. public discourse. The 
competitive structure of the negotiation of the category of intersex and the seemingly 
contradictory definitions of what intersex is prompt Hillman to question her own 
identification as intersex: “I was nervous to tell my story: how I was diagnosed, what 
my life’s been like, what makes me intersex… mostly I was nervous because I wasn’t 
all sure if I was intersex fully, and because the group I was speaking to was so 
politicized” (Intersex 90). Her use of the phrase “if I was intersex fully” (emphasis 
added) suggests that there exists some scale for being intersex, that some people are 
more intersex than others, and that the rate of intersex authenticity is measurable by 
some norm. 
Hillman’s narrating of her intersex story at the workshop revolves around 
questions of medicalization and the relation of her intersex variation to issues of 
gender and sexuality. Her frequent use of the term ‘condition’ when referring to 
intersex, and her rather biological determinist stance towards the relationship 
between genitals and perceived gender nonconformity (“I was aware that my 
difference or freakishness originated from my genitals,” Intersex 91) and the 
causality between the sexed body and sexuality (“40% of girls with my condition end 
up being bi or lesbian,” Intersex 91) reproduce the faulty continuum between sex, 
gender, and desire (what Butler has called the “heterosexual matrix,” 1990: 151, fn6). 




The reiterations of arguments and certain notions of sexed embodiment, gender, and 
sexuality constitute her intersex narrative within the terms of a traditional medical 
and normative discourse. For this supposed reproduction of medical discourse and its 
normative implications Hillman is subsequently reproached by the other intersex 
persons present at the workshop. Confronted with criticism, she feels ashamed and 
immediately seeks a justification for her use of language:  
 
“While I agreed with [Xander], I felt really embarrassed. I felt exposed, my language clearly 
reflecting the experience of having a body that had been pathologized and medicalized and 
described to me as the result of a mutation. But I also understand the problem with words like 
‘condition.’ [...] I explained to Xander and the others in the workshop that I was just beginning 
to see my body in a completely new way, learning that my body was something to be 
appreciated and normalized socially, rather than fixed medically.” (Intersex 92) 
 
The discursive context within which the intersex workshop, and the overall 
conference, are positioned and which they are in turn reproducing generates such an 
amount of power as to validate some opinions on the issue as ‘right’ or legitimate 
within this specific discourse, and rule out others as ‘wrong’ or illegitimate. 
The telling of her personal intersex story is fraught with uncertainty, and Hillman 
experiences shame, embarrassment, awkwardness, and a strange kind of emotional 
dissociation from her intersex story at the same time: “I don’t remember looking at 
people’s faces as I spoke. I don’t remember what it felt like to tell the story” (Intersex 
91); “In my shame and excitement, I blanked out the rest of the afternoon” (Intersex 
92). Her coming out as intersex in a queer community space is to a large extent 
conditioned by the discursive regulations established by the community. Her 
construction as an intelligible intersex subject within the community depends on the 
recognition of community members and on the intersex (identity) claims the 
community makes. As elaborated in chapter two, the establishment of a collective 
intersex identity in the course of intersex activism involves potential exclusionary or 
assimilationist mechanisms, and might therefore fail to represent intersex individuals 
who do not share the same experiences as community members who count as 
authorities within the group and hence set the agenda for the community discourse. 
The question of recognition, i.e. who qualifies as intersex and how to prove one’s 
eligibility for participating in the intersex collective, becomes a question of how to 
perform intersex ‘right.’ Hillman sums up her experience of telling her intersex story 
in the following way:  
 
“What happened that day was that I began to claim may experience as an intersex person, no 
matter how awkward or imperfect it might be. Soon, I’d come to know that that awkwardness, 
that feeling that there was some way to be that I couldn’t quite attain, was one of the most 
intersex things about me.” (Intersex 92) 
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Intersex here comes to signify an intangible mode of being which is always 
contingent, fragmented, contested, and perpetually displaced.  
 
4.2.2 “A Password into a Secret Club”: Anxieties about the 
‘Different’ Body, the Medicalization of Intersex, and 
Questions of Non/Conformity    
 
Hillman’s autobiography ties in with earlier autobiographical accounts of intersex 
persons’ experiences with the medicalization of their bodies and the consequences of 
‘normalizing’ treatments. Intersex renegotiates the interrelatedness of the lived 
experience of the sexed body, gender identification, and sexuality in the context of 
processes of the medicalization and ‘normalization’ of intersex. While these 
interrelations play a significant role in many accounts of intersex experience, the 
length of her memoir allows Hillman to articulate her experiences with these issues 
in greater depth. Issues of recognition and definitions of intersex are the structuring 
principles of her narrative trajectory. In the following, questions of how Hillman’s 
intelligibility as an intersex person is constrained by medical parameters, and in what 
ways these medical parameters are renegotiated, reaffirmed, or challenged when the 
question of recognition (according to medical terms) is displaced to an intersex 
activist context, are in the center of the analysis. 
Hillman’s medicalization of her body does not immediately occur after her birth, 
as is the case with many other intersex individuals whose bodies are pathologized 
and medicalized. She is four years old when her mother notices pubic hair on her 
daughter’s body. Her mother’s look at Hillman’s child body constitutes her sexed 
body as ‘different’ in the first place. In contrast to other intersex people’s stories, in 
Hillman’s intersex narrative it is not a medical professional but the mother who 
initially ‘diagnoses’ her and identifies her body as ‘different,’ as in some way 
afflicted by a strange, unfathomable ‘condition.’ Her mother reacts with “horror,” 
“panic,” and “frenzy” at the sight of the tiny hairs: “My mother’s first frantic thought 
is, Oh, my God, my daughter’s got Virilizing Adrenal Hyperplasia. I know, it 
couldn’t sound weirder if I made it up. But I didn’t. It’s an unlikely thought, yes, but 
a wildly coincidental twist of fate that only real life could come up with” (Intersex 
14). The tension between fiction and reality, between the ‘abject’ and a ‘real person’s’ 
life, haunts Hillman’s intersex story as a recurring motif and expresses itself in a 
perceived “awkwardness” (Intersex 92) which is implicit in her construction of 
herself as an intersex subject. 
What follows her mother’s tentative lay diagnosis is a medical marathon in an 
effort to figure out and validate Hillman’s ‘true’ diagnosis by a medical authority. 
Generally in intersex narratives’ representations of the relationship between doctors 
and the intersex child’s parents, the medical professional is the one who exerts their 




authority over the parents, provides medical information and prescribes treatment. In 
Hillman’s case, it is the mother who utters a medical concern and insists on finding 
a diagnosis and adequate treatment. Hillman’s corporeality becomes the focus of both 
the mother’s and the doctors’ attention and is subsequently negotiated and 
renegotiated by medical parameters: 
 
“[The endocrinologist] orders a battery of tests. My mother takes me for countless blood tests, 
bone age tests, and so many other tests that my mother has long since forgotten their names and 
their purposes. [...] We go for test after test for close to six months, and each test makes my 
mother more nervous. With every one, she has to consider a whole new set of terrifying 
outcomes and treatments. I’m tested for genetic disorders, birth defects, hormonal imbalances 
– and each offers a different, bleak future of illness, drug treatments, and discomfort.” (Intersex 
16) 
 
The definition of her ‘condition’ is largely, or almost exclusively, dependent on and 
produced by medical knowledge and terminology. But not simply her bodily 
condition, her whole future as a healthy and socially acceptable gendered subject is 
at stake in the medical negotiations: her potentially “bleak future” might involve not 
only an affliction with illness and its respective treatment, but might cause further 
“discomfort.” While this discomfort might refer to the inconveniences related to a 
possible disease, it also hints at an anxiety about ‘difference,’ which is related to a 
social context. The potential “terrifying outcome” thus has both medical and social 
implications, and medical concerns become conflated with cultural anxieties.  
This fear of ‘difference’ Hillman’s mother experiences when she worries about 
her daughter’s condition rapidly escalates into horror when she researches hormonal 
disorders, particularly Virilizing Adrenal Hyperplasia, or Congenital Adrenal 
Hyperplasia (CAH): 
 
“[...] what she finds is horrifying. Each book is filled with pictures of naked children, their eyes 
blackened out. Children with strange-looking genitals, their bodies vulnerable and small, 
captured on the pages, victims of harsh light, the extreme close-up, and a complete lack of 
consideration for the young human inside the body. The pictures that scare her most are the 
pictures of the girls with excess virilizing hormones, the girls that I might grow up to be like, 
the girls who are dwarfs, who have full beards. Most of these girls stare straight into the camera, 
every single one miserable. And then there are the words: disorder, masculinized, 
hermaphrodism, cliteromegaly, abnormal.” (Intersex 17) 
 
This reference to photographs of intersex children in medical books is a recurring 
subject in intersex peoples’ narratives. Like the short first-person accounts published 
in intersex newsletters and magazines, Intersex reveals in detail the ways in which 
the children become depersonalized and dehumanized by the visualization strategies 
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of their pictorial representations in the medical context. The children are helplessly 
exposed to the medical observers’, and by extension other viewers’, gazes without 
the power of returning the gaze, as their eyes are blackened out and hence their vision 
is obscured. The spectator is protected against the children’s “straight stare” by either 
a black bar in front of their eyes or by their staring into nothingness, not meeting the 
spectator’s eyes, due to the medium of both the camera and the book/article in which 
the photographs are printed. Their nudity allows for an unrestricted view on their 
bodies and particularly their genitals; the “harsh light” and the “extreme close-ups” 
illuminate any detail of their naked bodies and their genitals. The uninhibited 
exhibition of their naked bodies makes them “vulnerable victims,” “captives,” 
“miserable,” and completely defenseless against any potential observer.  
These visualization practices serve as tools of sheer violence exerted on helpless 
human beings. This violence moreover manifests itself in the dehumanizing of its 
objects: the erasure of the children’s eyes strip them off their individuality and 
personhood, and the subtitling of their pictures with medical denotations, which are 
inherently normative, marks them as specimens of a specific medical condition or 
‘abnormality.’ The human is transformed into a medical category and is supposed to 
serve medical doctors as illustrative clinical material. The terms “disorder” and 
“abnormal” signify a more generally perceived deviance from culturally/medically 
constructed bodily norms, while the terms “masculinized” and “cliteromegaly” refer 
specifically to bodily deviances in ‘females,’ i.e. individuals who are otherwise 
classified as female, but whose ‘femaleness’ is in specific ways impaired, flawed, or 
dysfunctional due to an “excess of virilizing hormones.” Such bodily ‘anomalies’ 
which affect females are referred to in terms of ‘excess’ or ‘enlargement.’ There is 
‘too much’ of what is considered as ‘male’: an excess of ‘male’ hormones, excessive 
growth of body hair (beards, pubic hair), and an enlargement of the phallus 
(‘clitoris’). The CAH-girl’s body thus not only violates gender norms, but moreover 
claims male bodily privileges, particularly a large phallus with the capacity to 
penetrate – while the traditional female role is to be the recipient of the penis, being 
penetrated. 
The “complete lack of consideration for the young human inside the body,” as 
Hillman puts it, might also be the root cause of the horror these pictures evoke. 
Rosemarie Garland Thomson notes with regard to the cultural construction of the 
figures of the ‘freak’ or the ‘monster,’ as “forms that challenge the status quo of 
human embodiment,” that “[m]edicalization has not only purged many freaks from 
humanity, but it has transformed the way we imagine human variation” (Thomson 
2005). Both the description of the medical book’s pictures by Hillman’s mother, 
recounted by Hillman, and her mother’s subsequent reaction when she relates these 
representations of girls with Virilizing Adrenal Hyperplasia to her daughter, are 
reminiscent of representations of freak show attractions, or more generally, of 
‘monstrosity.’ After looking at these pictures, her mother is  




“petrified beyond belief, full of terror. And shame. And guilt. She is wracked with questions, 
wondering what she’s done to cause this [...] She doesn’t tell anyone her fears: that I might not 
grow up normally, that I might be a dwarf, or grow a beard, or something else unimaginable. 
She bathes me and sees my little hairs, and her fears clutch her.” (Intersex 17) 
 
The horror of her daughter potentially developing into an estranged, almost freakish 
figure almost distorts the way she views her child: “There are moments when she 
doesn’t recognize her sweet baby. Especially when I’m crying. [...] For Mom, it’s as 
if her daughter has been replaced by an angry, screaming other” (Intersex 14f). This 
experience of estrangement between mother and daughter is resolved only later, when 
a picture of Hillman and her mother is chosen for the cover of the ISNA parents’ 
handbook. The visual representation of an intersex person with her parent in a fashion 
that suggests a development of intersex children into healthy individuals and a 
functioning family bonding not only serves to consolidate the Hillmans’ mother-
daughter-relationship, but also functions as a subversive strategy, “showing parents 
and doctors that intersex people are whole human beings, not just naked bodies with 
eyes blackened out for privacy’s sake” (Intersex 147).  
This anxiety about the ‘different’ body and her child’s future as a potential gender 
transgressor triggers the need to eliminate or prevent any deviation from normative 
femaleness in her daughter’s body in Hillman’s mother. When the doctor finally 
confirms the diagnosis Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia, treatment suggestions for a 
‘normal’ development immediately follow:  
 
“The doctor tells my mom that since it was detected so early, there is a chance to get me back 
on track. With close supervision and monitoring of my hormone levels through regular blood 
tests, they can try to stave off puberty. And if it is successful, I will reach a short-to-normal 
height, will begin puberty at a normal age, and won’t have excess facial and body hair.” 
(Intersex 18) 
 
The rhetoric of defending normativity, i.e. the ‘normal’ female body, against 
intruders in the form of undesired masculinization by means of surveillance, is quite 
evident here. As Foucault has noted in Discipline and Punish, the observing gaze 
serves as a tool of disciplinary control exerted over individuals within a society or 
system. This mode of disciplinary power is exercised and (re)produced by the 
system’s institutions and implies the punishment of individuals whose behavior fails 
to comply with the system’s norms; the aim is to correct behavior considered as 
deviant or transgressive. As discussed in the previous chapters, the observing or 
inspecting control mechanisms applied by medical authorities in the case of intersex 
have as their intended goal the violent classification of intersex subjects as either 
female or male subjects. In Hillman’s case, what is classified as a medical condition, 
CAH, becomes representative of the whole intersex body, and of its subject, which 
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threatens to disrupt normative bodily and gender standards and hence is treated as an 
enemy – not only of Hillman’s ‘female’ body but of the whole system which is 
grounded in gender binaries. The three central techniques of control specified by 
Foucault, ‘hierarchical observation,’ ‘normalizing judgment,’ and ‘the examination’ 
(Foucault 1977: 170), are equally utilized in this ‘normalization’ process: Hillman is 
subjected to countless medical tests and examinations, which are both triggered by 
and eventually confirm a judgment regarding the ‘normalcy’ of the subject, who 
consequently needs to be constantly surveilled in order to keep ‘deviance’ at bay. The 
desired outcome is defined in terms of normative femininity, and the incessant 
medical controlling of her body in order to ensure a ‘normal’ sexual development 
serves as a constant reminder of her ‘precarious’ femininity:  
 
“I was monitored very closely to make sure the medication was mimicking what my hormones 
would have been doing if they were doing the right thing on their own. In addition to my 
hormone levels, my weight and height were watched closely because of the relationship 
between androgens and sexual development.” (Intersex 36, emphasis added) 
 
What is obviously at stake in this medical practice is the production of a ‘real’ 
woman, which implies a “mimicking” of what is considered ‘natural’ femaleness or 
femininity by ‘artificial’ means (medication). The cultural constructedness of genders 
and of the demarcation between binary sexes becomes clearly evident. It is obviously 
not a medical necessity but social and aesthetic imperatives that drive the 
medicalization process. 
The way in which Hillman’s intersex corporeality is articulated confirms the 
medical constitution of intersex, in that intersex is defined as a condition, a diagnosis 
or an “imbalance” which requires perpetual medical surveillance and medication 
(Intersex 18). What her mother conceals from her is the possibility of a bodily 
development that results in ‘intersex’ variations such as an “enlarged clitoris,” 
“masculinization,” or an “inability to get pregnant” (Intersex 18). She also refrains 
from addressing any assumptions regarding the potential sexual development of girls 
with CAH, such as an above-average inclination towards homo- or bisexuality, or 
increased sexual activity. These propensities are articulated in terms of what are 
normatively considered ‘masculine’ traits or ‘male’ behavior. Hence, her mother 
seeks to negate, by simply keeping them a secret, any possible bodily and/or sexual 
developments deemed socially unacceptable for a girl/woman. This strategy of 
secrecy suggests a strong encouragement to deny any bodily and sexual differences, 
and to pass as a ‘normal’ female. Addressing Hillman’s individual differences by 
medical or diagnostic terms like CAH, ‘condition,’ or ‘disorder’ erases intersex or 
makes it invisible, and denies her an identification as intersex. Secrecy and shame 
surrounding her corporeality do, however, not result in a smooth incorporation of 
denial into her self-perception but are conspicuously omnipresent in Hillman’s 




interaction with her mother: “It’s not that I think she should have told me these things. 
It’s just that they were there, between us and around me, hovering behind every word 
and gesture” (Intersex 18). 
Even at her young age, Hillman is aware of being somehow ‘different’ from other 
children, the secrecy and the attempted eradication of her ‘difference’ 
notwithstanding. Her self-identification is based on a demarcation from others, as she 
experiences her intersex variation as something that distinguishes her from her 
classmates and hence makes her “special” (Intersex 18). Evidently, this self-
identification results at least partly from the processes of medicalization she is 
subjected to, and her experience of being ‘different’ largely stems from the fuss made 
about her body:  
 
“It became clear to me that my body, and my sexual organs in particular, were the origin of my 
freakishness. I spent a lot of time comparing myself to other girls to find out what was wrong 
with me and to figure out how to be normal. I learned to hate my body. And I learned to see 
my body as doctors did, adopting a view of my body as pathological and in need of medical 
cures.” (Intersex 135) 
 
Hillman’s self-perception oscillates between internalized self-hate as a result of the 
perpetual body-shaming and a refusal to submit to the politics of shame and 
stigmatization. She affirms her difference in an assertive manner, she openly tells her 
schoolmates and teachers about her CAH variation and its medical implications, feels 
proud of being the only kid that has to take pills regularly, and is eager to develop 
physically earlier than others, in particular to start growing breasts, as she relates this 
to having a boyfriend and kissing like an adult. However, her intense self-
consciousness related to her perceived difference from other children constantly 
tantalizes her. She recalls an incident at preschool where some of her classmates play 
tag and a boy tries to catch and kiss two girls, and she desires to join them:   
 
“I run alongside them, past the big windows, [...] and I shriek like the girls do, waiting for them 
to look back and see me and grab my hand and pull me with them into the cover of the trees, 
and I giggle, wanting Josh to hear me and turn around and choose me as his next target. I want 
him to chase after me and catch me and kiss me.” (Intersex 22) 
 
The other kids, however, do not include her into their game, which leaves her left out 
and confined to the marginalized, passive and observing position. She considers her 
‘difference(s)’ as the reason for her exclusion: 
 
“I already know I’m not like them. I already know I’m not pretty and little and squealy. My 
hair is wavy and curly and thick. Part of what makes me different is those girls don’t seem to 
130 | INTERSEX NARRATIVES 
 
want Josh to catch them, and I do want him to catch me. [...] But me, I’m inside myself, 
observing, apart, and knowing this before I am six years old.” (Intersex 22) 
 
Hillman’s perceived difference which she feels sets her apart from others, manifests 
itself on several levels. Her outward appearance is marked by both her Jewishness 
and her CAH variation: in contrast to one of the other girls who has “straight hair that 
catches the light and takes flight in the wind” (Intersex 22) and to Josh who is “cute, 
with blond hair and blue eyes, even though he’s Jewish, like me” (Intersex 22), her 
hair is unruly, heavy and not shiny. Moreover, she feels unpretty and not cute and 
petite like girls are supposed to be. In her understanding, female desirability is 
inextricably linked to beauty, and beauty is associated with both normative 
femininity, such as prettiness, fragility and supposed ‘girlish’ behavior, and with 
Caucasian traits, particularly light and straight hair and blue eyes.  
But not only her physical appearance distinguishes her from the other girls, there 
is also a prepubescent sexual aspect to it: while the two other girls have allegedly 
innocent interests in their game, i.e. “only [...] the chase and the thrill and the joy of 
running with another girl” (Intersex 22), and not wanting the boy to actually catch 
and kiss them, Hillman decidedly wants Josh to catch and kiss her. Precocious sexual 
interest is intuitively attributed to her intersex variation, although as a child, she might 
only be semiconsciously aware of this connection. In fact, her precocious sexual 
interest is more likely a result of her experience of repeated genital examinations, and 
a reference to the relationship between medical examinations and sexual abuse, as is 
hinted at in other instances in the narrative. 
The perceived interrelation between medicalization, gender coherence, and 
sexuality is a recurring issue throughout Hillman’s adolescence until her adult life. 
In the chapter “Another,” she ponders on the connection between hormones and 
queerness, triggered by a medical article that claims a correlation between high levels 
of testosterone in women and their sexuality, stating that “girls with CAH [...] desire 
other women because they were ‘othered’ hormonally in a masculine direction in 
utero and now seek the exotic other (women) rather than men” (Intersex 72). This 
kind of reasoning not only relies on and reproduces dichotomous notions of both 
gender and sexual desire, but moreover is based on biological determinist premises 
which assert an inevitable and causal relationship between corporeal characteristics, 
gender, and sexuality. 
Hillman at first seems to submit to the medical defining power over her gender 
and her sexual orientation, and the alleged causality between testosterone levels and 
the two factors. However, while she ascribes to testosterone at least some effects on 
(her) sexuality, she also questions it as the root cause of the direction of sexual desire: 
  
“I wonder what is it about testosterone – on the brain, coursing through veins – that makes 
everyone, anyone, male or female, want to fuck women? According to medical literature and 




popular culture, if men want to fuck women, it’s because of testosterone. And if women want 
to fuck women, it’s because of testosterone. But testosterone isn’t a male hormone; it’s just a 
hormone. I understand that it makes people hornier, but I would think it makes them hornier 
for whatever they like, not that it dictates what they like. I begin to wonder what makes me 
queer.” (Intersex 72) 
 
Ultimately, the culturally established relationship between sexuality and testosterone, 
as Hillman observes it, is articulated in terms of ‘who does the fucking’ and ‘who 
gets fucked’: the female subject, i.e. the female with testosterone levels medically 
considered ‘normal’ for females, is always in the passive, ‘getting fucked’ position, 
while the active ‘fucking’ position is reserved for subjects who are in some way 
‘masculine’/’masculinized’ which in this case means subjects who have testosterone 
levels considered ‘normal’ for males, irrespective of the subject’s own gender 
identification. This active/passive role allocation within sexual acts signifies a 
heteronormative, hierarchical relationship between ‘male’ and ‘female’ subjects 
which is, if necessary, to be asserted by force, like in the case of some intersex 
individuals through genital surgery.   
Kira Triea regards this ‘fuck/being fucked’ dualism as inherent in the medical 
practice of treatment of intersex people, a practice informed by heterosexist and 
pornographic concepts of sexuality. The process of assigning a gender is inextricably 
related to a sexuality that is defined by the principles of penetration. The medical 
notion of ‘normal’ sexuality seems to be substantially informed by pornographic 
images of heteronormativity, (sexual) violence, male power and domination over 
females, and ‘adequate’ genital appearance (a large penis) and performance (i.e. fit 
for penetration on either side). Triea conceives of this connection between the 
medical and the porno industries’ negotiation of sexual roles (i.e. roles or positions 
assumed during sexual acts), and by extension of gender roles, as driven by a mutual 
interest in asserting male authority: “a need to express and preserve androcentric 
control is at the root of the medical-industrial complex’s fascination with my (our) 
genitals” (Triea 1997/98: 23). 
Although any forms of sexuality which deviate from heterosexuality, including 
homo- and bisexuality, are largely ignored in the medical thinking when it comes to 
assigning an intersex child or adolescent a male or female gender, medicine accounts 
for sexual nonconformity in terms of biological deviance, such as an 
‘overproduction’ of hormones. This rationale already implies a remedy for the 
ostensible deviance, i.e. medication; specific variations of gender behavior are first 
pathologized and then ‘cured’ or ‘corrected’ by medical means. The pressure exerted 
by medical authorities over individuals to accept not only the attribution of pathology 
to their body, their gender, and/or their sexuality, but moreover the recommended 
corrective treatment is often so tremendous that these individuals do not dare to 
question its legitimacy. What is more, societal pressure to ‘fit in’ as well as possible 
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rejection or punishment reinforces the perceived necessity to conform to what is 
considered bodily, gender, and sexual ‘normalcy.’  
Hillman’s contemplation about the relationship between her sexuality, or her 
queerness, and the medicalization of her gender behavior reveals her own investment 
in the intricacies of normativity:    
 
“And I realize, as I often do, that I don’t know why I take my medication. I get my period on a 
regular basis. I might get more hair growth or acne without the medication, but I’m not even 
sure that would happen. I tell people the medication helps me to normalize my levels. I don’t 
know what that means. What am I trying to become? A normal what?” (Intersex 73) 
 
While she takes a biomedical explanation for her queerness at least into consideration 
– “maybe it’s because I’ve been [hormonally] othered” (Intersex 72) – and actually 
affirms its appropriateness by taking the recommended medication for decades, she 
gradually begins to question her intended achievement of ‘normalcy’ and above all, 
the notion of normalcy itself, challenging the medical establishment’s investment in 
her ‘normalization’: “To what degree have I taken medication to maintain girl 
chemistry, to attain girl attributes and keep boy ones suppressed? To what degree 
have the doctors done this, and in what ways have I become complicit?” (Intersex 
86f). As a consequence, she stops taking birth control and reduces the dexa-
methasone, “in an attempt to be as much as me as I can be” (Intersex 86, emphasis 
added). Her refusal to the ‘normalization’ of her sexed body, and implicitly to the 
gender assignment made by doctors on which this ‘normalization’ is based, “opens 
the way for a more radical form of self-determination” (Butler, in Williams 2014). 
Implicit in her decision to stop or reduce medication is a sense of what her gender 
‘really’ is, or should be, which was ‘meddled with’ through medical intervention and 
can possible be regained by discontinuing medication.  
Intersex as conceptualized within a matrix of gender conformity and me- 
dicalization is a continuously renegotiated theme which structures Hillman’s 
whole memoir. The medical discourse on intersex is in the course of the narrative 
displaced to an activist-community space where intersex as a product of the medical 
discourse is renegotiated, gradually dismantled, and to some extent subverted. At 
first, Hillman’s narrative suggests that her self-/definition as/of intersex and the 
language she uses to refer to intersex quite clearly reflect her medical experience. It 
is important to note that it is not her adoption of medical terminology per se which 
informs her conception of intersex, but rather her experience of being born with a 
body that subjects her to the scrutiny of medical power, of being pathologized, 
constantly examined and observed, subjected to ‘corrective’ treatment, in an effort to 
‘normalize’ her perceived ‘deviances.’ 
The actual event which prompts her to deal with intersex on both a personal and 
a cultural, more political level occurs when her mother tells her about a Nepali child 




with potential CAH who is about to undergo medical treatment. Hillman’s 
subsequent research on the internet introduces her to the Intersex Society of North 
America (ISNA). What first comes up on ISNA’s website is a chart comparing the 
current model of medical treatment with a patient-centered model suggested by 
ISNA, which focuses on the needs of intersex individuals and rejects the current 
model’s recommendation to perform surgery on infants as early as possible. Soon 
after, Hillman gets to know Cheryl Chase, director of ISNA at the time, who asks her 
to become involved in ISNA’s activism. This moment raises an awareness in Hillman 
of her own potential belonging to a cultural category based on her intersex 
corporeality and triggers a negotiation of her identification as intersex: 
 
“It seems like Cheryl thinks I’m intersex. And while I’m honored that she includes me, I write 
back, thanking her, telling her that I am not intersex. [...] at the time, I feel I have to decline 
membership in this club. While I know CAH is an intersex condition, I have normal-looking 
genitals; I menstruate; I could probably have a baby [...]; and, most importantly, I never had or 
‘needed’ genital surgery.” (Intersex 76) 
 
Her definition of intersex is inextricably linked with medical parameters, and in 
particular with heteronormative ideas of gender, which go completely unquestioned, 
at least for the moment. Intersex seems to be all about ‘conditions,’ and in particular 
about genitals whose appearance subjects them to medical techniques of control, and 
about whether they were surgically altered or not. For Hillman, intersex is defined by 
a differentiation from a normative femaleness, which manifests itself in the ability to 
procreate, i.e. having the biological equipment for getting pregnant (a uterus, ovaries 
etc.) as well as an ‘appropriately’ ‘female’-appearing genital make-up (a clitoris that 
is not so large as to resemble a penis and thus deter males from engaging in 
heterosexual intercourse with her). 
In the intersex activist context where Hillman is subsequently positioned, intersex 
is likewise conceived of in medical terms, and the affirmation of a bodily variation 
related to intersex serves as a “password into a secret club” (Intersex 77), a proof of 
legitimacy and credibility for membership in this community. Yet while her CAH 
qualifies her as intersex for the activist community, she still questions her belonging 
in this category. In her negotiations about a possible identification as intersex, 
biological determinist factors play again a central role: 
 
“I tell [David], thinking out loud, that my genitals are normal and that I have a slight, borderline 
case of Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia. If I were to call myself intersex at all, I think I’d say 
I have an intersex brain. My rationale is that those excess androgenizing hormones my body 
produced while I was in utero probably have affected my brain. That’s also probably why I was 
precocious as a kid and aware of sex at an early age. And why, even now, I feel there are ways 
in which I am quite masculine – from being muscular to being promiscuous.” (Intersex 78) 
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Her reasoning is reminiscent of ‘scientific,’ or medical explanations for gender 
attributes and sexual behavior and uncritically refers to their logics of ‘naturalizing’ 
sexed bodies, genders, and sexual desires. Hillman’s seemingly uncritical 
understanding of the assumed continuities between body, gender, and sexuality 
stands somehow in contrast to her motivation for engaging in intersex activism, 
namely the challenging of gender norms – implying a critical awareness of the 
sociocultural regulatory mechanisms which produce genders and sexualities as 
normative or non-normative, as recognizable or unrecognizable, as intelligible or 
unintelligible –, reckoning that “working against oppression of intersex people is 
really quite radical in that it’s about breaking down binaries of male and female. For 
if we broke that down, couldn’t everything fall – every assumption, every system, 
every simplistic formula that didn’t really fit real life?” (Intersex 76).  
Hillman’s insecurity regarding her being intersex arises to a considerable extent 
from a fear of being not accepted as ‘really’ intersex from other intersex persons or 
community members. The question of recognition within the intersex community is 
a central theme in Intersex, and Hillman finds herself stranded in the face of contested 
claims about intersex. At a queer activist conference called Creating Change, where 
she supports the ISNA group for intersex activist purposes, she is nervous to meet 
intersex people as she fears their judgment on her eligibility for belonging to the 
category of intersex:   
 
“I don’t know what ambiguous genitalia look like. I’m not sure if all intersex people look 
different, even with their clothes on. I wonder what people will say when they find out how 
little I am intersex, that my genitals appear normal, that I’ve never had surgery. I wonder what 
other people at the conference will say about my genitals. I wonder if I will see anyone else’s 
genitals.” (Intersex 78f)   
 
For Hillman, being recognized as intersex seems to be primarily based on the 
appearance of genitalia, whether they look ‘ambiguous’ or were surgically altered, 
and what the underlying medical conditions are. The politics of intersex activism in 
its early days, as discussed above, were motivated by intersex persons’ desire to 
publicly articulate their personal experiences with the medicalization of their bodies 
and to speak out against medical interventions, particularly genital surgery. Thus, the 
intersex activists’ definition of intersex, and by extension of a (collective) intersex 
identity, is heavily informed by medical parameters, albeit parameters the activists 
seek to challenge. 
The constitution of Hillman’s intersex ‘authenticity’ depends alternately on 
doctors’ and activists’ affirmation of her intersex variation, and both the doctors’ 
assertion that she does not look like other girls with CAH and Cheryl Chase’s 
definition of intersex as individuals “whose genitals make them subject to surgeries 
or medical intervention” (Intersex 81) seem to negate her belonging to the category 




of intersex. When Hillman informs Cheryl that she feels excluded by her definition, 
she experiences this as a crucial moment of identity reconciliation: “Me, challenging 
a definition put forward by the very person who birthed the modern intersex 
movement. This must be huge. This must mean something important to me, too, about 
my identity. Maybe this is the moment I’ve been waiting for, when my identity is 
finally recognized and confirmed” (Intersex 82). However, the desired result, namely 
a renegotiation of a medically-based definition of intersex, fails to materialize. 
Moreover, ISNA’s approach to intersex activism turns out to be not “about breaking 
down binaries of male and female” (Intersex 76), as she was hoping for, and thus 
refuses any alignment with queer or transgressive gender identity politics.  
Yet while ISNA members were pioneers in late 20th century intersex activism and 
crucially shaped early intersex politics, other intersex voices appeared on the scene 
who did not leave the premises of intersex as defined by surgical experience 
unchallenged. As Hillman recounts her experience at Queeruption, her own definition 
of intersex that is informed by medical parameters comes under attack from other 
intersex activists. Her definition of intersex at the time as “someone born with 
anatomy that someone decided wasn’t standard for male or female” (Intersex 90) is 
rejected by Hida, as “the definition itself referenced another’s standard of the intersex 
person’s body” (Intersex 90). Other definitions challenge the hegemonic definition 
of intersex. Hida herself has escaped surgery and other medical treatment, but claims 
“that this did not negate her being intersex” (Intersex 90). Xander, another activist, 
claims intersex to be an identity outside of the gender binary altogether. While these 
definitions contradict each other, they do not, or cannot claim a universal definitory 
power, but are coexistent and produce a multiplicity of narratives. Hillman eventually 
begins to realize that experience (as an intersex person) is “a systemic process that 
actively produces and differentiates subjects as individuals” (Holmes 2008: 123), and 
thus cannot be generalized by and for an intersex collective: “I [...] know the ways in 
which my experience isn’t the same as other people with intersex, so people shouldn’t 
assume anything – genital conformation or life experience – when they hear someone 
is intersex” (Intersex 82). 
Hillman’s involvement in intersex activism eventually prompts her to come to 
terms with her own experiences with doctors and the medicalization of her body. Her 
experiences with the medical establishment seem to be ambivalent at first. At the 
beginning of her memoir, she recalls that as a child, she almost enjoyed the attention 
she received and felt important and mature, in fact even “special” for missing school, 
having to take medication, and having something the other kids did not have (Intersex 
17f). While she reminisces that everyone of the medical staff was nice to her, more 
problematic and negative feelings are insinuated. She describes the examination 
situation at the endocrinologist’s in detail, although a long time has passed since it 
occurred, remembering “his large hands palpating my chest to check for breast 
development, pressing my belly, and then pulling down my underwear, noting the 
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pubic hair, and pulling my labia apart to see if there’s clitoral enlargement, which 
there isn’t” (Intersex 16). Despite the doctor’s best efforts to put his little patient at 
ease, this moment lingers in her memory as a highly uncomfortable incident in her 
childhood: “[The endocrinologist] seems embarrassed and performs his examination 
as fast as he can. I’m embarrassed, too, and ticklish under his cold hands. I’m glad 
when he’s done and Mom takes me down from the table” (Intersex 16). Hillman 
however represses her troubled feelings for the time being and does not address them 
until later in her memoir, at a moment when her memories catch her virtually off 
guard.   
The chapter “Out,” set roughly past two-thirds of her narrative, is entirely 
dedicated to her reprocessing of her early medical experiences, which turn out to have 
had a more traumatic effect on her as the narrative has indicated so far. The trigger 
event for her to face what she has emotionally displaced for several decades is when 
she reads the transcripts of an ISNA training video in which several people discuss 
the problems with the ‘old’ model of medical treatment of intersex infants and 
children. The transcripts’ account begins with describing a scene of brute violence 
and abuse exerted over an intersex girl: 
 
“What I read chills me. [...] First is a pediatric social worker’s account of being called in to help 
calm a resistant patient who was receiving ‘vaginal dilation.’ There were all sorts of people in 
the room while the procedure was being attempted: a fellow in pediatric surgery, the attending 
physician, the attending special clinical nurse, two or three medical students. All the while they 
were holding the girl down, trying to insert something into her vagina. The social worker says 
she had no idea what she was supposed to do so she left the room and went to calm the parents 
instead.” (Intersex 109f) 
 
It is an incident that is reminiscent of a gang rape in its force, brutality, and the 
powerlessness of the victim, a little girl, while all persons involved are complicit in 
one way or another: the medical staff who hold her down, penetrate her with the 
dilator, watch the scene without intervening or leave without helping the girl, and 
finally the parents who leave their daughter to her fate, i.e. at the mercy of her abusers. 
Vaginal dilation is a procedure routinely following a vaginoplasty, the surgical 
creation or widening of a vagina, for the purpose of stretching the surgically created 
vaginal opening; this procedure is intended to facilitate the girl’s ability to have 
heterosexual penetrative intercourse as an adult. This child abuse in the form of 
vaginal dilation is not only committed by doctors but extended to the realm of the 
family, who need to continue the dilation when the child is at home after the surgery. 
Parents and other family members become guilty of, or at least complicit in, the 
sexually abusive procedure inflicted upon their own child:    
 




“Next I read a mother’s account of having to dilate her six-year-old child after the child’s 
vaginoplasty. Her daughter would scream, ‘Nooo,’ an her grandmother held her down while 
this woman attempted to do what doctors had told her she had to do so that when the child was 
older she could have sexual intercourse.” (Intersex 110) 
 
Abuse here signifies both the violence exerted by means of medically intruding into 
the body and the violence involved in the definitory power of assigning a gender. 
Morgan Holmes argues for an extension of the definition of interpersonal violence 
beyond “acts of aggression” in the context of medical treatment of intersex infants: 
“I am suggesting that the term ‘violence’ be applied to any situation in which one 
person or group is using power and privilege as a means to control, limit or altogether 
deny the freedoms of another person or group of people,” referring specifically to 
“infants who are forcibly sexed as females,” and to the “violent means employed to 
construct an ‘adequate’ male body” (Holmes 1995).  
Hillman proceeds with the training video’s transcripts and arrives at a moment of 
revelation when confronted with a scene reminiscent of her own experiences as a 
child, “the trauma of repeated genital displays” (Intersex 110). She recalls repeated 
situations at the doctor’s office during her early childhood, where the endocrinologist 
feels her chest and examines her genitalia, and touches and presses her stomach. She 
is ticklish under his touch and not able to keep still, a moment she dreads most at 
every examination, and feels guilty for her reaction: “I felt bad. I would worry before 
each appointment that I wouldn’t be able to stop myself from being ticklish. I would 
say sorry to him that I couldn’t sit still. Only now do I see that this is the same little 
girl who apologized to the child molester, whom I was sure I had disappointed 
because I couldn’t climb the tree in my skirt as he asked to” (Intersex 110). Although 
she remembers the doctor as “a nice man” (Intersex 111), the analogy she draws 
between him and the child molester and the similarity of her feelings and reactions 
to being subjected to their will strongly suggests that she experienced the examination 
situations, albeit subconsciously or semiconsciously, as a form of sexual abuse.   
She realizes that the secrecy kept about her intersex variation and the 
misinformation she received regarding the medical procedures she was subjected to, 
i.e. the “lack of comprehension and explanation for the events happening” to her, 
have resulted in her “inability to make sense of [her] experiences and to encode them 
in a meaningful way,” as Tamara Alexander argues with regard to the practices of 
silence and intentionally wrong information recommended by doctors and 
implemented by parents of an intersex child (Alexander 1997). Her mother’s 
concealment of relevant information concerning her daughter’s intersex variation and 
the real purpose of her medical treatment has evoked a sense of shame and even 
stigma in Hillman and hence restrained her from articulating her anxieties. Hillman’s 
inability as a child to grasp what was happening to her, together with the sense of 
shame and humiliation of being completely exposed to the doctor’s hands and gaze, 
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all of this happening while her mother was present at the examinations the entire time 
– which makes her unintentionally complicit in the abusive events – have resulted in 
the suppression of her traumatic feelings: 
 
“These memories aren’t buried in some primordial mud of my mind. What’s buried are the 
feelings. I picture the little girl that’s me bravely trying to keep still and not be ticklish. I wonder 
at her ticklishness. I wonder that she was never scared. That she never cried. That she never 
complained. That she never said no. [...] But what I didn’t know until now is that somewhere, 
hidden far away from everyone, and especially me, was a terrified person – and more 
particularly, a terrified little girl.” (Intersex 110f)  
 
It is only after the confrontation with the video material conveying the experiences 
of other intersex persons that she is able to reprocess what was happening to her as a 
child.  
Although these accounts of other intersex experiences serve as a catalyst for 
Hillman to understand her own pain and trauma, reading the video transcript makes 
her feel “damaged,” and she denies a connection between what is happening to the 
others and her own experiences at first. She discusses her feelings with her lover and 
is shocked when he admits to her that he has wondered if she had been sexually 
abused but does not remember it. His assertion effects a sudden, momentary undoing 
of her subjectivity and threatens to dismantle her assertive conception of herself: 
 
“I’m incredulous. What? Me? Sex-positive me? The only girl I know with no shame, me? A 
sexual abuse survivor? I know it’s not true, but why do I feel cornered, pegged, nailed? I look 
him straight in the eyes and then look away, scared for him to see me unscripted, to see more 
things I don’t know or can’t remember. I feel inside out in front of him and without answers, 
without information, without understanding of myself. How do you have a conversation about 
yourself when all of a sudden you don’t know what you’re talking about?” (Intersex 112)  
 
Her previously coherent sense of self is disrupted, almost breaking down in the face 
of her lover’s statement, and by implication, in the face of this revelation. According 
to Butler’s account of the limits of the autonomy of the self, our relations with others 
are constitutive of our sense of self. This relationality becomes most obvious when 
these ties to others are in some way shattered, leading to a “challenge [of] the very 
notion of ourselves as autonomous and in control” (Butler 2004: 19). Hillman’s 
relation to other intersex people undergoes a rupture, in that her previously perceived 
difference and dissociation from them collapses as she becomes aware of their 
possibly shared experiences and her relatedness to them. Likewise, her relation to her 
lover experiences a disruptive moment, calling into question the terms upon which 
their sexual relationship and their shared sexuality rest (her lover has wondered for a 
year and a half whether she is a survivor of sexual abuse, and she was unaware of his 




speculation the entire time). This rupture in her sense of self manifests itself on the 
narrative level of her intersex story, in her difficulties to give an intelligible account 
of her (intersex) self. 
Still she questions the legitimacy of feeling hurt the way other intersex people do 
because she apparently lacks the shared intersex experience of infant or childhood 
surgery: “At the time, I felt so different from them. I had never had a body that others 
wanted to operate on to make it look normal. I had a determined sex that everyone 
agreed on, including me” (Intersex 112); “My treatment was a huge success. 
Everyone said so. [...] Then why did I feel bad? It wasn’t like I’d had surgery like 
other people I knew. Or even a different-shaped body. Was I allowed to feel hurt?” 
(Intersex 112). Although she at first denies a straightforward relation to the ‘typical’ 
intersex experience, she eventually realizes a recognition as intersex through the 
writing of her memoir:   
 
“What I didn’t really register at the time, I realize now, was that while watching the films, I 
would get hot and flushed. A deep sense of shame, of feeling found out, would rise and swell 
and push up against my throat. A part of me recognized myself in those films. If it wasn’t in 
the body itself, it was in sharing the name of the condition Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia, or 
seeing the clear disgust of the doctor, or watching a child being turned into a freak right in front 
of my eyes. Those things I shared. Maybe that’s what being intersex was about. Maybe I didn’t 
need to have had surgery. Maybe the most intersex thing about me was my experience of how 
my body was treated and how I felt, rather than whether or not I had confusing anatomy or 
genital surgery.” (Intersex 112f, emphasis added) 
 
Her definition of, and consequent self-identification as intersex departs, at least to 
some extent, from ISNA and other activists’ notion of grounding intersex in an 
‘ambiguously’ sexed body and genital surgery, claiming intersex to be “people whose 
genitals make them subject to medical intervention” (Intersex 81), and denying 
definitions based on experiences that diverge from this ‘intersex script.’ While 
Hillman feels that this commonly accepted definition excludes her from 
identifying/being identified as intersex, her narrative reconciliation of her sense of 
self eventually allows for a moment of intersex intelligibility.  
In trying to figure out how to deal with this information and how to act on it – 
“Was I supposed to break down? Was I supposed to seamlessly integrate this new 
material into my fabric of self?” (Intersex 113) –, her strategy is to write down, and 
thus materialize, the fragmented pieces of information in order to construct them into 
a coherent narrative of self: “I grabbed little scraps of paper and began to scribble 
down snippets of my conversation with my lover as we had it so that I could figure 
myself out later, when I was alone, when I had time to think” (Intersex 113). The 
writing down of her thoughts and feelings, first in an unsorted, stream of 
consciousness mode and later in a more reflected, consistent narrative form in her 
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memoir, functions as a cathartic moment in her narrative. For Hillman, the retelling 
of her experiences enables her to integrate this part of her into her sense of self, and 
more particularly, her sense of intersex self.   
 
4.2.3 Inhabiting Uninhabitable Homes:                                  
Intimate Relationships, Sexual Survival, and                   
Queer Subculture as an Alternative World 
 
Hillman’s experiences with the medicalization of her body is contrasted with chapters 
that deal with her sexual experiences in explicit ways. This narrative juxtaposition of 
the medicalized and the sexualized body – the chapters on medical issues do not 
chronologically precede the chapters focused on sexuality, but are alternating – 
effects a decentering of the medicalization of intersex, resulting in the narrative’s 
defiance of a coherent representation of Hillman’s sexed embodiment. The following 
interrogation focuses on how Hillman’s sexuality and sexual acts and her intimate 
relationships function as crucial parameters for producing the conditions of her 
recognizability as intersex, how the norms inherent in these sexual practices and 
relations constrain or allow for her recognizability in specific sexual contexts (the 
alternative queer scene, subculture, relationships), and how her perception of her 
body and her sense of gendered self matches or conflicts with the ways she is 
perceived by her (sex) partners. 
Sexuality is a theme discussed very openly and extensively in Hillman’s memoir. 
Several chapters focus on Hillman’s sexual experiences and her life in the alternative 
queer world, more precisely, her sex and community life in San Francisco. The 
narrative’s strategy of addressing issues of sexuality in very explicit ways is regarded 
with suspicion by some intersex people and often considered as off-limits in intersex 
discourse. In earlier narratives that deal with sexual experiences of intersex persons, 
sexuality is largely linked to the consequences of genital surgery, with a clear focus 
on sexual dysfunction as a result of genital mutilation and sexual trauma. Intersex’s 
representations of sexuality address the results of the medicalization of the 
protagonist’s intersex body as well, albeit in a different way. Yet the narrative goes 
far beyond representing sexuality of intersex individuals as merely afflicted by sexual 
trauma and dysfunction. Representations of an intersex person enjoying her sexuality, 
experimenting with sexual practices, and openly talking about it challenge both the 
notion of intersex sexuality as always troubled by pain and intersex persons’ 
seemingly mandatory reticence with regard to their sexuality. This openness about 
her sexual experiences however is not without cost and has made Hillman vulnerable 
to reproach from the intersex community. As she later admits in her memoir, “[t]here 
were those [intersex people] that didn’t trust me because I hadn’t had surgery, and 




there were those that didn’t trust me because I talked about sex too openly” (Intersex 
147f).  
In the very first chapter, “Haircut,” Hillman reminisces about an incident in her 
adolescence where her then girlfriend wanted to give her a genital haircut. 
Immediately the narrative sets up a seemingly inextricable relationship between 
bodily difference and self-consciousness, medicalization, (sexual) abuse, and 
sexuality. The chapter tentatively introduces some relevant pieces of information 
foreshadowing several of these interrelated issues, which will be put together into a 
coherent and meaningful whole in the course of the narrative. Hillman’s assertion, 
“[w]hat I should have told her right then is that I’m kind of sensitive about my hair 
down there. That it’s been there since I was a toddler, that it makes me feel special, 
and that I’m still ashamed of it” (Intersex 9), raises the subject of an unspecified 
bodily variation which is in some way problematic for her and has troubled her since 
her childhood, without giving away too much information at this moment. The genital 
haircut given by her girlfriend, an intimate and sexual(ized) act, is displaced to a 
medical scene, most explicitly through the focus on the scissors with which her 
girlfriend is going to cut her pubic hair: “These scissors are the kind with teeth so 
sharp they seem to cut molecules of air as they close. Like a surgical implement, 
they’re long, thin, silver, and cold” (Intersex 9). Her description of her sexual 
encounters, and particularly the haircut situation, are highly evocative of past 
examination situations at the doctor’s office. Hillman attributes her ticklishness, her 
inability to relax during sexual encounters, and her difficulties with being touched by 
a lover to her experiences with a certain doctor in her childhood, “whose job it was 
to make sure I was developing at a normal rate, whose fingers pushed on my chest to 
see if breast tissue was developing, whose fingers opened me to make sure my clitoris 
was doing everything it was supposed to and not one bit more” (Intersex 10). The 
medical examination context is juxtaposed to the intimate scene of the haircutting: “I 
was cold sitting there, watching the scissors do their work, and I was getting more 
nervous by the minute, the ice cold of the metal biting my skin. [...] The sharp scissor 
tips were poking my labia. I was beginning to panic, but I wanted to give her what 
she wanted, so I let her keep going” (Intersex 10).  
The question of power and control is very much at issue in both contexts, and 
although Hillman did not undergo any surgical intervention, the image of the scissors 
is evocative of the “sharp, cool tools of a doctor” (Intersex 11) that have intruded into 
her body and hence become a signifier for her being at the mercy of someone else’s 
hands. When her girlfriend cuts her hair, Hillman feels her to be in complete control, 
leaving herself “reduced to feeling like a small child, and even though I’m petrified, 
I’m committed to letting her be in charge. I’m trying so hard to give it up” (Intersex 
11). This power/control play is reminiscent of Hillman’s descriptions of her 
experiences with doctors, which will come up time and again in the narrative, and 
indicates her perceived powerlessness and inability to fend off acts she is 
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uncomfortable with. Experiences of sexual abuse are related to sexuality and her 
sexual encounters: “Years of having sex with women, or people who were designated 
as female at birth, has taught me a lot about having sex with survivors of sexual abuse. 
I recognize the stillness of someone leaving their body,” and so on (Intersex 10). The 
issue of sexual abuse is addressed only tentatively at this moment and foreshadows 
her own survival of childhood sexual abuse with which she will deal at a later point 
in her memoir. For Hillman, sexuality seems to revolve around questions of power 
and trust, and in particular the question of setting limits when it comes to corporeal 
and/or sexual acts:  
 
“The more I learn the secrets of other people’s bodies, the more patient I am when they need 
to stop, slow down, the more I realize I haven’t said ‘No’ very often. That I apologize for being 
ticklish instead of listening to what it’s telling me. That I need to teach people how to touch me 
so my body will trust them, that my body is smarter and wiser than I am. That maybe it realizes 
there’s a survivor in many of us, or at least in me.” (Intersex 11) 
 
Only at some remote moment in her narrative are the true reasons for her ticklishness 
revealed and her difficulties in refusing others to touch her are traced back to early 
childhood experiences within a medical context. Her experiences with the medical 
focus on her body and the processes of medicalization she was subjected to as a child 
have become incorporated into her sexuality: “I am learning that being comfortable 
with sex doesn’t mean sex is comfortable, and that not being ashamed of sex doesn’t 
mean there aren’t layers of shame hiding in there, invisible to my eye, places I’ve 
never seen, in the dark recesses, where only the sharp, cool tools of a doctor have 
been” (Intersex 11). Although her genital sensation has not suffered from medical 
treatment, the psychosexual effects of medicalization seem to have an impact on how 
she experiences her sexuality. 
After a brief moment of hesitation, Intersex continues with providing explicit 
accounts of Hillman’s sexual experiences, which encompass a range of activities 
which predominantly take place in San Francisco’s alternative queer/trans 
communities. The narrative’s representational strategies of ‘queer’ sexuality and 
sexual practices construct, at least to some extent, a dichotomy of heteronormative 
sexuality and a sexuality which negates anything this heteronormative sexuality 
supposedly involves. The practices engendered and acted out within these alternative 
communities are considered as forms of resistance to a culture in which difference is 
“corrected, fixed, obliterated, or erased” (Intersex 121), where resistance consists in 
embracing difference, in “myriad, multiple, varied and beautiful ways of being alive” 
(Intersex 121), in resisting assimilation and instead performing the non-normative: 
    
“I love San Francisco because we’re not normal here, we’re revolting. Every time we break an 
unjust law by marrying each other, we’re revolting. Every time we declare the bathrooms in a 




building gender-neutral, we’re revolting. I love San Francisco because so many of us are 
revolting everyday, just by being ourselves. Every time we choose an option that wasn’t 
offered, every time we question, we make it safer to be in between” (Intersex 96)  
 
This strategy of undermining the norms that regulate sexed embodiment, gender, and 
sexual acts, “just by being ourselves,” can only be read as a revolt, as (a) counter-
narrative(s), because these queer/trans representations are culturally marked as 
‘transgressive,’ because there already exists an established discourse which produces 
and legitimates the cultural meanings of sex, gender, and sexuality. This binary 
construction primarily relies on representations of ‘queer’ sexual practices as 
‘alternatives’ to heteronormative practices, while ‘heterosexual’ activities are 
conspicuously absent in Intersex. The only moment when a straight relationship is 
discussed it is phrased in terms of a monogamous commitment and serves as a 
demarcation from an allegedly queer lifestyle, which means in this case sex parties, 
celebrating promiscuity, and enjoying sexual ‘freedom’ and open or polyamorous 
relationships. However, as will become obvious, this seemingly clear-cut 
demarcation proves to be unstable, as the narrative’s construction of a queer sexuality 
itself is fraught with contradictions and is at times inherently normative.  
Hillman’s frequent participations in sex parties, particularly at S/M clubs, are 
initiated by a visit to New York when she is twenty-one years old, a stay she describes 
as a “six-month field study” on sex (Intersex 39). Previously all her knowledge about 
sex has come from books, especially from gay porn. Her first visit to a gay S/M club, 
called the Vault, is anticipated and accompanied with stereotypical ideas, even myths, 
about gay sex culture (“hot, muscled men dominating each other, humiliating each 
other, fucking and sucking each other”; the location at the Meatpacking District is 
“perfect: dark, industrial, factory loading docks all closed shut,” Intersex 39). Her 
anticipations, however, are discouraged straight away. Entering the club, she 
becomes virtually invisible and is not even charged money or gets asked for ID; only 
when she is accompanied by a male friend money is charged from them. Moreover, 
she is surprised that she is completely ignored by the other members: “I think I 
expected to be welcomed into the Vault, taken on a tour of the underworld, taken by 
the hand and introduced politely to the illicit arts of rough sex, pain play, and 
submission. Truth is, I had no idea what I was looking for” (Intersex 41). Her 
statements evoke a strong sense of feeling somehow lost between theoretical 
knowledge about sex, which mainly comes from her women’s studies classes that 
condemn fetish as an oppressive act and books by Pat Califia and Carol Queen that 
take a sex-positive stance on queer S/M and leather subculture, and the realities of 
subcultural sex life. But the most disillusioning realization she makes is that “S/M 
wasn’t an innately queer activity” (Intersex 41).  
Yet despite her disenchanting first experience with the queer sex and S/M scene, 
her excitement and desire to be part of that sex subculture is sparked off: “It was part 
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of an education that was just the beginning, a field study about courage, desire, and 
having no idea where I was going, but hoping I would know it when I got there, or 
better yet, that someone there would recognize me” (Intersex 42). She not only seeks 
to reconcile her contradicting information about sexuality, by plunging into queer 
sexual activities, but searches for a consolidation and a recognition of her queer 
desires: “Now I know I was looking for someone to take me, take me down in 
particular. I wanted to lose control, but only because someone would take it from me. 
And not because I had explained it to them, but because they could read me, could 
see through me, could see what I wanted” etc. (Intersex 41). Hillman’s desire for 
(sexual) recognition within a community space is not fulfilled until she graduates 
from college, where she experienced no “wild experimentation years” (Intersex 44) 
and was largely ignorant of sexual matters and her sexual orientation. This changed 
when she is introduced to the “alternative queer world” with its sex parties, which 
mark “the beginning of the kind of life I’d always dreamed of” (Intersex 44). Whereas 
she refers to ‘gay’ as a rather conservative lifestyle, as basically reproducing or at 
least aiming for heteronormative values, ‘queer’ signifies for her a subversive way of 
life, rejecting and challenging any normative notions of gender and sexuality, 
premised on an underlying political motivation. Her normative and quite 
stereotypical binary construction of ‘gay’ vs. ‘queer’ goes however unchecked. This 
apparent glorification of a queer life signifies her longing for a belonging to a 
community space existing outside of a regulatory hegemonic and normative 
framework, and within which she can act out her perceived sense of queerness. 
The same person who introduced Hillman to the queer alternative world, Susan, 
is also responsible for her first experience of masturbating using a vibrator, causing 
her first orgasm. This information regarding her ability to orgasm and to feel sexual 
pleasure, without difficulty and at any time she pleases – “the pleasure that I could 
just turn on and off. I felt like I’d never need a lover again” (Intersex 45) – stands in 
stark contrast to many accounts from intersex people who disclose their inability to 
have orgasms or to experience pleasure, and for whom the achievement of a more or 
less fulfilled sexuality often involves a lot of emotional and physical pain and 
struggle. For Hillman, sexual satisfaction through a vibrator is a habitual activity such 
as brushing her teeth, and moreover confirms that her “clit is working just fine” 
(Intersex 46) – as if to attest that she did not undergo a clitorectomy, unlike many 
other intersex people.  
One of the very rare times sexual dysfunction is addressed in Intersex occurs 
when Hillman attends a queer conference, Creating Change, shortly after she has met 
Cheryl Chase and joined intersex activism. And even at this instance, it is not Hillman 
whose sexuality is affected by the consequences of medical treatment such as genital 
surgery, but someone else’s. Natalie, who identifies as an intersex woman and is also 
an intersex activist, is at the focal point of Hillman’s attention both in a sexual way 
and due to Natalie’s own problematic sexuality, and it is this particular combination 




which makes her extremely attractive for Hillman. Natalie is represented as an 
intriguing figure of intersex embodiment whose ‘intersex body’ becomes conflated 
with her intersex politics in Hillman’s perception. Hillman’s advances towards her 
are at first repeatedly frustrated and ultimately fail when she unintentionally jokes 
about Natalie’s failure ‘to come,’ what Natalie understands as her making fun of her 
inability to orgasm due to genital surgery. It seems as if Hillman finds her sexy not 
despite of but rather because of her post-surgery, clitorectomized ‘intersex body,’ 
meaning a body that is produced as a specific intersex corporeality through its 
surgical alteration. Natalie’s intersex body comes to represent Natalie herself in this 
process; thus Natalie is constructed as an intersex subject through the narrative’s 
representational strategies: “Natalie and her body and her amazing politics have been 
haunting me for weeks. Natalie embodies the intersex experience for me, and my 
mind wrestles with her as a way of figuring out my own relationship to intersex” 
(Intersex 85). The context within which this incident is set is one heavily charged 
with conflicting intersex identity claims. Chase’s master definition of intersex 
persons as “people whose genitals make them subject to medical intervention” 
(Intersex 81) prompts Hillman to deal with her own self-identification as intersex, 
and to question her legitimation as intersex and the exclusionary mechanisms effected 
by this definition. Natalie therefore comes to signify ‘intersex,’ performing or 
embodying the master definition, and Hillman’s failure to reach her becomes 
synonymous for her failure to achieve this intersex ‘standard.’ 
Simultaneously, Natalie’s ‘intersex body’ is eroticized, almost fetishized through 
Hillman’s sexual fantasizing, yet always on an abstract, unfathomable level, 
inhibiting Natalie’s capacity to exist as a livable subject: 
 
“She floats behind my eyelids during sex with my new girlfriend, appearing like a secret lover, 
surprising me when she appears there, shadowy and knowing. In the middle of sex, I think of 
her and wonder, what part of this do I take for granted? And I think, where would Natalie want 
me to touch her? And I think, where would she touch me? And I think, at what point does she 
tell a new girl?” (Intersex 85) 
 
Natalie’s intersex corporeality is stylized as a site of sexual fantasy for Hillman, on 
which she projects her own complicated sexuality. In a way, Natalie represents a yet 
undefined intersex part of Hillman, but at the same time serves for Hillman to set 
herself off against this specific intersex experience, and more particularly this 
specific intersex sexuality. Her strategy of demarcation works predominantly through 
the narrative’s oversexualized accounts of her sex life, deliberately negating any 
dysfunctional or problematic aspect of her sexuality, and instead asserting the 
functioning of her genitals by providing explicit details of her intimate encounters. 
The chapter “Home” captures in retrospect the heyday of Hillman’s sex life in 
San Francisco’s queer community and is written in second-person narrative mode, 
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reminiscent in its form of a love letter, the addressee being San Francisco: “You were 
a wish come true. An eight-year adventure” (Intersex 48). After she has graduated 
from college, a sex party triggers off her decision to move to San Francisco, as she 
feels the city’s sex subculture offers her a queer space within which she can act out 
her desires and her perceived ‘difference’: “I was amazed by the diversity of the 
party, the strangeness of the people, and the radical acceptance of every kind of 
weirdness. I felt very normal for the first time. And like I’d found a place I could be 
myself and be accepted” (Intersex 49). She quickly immerses in the various spaces 
of the city’s queer alternative subculture: the queer sex parties, the punk rock dykes 
scene, the open mic at Poetry Above Paradise, and the girls clubs. This queer 
community, actually made up of a variety of rather different communities, serves for 
Hillman both as a ‘surrogate’ family or home and as a place for her to be 
recognizable. While she has not yet come out as queer to her family at this point, and 
still feels to be trapped in the ‘closet’ when being with her family (Intersex 50), the 
San Francisco queer communities allow for her coming out and moreover for her 
belonging to a group as a legitimate member, being recognized and accepted as an 
intelligible queer subject.   
Yet it becomes obvious that the various queer communities, despite their efforts 
to challenge or resist heteronormative notions of genders and sexualities, themselves 
reproduce practices of inclusion/exclusion and parameters of gender and sexual 
normativity. Hillman’s own inclination toward sometimes rather stereotypical 
conceptions of gender and sexuality is facilitated and at times even encouraged by 
the communities’ structures and (implied) regulations.  
The tensions between Hillman’s seemingly conflicting desires for both 
normativity and queerness become apparent at several instances in her narrative. 
While she acts out her sexuality exclusively in queer community contexts, as 
represented in Intersex, her notion of genders, sexuality, and their supposed 
interrelatedness oscillates between questioning and reaffirming normative ideas, 
between a challenging of the desire to ‘fit in’ and a need for intelligibility. Her own 
gender construction occurs predominantly in relation to her various lovers. In the 
chapter “Ordinary,” narrated in second-person mode, she addresses an ex-lover 
shortly after their break-up, telling them of her sexual encounter with another woman 
she met at a club:  
 
“I felt like such a woman last night. Why is it that misery has me feeling more female than 
ever? [...] Maybe it’s being so far outside myself, getting fucked by strange girls and seeing 
myself the way the way some new girl does. I look at myself and feel desirable. [...] I put on 
my red slip last night and the slutty white mules you love so much and danced in front of the 
mirror. I was so satisfied with myself last night.” (Intersex 58) 
 




The break-up with her ex-lover and the consequent misery and pain she suffers are 
as responsible for her feeling ‘female’ as is her sexual encounter with another girl; in 
either case it is a lover or person she has sex with who defines her femaleness. Her 
mediated look at herself, from an ‘outside’ perspective, even dissociated from herself, 
through the perspective of a (new) female lover, constructs Hillman as a desirable 
(and) female object, while ‘femaleness’ is defined by ‘slutty’ or supposedly ‘sexy’ 
accessories or underwear. Even her look at herself in the mirror projects a distorted 
vision of her, a bias reinforced by sleep deficit and being drunk. 
While this chapter reveals no further information on how Hillman defines her 
own femaleness independently of her lovers, her later negotiations however challenge 
the notion of herself as distinctly female, or the conception of femaleness itself. In 
“Femme,” she scrutinizes the use of the pronoun ‘her’ and discusses its inadequacy 
or deficiency as a reference to herself: 
 
“Her. It’s a distancing technique, to be sure. The word short and far away. A call. A reference 
without direction, but with intent. Her would be fine if it were true, but her is an assumption 
made across a crowded restaurant, on the page, in the restroom. Her is an assignment, 
homework, gossip, a guess, a limitation. Being intersex makes her half-assed and incomplete, 
a cop-out, and the easier of two destinations. Her is one path out of many. An option. A state 
of mind defined more by articulation than genital presentation. Her is me not because you say 
so, but because I haven’t come up with something better yet.” (Intersex 124) 
 
Hillman’s discomfort with the pronoun ‘her’ stems mainly from the perceived 
mismatch between a signifier charged with specific cultural meanings and her 
gendered concept of herself. She feels her intersex sense of self misrepresented and 
what she defines as her ‘male’ part unrepresented by a referent culturally considered 
to represent ‘femaleness,’ and moreover only a very specific form of intelligible 
femaleness. ‘Her’ (mis)represents Hillman as an ‘intelligible’ female subject, but fails 
to represent Hillman as an intelligible intersex subject, negating or erasing the 
complexity of her gender identification(s), and as a consequence denies her 
intelligibility. Hillman’s struggle for gender representation can be understood in 
terms of the double bind of recognition, and hence of intelligibility, as theorized by 
Butler (discussed in chapter two). Hillman’s dilemma results from feeling 
misrecognized by the norms on which her intelligibility, and thus her survival, 
depends, and feels she can only survive by escaping these norms as they threaten to 
undo her as a subject: “In the same way that a life for which no categories of 
recognition exist is not a livable life, so a life for which those categories constitute 
unlivable constraint is not an acceptable option” (Butler 2004: 8). 
While Hillman’s comment that ‘her’ is “the easier of two destinations” probably 
refers to the assumption that a female gender pronoun seems to match Hillman’s 
gender presentation more aptly than a male one, and thus eludes a seemingly 
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‘contradictory’ and hence problematic public gender performance, it can also be 
interpreted as a reference to the common medical practice to preferentially assign an 
intersex infant a female gender, as it is considered easier to surgically construct a 
provisional vaginal opening than a phallus.4 
Yet while Hillman objects to the defining power of ‘her’ as a signifier for her 
gender, exerted by others, she cannot think of an alternative, for instance using a 
gender-neutral pronoun such as ‘ze’ (and the respective possessive pronoun ‘hir’). 
As she presents herself mostly as ‘female’ and ‘feminine’ to others, particularly to 
persons she is intimate with, her gender performance raises expectations she cannot 
or does not want to live up to. Her lovers in particular seem to derive a certain way 
of (sub)culturally encoded (sexual) behavior from her gender performance. This 
gender and/or sexual misrecognition she experiences is inextricably bound to a 
specific queer subcultural normativity. Her assigned gender and/or sexual role as “a 
training femme for several butches,” for instance, clashes with her self-perception, 
“because I don’t identify as a femme, even if that’s what I look like to people. I didn’t 
[...] understand what these butches wanted from me. They seemed to have some script 
that I hadn’t gotten” (Intersex 125). Hillman’s ‘masculinity’ or ‘masculine’ aspects 
of her gendered appearance obviously does not fit this queer-culturally encoded 
(sexual) script internalized by some of her lovers, especially her butch (or) masculine 
lovers, who are confused or even feel “emasculated” by Hillman’s masculinity and 
sometimes simply don’t “know what to do with [her] body” (Intersex 125). 
The sociocultural constructedness of gender attributions along specific cultural 
expectations however seems to leave room for alternative or multiple interpretations, 
creating possibilities for Hillman to acknowledge her intersex self. Hillman asserts 
her masculinity without denying or erasing her femininity, thereby invoking 
stereotypical gender notions in order to deconstruct them as essentialist or 
determinist: 
 
“Of course, masculinity isn’t just who you fuck, or how you fuck, or that you want to fuck. But 
that’s part of it. I’d like to tell you that masculinity has nothing to do with hormones, that 
masculinity is some innate thing, something distinct from muscles or chemicals, but in my case, 
                                                             
4  Morgan Holmes notes that the medical practice of assigning an intersex newborn a sex is 
based on heteronormative functional factors, privileging the function and the appearance 
of the ‘penis’ generally over other aspects: “because of the issue of phallic adequacy and 
because ‘...the surgery necessary to convert to female is simpler...’ [...] even in a 
chromosomally male body, a phallus which cannot meet the medical criteria to become a 
certifiable penis will be removed. [...] The same sentiment is expressed as ‘It's easier to 
make a hole than build a pole’ by Dr. John Gearheart in Johns Hopkins Magazine, Nov. 
1993, 15” (Holmes 1994b: 12f). 




that’s not quite true. Due to being intersex, I got some high doses of those chemicals that our 
society believes turn boys into men.” (Intersex 125) 
 
“There are a lot of stereotypically male things I do: I’m usually not the crier in a relationship. 
Often the hottest thing for me isn’t getting fucked, but is fucking someone else. [...] I’m quick 
to sweat, to build muscle, and I’m not really a natural when it comes to cuddling. But then 
again, all that’s bullshit.” (Intersex 125f) 
 
“What’s a normal girl? Who doesn’t have masculinity in her? Who doesn’t get off fucking girls 
in public spaces? There’s no such thing as a normal girl, thank God, and especially not in our 
community.” (Intersex 126) 
 
Although Hillman asserts a critical awareness of the performativity of gender and its 
relationship to sexuality as normative (or non-normative), she inadvertently 
reproduces the misconception of constructed cultural notions as naturalistic ‘facts’ 
and biological determinist assertions. In directly addressing the reader, she seeks to 
convince them – and herself – of being perfectly aware of this naturalistic 
misconception, but simultaneously qualifies the validity of the constructivist theorem 
of gender and sexuality with regard to her own ‘special’ intersex position. She 
thereby seems to fail to acknowledge that intersex, just as female and male sexes, is 
in the same way subjected to sociocultural constructive mechanisms which produce 
it as a cultural category. The inconsistencies of Hillman’s gender conceptions cannot 
be easily resolved but prove all the more that they are complicated and far from being 
disentangled. 
The entanglements of her intersex intelligibility and the construction of Hillman’s 
gender and her sexuality through lovers or sex partners are reiterated in one of the 
final chapters in her narrative, in which the narrative mode alternates between second 
and first person, directly or indirectly addressing her first lover, Jesse. After having 
spent a couple of hours with the first girl she fell in love with, talking and having sex, 
she starts writing because of the strong emotional impact this person has had on her: 
“I had this odd, overwhelming sense that she had gotten me pregnant, with myself” 
(Intersex 145). Love and sex have a productive and creative power, engendering 
narratives of queer selves:  
 
“Jesse dragged me, willingly and roughly, from bi-curious into queerness, my bare knees 
scraping the rocks I stumbled over as I crossed the river between what I was in the world and 
what I truly wanted to be. I understand the allure now, what it’s like to sense that hunger in 
someone’s longing gaze your way, reaching out a hand for the leap across the water. [...] I know 
what it’s like to see something in someone that they don’t see yet in themselves. I know what 
it’s like to introduce someone into a world they’ve always belonged to but never knew existed. 
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I know what it’s like to fuck someone so hard they start writing poetry, turning a silent crush 
into a songbird.” (Intersex 146) 
 
These narratives of queer selves seem to be possible only through the recognition by 
other queer subjects, specifically lovers, who see themselves reflected, or 
‘recognized,’ in each other. The demarcation between ‘self’ and ‘other’ does not 
precisely become dissolved, but is challenged by their relation to one another. 
Hillman’s “predilection for distance [...] [w]hen it comes to love” (Intersex 145) 
requires a transition for her lovers, for them to cross the country, to arrive at 
“previously uninhabitable homes” (Intersex 146). This becomes symbolic not only 
for gender transitions, but for becoming recognized as a queer subject and hence to 
occupy an intelligible subject position, which enables the queer subject to live a 
livable life. 
 
4.2.4 “I’m More Like You than I Am Like Them”: Ideas of 
Community and Questions of Belonging 
 
An issue that concerns many intersex people, in particular those who do activist work 
and/or consider themselves members of intersex (and/or other) communities, is 
negotiated in Hillman’s narrative as the “public/privateness of intersex, this constant 
negotiation between self-definition/representation and group representation” 
(Intersex 93). As elaborated in chapter two, the intersex (identity) claims made by 
activist groups and community members, among others, are highly contested and 
“eternally shifting and in dispute” (Intersex 93). The discussion of early intersex first-
person accounts showed that intersex community members are subjected to a certain 
pressure to comply with specific community rules in order to be accepted as 
legitimate members, so as to represent an intersex collective in public and to function 
as a political agent.  
Intersex frames these tensions in terms of the question of the public affirmation 
of Hillman’s intersex status on one hand, and the perceived conflicts between the 
intersex, trans, and queer communities on the other hand. As discussed above, 
Hillman’s quest for membership in the intersex community seems to be inextricably 
bound to a conformity to a specific definition of intersex as an experience of genital 
surgery, and to a profound fear of exclusion and being exposed as a ‘fake’ intersex. 
‘Authenticity’ is primarily, if not exclusively, based on non-normatively appearing 
genitalia, and Hillman at first adopts the activist/community rhetoric when 
constructing her own intersex authenticity:  
 
“When I first started telling people about intersex, or telling them I am intersex, I would tell 
them it’s people whose genitals present ambiguously as neither male nor female, or who have 




characteristics of both. And if I told them I’m intersex, I would feel compelled to tell them that 
my genitals appear ‘normal.’” (Intersex 107) 
 
Hillman’s compulsion to admit her failure to meet the required conditions in order to 
qualify as intersex, according to the definition set up by activist leaders and 
reaffirmed by herself, stems from a fear of being revealed as an ‘imposter,’ as being 
not ‘really’ intersex and being denied the legitimation of acting as a public intersex 
activist: “I think I needed to be affirmed as intersex in order to do the activism. And 
for that identity to be publicly acknowledged. There’s this fear I have that people will 
think I’m just trying to be different, to get attention” (Intersex 107). Thus in order to 
compensate for her perceived lack of the primary ‘intersex signifier,’ i.e. ‘ambiguous’ 
and surgically altered genitals, she informs people about her prepubescent growth of 
pubic hair, “and they say ‘Wow,’ and are impressed, and I can put my intersex 
membership card back in my wallet” (Intersex 107).  
Hillman’s assertion of her intersex variation also obviously serves as a 
demarcation between several identitarian boundaries. Although she claims not to be 
ashamed of being (mis)recognized as a ‘hermaphrodite,’ she is constantly cautious to 
affirm her ‘normalcy,’ both with regard to her genitals and other aspects of her 
corporeality, in an effort to prevent being marked as a ‘freakish’ figure. On the other 
side, she eagerly seeks to affirm her queerness and thus to distance herself from 
normative gender subjectivities: “What makes me tell them I might have been a 
hermaphrodite, and that if I had it worse I’d be one… implying, of course, that I’m 
not? It’s not shame so much as false modesty, in part, saying, ‘I haven’t gone through 
what they’ve gone through.’ And fear, maybe: I’m more like you than I am like them” 
(Intersex 107f). Thereby she produces a discursive demarcation line, a binary 
between ‘you’ and ‘them,’ between the non-intersex people and the ‘real’ intersex 
people, working with (mis)attributions that are not only normative but moreover 
dangerous in that they are producing several exclusions. She is particularly anxious 
to convince queer people of her intersex ‘authenticity’: “I wonder if every queer 
who’s met me in the past decade or so is wondering what I have to offer, what 
bandwagon I’m jumping on” (Intersex 108). 
The question of what intersex signifies and how an intersex community can be 
conceptualized is also a recurring motif to which the narrative does not provide a 
final or coherent answer. Although Hillman frequently refers to herself as intersex, 
she seems to be reluctant to use the term intersex as an umbrella term since not all 
people would identify as intersex or refer to intersex as an identity category, and 
calling someone intersex would be reducing them simply to their intersex ‘condition,’ 
and moreover, the term comes from medical terminology (Intersex 93). Yet the 
different and unequal premises on which the definitions of and the processes of 
identification as intersex, trans, queer, etc. rest are repeatedly phrased in terms of 
medical terminology – while people who have an underlying medical ‘condition’ can 
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use it as a root cause for their perceived gender difference, others, such as trans 
people, supposedly cannot rely on what is represented as ‘biological’ causes: 
 
“Emi and I talked about the problem of language in our allied communities. About how 
problematic it can be when an intersex person says, ‘I never quite felt like a girl or a boy, but 
rather in between, something different,’ as an explanation for their intersex-ness. How does 
everyone else, the non-intersex people who never felt quite like a boy or girl, account for their 
difference? What’s their diagnosis?” (Intersex 93) 
 
Again, the narrative resorts to a biologist argumentation and involuntarily reinscribes 
naturalistic and biological determinist notions into the intersex subject. This notion 
is also reflected in Hillman’s nightmare about representing the intersex community 
on TV, in which she “was desperately repeating one line over and over in [her] head, 
trying to remember the three root causes of intersex: hormonal, chromosomal, and, 
and… over and over again” (Intersex 106). This nightmare also demonstrates her 
anxieties about performing her work as an activist ‘appropriately,’ meeting the 
(perceived) expectations of other intersex people, and proving her commitment to the 
intersex collective: “I felt the weight of unborn babies on my shoulders and all the 
intersex people I’ve met, heavy and wonderful. I knew I needed to come through for 
them” (Intersex 106).   
Yet Intersex’s at other times rather critical stance towards the intersex, 
transgender, and queer communities and community politics is quite daring. 
Criticism, and in particular public criticism of the community is generally not 
appreciated, as the intersex status quo is sought to be upheld by community/activist 
leaders who want to keep the (defining) power over what intersex is or should be in 
their own hands, under the precept of maintaining a unified collective and a 
unanimous (public) voice. One of Hillman’s major concerns with regard to 
community spaces is how “to bridge the communities I’m in: trans, queer, women’s, 
performance” (Intersex 89), communal mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion, and 
the tensions arising from sometimes diverging interests.  
The difficulties facing the allied communities turn out to be problems of 
language, more precisely conflicting discourses, in the first place. In particular the 
alliances between intersex and transgender movements and shared spaces have had a 
difficult history since the 1990s. The crucial conflict is that ‘trans’ has been utilized 
as an umbrella term for many non-normative, or ‘queer,’ identities, potentially 
subsuming or subordinating intersex politics under their own or broader transgender 
politics, thereby ignoring or even erasing the specificities of intersex premises and 
needs and appropriating intersex and intersex experiences.5 The question of who is 
                                                             
5  Intersex organizations and/or activists in particular have commented at several occasions 
on this issue. For instance, the influential Organization Intersex International (OII) has 




part of an intersex community, how this community is organized, and how it operates 
is an ongoing debate. This community, or rather, communities are mainly internet 
based, and their members are primarily activists or people who are members of more 
specific self-help groups for certain intersex-related conditions. In Intersex, an 
‘intersex community’ is conspicuously absent; it is rather in queer community 
contexts where intersex people appear as some sort of collective. A clear-cut 
demarcation between different identity-based communities is not constructed in and 
by the narrative; rather, their boundaries are constantly shifting. At one point, 
Hillman joins a workshop on trans inclusion and activism in women-only spaces at a 
queer anarchist conference. While she admits a previous skepticism towards the term 
‘trans’ as appropriating intersex under its agenda, she now feels a sense of belonging 
to this community: “What’s changed recently is my connection to trans issues: the 
trans umbrella that I find so inappropriate for me as an intersex person does offer me 
shade, support, and community” (Intersex 88). Fed up with the exclusionary 
mechanisms and the “inequities of women-only spaces” (Intersex 88), she seeks a 
way to connect the different communities she is in. 
At other times, Hillman is painfully aware of the perceived differences and 
discontinuities between the various queer modes of being and groups, and torn 
between the dis/continuities of intersex, trans, and other queer experiences. In the 
chapter “Testosterone,” she ponders how her intersex experience sets her apart from 
other queer subjects, in particular from trans persons:   
 
“Sometimes I think I’m really different from you. You see, the queerer I am, the more I think 
I’m different than everybody else. It’s as if there’s this scale of queerness, and each degree of 
queerness takes me further from other people, even from other queers. And since I’m intersex, 
I often feel like I’m at this frontier of queerness, [...] having buried many of my intersex 
compatriot explorers along the dangerous journey, and having eaten the others.” (Intersex 129) 
 
Although Intersex does not provide a distinct definition of the term ‘queer,’ Hillman 
understands queer not as exclusively referring to homosexuality, but as a signifier for 
any sense of self, gender, sexuality, experience, and corporeality that challenges 
heteronormative constructions. Queerness is articulated in terms of difference, where 
difference increases proportionally to the amount of queerness. In this passage, the 
vaguely specified addressee(s) apparently is/are outperformed in their queerness by 
Hillman, whose queerness is enhanced by her intersex experience. She is most likely 
addressing one or more trans persons, and their mutual inability to understand each 
other leads to a distancing or even disconnection from one another: 
 
                                                             
released a position statement about “‘ISGD’ and the appropriation of intersex” on their 
website (OII 2012). 
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“Being a queer pioneer often means that I think you don’t understand me. And not only that, 
but I think I don’t understand you, either. As I learn more about being intersex and I stop taking 
hormones, and as many of my friends and lovers learn more about their transgender selves and 
start taking hormones, I often think we’re moving even further away from each other.” (Intersex 
129) 
 
Her statement suggests a demarcation line between intersex and trans which is 
premised on testosterone. Testosterone remains the crucial signifier for Hillman’s 
intersex variation even when she reevaluates its function as a marker for the 
demarcation between herself and trans subjectivities: “It hit me recently that that’s 
just isolation talking, and shame, and fear, because I do, on some level, understand 
what my trans friends and lovers are going through. [...] I know what their bodies are 
going through. [...] I know because I’ve been a female-bodied person on T” (Intersex 
129). Having been skeptical about using the term ‘T’ instead of ‘testosterone,’ feeling 
that it suggested “a false intimacy” and “fed into people’s denial” (Intersex 129), she 
changes her mind on its usage as it signifies a reappropriation of the term by 
genderqueer and trans persons in particular. She suddenly begins to conceive of 
testosterone not as separating her from trans persons, but rather as a signifier of 
shared experiences. The perceived similarities of her experiences and those of trans 
persons are almost exclusively phrased in terms of a corporeality which is in various 
ways ‘different,’ “caus[ing] people anxiety,” ‘shocking’ and ‘scaring’ people 
(Intersex 130), and which develops towards a ‘masculine’ appearance as a result of 
testosterone ‘excess’ or injections: “I know the feeling that something is coursing 
through your body that’s making you different from the people around you” (Intersex 
131).  
Hillman continues her argument in the subsequent chapter “Community,” 
persistently alternating between the continuities and discontinuities within the queer 
communities, and particularly between intersex and trans. She makes it clear that it 
is impossible to tell her story about her intersex experience without telling the stories 
of trans persons: 
 
“I’m drawn to these transmen as the unborn part of me. The medically unaltered self, the body 
no one wanted me to have. But as much as the results of their medical modifications touch me 
and turn me on, their choices scare me, especially their reliance on medicine to give them the 
body they always wanted, that no one wanted them to have. Their love-hate relationship with 
the needle and the knife, their worship of its power to give shape to their desire scares me 
because it’s the same needle and knife that have sculpted my own dented self-image and stolen 
the desire from so many people I love.” (Intersex 134f) 
 
The juxtaposition of intersex experience, in particular intersex surgery, to trans 
(experience with) surgery creates a binary of ‘good’ or desirable vs. ‘bad’ or 




unwanted and condemnable surgery, which demonstrates how very differently the 
very same medical tools and processes and their outcomes can signify, depending on 
the relations of power/control inherent in these processes.  
In telling two stories about her sexual encounters with trans persons, the relations 
between Hillman and them, i.e. other members of the community, and the way these 
relations constitute her own sense of self are once again revealed: “these stories [are] 
[a]bout my own challenge to distinguish between changing your body because you 
love it and changing your body because you hate it. They’re about me trying to love 
my own body, and watching that process reflected in the people closest to me, my 
community. Our community is in transition” (Intersex 137). The juxtaposition of 
body and community, which are both subjected to changes and processes of 
transition, creates a sense of the community as an organism, a large body or corporeal 
space which functions relationally to its individual members. Its members, in turn, 
become incorporated into this lager ‘organism’ and enter a kind of symbiosis. For 
Hillman, as for many other members, the community also functions as a ‘surrogate 
family,’ especially when they are not accepted by their families of origin – which 
might explain the cautiousness of many members to adhere to the community’s 
regulations of what is legitimate to say or to do: “Always there were those so 
desperate for community that any disagreement was seen as a threat” (Intersex 148). 
Hence, addressing her concerns about surgery and other medical treatment in trans 
and queer contexts openly is quite daring, as Hillman herself perceives it, since such 
an outspokenness puts her at risk “of being seen as anti-trans and anti-surgery” 
(Intersex 132) by trans or queer community members. 
The organization of the intersex community which unites intersex individuals as, 
and so produces, a collective is initially understood by Hillman as a reaction to a 
perceived oppression of individuals by the medical establishment: “I considered 
[intersex] a set of shared experiences of sex and gender oppression. I understood the 
problem of basing a definition on treatment by others, but that common oppression 
was all I understood as an organizing concept at the time” (Intersex 91). This 
conception of intersex community or intersex identity politics as based on a common 
identity is reminiscent of the way identity politics have at times functioned in a 
feminist context, prominently criticized in Gender Trouble by Butler. In the case of 
feminist politics, Butler has questioned the category of identity, or a common 
identity, as the foundation for feminist politics and criticized the concept of ‘unity’ 
as “set[ting] up an exclusionary norm of solidarity at the level of identity” (Butler 
1990: 15). Instead, she has suggested a “radical inquiry into the political construction 
and regulation of identity itself” (1990: ix). While the point she makes has been the 
subject of criticism in ongoing debates in intersex activist and/or academic contexts, 
the actual consequences this foundationalist approach to intersex politics has for 
individuals have been rarely addressed in personal, in-depth accounts. It is to 
Hillman’s credit that she reveals from a first-person perspective what these 
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consequences can look like for an intersex individual, and how members of the 
community might even need to compromise their autonomy, as they have to “present 
[them]selves as bounded beings, distinct, recognizable, delineated, subjects before 
the law, a community defined by sameness” (Butler 2004: 20) in the language and 
the context of a collective politics. 
Towards the very end of her memoir, Hillman eventually dismantles what appears 
to be an intersex ‘community’ as lacking a common ground on which intersex identity 
claims and a collective intersex identity can rest. She exposes this collective’s 
apparent coherence and functioning as relying on terms of medicalization, which are 
debunked as inconsistent and false. Her deconstruction of these claims however again 
refers back to a discourse on corporeality which is borrowed from the medical 
discourse on intersex:  
 
“After all these years in the intersex community, I can tell you there is no intersex community. 
There’s a bunch of people who have a variety of bodies, some radically different from each 
other, and even more different experiences. What many of us have in common are repeated 
genital displays, often from a young age. Many of us have had medical treatments done to us 
without our consent to make our sex anatomy conform to someone else’s standards. Many of 
us suffer from intense shame due to treatments that sought to fix or hide our bodies. And many 
of us have experienced none of the above.” (Intersex 148f) 
 
Hillman’s reference to medical discourse in the dismantling of this very discourse 
and its premises demonstrates that it is not possible to elude this discourse. Her alert, 
set purposefully at the end of Intersex, also obviously has an educational function 
towards the readers. With the paradoxical statement “[a]fter all these years in the 
intersex community, I can tell you there is no intersex community,” she designates 
the very conception and the ideality of an intersex community as problematic. The 
tensions between moving within (a) collective intersex space(s) of any kind and 
questioning the very foundation on which this/these collective(s) relies/rely remain 
unresolved. 
 
4.2.5 The “Daily Work of Acceptance,” of Surviving as Intersex 
 
As the first book-length autobiographical intersex text that appeared in North 
America, Intersex makes a substantial contribution to the corpus of intersex 
narratives conveyed from an intersex person’s perspective. The insights Hillman 
provides both into her personal life and into the intersex community life have never 
before been made available to a broader readership. Yet the fact that hers is so far the 
only published intersex autobiography should not result in considering it as “an 
authoritative treatise on being intersex” (Roth 2008), or as “tell[ing] other intersex 




people’s stories” (Hillman, in Roth 2008). To treat Intersex as a transhistorical 
account of what it means to be intersex would be as inaccurate as trying to derive any 
universal ‘truths’ about intersex persons from the narrative. 
When Hillman writes, “I’ve been thinking about how through my work I end up 
coming out in performance as intersex” (Intersex 108), she both points to the 
performativity of intersex and reclaims the defining power of herself as intersex from 
doctors, thereby transferring the discourse on intersex from a medical to a literary 
and/or activist space. In doing so, she manages to achieve an intelligibility as an 
intersex subject, which was denied to her in other, heteronormative contexts. For 
some persons for whom recognition along prevailing social norms seems to fail, 
Butler argues, it is from the “incommensurability between the norm that is supposed 
to inaugurate [one’s] humanness and the spoken insistence on [one]self that [one] 
performs that [one] derives [one’s] worth, that [one] speaks [one’s] worth” (Butler 
2001: 634). Likewise, Hillman “speaks her worth” in/through a critique of “the norms 
that confer intelligibility itself,” by ultimately declining to submit to the social 
requirement of being “fully recognizable, fully disposable, fully categorizable” 
(Butler 2001: 634) – although, and this is important, she repeatedly seeks to be 
recognizable throughout her narrative for the sake of social survival. The kind of 
recognition, and thereby intelligibility, she finally achieves does not precisely come 
as a result of her various attempts to submit to a norm (more specifically, queer or 
intersex norms), but rather as the consequence of her refusal to accept the norms that 
are constitutive of her recognizability, available or offered to her by both the 
hegemonic power and, at least to some extent, the intersex and queer communities. 
Intersex’s last chapter “C/leaving,” written as a poem, gets to the heart of the 
performativity and historicity of intersex and the recognition of intersex subjects. 
Hillman’s statements that “There is the daily work of acceptance” and “Choice, the 
deepest kind / Is an illusion I use / To soothe myself to sleep / Daily” (Intersex 155), 
can be interpreted in the sense of Butler’s understanding of the conditions of 
intelligibility:   
 
“If I am someone who cannot be without doing, then the conditions of my doing are, in part, 
the conditions of my existence. If my doing is dependent on what is done to me or, rather, the 
ways in which I am done by norms, then the possibility of my persistence as an ‘I’ depends on 
my being able to do something with what is done to me. This does not mean that I can remake 
the world so that I become its maker. That fantasy of godlike power only refuses the ways we 
are constituted, invariably and from the start, by what is before us and outside of us. My agency 
does not consist in denying this condition of my constitution. If I have any agency, it is opened 
up by the fact that I am constituted by a social world I never chose. That my agency is riven 
with paradox does not mean it is impossible. It means only that paradox is the condition of its 
possibility.” (Butler 2004: 3) 
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Hillman realizes the possibility of her agency as the “daily work” that needs to be 
done in order to be recognized as a queer or an intersex subject, precisely as “liv[ing] 
in ways that maintain a critical and transformative relation” (Butler 2004: 3) to the 
norms by which she is constituted. More concretely, this means that in order to live 
an intelligible and livable life, she needs to work toward a constitution of herself as 
an intersex subject, where this constitution is understood as a process that has to be 
incessantly interrogated, reassessed, and reestablished. However, this project cannot 
be accomplished entirely individually, as she needs a collective point of reference 
which provides the (alternative) conditions, and the (alternative) norms by which she 
can articulate her ‘alternative’ intersex subjectivity. The last stanza of her poem, 
which at the same time contains the last words of Intersex, “There is the ground / The 
soil / And the question of / What to do with these hands” (Intersex 155), indicates the 
emergence of a (collective) intersex space, which simultaneously provides the 
conditions by which she is able to write her narrative and do her activist work, and is 
in turn (re)constructed by her narrative/work. This last statement also hints at the 
impossibility to resolve the question of “what is intersex?”, the central issue driving 
Hillman’s memoir, in a final answer. Hillman’s “search for self in a world obsessed 
with normal” (Intersex back cover) hence has to be a narrative that challenges the 
very possibility to provide a coherent solution to this question. 
 
 
5. Reimagining Intersex  
     Literary Renegotiations of the Dis/Continuities between   




5.1 MAINSTREAMING INTERSEX I:                                
NOVELS BETWEEN FICTIONAL LIBERTIES AND            
THE NEED FOR NARRATIVE CLOSURE 
 
Fictional literary works about intersex themes that are mainstream enough to attract 
a larger readership are rare in North America. The most famous novel is clearly 
Jeffrey Eugenides’ Middlesex, published in 2002, followed almost a decade later by 
Annabel, written by Canadian author Kathleen Winter in 2010. The relative success 
of both novels has resulted in making intersex themes accessible to mainstream 
audiences, which has helped to make intersex people more visible within society and 
contributed to the cultural renegotiation of intersex.1 Yet the scarcity of literary works 
that include intersex characters and/or deal with intersex issues marks a significant 
gap in intersex representation, which makes the literary negotiation of intersex 
necessarily highly selective and exclusionary and produces a very restricted narrative 
that defines the contemporary western literary ‘canon’ of intersex works.2 Both 
                                                             
1  Middlesex won the 2003 Pulitzer Prize for Fiction, the Ambassador Book Award, Spain’s 
Santiago de Compostela Literary Prize, and the Great Lakes Book Award and was 
shortlisted for several other relevant literary awards. Annabel won the 2011 Thomas Head 
Raddall Award and was shortlisted for three major Canadian literary awards. In addition, 
the novel was adapted as a radio play for BBC Radio and inspired Alison Goldfrapp for 
her song “Annabel” (Bailey 2014). Both novels are best sellers, Middlesex in the USA and 
on a global scale (the novel has been translated into 34 languages), and Annabel foremost 
in Canada.  
2   To date, it cannot be said that a canon of intersex literature exists. However, literary and 
cultural productions of intersex have been gradually increasing in number over the past 
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novels focus on the coming of age of a child born with an intersex variation in the 
1960s, their struggles with their initial gender assignments and the consequences of 
the medicalization of their bodies, and their eventual escapes out of the small confines 
of their homes to the city, in an effort to come to terms with being intersex and with 
their gender identification. Middlesex and Annabel share a particular understanding 
of what it means, or can mean, to be intersex, of how the category of intersex has 
been produced by specific hegemonic discourses, and of the problematic aspects 
inherent in this production. Yet while they both employ certain narrative strategies, 
discourses, and plots in their representations of intersex, the two novels depart in 
significant ways from each other. The perhaps most obvious difference lies in their 
respective strategies to produce a coherently gendered intersex subject and a 
(coherent) narrative closure.  
My analysis of the fictional literary representations of intersex subjects 
necessitates a preliminary delineation of what cultural texts can, and cannot 
accomplish and contribute when it comes to contemporary cultural negotiations of 
intersex. Fictional literary works offer, in contrast to non-fictional and/or 
autobiographical narratives, a greater range of possibility for the reimagination of 
intersex lives. While fictional narratives are subjected to the demands of fair 
representation and avoiding harmful and insensitive portrayals of intersex persons, a 
work of fiction is not bound to do actual activist work, hence it is not obliged to 
produce a narrative whose (primary) function is to call attention to the human rights 
violations many intersex individuals are subjected to. This specific function of 
intersex narratives is, as discussed at an earlier point, a significant part of intersex 
first-person accounts that emerged in the 1990s. Novels and other fictional work, in 
contrast, have more liberties in constructing narratives that go beyond discussions of 
the medicalization of intersex individuals and that can create storylines which involve 
intersex characters whose defining feature is not or involves more than being 
subjected to processes of medicalization.  
However, the question of whether a literary/cultural production, or an author, can 
be held accountable for narrating a specific story and ignoring particular aspects of 
intersex issues that are important to activist struggles, for instance, is debatable (e.g. 
Holmes 2008, Hillman 2008). The most significant and controversial questions are 
whether a (non-intersex) author has a moral obligation to write a particular story of 
intersex, and whether an intersex story has the obligation to challenge, or even 
subvert, gender and sexed bodily norms. Both questions imply the demands of 
                                                             
twenty years, so that it can be reasonably argued that cultural negotiations of intersex take 
place in North America, from which to deduce a specific cultural narrative on intersex that 
exists at the intersection of medical discourses, activist intervention, gender and queer 
theory, LGBQ and transgender representation in literature and (popular) culture, and 
human rights debates/ethics. 




‘authenticity’ regarding the representation of intersex lives and of the resistance to 
hegemonic medical narratives, and consequently the demand on the text to 
acknowledge, and to critically position itself towards the social, political and legal 
discrimination and the human rights violations against intersex persons. While there 
is disagreement about which aspects should be part of an intersex storyline, there 
seems to be more consensus about what an intersex narrative should not do. 
Disrespectful, insensitive and sensationalist (mis)representations of a group of 
individuals that has been continually threatened with cultural and physical erasure, 
with violations of their bodily integrity and self-determination that are categorized as 
human rights violations, become indispensably questions of ethics. As a 
consequence, literary works can be held accountable for their perpetuation of 
hegemonic intersex narratives, as they inevitably reaffirm the ‘naturalization’ of the 
presumed continuities between body, gender, and sexuality (see Butler 1990), which 
has informed, and still informs, the basis for physical and psychological 
‘normalization’ procedures. 
Literary representations of intersex, then, indispensably involve a critical 
positioning towards existing discourses and narratives on intersex, both non-fictional 
and fictional. The time frame between the publication of the two novels under 
consideration spans nearly a decade (2002-2010) within which significant processes 
of intersex renegotiations have taken place. In particular, the challenges to medical 
discourses and treatment practices prompted by activists, the re-organizing of 
intersex activism, the changes in (mainstream) media coverage on intersex themes, 
and critical reactions to Middlesex (both by intersex and non-intersex academics and 
non-academics) have considerably redefined the conditions for the cultural, legal, and 
public recognition of intersex existence and issues. In this context of shifting 
paradigms of intersex representation, my analysis of and comparison between 
Eugenides’ and Winter’s novels interrogates the dis/continuities of (fictional) cultural 
renegotiations of the category of intersex and traces the dis/continuities between the 
cultural imaginary of intersex and social and political developments. The novels’ 
intertextual references and renegotiations of specific intersex narratives and the 
concomitant iteration of certain discursive elements, motifs, narrative strategies, and 
narrative plots simultaneously perpetuate hegemonic narratives on intersex and 
submit the category of intersex to processes of resignification, and potential 
subversion of hegemonic versions of intersex. 
In my analysis of the literary intersex representations in Middlesex and Annabel, 
I proceed from the claims Judith Butler makes in her analysis of the ramifications of 
conflicting gender and sex (re)assignments, “Doing Justice to Someone” (2001), 
where she discusses the conditions of intelligibility for individuals whose sense of 
gendered self is in a precarious state as it is apparently irreconcilable with the norms 
by which genders are recognizable. The usefulness of this theory for approaching the 
two novels lies in its capacity to formulate the struggle of the (fictional) intersex 
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characters with their conflicting gender assignments in theoretical terms, which 
reference the structural framework within which the conditions of intelligibility are 
negotiated. My literary analysis is based on the following theoretical propositions or 
questions regarding the conditions of intersex intelligibility in the novels: how is the 
recognizability of the intersex characters’ gender, and hence, subjecthood negotiated 
in the novels? How are the (potential) conflicts between the intersex characters’ sense 
of self and (non-consensual) gender assignments and/or sexed bodily assignments, 
between their desire to be recognized in a specific way and the conditions of their 
recognizability available to them, reconciled? How do different intertextual 
discourses and narratives regulate, and hence, either allow for or constrain their 
intelligibility as intersex and/or gender nonconforming subjects? Do the novels 
establish narrative spaces for acting out alternative, affirmative concepts of intersex? 
Do the novels offer metanarrative criticism of the regulatory processes that govern 
the conditions of intelligibility (for intersex subjects), do they contain a level of self-
reflexivity with regard to their own perpetuation of the norms which subjugate their 
intersex characters? Are there dis/continuities regarding the literary renegotiation of 
the category of intersex in Middlesex and Annabel, and in what way can they be 
considered as commentaries on the dis/continuity of contemporary cultural 
discussions on intersex themes? My discussion of the novels starts out from these 
questions, at the same time focusing my attention on the potential of fictional texts to 
create intersex narratives that go beyond the concerns of non-fictional intersex first-
person accounts.  
I begin my analysis with the claim that both Middlesex and Annabel offer, 
respectively, coming of age narratives that negotiate (some of) the complexities and 
realities of the lives of their intersex characters, their struggles with their initial 
gender and/or sex assignments, and their trajectories of finding/making a place for 
themselves that allows them to live ‘livable’ lives, in an overall believable way, while 
the obvious shortcomings and problematic aspects necessitate critical scrutiny. I will 
discuss the options the narratives themselves provide for the intersex persons of 
finding a way out of the dilemma of being/becoming (un)intelligible as theorized by 
Butler. Hence I look at the (symbolical) survival strategies the novels offer for their 
intersex protagonists that help them to sustain at the “limits of intelligibility,” in “the 
place of not-being within the field of being, living, breathing, attempting to love, as 
that which is neither fully negated nor acknowledged as being, acknowledged, we 
might say, into being” (Butler 2001: 622). I will scrutinize the novels’ potential of 
resistance to hegemonic narratives, in particular the narrative closure they offer, 
whether the intersex characters’ struggles with being/becoming intelligible are 
resolved by a ‘normalization’ in form of an assimilationist closure along 
heteronormative lines, or by a defiance of this ‘normalizing’ and the prospect of 
(gender) nonconformity.  




5.2 FROM MEDICAL OBJECT TO CULTURAL PHANTASMA 
AND BACK ON TRACK: MIDDLESEX AND MOVEMENTS 
OF ESCAPING/STRIVING FOR ‘NORMALIZATION’  
 
The following analysis of Middlesex focuses on the literary negotiations of intersex 
intelligibility with regard to the novel’s intersex protagonist, Cal_lie, and, to a lesser 
extent, another intersex character, Zora. As elaborated before, the crucial question 
for whom the production of intersex intelligibility is desirable in terms of the 
production of coherent subjecthood (implying a coherent gender) must be qualified 
when turning to the novel and its narrative and metanarrative representations. I 
understand the question of intersex intelligibility here on several levels: first, how do 
the intersex characters desire to be recognized as gendered subjects, and how are they 
recognized within the narrative? How do different power regimes and discourses 
regulate, and hence, either allow for or prohibit their intelligibility as non-
normatively gendered beings? Second, does the novel provide conditions of intersex 
intelligibility within the narrative? Does it open up possibilities and/or (narrative) 
spaces for an affirmative rearticulation of intersex subjecthood? Third, does the novel 
provide metanarrative critical commentary on the regulatory mechanisms that govern 
the conditions of intelligibility (for intersex subjects), does it show a level of self-
reflexivity with regard to its own (re)production of the norms which subjugate its 
intersex characters? How does it relate and/or contribute to current debates on and 
cultural reimaginations of intersex? The critical discussion of Middlesex’s production 
of intersex intelligibility takes into consideration all of these interrelated levels and 
thereby takes into account the fictionality of the narrative, which means that any 
judgment related to the fictional characters in the novel needs to be considered as a 
judgment of the novel’s representations of its characters, and not of real persons’ 
decisions they might make about their lives. 
As the recognition or the prohibition of intersex intelligibility is always 
contextual and culturally contingent, the analysis of Middlesex continues the question 
of how different narratives and discourses about intersex are integrated in the literary 
articulations of intersex subjects. The crucial moments of intersex articulations in 
Middlesex are informed by and reproduce narratives of mythology and medical 
science, which, historically, have produced and established hegemonic narratives and 
constructions of intersex subjects and the category of intersex.3 Under scrutiny are 
                                                             
3  The exhibition of bodies considered ‘transgressive’ is a phenomenon that is specific to the 
historical and cultural context in which it occurs, and that conveys general cultural 
assumptions about the (gendered) body. America’s exhibition culture of the 19th and the 
beginning of the 20th centuries, with its traveling carnivals, circuses, and medicine shows, 
serves as a site from which to scrutinize how bodily norms are constructed and enforced, 
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therefore two distinct (though interrelated) spaces of intersex (re)negotiations in the 
novel: the medical space (represented by Callie’s stay at the Sexual Disorders and 
Gender Identity Clinic) and the space of freak shows and mythology (represented by 
Cal’s and Zora’s performances at Octopussy’s Garden).  
Jeffrey Eugenides’ novel Middlesex (2002) interrelates a Greek family saga and 
a coming-of-age narrative of a family member who is born intersex in the second half 
of 20th century US-America. An acclaimed ‘hybrid’ text in many respects,4 Middlesex 
strives to provide a multilayered narrative voice. The first-person narrator 
Calliope/Callie_Cal Stephanides5 is presented as both an ethnic and a gender ‘hybrid’ 
as s_he is a child of first-generation Greek-Americans and born with an intersex 
variation. The novel’s narrative strategies and visualization practices open up a 
multidimensional space of representation for its diverse characters, who have “a 
knack for self-transformation” (MS 312):6  
 
“[D]er literarische Text [generiert] durch die Erschaffung einer eigenen Welt ein paralleles 
Netzwerk von Räumen, das in ein vielschichtiges, weit über die referentielle Bezugnahme 
hinausgehendes, Verhältnis zu den realen Räumen tritt. Darüber hinaus konstruieren manche 
Texte in einem selbstreflexiven Gestus ihrerseits Orte, die innerhalb des Textes die Qualität 
                                                             
and how these norms have impacted upon the lived experiences of individuals represented 
as physically different. At the same time, the 19th century has witnessed the rise of 
medicine’s authority and with it a perceived shift from staging bodily difference as 
performances of freakery in an entertainment context to the medicalization and 
institutionalization of bodies that were classified as ‘deviant.’ While the representation of 
‘transgressive’ bodies in so-called freak shows was generally associated with beliefs 
derived from mythology and folklore, medical science was associated with more 
‘progressive’ forms of knowledge. However, this supposed dichotomy between myth and 
science proves to be untenable. These two movements – the exhibition and staging of 
bodily difference in circuses and traveling shows and the establishment of asylums and 
hospitals – were parallel rather than sequential ones, and the medical establishment and 
medical practices mirrored to a considerable extent the representational strategies of the 
entertainment industry (the freak shows). 
4  Eugenides has defined Middlesex as a “hybrid” text that is simultaneously an “immigrant 
or family saga,” “mirrors the progression of Western literature,” and is “[p]art third-person 
epic, part first-person coming-of-age tale” (interview with Foer 2002). 
5  I will refer to Callie_Cal and the respective pronouns as they are used in the respective 
passages in Middlesex. When referring to the character in general, I will refer to her_him 
as Cal_lie. 
6  The following page references in this chapter refer to the paperback edition of Middlesex 
(abbreviated with MS) published in 2003. 




einer Heterotopie annehmen und zu privilegierten Orten der Veränderung oder zumindest der 
kritischen Reflexion der Ordnungen der anderen Räume im Text werden.” (Kilian 2014)7  
 
Middlesex is narrated by an intersex character, Cal_lie, who as the homodiegetic 
narrator (re)claims the authority over her_his own story; this narrative strategy thus 
can potentially serve as a destabilization of the normative narrative mechanisms that 
constitute her_him as an (un)intelligible subject (see also Kilian 2014). The narrative 
perspective is complicated by the narrative authority of a non-intersex author, or as 
Anson Koch-Rein phrases it: “Eugenides’ novel [...] invokes and draws on the power 
and authority of omniscient narration, epic story-telling, and a very present 
heterosexual and assertively male author, while simultaneously trying to pass as a 
realist intersexual first-person account” (Koch-Rein 2005: 250). Middlesex is also a 
‘hybrid’ text as it refers to, uses, integrates, reaffirms, and challenges different texts, 
discourses, and perspectives on and about intersex. Mythological narratives, medical 
texts on intersex, intersex first-person accounts and/or activists’ texts, and other 
(popular) cultural narratives are integrated in the literary rearticulations of intersex 
subjectivity in the novel. The novel thereby produces a not unproblematic multivocal 
text in which intersex is reconceptualized; these reconceptualized versions of an 
intersex character, or intersex characters (Cal_lie and Zora), are made available to a 
mainstream audience. Thus, the novel contributes to a considerable extent to a 
cultural (re)imagination of the category of intersex. The multilayering and the 
constant reaffirmative and challenging moments/movements in the novel produce 
ruptures in the text, which simultaneously allows for and forecloses moments of 
intersex intelligibility. 
The narrative visualizations of the intersex body, or bodies, are complicated by 
multiple and multilayered perspectives and narrative voices which produce 
ambiguous images of intersex corporeality. The novel at times refuses to expose or 
visualize the naked intersex body, at times it renders only fragmented parts of it, and 
at times it provides explicit images of it. The difficulties and the eventual 
impossibility to produce a coherent image of ‘the’ intersex body within the narrative 
scope of the novel are further reinforced by the presence of more than one intersex 
character; Zora represents a version of intersex corporeality that is very different from 
Cal_lie’s. With the coexistence of two intersex subjects within the same narrative 
space, Middlesex opens up the possibility of multiple, simultaneously valid intersex 
                                                             
7  “The literary text generates, through the creation of its own world, a parallel network of 
rooms that enters into a complex, more than referential relationship with the real rooms. 
Some texts furthermore construct places in a self-reflexive gesture that take on the quality 
of a heterotopia within the text and become privileged places of transformation or critical 
reflection on the other rooms’ orders in the text” (translation V.A.). 
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subjectivities. To what extent these different intersex representations can achieve a 
state of intelligibility needs to be scrutinized more closely. 
Middlesex opens with Cal’s account of his multiple births: “I was born twice: 
first, as a baby girl, on a remarkably smogless Detroit day in January of 1960; and 
then again, as a teenage boy, in an emergency room near Petoskey, Michigan, in 
August of 1974” (MS 3). While the novel evokes the motives of gender ‘ambiguity’ 
and transformation right from the beginning of Cal_lie’s fictional autobiographical 
story, this gender trajectory seems to be organized along the lines of medical 
interventions (the reference to the emergency room). The novel seeks to set up a 
possibility of non-fixed, unstable and shifting gender conceptualization, while it 
simultaneously reproduces the heteronormative gender binarism with its two 
legitimate and mutually exclusive genders (male/female). The motif of rebirth, a 
philosophical or religious concept of the ‘transmigration of the soul’ (Encyclopædia 
Britannica), undergoes a reformulation in medical terms here. The coherence of Cal’s 
self-narration is further complicated by the ‘third birth’ the narrator seems to 
experience at the age of forty-one, at the present time the frame narration is set. 
Eveline Kilian argues that this symbolic third birth functions as a narrative act of self-
construction and self-affirmation, which hence effects a resignification of himself as 
a (narrative) subject: “Bei der dritten ‘Geburt’ mit 41 Jahren handelt es sich um die 
literarische Selbsterschaffung des Protagonisten im Kontext seiner Familien-
geschichte, die als Selbstvergewisserung fungiert und dem Subjekt die Chance bietet, 
sich ein neues Verhältnis zu sich selbst zu erschreiben, sich als textuelles Subjekt neu 
zu entwerfen und dieses geschriebene Selbst zu bewohnen“ (Kilian 2014).8 The 
missing links and the gaps between the three (re)births need yet to be established and 
filled to produce a narratively coherent (fictional) autobiographical story.  
The first image of the intersex body the reader is confronted with, or not 
confronted with is evoked by a strategy of simultaneous reticence to visualize the 
(naked) intersex body and reference to a violent practice of exposing the naked 
intersex body. Cal formulates an image of her_himself within the context of medical 
discourse and practices and thereby refers to the (metanarrative) conditions of 
intelligibility, and simultaneously marks the narrative’s conditions of intelligibility, 
by which intersex bodies are knowable:  
 
“Specialized readers may have come across me in Dr. Peter Luce’s study, ‘Gender Identity in 
5-Alpha-Reductase Pseudohermaphrodites,’ published in the Journal of Pediatric Endo-
crinology in 1975. Or maybe you’ve seen my photograph in chapter sixteen of the now sadly 
                                                             
8  “The third ‘birth’ at age 41 refers to the protagonist’s literary self-creation in the context 
of his family history, which functions as a self-assurance and provides an opportunity for 
the subject to establish a new self-relation for himself in writing, to redraft himself as a 
textual subject, and to inhabit this newly written self” (translation V.A.). 




outdated Genetics and Heredity. That’s me on page 578, standing naked beside a height chart 
with a black box covering my eyes.” (MS 3) 
 
The narrative strategy to visualize the protagonist’s intersex body thereby relies on 
the presumed knowledge of the implied reader(ship).9 The indirect address, 
“[s]pecialized readers” (and the referential direct address, “you”), may refer to 
medical doctors but also to intersex persons and/or activists, i.e. those who are 
familiar with medicalized images of intersex subjects and medical terminology of 
intersex variations. For intersex individuals, the evocation of this type of images can 
have a hurtful and traumatic effect, and thus constitutes a (meta-) narrative act of 
violence. While specific groups within the (actual) readership can draw on their 
knowledge so that for them, an immediate visualization of a very specific image of 
the intersex body materializes, the majority of readers can be assumed to have no 
precedent knowledge about these pictures and/or the particular intersex variation (5-
alpha-reductase deficiency), and consequently for them, a (definite) visualization of 
Cal_lie’s intersex body fails to materialize. The novel’s narrative strategy to refuse, 
to a certain extent, a definite visualization of the intersex body can be interpreted as 
a refusal to satisfy voyeuristic desires and/or the objectifying and ‘exoticizing’ of 
intersex bodies. On the other hand, this reticence to visualize the intersex body risks 
to induce even more horror about it in the readers’ imagination, as the visual gaps are 
filled by default with notions of intersex that are potentially harmful (especially since 
the novel makes various references to the myth of Hermaphroditus). An explicit 
visualization of the intersex body is displaced to the margins of the knowability of 
(gendered) bodies – and of the human – and thereby intersex intelligibility, at this 
point in the narrative, is constituted as precarious. 
Moreover, the multilayeredness of narrative voices and of temporal sequences 
through which this image of intersex corporeality is mediated complicate a 
straightforward reading. This instance in the novel opens Middlesex’s narrative and 
is at the same time part of the frame narration, narrated by a then forty-one year old 
Cal, who lives as a male-identified individual in Berlin. Cal narrates retrospectively 
on his past as Callie, who has an intersex variation and was assigned female at birth. 
In this instance, medical authority is neither clearly challenged nor affirmed. The 
references to medical discourses and images for a self-referential subject construction 
can be read as an acceptance of medical authority over Cal_lie’s body and, by 
extension, his_her gender identification. The use and the simultaneous reproduction 
of hurtful and outdated medical terminology (“Pseudohermaphrodites”) and violent, 
                                                             
9  Wolf Schmid notes that “the implied reader can function as a presumed addressee [...] 
whose linguistic codes, ideological norms, and aesthetic ideas must be taken into account 
if the work is to be understood. In this function, the implied reader is the bearer of the codes 
and norms presumed in the readership” (Schmid 2013). 
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pathologizing images reinforce a self-image as an intersex subject that is utterly de-
individualized, depersonalized, and even dehumanized.  
At the same time, this passage contains traces of resistance against, or criticism 
of medical authority over intersex lives and its depersonalizing effects. The very act 
of verbalizing Callie’s abuse by medical authority (“standing naked [...] with a black 
box covering my eyes”) creates a moment of exposing the violent medical practices 
and the dehumanizing conceptualization of intersex persons. Thus read, the first 
passage of Middlesex also serves as a metatextual critical commentary on the 
medicalization of intersex subjects, and perhaps even marks the novel’s self-
awareness about its own perpetuation of this specific representation, which 
introduces and foreshadows the struggle of the protagonist. Moreover, this passage 
is immediately followed by Cal’s summing up her_his life, which contradicts the 
depersonalizing effects inherent in the medical production of intersex. In this part, he 
also comments explicitly on the violence s_he experienced from medical authorities: 
“I’ve been [...] guinea-pigged by doctors, palpated by specialists, and researched by 
the March of Dimes” (MS 3). Cal’s assertion that he was “born [...] again, as a teenage 
boy, in an emergency room” (MS 3) is misleading as it suggests that he had to undergo 
surgical procedures in order to effect this gender ‘transition,’ but this surgery never 
takes place. Yet, Cal_lie’s decision to ‘change’ her_his gender (identification) is in 
fact effected by a doctor’s definition of her_his gendered body. The narrative 
establishes and maintains critical ambivalence, through the perpetual and alternating 
reaffirmation and challenging of medical authority over intersex representations. The 
narrative juxtaposition of the medical perspective to Cal’s perspective, i.e. the 
perspective of an intersex subject, effects to a certain extent a destabilization of the 
authoritative perspective(s) and the medical gaze on the intersex body. However, the 
power relations between the intersex narrator – that is, a narrator who refuses to 
identify as intersex – and medical authority in the novel continue to be complicated.  
 
5.2.1 Callie, a Medical Case Report: The Sexual Disorders and 
Gender Identity Clinic as a Space of Pathologizing Intersex 
 
The narrative strategies and visualization practices at work in Middlesex’s 
representation of the medical discourse on intersex and its regulatory mechanisms 
can be conceived as operating in the terms that Foucault refers to as ‘instruments of 
disciplinary power’ (Foucault 1977: 170). Hierarchical observation, normalizing 
judgment, and the examination are exactly the means by which Callie’s intersex body 
is subjected to disciplinary control. The medical discourse constructs Dr. Luce and 
Callie as ‘doctor’ and ‘patient,’ respectively, within the narrative. Their respective 
positioning within the medical space/discourse is both an effect of and in turn results 
in the particular power relation between them. While generally in this relation, the 




doctor is the holder of medical authority over the patient, in Middlesex this power 
relation is complicated by Cal_lie’s narrative authority and her_his strategies to resist 
her_his subjugation.  
Dr. Luce is introduced as a famous sexologist to the reader by Callie. His 
identification as a doctor precedes him: even before Dr. Luce presents himself or is 
referred to by his name, his intelligibility as a medical authority is established by 
Callie’s commenting on their first visit of the Sexual Disorders and Gender Identity 
Clinic. The interior of the clinic is described in detail as generic for medical clinics: 
the “carpeting was institutional,” and “[t]here was even a reassuringly medicinical 
smell in the air” (MS 406); the doctor’s office “inspired confidence” and is perceived 
as the “surround of a triumphant psychoanalytic world-view” (MS 407). Before Dr. 
Luce appears in person the reader already expects him to perform his ‘identity’ as a 
sexologist in a way deemed ‘typical’ for a medical authority. Callie’s overtly ironic 
description of the clinic and the office signifies both the institutionalization of 
medical practices and its de-individualizing effects and, to some degree, the absurdity 
of medicine’s undisputed demigodlike status and power. The narrative’s ambivalence 
regarding the affirmation/challenging of medical authority from the novel’s opening 
passages is reiterated at this point, and continues in the subsequent narration. 
The relationship between doctor (Dr. Luce), patient (Callie), and by extension, 
the parents of the patient (Milton and Tessie) in the novel’s medical narrative 
functions as an allegory of the general relationship between the medical authorities 
and intersex individuals. The physician-patient relationship is hierarchically, and thus 
unequally, structured. The doctor obtains his predominance in this relationship 
through several interrelated power tools: he is the exclusive holder of relevant 
knowledge, he is the observer of bodies, he does virtually the entire speaking and he 
has the defining power through medical terminology. The patient (and furthermore, 
her parents) is (are) characterized by passivity and victimization in the novel. Dr. 
Luce, however, manages to gain her parents’ confidence through his patronizing 
manner considered as characteristic of medical authorities, i.e. by speaking and 
reassuring. By using medical terminology which is incomprehensible for anyone 
without medical knowledge he excludes Callie and her parents from the discourse. In 
doing so, he silences her and her parents – an act of violence, rendering Callie mute 
and powerless. His obtrusive remarks with respect to Callie’s sexuality add to the 
intimidation of his patient. Callie “hid inside [her] hair as usual” (MS 407), barely 
says anything except for giving short, quiet answers to the doctor’s questions, that is, 
only when he allows her to speak. Her parents are confined to nodding, whispering, 
waiting, and remaining silent in response to Dr. Luce’s daunting medical verbiage. If 
voice is a symbol of identity, and subjecthood depends on being a subject of 
language, then Callie is relegated to an object position without choice or agency. 
However, rendering a criticism of medical supremacy by exposing medical power 
and patients’ powerlessness is a strategy which is often found in non-fictional 
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intersex first-person accounts. As Middlesex refers to ISNA’s newsletter 
Hermaphrodites with Attitude as one of its sources, it can be plausibly inferred that 
the narrative strategy used by intersex individuals who experienced medical abuse is 
iterated in the novel’s (meta-) narrative critique of the power relations between doctor 
and patient. 
Another narrative strategy of challenging medical supremacy is the ironic 
construction of the figure of Dr. Luce. The narrative presentation of Dr. Luce is 
mediated and structured by Callie’s perception and by her relation to the doctor. Dr. 
Luce  
 
“was considered the world’s leading authority on human hermaphroditism. The Sexual 
Disorders and Gender Identity Clinic, which he founded in 1968, had become the foremost 
facility in the world for the study and treatment of conditions of ambiguous gender. He was the 
author of a major sexological work [...] which was standard in a variety of disciplines ranging 
from genetics and pediatrics to psychology.” (MS 409, emphasis added)10 
 
The hyperbolic representation of Luce’s seemingly uncontested demigodlike status 
within the medical sphere iterates the irony in Callie’s description of the clinic; this 
parallelism construes Luce as an ‘extension’ of the clinic, as an embodiment of the 
medical institution rather than an individual. This de-individualizing of the character 
of Luce might seem paradoxical given his outstanding accomplishments and his 
starlike status. However, while his work is claimed to have influenced and, in fact, 
established the standard for medical treatment of persons with ‘ambiguous’ gender, 
Luce needs to be considered as a ‘tool’ in the medical machinery. This, the novel 
attempts to make clear by its strategies to ironically exaggerate its demigodlike 
construction of Luce and to render a de-individualized representation of him through 
Callie’s perspective. As the founder of the Sexual Disorders and Gender Identity 
Clinic and the major referee in questions of sexology he functions as the 
representative of the institutionalization, classification, and thereby the legitimization 
of intersex variations as a sexual “disorder,” a medical “condition” which requires 
                                                             
10  The character of Dr. Luce bears striking analogy to pediatrician and sexologist John 
Money. In his acknowledgment Eugenides cites one of Money’s texts as a source for the 
novel. During the 1950s up to the 1970s and beyond, Money claimed that a child’s gender 
identity is fluid in very early life, which would become fixed at arriving a certain age. This 
theory led to his argument that children born with intersex genitalia could develop a stable 
gender identity when they were raised in one sex assigned at birth. Although Money’s 
(in)famous and widely influential ideas relating to gender identity and his medical 
management of intersex variations have been heavily and publicly refuted, Money’s 
theories have formed the basis of medical practice concerning intersex variations up until 
today. 




medical “treatment.” As “a famous sexologist” with “glamour status in the field” (MS 
408), he has the authorized, exclusive power of defining ‘normative’ and ‘non-
normative’ sexes and genders. Callie’s referring to him as “a scientist like Luce” (MS 
408, emphasis added) negates him as an individual and instead constructs him as a, 
or the, specimen of medical authority. The apparent impossibility to call (t)his 
authority into question is underscored by the “strength of this success” – i.e. of Luce’s 
theory of gender as “determined by a variety of influences [...], most important, the 
sex of rearing” – so that consequently “his reputation reached the stratosphere” as the 
late 1960s were “a great time to be a sexologist” for sexology “was a matter of 
national interest” (MS 410f). The public’s unchecked approval of this medical 
authority can, according to Callie’s assessment, be accounted for by “the American 
belief that everything can be solved by doctors” (MS 426).  
The protagonist’s ironic comments on medical authority and her_his at times 
caricature-like descriptions of Luce can be interpreted as her_his attempt to reclaim 
(narrative) authority over her_his situation, which effects moments of destabilization 
of the ‘traditionally’ rigorous doctor-patient relationship and its inherent regulatory 
power. It becomes also clear, however, that these strategies cannot ultimately 
dismantle medicine’s power over intersex subjects but can merely serve as a (meta-) 
narrative critique of this power. Hence, while the novel shows a level of self-
reflexivity about its own limitations regarding the dismantling of medical authority, 
it simultaneously reaffirms medical authority’s efficacy, both on the narrative 
(Cal_lie radically redefines her_his gender identification based on medical 
definitions of gender) and the metanarrative level (by reproducing hurtful and 
outdated medical terminology, reiterating and reveling in representations of violent 
examination practices, and granting medical authority the defining power over 
intersex [self-] identifications, etc.).  
The narrative oscillates between (re)producing and challenging Cal_lie’s 
objectification through several interrelated power discourses and mechanisms that 
regulate her_his intelligibility as a gendered subject. The question of who (or what) 
controls the narrative is crucial in determining what Cal_lie can be/come within the 
limits of the narrative. The conditions for Cal_lie to be/come a recognizable subject 
are to a considerable extent provided by the narrative’s reiteration of cultural norms, 
which marks the boundaries of being/becoming for Cal_lie but at the same time 
allows for the possibility of their contestation. It becomes also clear that subject 
formation always occurs in relation to an other and its norms, as Butler notes: “the 
very being of the self is dependent not just on the existence of the Other [...] but also 
on the possibility that the normative horizon within which the Other sees and listens 
and knows and recognizes is also subject to a critical opening” (Butler 2001b: 22). 
This ‘other’ in the novel is (temporarily) represented by Dr. Luce, in relation to whom 
Callie’s gendered body is marked as ‘deviant.’ For Luce,  
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“I was an extraordinary case, after all. He was taking his time, savoring me. To a scientist like 
Luce I was nothing less than a sexual Kaspar Hauser. There he was, a famous sexologist [...], 
and suddenly on his doorstep, arriving out of the woods of Detroit like the Wild Boy of 
Aveyron, was me, Calliope Stephanides, age fourteen. I was a living experiment [...]. He was a 
brilliant, charming, work-obsessed man, and watched me from behind his desk with keen eyes. 
While he chatted, speaking primarily to my parents, gaining their confidence, Luce was 
nevertheless making mental notes. He registered my tenor voice. He noted that I sat with one 
leg tucked under me. He watched how I [...]. He paid attention to [...] all the external 
manifestations of what he called my gender identity.” (MS 408, emphasis added) 
 
In this moment of doubled visualization – Callie observing Luce observing her – the 
object of the medical gaze becomes simultaneously the agent of the gaze, while the 
holder of the medical gaze becomes the object of its own object. Through this change 
in, or appropriation of perspective, Callie manages to reevaluate and hence to 
destabilize the doctor’s construction of her as a gender ‘deviant,’ and as a ‘case,’ or 
object of study. Furthermore, Callie sees herself through the doctor’s eyes – although 
it can be claimed that she rather projects her own self-perception onto Luce – which 
complicates the narrative coherence of her self-construction. Through Luce’s gaze, 
or rather his various modes of gazing, which is further complicated by Callie’s 
appropriation or projection of the gaze, Callie’s intersex body is constructed as a 
medical condition, as a genetic ‘disorder’ that causes ‘pseudohermaphroditism’ and 
as such ‘deviates’ from normative conceptions of gendered bodies which are set up 
and enforced by medical authorities, represented by Luce. While Cal_lie’s narrative 
voice challenges her_his objectification to some extent, the novel cannot avoid the 
seemingly inevitable pathological connotation of intersex. 
The dichotomization of culture/nature, or civilization/wilderness, as embodied by 
Luce and Callie respectively, amplifies the marginalized status of an individual who 
fails to conform to the system’s norms and whose corporeality is transgressive of the 
normative system of rules and regulations. Since all those ‘transgressors’ come to 
Luce’s clinic, he “had at his disposal a body of research material – of living, breathing 
specimens – no scientist had ever had before” (MS 412). Callie is a representative of 
this body of research material, of an object at the mercy of medical authority’s 
regulative forces. Luce’s examinations of Callie’s body, and the other medical 
experts’ examinations of her body, reiterate the hierarchical relationship: Callie is 
commanded to undress and is powerless against the humiliating scrutinizing of her 
body. These situations of medical examination are negotiated in terms of systematic 
and institutionalized violence exercised over a specific group of subjects by 
representatives of the (medical) system. 
While Dr. Luce probes Callie’s genitals during the first instance of gynecological 
examination, he himself becomes the object of Callie’s observation: “I looked down 
to see that Luce was holding the crocus between his thumb and forefinger. [...] He 




didn’t look shocked or appalled. In fact he examined me with great curiosity, almost 
connoisseurship. There was an element of awe or appreciation in his face” (MS 412). 
This doubly mediated perspective on Callie’s genitals produces a moment of 
ambiguity and destabilization of medical definitory power. This disruption, however, 
lasts only momentarily as institutional power is immediately reestablished by 
ignoring and transgressing the patient’s physical and emotional limits: against 
Callie’s protest, Luce keeps on with his invasive examination: “There was a hint of 
annoyance, of command in his voice. I took a deep breath and did the best I could. 
Luce poked inside. [...]. [...] a sharp pain shot through me. I jerked back, crying out. 
‘Sorry.’ Nevertheless, he kept on. He placed one hand on my pelvis to steady me. He 
probed in farther [...]. My eyes were welling with tears. ‘Almost finished,’ he said. 
But he was only getting started” (MS 412f). This scene provides a commentary on 
the institutionalized medical examination practices from different angles. In an effort 
to regain control, to a certain extent, over a situation of powerlessness, Callie reverses 
the gazing relations in an attempt to regain mastery over her body via the regulatory 
power over corporeality. Her ultimate defenselessness against Luce’s acts of violence 
and of violating her corporeal and emotional boundaries signifies all the more the 
apparent insurmountability of medical authority. While the novel provides criticism 
directed at the violent medical practices in examination situations, it narratively 
reproduces the violent practices in question, and thereby reiterates the potentially 
triggering and traumatic effects on intersex, or other, individuals (including the 
implied readers) who have made similar harmful experiences. This raises the question 
of whether the explicit and graphic description of violent acts is always indispensable 
to narrative representations of and their metanarrative critical commentary on 
structural or interpersonal violence. Middlesex contains several explicit scenes of 
violence – not only against the intersex protagonist –, and thus perpetuates violence, 
which undermines its own claims of self-reflexivity. 
The institutionalization of medical violence constitutes the context for, and is in 
turn produced by, the repetitive performance of the examination. Thereby the intersex 
subject’s internalization of its routine marks the problematic interdependency of 
acceptance of and refusal to consent to this systematic violence. Callie has the 
processes of a “typical unveiling” (MS 419) internalized to the extent that her active 
participation in the examination is confined to mechanical movements to facilitate 
the process of exposure: “I knew the drill. Behind the screen I undressed while the 
doctors waited” (MS 420), “[w]ithout having to be told, I lifted my legs and fit my 
heels in the gynecological stirrups” (MS 421), “after the third or fourth time I could 
recite the list” of medical terms “by heart” (MS 421), “I lay there, letting Luce [...] 
do what he had to do” (MS 421), “I dropped my robe. Almost used to it now, I climbed 
up on the riser before the measuring chart” (MS 422), etc. What at first might seem 
like consent to or acceptance of the examination practices, the submission to the 
authorities is not so much an expression of the patient’s consent but rather a result of 
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the internalization of the workings of the regulatory regime, and its sanction system, 
in question. Moreover, this (non-)consensual subjection can serve as a survival 
strategy in situations where no other form of resistance is available.  
That the interdependency of (alleged/forced) acceptance and refusal of 
institutional violence cannot be easily disentangled, if at all, becomes obvious in 
Callie’s self-reflections on her ambivalent reactions to the forces of medical 
authority. In one of the examination scenes with two other doctors present, the 
intricate processes of dependency and ‘obedience’ constitute a psychological double 
bind for Callie:  
 
“Luce put his hand on the small of my back. Men have an annoying way of doing that. They 
touch your back as though there’s a handle there, and direct you where they want you to go. Or 
they place their hand on top of your head, paternally. [...] Luce’s hand was now proclaiming: 
Here she is. My star attraction. The terrible thing was that I responded to it; I liked the feel of 
Luce’s hand on my back. I liked the attention. Here were all these people who wanted to meet 
me.” (MS 420) 
 
This self-reflective moment marks an awareness about the manipulative forces 
behind Callie’s conflicting emotions. Yet the narrative here itself makes a 
problematic assertion. Introducing the (ever so vague) possibility of an intersex 
person actually enjoying the medical examinations – even when feeling ambivalent 
about it – constitutes a gross misrepresentation of the actual harm and traumatizing 
effects many intersex individuals have to suffer as a result of these practices. The 
novel here seems to prioritize a representation of the psychological complexity of its 
main character to make her_him appear more ‘interesting,’ at the expense of 
decidedly criticizing the institutionalized medical violence and its harmful 
consequences for its intersex subjects. Again, the novel here perpetuates problematic 
ideas about intersex subjects and hence compromises its self-critical approach. 
While one of the recurring narrative strategies to challenge the medical 
perspective on and medical authority over the representation of Callie’s intersex 
corporeality is Callie’s appropriation of visualization practices and of narrative 
authority, which serves to expose, and to some extent subvert the power relations 
inherent in the relationship between institution and individual, the narrative presents 
several other strategies for Callie to cope with the violence she is subjected to. The 
strategy of bodily dissociation serves as a survival tool at various points in Middlesex. 
In the examining situation, Callie’s attempt at mentally escaping the shameful and 
traumatic experience succeeds only for brief moments: “behind the curtain, I no 
longer felt as if I were in the room” (MS 421), “I was there and not there, cringing at 
Luce’s touch, sprouting goose bumps, and worrying that I hadn’t washed properly” 
(MS 421). The willful or, in terms of emotional survival, necessary attempt at 
disembodiment is reiterated by, or reiterates the dissociation of body and 




person(hood) as the premise and the effect of medical practices, which focus on 
intersex body parts detached from the individual who inhabits this body. The 
depersonalizing and dehumanizing process is fortified by the covering of Callie’s 
face in the medical textbook: “The black box: a fig leaf in reverse, concealing identity 
while leaving shame exposed” (MS 422). Individuality is erased, body parts deprived 
of humanity are left, with the aim of making intersex individuals invisible within 
society (MS 428f). Although the processes of bodily and mental dissociation are 
based on different premises – one functions as a dehumanization of medical subjects, 
the other as a protective mechanism against this dehumanization –, disembodiment 
seems to be inherent in the medicalization of intersex. 
The mechanisms of enforced ‘normalization’ are quite evidently at work in the 
narrative. One significant moment in the novel is an incident in Dr. Luce’s office 
where the sexologist discusses the medical treatment of Callie with her parents in 
Callie’s presence. At stake is a sex/gender ‘reassignment’ surgery to make her 
genitalia look more ‘normatively female’ as she was assigned female at birth and 
raised as a girl until puberty, when her body starts producing more testosterone and 
develops into a different direction. The politics of gender ‘normalcy’ and the 
‘normalization’ of bodies which do not seem to ‘fit’ cultural/medical gender 
standards constitute a motif that structures Middlesex’s entire narrative, but becomes 
most explicit and compressed in the novel’s representation of the attempted medical 
‘normalization’ of Callie’s intersex body. Cultural notions of gender performance 
and questions of bodily and sexual capabilities are interdependent factors in the 
novel’s negotiation of intersex intelligibility. The novel oscillates between 
acceptance or reaffirmation of and challenging normative ideas of gender, a narrative 
process that is also represented through the protagonist’s internal struggle.  
The point of origin for the impending medical ‘normalizing’ procedures is a 
“doctor’s wild claim about [Callie’s] anatomy” while she is hospitalized after an 
accident (MS 401). The narrative’s adamant focus on the relevance of genitals in its 
negotiation of intersex intelligibility is all the more striking when compared to 
representations of non-intersex subjects. Genitals in Middlesex are only under 
consideration – and this to a great extent – when they apparently ‘deviate’ from an 
(unmarked) genital or gender norm. The novel’s failure to mark normative genitals 
and other gendered bodily characteristics as normative conceals the construction of 
‘nonconforming’ gendered corporeality along the lines of, or in (supposed) 
opposition to gender and sexual norms. It is the very unmarkedness of normative 
representations of genders and corporeality that establishes the apparent priority of 
genitals for intersex individuals. When Callie asserts, “my genitals have been the 
most significant thing that ever happened to me” (MS 401), the novel at once claims 
that genitals are the defining parameter of intersex – and intersex only – subject 
construction and that they are, after all, not inherent in a person. To point out the 
significance of genitals in the production of the category of intersex while at the same 
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time relating to their performative qualities sets up a contradiction between biological 
essentialism and cultural constructivism. The performative character of genitals (and 
of hormones and chromosomes) does not mitigate their crucial function in the 
negotiation of Callie’s intelligibility. When the doctor’s claim about her ‘atypical’ 
gendered corporeality leads her parents to take her to the Sexual Disorders and 
Gender Identity Clinic in order to find a ‘solution’ to the ‘problem,’ Callie becomes 
aware of the signifying power of the gendered body:  
 
“I knew that my situation, whatever it was, was a crisis of some kind. [...] They [my parents] 
acted as though my problem was medical and therefore fixable. So I began to hope so, too. Like 
a person with a terminal illness, I was eager to ignore the immediate symptoms, hoping for a 
last-minute cure. I veered back and forth between hope and its opposite, a growing certainty 
that something terrible was wrong with me.” (MS 405) 
  
By comparing an intersex variation to an illness – a terminal illness no less – the 
process of the medicalization of intersex is rendered explicit: first comes the 
declaration of intersex as a “crisis,” or a state of emergency, followed by a 
pathologization of intersex, and finally, at least, the prospect of a remedy, a “cure,” 
the “fixing” of the intersex ‘condition.’ 
Callie’s alleged ‘deviance’ from gendered bodily norms triggers sequences of 
attempted ‘normalization’ in the narrative. Callie is suddenly confronted with her 
perceived failure to meet the cultural/medical standards of femaleness/femininity by 
both her parents and the doctors. Her bodily self-perception clashes with the 
perception of others: “I was largely oblivious to the clumsy figure I cut. [...] all that 
machinery clanked beneath the observation tower of my head, and I was too close to 
see it” (MS 406). Her parents, however, make her aware of her non-normatively 
gendered body: “It was terrifying to see your child in the grip of unknown forces. [...] 
they [my parents] were seized with a fear that I was growing out of control” (MS 406, 
emphasis added) – like a Bakhtinian grotesque body that is continually growing, 
transgressing its material, bodily boundaries. Yet the novel urges to preserve, or re-
establish, Callie’s gender intelligibility: “There was no sense in worrying about a 
psychological assessment that could only confirm what was obvious: that I was a 
normal, well-adjusted girl” (MS 415). 
The impending ‘re-establishing’ of gender ‘normalcy’ – or rather, as it is phrased 
by the doctor, the establishing of an ‘appearance’ of gender ‘normalcy,’ more precise: 
normative ‘femaleness’ – is formulated in terms of a quick-change medical 
intervention aimed at ‘aligning’ Callie’s physical gender characteristics with her 
female self-identification. This medical intervention as suggested by Dr. Luce draws 
on a rhetoric that can be formulated as the “legitimating rhetoric of spiritual 
transformation to naturalize [the] makeover processes” (Weber and Tice 2009). This 
rhetoric, containing a logic that, as Ann Kibbey argues, “‘converts the ordinary 




person or object into something that is retrospectively perceived as inadequate,’ in 
turn heightening the salvational powers of the intercessionary agent” (quoted in 
Weber and Tice 2009), seems to be an integral strategy in Luce’s recommendation of 
medical treatment:  
 
“‘First, hormone injections. Second, cosmetic surgery. The hormone treatments will initiate 
breast development and enhance her female secondary sex characteristics. The surgery will 
make Callie look exactly like the girl she feels herself to be. In fact, she will be that girl. Her 
outside and inside will conform. She will look like a normal girl. Nobody will be able to tell a 
thing. And then Callie can go on and enjoy her life.’” (MS 428, emphasis added) 
 
This statement strikes as problematic in several ways. First, the notion of gender 
binary is reaffirmed, or in fact about to be reproduced, by the planned endeavor to 
create an ‘unambiguously’ (appearing) gendered body and the underlying assumption 
that ‘unambiguously’ gendered bodies do even exist, and can be produced with the 
help of medical technology. Second, this idea relies on a biological essentialism, 
which allows for a ‘conformity’ between body and gender identification. Third, it 
perpetuates the idea that specific genders are ‘authentic’ and others are ‘non-
authentic,’ and that there are particular persons or groups who have the (legal) 
authority to determine the criteria for a demarcation of this gender ‘authenticity.’ 
Forth, it is suggested that intersex lives are miserable, unintelligible lives, and only 
normatively gendered persons can live fulfilled, intelligible lives. And finally, fifth, 
the logic of the argumentation requires the consequent erasure of any intersex 
characteristic. The novel’s iteration of the well-established medico-cultural 
justification for medical intervention picks up the criticism formulated in many 
intersex first-person narratives. However, the novel lacks self-reflexivity here, as the 
anticipated outcome of the interventions sounds too promising even to Callie. 
Moreover, the connotation of processes of gender reassignment surgery and 
procedures in transgender contexts and its displacement to an intersex context lacks 
an awareness about this problematic narrative strategy.11  
The willfully intended erasure of any intersex characteristic from Callie’s body 
contributes to the invisibility of intersex subjects and forecloses the possibility of 
(adult) intersex intelligibility. The surgical and hormonal interventions are trivialized 
and the risks downplayed by Dr. Luce, and consequently by Callie’s parents, 
especially in comparison to the anticipated result of the creation of a ‘fixed’ (in the 
                                                             
11  While some people opt for surgical, hormonal and other medical treatment on their own 
accord, in order to align their bodily characteristics with their gender self-identification, in 
the case of Callie the situation is different. Callie does not have a say in the decision-making 
process. Moreover, prior to her stay at the clinic she never felt the need to change her body 
in any way. 
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double sense of ‘corrected’ and ‘stable’) female subject: “It was not a difficult 
decision, especially as Luce had framed it. A single surgery and some injections 
would end the nightmare and give my parents back their daughter, their Calliope, 
intact. [...] No one would know. No one would ever know” (MS 429). Any mark of 
an intersex variation needs to be ‘corrected,’ in order to (re-) produce ‘normalcy’ – 
most crucially, to enable Callie to perform heterosexuality by making her sexually 
available, i.e. sexually attractive and bodily capable, for heterosexual activities. The 
influence of pornography on medical views on gendered corporeality and sexuality, 
which has been discussed previously, is explicitly commented on in the narrative. 
Not only does Dr. Luce write a sex advice column for Playboy; he moreover utilizes 
the “diagnostic tool of pornography” (MS 418) in his psychological assessment of 
Callie’s (psycho-) sexual development, by showing her heterosexist porn movies to 
find out about Callie’s sexual preferences; accompanied by the doctor’s uncalled-for 
sexual remarks (MS 419). 
The novel’s naturalization of heterosexuality and the erasure, or the biologist 
explaining away of lesbian sexuality is not only effected by the planned medical 
interventions and its heteronormative premises. Throughout the narrative, lesbian 
desire is either prohibited (Callie’s desire for the Obscure Object, a girl from her 
school, fails to materialize) or retrospectively justified by bodily characteristics 
marked as ‘male’ (XY chromosomes; testosterone level, MS 166) and the “inkling of 
her true biological nature” (MS 327). The contrast to a heterosexual male-identified 
Cal’s success with Julie amplifies the novel’s heteronormative privileging of 
heterosexuality. Morgan Holmes argues that this erasure of lesbian desire and 
existence is “deeply problematic,” and criticizes Middlesex’s double standard with 
regard to sexuality: “Eugenides’ characterization of Cal/liope falls right along the 
matched values of prescientific and biologist explanations for sexual dimorphism as 
the appropriate mode of being” and hence “rewrites [lesbian desire] as male 
heterosexuality” (Holmes 2008: 93). As a consequence of this characterization, 
Holmes claims, Callie is deprived of “any transgressive power”; queerness, she 
concludes, is marked as the non-human in the novel:  
 
“The problem is that the hermaphrodite can only become recognizable as human once all the 
queer desire, embodiment, and sex have been erased in a zero-sum game. [...] Until Caliope’s 
[sic] humanity is as obvious as a lesbian – or a queer person more generally – as it is as a 
heterosexual protagonist, then Calliope is not an especially powerful character and the novel 
not especially new, revolutionary, or useful, but just a retrenchant heterosexist politics.” 
(Holmes 2008: 94) 
 
Middlesex’s narrative strategies to (re)construct Cal_lie as an intelligible subject and 
the question of the “relationship between intelligibility and the human” (Butler 2001: 
622) becomes particularly explicit in the narrative’s negotiations of her_his sexuality 




and the origins of her_his sexual desires. Cal_lies humanness depends not only on a 
coherent gender (Butler 2001: 622), but on a coherent performance of her_his gender 
in sexual terms. A ‘failure’ would mean to lose her_his humanness – thus, the novel’s 
cautious efforts to prevent Cal_lie’s loss of humanness, or of her_his recognizability 
as human, at the same time works to stabilize the very normative conditions of 
intelligibility. 
A closer analysis of Dr. Luce’s case report about Callie, titled PRELIMINARY 
STUDY: GENETIC XY (MALE) RAISED AS FEMALE (MS 435), reveals it to 
render a condensed version of conventional medical studies on intersex subjects, that 
entails its own deconstruction. Luce’s report presents medical “data,” his 
observations of Callie’s gender behavior, notes on her familial background, on her 
“sexual function,” and finally concludes: 
 
“‘As the girl’s gender identity was firmly established as female at the time her condition was 
discovered, a decision to implement feminizing surgery along with corresponding hormonal 
treatment seems correct. To leave the genitals as they are today would expose her to all manner 
of humiliation. Though it is possible that the surgery may result in partial or total loss of 
erotosexual sensation, sexual pleasure is only one factor in a happy life. The ability to marry 
and pass as a normal woman in society are also important goals, both of which will not be 
possible without feminizing surgery and hormone treatment.’” (MS 437)  
 
The report can be interpreted as constituting a moment of self-reflexivity and an 
ironic rearticulation of ‘traditional’ medical intersex discourses in the novel. 
Metanarrative references to medical texts (case studies etc.), heteronormative 
concepts of femaleness and female sexuality (that the medical texts themselves draw 
upon), and – more implicitly – to criticism of medical practices formulated by 
intersex activists and in first-person accounts, are interwoven in and appropriated for 
both a textual and a metatextual criticism on medical practice and its underlying 
normative framework. Thereby the text exposes the absurdity and the self-
deconstructive moments of the medical reasoning. While the character of Luce 
himself does not show any hint of a self-reflective perspective on his own work, or 
on the medical establishment, or on his privileged positioning in a hierarchical 
context of institutionalized power relations, let alone on his own position as a white, 
able-bodied, middle-class, heterosexual, non-intersex, male individual, Middlesex’s 
fictional medical doctor functions here both as a representative (a specimen indeed) 
of the medical establishment and as an inherently (self-) revealing allegory of 
everything that is wrong, i.e. ethically questionable, with it. The doctor is not 
represented as an insensitive, barbaric monster who goes out of his way to inflict the 
greatest possible harm upon his patient. It is his patronizing manner and his pretense 
to act in the ‘best interest’ of his patient, together with his lack of critical (self-) 
awareness, that constitutes his violence. 
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Ultimately, the mechanisms of enforced ‘normalization’ in Middlesex are 
de/legitimated, respectively, by Callie’s refusal/acceptance of the medical authority’s 
gender construction. Callie comments on the apparent impossibility to not obey the 
medical authority’s definition of her gender as female: “In his mellow, pleasing, 
educated voice, looking directly into my eyes, Luce declared that I was a girl whose 
clitoris was merely larger than those of other girls” (MS 433) – “If I had a clitoris – 
and a specialist was telling me that I did – what could I be but a girl?” (MS 434). The 
defining relative clause that modifies “a girl,” “whose clitoris was merely larger than 
those of other girls,” marks Callie’s femaleness as ‘inadequate’ or ‘insufficient’ 
(paradoxically, the ‘excess’ of the clitoris signifies a ‘deficit’). Callie internalizes the 
necessity to occupy a clearly delineated identity, or gender category, in order to 
be/come intelligible. The novel, once again, is anxious to establish, or to restore 
Callie’s intelligibility:  
 
“It wasn’t difficult to pour my identity into different vessels. In a sense, I was able to take 
whatever form was demanded of me. I only wanted to know the dimensions. Luce was 
providing them. My parents supported him. The prospect of having everything solved was 
wildly attractive to me, too [...]. I only wanted it all to be over. I wanted to go home and forget 
it had ever happened. So I listened to Luce quietly and made no objections.” (MS 434) 
 
Again, ostensible acceptance of a situation (“the blankness of obedience,” MS 434) 
of being subjected to (institutional) power functions as a strategy to cope with or 
escape this situation, when other strategies of resistance are not possible or might 
even be potentially harmful for the individual, e.g. through sanctions. However, the 
use of this strategy in the narrative is not unproblematic as it perpetuates the idea that 
intersex individuals are able or willing to arbitrarily take on any gender identity; 
thereby it claims an essentialist relationship between body and gender identification, 
and reinforces the highly problematic notion found in medical reasoning that intersex 
infants’ or children’s gender identification is ‘malleable,’ which functions as a 
prerequisite for surgery and hormone treatment. 
Callie leaves her family in order to escape the ‘normalizing’ surgery, which might 
seem like an act of liberation from the medical authority’s control and a rejection of 
its coercive regulatory mechanisms which affect her body. However, Callie’s 
rejection of a female gender does not lead to an acceptance of her intersex 
embodiment. Callie decides to radically redefine herself as a boy – a decision based 
on the data she finds in Dr. Luce’s report (the discovery of her XY chromosomal 
status, undescended testes, and a slight hypospadia), and hence on a biologist concept 
of gender , and not on a subjective, individual experience or choice. By “going where 
no one knows me” (MS 439) Callie seeks to erase her former identity as a girl, or as 
a “hermaphrodite,” as a “monster” (MS 431), in order to take on the ‘unambiguously’ 
male identity of Cal. The novel’s continuing renegotiations of gender intelligibility, 




epitomized by Cal’s subsequent struggle with the sociocultural demands of gender 
and sexual normativity, are summarized by Cal’s critical reflection on normativity on 
his westward journey:  
 
“I was beginning to understand something about normality. Normality wasn’t normal. It 
couldn’t be. If normality were normal, everybody could leave it alone. They could sit back and 
let normality manifest itself. But people – and especially doctors – had doubts about normality. 
They weren’t sure normality was up to the job. And so they felt inclined to give it a boost.” 
(MS 446) 
 
This insight corresponds to a simplified concept of cultural constructivism and relates 
to medicine’s investment in relying on and reproducing bodily, gender, and other 
norms. The explicit commentary on the historical and cultural contingency of norms 
marks the protagonist’s individual process of awareness and simultaneously 
functions as a metanarrative moment of self-reflexivity.  
However, the novel’s explicit statement of self-reflexivity at this point seems like 
a predictable attempt to anticipate potential criticism directed at Middlesex’s 
reproduction of normative concepts of gender and sexuality – an anticipation that has 
proven true, considering the amount of literary reviews that formulate their critiques 
exactly along these lines (e.g. Koch-Rein, Lee, Holmes). This metanarrative strategy 
to anticipate – and thereby evade – criticism by explicitly claiming the author’s/the 
text’s own awareness about problematic representations and their/its own 
reproduction thereof as an a priori justification for their reiteration is a popular 
strategy of postmodern texts about politically, ethically, or otherwise precarious 
themes. 
At a later instance in the narrative, Cal’s elaboration of conflicting theories on 
gender identity formation similarly serves as both a reflection on his gender 
identification and a metanarrative commentary on the debates surrounding the 
cultural/biological constructedness of gender. Cal finds himself caught up within 
contradictory theories and discourses on subject and gender formation, including 
evolutionary biology, Luce’s theory that “personality was primarily determined by 
environment,” and the “essentialism” of the intersex movement (MS 479): “My life 
exists at the center of this debate. [...] I don’t fit into any of these theories. [...] I never 
felt out of place being a girl. I still don’t feel entirely at home among men. Desire 
made me cross over to the other side, desire and the facticity of my body” (MS 479). 
Kilian argues: 
 
“Die Diskursvielfalt unterminiert den naturwissenschaftlichen Diskurs in seinem Geltungs-
anspruch, lässt ihn vielmehr als “Teil einer Serie kultureller Narrativierungen” [...] erscheinen. 
Sie erlaubt dem Protagonisten, sich aus den Fesseln eindeutiger Bestimmungen zu lösen, die 
verschiedenen Erklärungsmodelle sowohl als Begrenzung als auch als Ermöglichung der 
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Selbstpositionierung zu begreifen und gleichzeitig ihre beschränkte Reichweite zu markieren, 
indem er zwei Pole der Widerständigkeit postuliert: einen psychischen Überschuss, das 
Begehren, sowie die unhintergehbare Materialität des Körpers, die er allerdings ebenso 
unhinterfragt mit einer heterosexuellen Orientierung verbindet” (Kilian 2014)12  
 
While Cal’s self-positioning postulates an ‘ambiguity’ of gender identification, the 
binarism of gender constructions (and hence, of sexuality) remains in place. Intersex 
intelligibility is, yet again, displaced outside the realm of the possible. 
 
5.2.2 From Callie to Cal, from Detroit to San Francisco:                 
A Cross-Country and Gender Transition Journey 
 
The narrative transition from Callie’s life with her family in Detroit to Cal’s new life 
in San Francisco is allegorized by the double transition motif of Cal’s gender 
transitioning and his cross-country journey. The travel motif is frequently employed 
in transgender narratives; the departing from one geographical place to arrive at 
another as symbolizing a ‘departure’ from one bodily/identitarian place to ‘arrive’ at 
another conceptualizes the gender transgression in terms of a binary notion of gender, 
in which there are two fixed gender categories (male and female) cast as either the 
‘point of departure’ or the ‘final destination.’ Although this concept of gender 
transition can also be conceived as understanding gender as a continuum, and thus 
would allow for a identitarian/bodily ‘halt’ or ‘arrival’ at some place in-between (as 
it is, for example, the case with Jess Goldberg in Leslie Feinberg’s novel Stone Butch 
Blues), Middlesex’s protagonist seems determined to radically redefine his gender 
identification from female to male.  
As Cal makes his way across the country and from one gender to the ‘other,’ he 
faces substantial external (considering the travelling) and internal (considering his 
gender identification) problems. In appropriating various motifs, themes, and 
narrative strategies from transgender/trans and intersex narratives, the novel seeks to 
substantiate the ‘authenticity’ of the protagonist’s struggle during his gender 
transition. The narrative’s strategy to employ as many of these motives as possible 
however fails to construct a transition narrative that is differentiated or plausible. 
                                                             
12  “The plurality of discourses undermines the scientific discourse in its validity claim and 
makes it appear rather as a ‘part of a series of cultural narrativizations’ [...]. It allows the 
protagonist to free himself from the constraints of distinct determinations, to understand 
the various explanatory models both as a limitation and an enabling of self-positioning, and 
at the same time to mark their limited scope by postulating two poles of resistance: a 
psychological excess, the desire, and the uncircumventable materiality of the body, which 
he however also unquestioningly associates with a heterosexual orientation” (translation 
V.A.). 




Within a very short time period, Cal experiences an identitarian rollercoaster that has 
his intelligibility as a man constantly threatened by the reemergence of Calliope. The 
novel provides a commentary on the cultural constructedness of gender but at the 
same time resorts to essentialist ideas to make its point. Clothes, a haircut, and the 
‘proper’ use of the public toilet are equated with a distinct gender: “He [the barber] 
turned me to face the mirror. And there she was, for the last time, in the silvered glass: 
Calliope. She still wasn’t gone yet. She was like a captive spirit, peeking out” (MS 
442) (the narrative cannot avoid the clichéd usage of the mirror scene as a Lacanian 
moment of subject formation); this moment is followed by Cal’s own doubts about 
his male identification: “What if the girl in the mirror really was me? How did I think 
I could defect to the other side so easily?” (MS 442) – the only escape from this 
moment of uncertainty and ambivalence is closing his eyes, “refus[ing] to return 
Calliope’s gaze any longer” (MS 442). The refusal to meet the gaze of the ‘female’ 
part of his sense of self marks a moment of identity dissociation and contestation, and 
gives Cal room to scrutinize his gender re-identification, fearing that it would result 
in a compromising or denying of a part of his sense of self: “I was fleeing myself. 
[...] I was fleeing [...] under the alias of my new gender. [...] I was becoming a new 
person” (MS 443). The new male gender identification lacks ‘authenticity’ and 
therefore cannot be integrated into a coherent sense of self yet. Yet only one haircut 
later, Callie seems to have given way to Cal: “I opened my eyes. And in the mirror I 
didn’t see myself. [...] Not the shy girl [...] but instead her fraternal twin brother” (MS 
445). He feels himself to have become “a new creation” (MS 445) but at the same 
time he “didn’t feel like a boy would feel” (MS 444), as “the feelings inside that boy 
were still a girl’s” (MS 445).   
While these passages claim a self-reflexivity concerning the cultural construction 
of gender, they reproduce normative concepts of gender up to the point where they 
reproduce harmful images and ideas of intersex (or transgender/trans) subjects. The 
idea that a distinct gender can be aligned with certain ways of feeling – an example 
of “feminine” feelings is “[t]o cut off your hair after a breakup” (MS 445) – does not 
only reaffirm normative biologist-essentialist concepts of gender, but moreover 
misrepresents the real emotional and physical struggles of individuals who go 
through the experience of a gender transition or who seek to come to terms with the 
(un)intelligibility of their gender identification. The novel’s appropriation of themes 
and motifs from transgender/trans or intersex narratives strikes at moments as a 
misrepresentation, if not a mockery, of the referenced narratives.   
At other moments, the novel manages to capture some of the aspects and 
consequences of perceived gender ‘ambiguity,’ for instance the forms of violence 
trans, intersex, and (other) gender nonconforming persons have to face. Middlesex’s 
representation of these incidents is, however, far from unproblematic. The obligatory 
scene in which a gender nonconforming person – usually during their childhood 
and/or adolescence – is violently attacked by (cis) men who rip off the person’s 
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clothes (usually pants and/or shirts or binders) in order to inspect their genitals and/or 
chest/breasts, followed by more violent attacks due to the attackers’ feeling disgusted 
by either the ‘ambiguous’ body parts or a ‘discrepancy’ between corporeality and 
perceived gender, is integrated in Cal’s narrative (MS 475ff).13 The violence in this 
scene, both physical/sexual and visual, parallels the violence exercised by the medical 
authorities. The crucial techniques of power and control to which Foucault refers – 
hierarchical observation, normalizing judgment, and examination – are reiterated 
here, as the men who attack Cal easily overpower him, they are physically on top of 
him, they make normalizing judgment with regard to Cal’s perceived gender, and 
they finally examine his genitalia, leaving Cal disempowered, humiliated and 
stripped of humanity: “‘Crawl back into the hole you came out of, freak’” (MS 477). 
The novel asserts that no matter how hard Cal tries, as long as he remains in an 
unintelligible state (i.e. the failure to perform normativity), he can never escape 
disciplinary control, and consequently will be punished again and again for his gender 
‘transgressions.’ The narrative’s reiteration of (structural) violence against an 
intersex individual needs to be understood as the forcible reiteration of norms that 
produces the conditions for the intersex subject, Cal.14 By this point in the narration, 
the novel has constituted the conditions for its protagonist (that seem to be) in line 
with social norms and that represent its intersex character as an ‘impossible’ subject, 
marking Cal as “a real outlaw” (MS 467) – a gender “outlaw” no less. In its 
simultaneous processes and strategies of the iteration of norms and its appropriation 
of trans or intersex narratives, Middlesex reveals a persistent refusal to recognize, 
accept, and appreciate genders that are not classifiable according to one of two 
normative and legitimate categories, ‘male’ or ‘female.’ After all, “[r]unning away 
didn’t make [Cal] feel any less of a monster” (MS 449). 
 
5.2.3 San Francisco: Space of the Freak Show and Mythology 
 
With Cal’s arrival in San Francisco, the novel takes up and renegotiates two other 
(interrelated) historical narratives that shaped the category of intersex in problematic 
ways: Greek mythology and the US-American freak show of the 19th and early 20th 
centuries. Academic criticism on Middlesex repeatedly revolves around the novel’s 
use of the freak or monster trope and mythological motifs with regard to intersex. 
This relation is heavily refuted by many critics – intersex and non-intersex alike – on 
the grounds that it reduces intersex to a marginalized, pathetic and negative identity 
position. Sarah Graham refers to Cal_lie’s association with mythological tropes for 
                                                             
13  Other examples are Stone Butch Blues (Leslie Feinberg 1993), Sacred Country (Rose 
Tremain 1992), Boys Don’t Cry (dir. Kimberly Peirce 1999), XXY (dir. Lucía Puenzo 2007) 
and Tomboy (dir. Céline Sciamma 2011). 
14  This concept of iterability is theorized by Butler (1993: 95). 




her argument that Cal_lie is a “tragic” figure, inhabiting a “‘disqualified’ identity,” 
the intersex subject’s fate being inevitably “miserable, associated with 
disempowerment, the theft of identity and an unhappy dual existence” (Graham 
2009). She further argues that  
 
“like Cal, who rejects intersexuality in favour of a distinct gender identity, the novel itself 
continually expresses anxiety about sexual ambiguity by associating such hybridity with 
monstrosity and freakery. I propose that the novel’s use of Greek mythology and the tropes of 
the traditional American ‘freak show’ destabilize its otherwise affirmative representation of the 
central character by suggesting that intersexuality is, in fact, a ‘synonym for monster.’” 
(Graham 2009) 
 
As a partly Greek narrative, Middlesex makes various and recurring references to the 
myth of Tiresias, whose gender changed from male to female and back, and to the 
myth of Hermaphroditus; their motif of transformation is iterated by the novel and 
hence becomes its leitmotif that structures the whole narrative. It is thinkable that 
mythological narratives and figures have a potential to offer alternative spaces of 
representation for intersex subjects, which challenge the medical discourses on 
intersex in its validity claim (Kilian 2014); although, as pointed out earlier, 
mythological references can be traced in medical (re)conceptualizations of intersex.  
The evocation of mythology in the context of contemporary intersex 
representations is generally considered as problematic as it forecloses a reclaiming 
of viable intersex subject positions:  
 
“The mythic, metaphoric, monstrous hermaphrodite for all intents and purposes seems to have 
– for the longest time – eclipsed the existence of intersexual bodies, and silenced their realities 
[...]. [...] there is a history of the hermaphrodite as myth and metaphor that needs to be 
considered, a particular history of objectification, a history in which academic discourse has 
(widely) participated.” (Koch-Rein 2005: 242) 
 
Through the narrative displacement of intersex narratives, traditional, mythological 
narratives interfere with real-life narratives, as intersex author and activist Thea 
Hillman argues: “While the myth of Hermaphroditus has captured the imagination 
for ages, it traps real human beings in the painfully small confines of [...] someone 
else’s story” (Intersex 29). Middlesex indeed seems to make a distinction between its 
usage of the terms ‘intersex’ and ‘hermaphrodite’ and its (historical) connotations.15 
                                                             
15  The term hermaphrodite is and can be used as a self-affirmative term by some intersex 
persons. In Middlesex its use is not unproblematic, although an intersex character uses it to 
refer to himself. However, this usage is not sufficiently contextualized in the novel, and it 
is the non-intersex author who chose to use the term, not a (fictional) intersex person. 
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Some critics have noted that the use of the term ‘hermaphrodite’ associates Cal_lie 
with the mythological figure and thus connotes an unintelligible identity category, an 
“impossible state of being” (Graham 2009), implying “the conservative view that 
only the categories of male and female are natural genders” (Lee 2010: 33). In 
contrast, the term ‘intersex’ is mostly used in a political context and associated with 
activism and social bonding (represented by the character of Zora), and thus with a 
more progressive stance on gender nonconformity; a (self-) categorization which Cal 
rejects: “I happen not to be a political person. I don’t like groups. Though I’m a 
member of the Intersex Society of North America, I have never taken part in its 
demonstrations. I live my own life and nurse my own wounds” (MS 106). Cal’s 
refusal to associate himself with a collective intersex identity serves to further 
distinguish him from self-affirmative intersex persons. This self-imposed detachment 
has an alienating effect on him, as it restrains Cal from occupying a modern, 
empowered and intelligible intersex subject position. The message seems to be that 
(self-affirmative) non-intersex individuals can afford “apolitical apathy” (Holmes 
2008: 92). The novel thereby exposes its own apolitical stance, or rather its political 
agnosticism typical for postmodern narratives. Morgan Holmes argues that the “open 
declaration of an absence of political motive for Cal/liope conveniently releases the 
novel from any perceived duty to move the intersex movement forward, which is fair 
enough. [...] however, the claim to a lack of politics is specious, for whether the 
narrative voice does or does not declare a politics, the actual cultural product that is 
the novel exists within a political context” (Holmes 2008: 92).  
Middlesex’s iteration of the tropes of the freak and of mythological figures 
necessitates closer scrutiny with regard to its potential to offer an alternative point of 
reference for the novel’s intersex narrative. The problematic nature of the novel’s 
evocation of the ‘monstrosity’ of the intersex body is pointed out by Sarah Graham, 
who asserts that “the novel’s use of myth and freak show tropes conveys Cal’s 
monstrosity” and as a result it “invokes damaging images of transgender figures from 
the past to show the legacy that queer subjects are forced to contend with in the 
present” (Graham 2009). However, it can be argued that this connotation of freakery 
might also possibly function as the counter-site in the novel from which a subversive 
redefinition of (sexed) bodily difference can be realized. Morgan Holmes expresses 
ambivalent feelings about the subversive potential of associating intersex subjects 
with monstrosity:  
 
“At one time it may have been worth positioning intersexed bodies to fulfill what Donna 
Haraway has termed the ‘promise of monsters,’ creating patterns of interference to challenge 
traditional, masculinist, linear narrative structures that code power and privilege along a binary 
axis in which the self-contained male body always wins and the excessive, gestating female 
body always loses [...]. The problem, however, is that the deployment of intersexed monsters 
as culture jammers par excellence has stalled, resulting not in substantive interference [...], but 




in the reification of the proper place of traditional visions and modes of masculinity in 
opposition to femininity.” (Holmes 2008: 90) 
 
Ultimately, the “neutralized” intersex body is “repositioned not as disruptive agent 
but beyond and outside the realm of gender altogether” (Holmes 2008: 90). The 
following analysis of the (performed) freakishness of intersex bodies in Middlesex 
takes up and reconsiders the initial approach outlined by Holmes; thereby drawing 
on a concept of freakery as “the intentional performance of constructed abnormality 
as entertainment” (Chemers 2005) that reflects the performativity of corporeality, 
which calls into question dominant constructions of ‘normative’ and ‘non-normative’ 
bodies. The subversive potential of staging bodily indeterminacy is reflected in the 
structure of the performance itself: “the exhibition defie[s] official closure. To exhibit 
is to hold something up for question, to deny its totalizing teleology” (Fretz 1996: 
105). 
Both ‘intersex’ and ‘freak’ are concepts that rely heavily on visualization 
practices; historically, the former particularly within the medical discourse, the latter 
within the show context. These visualization practices are governed by hierarchical 
and objectifying relations which are generally prevalent in the social system, but 
which nevertheless have a very specific tradition in both intersex and freak contexts. 
Rosemarie Garland Thomson notes that “[f]reaks are above all products of 
perception: they are the consequence of a comparative relationship in which those 
who control the social discourse and the means of representation recruit the seeming 
truth of the body to claim the center for themselves and banish others to the margins” 
(Thomson 1997: 62). Freaks in this account contest the status quo of human 
embodiment. A similar point can be made for intersex subjects, but with a crucial 
distinction. Sandell et al argue that “[o]f the modes of being on display, one is 
‘freakishness’ – based on physical, usually visible, difference. It has been suggested 
that the identity of the dominant or mainstream community is strengthened by 
rejecting anomaly” (Sandell et al 2005, emphasis added). The significant difference 
between intersex and freak visual representations is the mode of ‘visibility.’ 
Historically, definitions of individuals as freakish arose generally from human 
responses to extraordinary bodies, based on visual appearance which was apparent to 
the public in most cases. While individuals who are visibly and publicly gender 
nonconforming were and still are often punished for their perceived gender 
transgression within their social and cultural surroundings, most intersex individuals 
were defined as such at birth or very early in their lives almost exclusively by those 
who possessed the clinical gaze. The historical dis/continuities between ‘freakish’ 
bodies and intersex bodies were marked by advanced medical knowledge providing 
‘scientific’ explanations for non-normatively sexed bodies, which classified them as 
pathological (Fausto-Sterling 2000: 34-37). 
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The potential of the freak show space, and by extension San Francisco, to function 
as a site of resistance or a heterotopia16 to the normative space of society depends on 
how the power relations within the freak show context are organized. The novel’s 
displacement of the freak show from its traditional locations to the city of San 
Francisco is an interesting strategy. Historically, places and spaces played a 
significant role in the social and cultural perception of intersex and functioned as the 
sites where the knowledge production of intersex was institutionalized. The freak 
show of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries was generally located outside the 
city sphere, or outside the ‘civilized’ life. The traveling carnivals had no fixed place 
but were constantly moving, mostly through North America’s rural areas, particularly 
in the Midwest and the rural South. The shows and entertainment industry located at 
Coney Island were, due to its peninsula status, while linked to the city sphere also 
remote enough to not disturb the ordinary social life of citizens. Either way freakery 
was not something encountered and confronted with in people’s everyday life: one 
either had to travel there, to leave the city or one’s ‘home space’; or it came for a visit 
but did not stay for long. In each case, freakery and its disruptiveness posed only a 
temporary challenge to normative notions of embodiment. In Middlesex, the 
relocation of the freak show to the sex club Sixty-Niners in North Beach, San 
Francisco signifies its positioning at once within the city limits but also on the social 
margins of ordinary city life, in “an America that had never existed, a kid’s idea of 
sharpies and hucksters and underworld life” (MS 483).  
In Middlesex it seems that a “seamy underworld” (MS 483) is the only space 
where an intersex person can make a living, by exhibiting their intersex body. 
Working in a freak show is conflated with working in a sex show: Cal’s journey takes 
him to San Francisco, where he works as an attraction in a freak sex show called 
Octopussy’s Garden. Cal’s performance as ‘The God Hermaphroditus – half man, 
half woman’ and his co-workers’ performances as ‘Melanie the Mermaid’ and ‘Ellie 
and Her Electrifying Eel’ make references to the myth of Hermaphroditus and the 
nymph Salmacis (MS 482, 490) – and as such are deemed ‘adequate’ work for gender-
variant persons like Carmen, a pre-op male-to-female transsexual, and Zora, who has 
Androgen Insensitivity (an intersex variation).   
                                                             
16   In “Of Other Spaces” (1967), Michel Foucault defines the heterotopia as a real place/space 
(in contrast to utopias) that is formed in the very founding of society; heterotopias are 
spaces in which other (real) spaces within the culture are simultaneously represented, 
contested, and inverted, and thus function as counter-sites (Foucault 1967). Heterotopias 
are usually found outside of all other places, or at the margins of society; they are ‘other 
spaces.’ One sort of heterotopia called ‘heterotopias of deviation,’ defined as “those in 
which individuals whose behavior is deviant in relation to the required mean or norm are 
placed” (Foucault 1967), can be related to the freak show, but also to the clinic/asylum of 
the 19th century. 




While working at the freak sex show, Cal’s self-identification and how he is 
perceived by others is inconsistent. For Bob Presto, the owner of the sex club, Cal is 
less an individual than a freaky commodity in his show. Presto represents the 
stereotypical unethical, money-hungry US-American white businessman – “an 
exploiter, a porn dog, a sex pig” (MS 483) – who has gained material prosperity at 
other people’s expense, who is unethical, with the attitude that he can buy anything, 
or anyone, with money. His position marks him as a representative of the dominant 
patriarchal ideology and capitalism. His only interest in Cal is economic; he considers 
him as “a gold mine” (MS 483), an object he can sell like the other ‘commodities’ in 
his club who are mostly female, or gender-variant: prostitutes, lap dancers, sex show 
performers. The novel is undetermined whether working at a freak sex show is 
considered as exploitation. The exploitative quality is downplayed by Cal’s 
assessment that he “could have done worse” (MS 483) – a problematic statement, as 
it suggests that it is somehow more ethically justifiable to exploit an intersex person 
than to exploit a non-intersex person for sex work.  
Cal’s objectification and exploitation operate on several intersected levels, as 
intersex persons are not only subjected to the medical but also to the economic 
system: “The Clinic had prepared me for it [i.e. working at the freak sex show], 
benumbing my sense of shame, and besides, I was desperate for money” (MS 483). 
Since trafficking in sex is one of the most profitable trades to conduct,17 the relations 
between trader, customer, and commodity are strictly and hierarchically regulated in 
economic terms. Presto’s gaze is the powerful gaze of the profit-greedy trader of 
bodies, and the object of his gaze is constructed in terms of how profitable the object 
is for him, how well Cal will perform as a commodity. In this trade relation, Cal 
considers himself a performer-object who gets paid for exhibiting his body. He knows 
that he would “give [Presto] an edge over his competitors on the Strip” (MS 484), i.e. 
would perform well in monetary terms, and he claims that he only works at the show 
because he needs the money. The spectators are repeatedly referred to as “customers” 
by Cal (MS 486). In adopting an economic viewpoint and its terminology which are 
established and dominated by the system’s authorities, Cal apparently submits to the 
                                                             
17   Sex trafficking has an estimated annual revenue of $32 billion, or about $87 million a day; 
about 800,000 people are trafficked into sex and forced labor throughout the world every 
year (Neubauer 2011). LGBT youth is disproportionally exploited for forced sex work: 
58.7 percent of LGBT homeless youth have been sexually victimized (compared to 33.4 
percent of heterosexual homeless youth); LGBT youth are three times as likely to engage 
in survival sex than their heterosexual peers; LGBT youth are roughly 7.4 times more likely 
to experience acts of sexual violence than heterosexual homeless youth (Lillie 2013). 
Transgender street youth are 3.5 times more likely to be involved in sex trade compared to 
cisgender street youth (Koyama 2012). 
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inspecting gaze and the power of the system. Ethical questions concerning sex 
trafficking remain largely untouched in the novel. 
While economic factors with regard to the exhibition of (intersex) bodies in 
freak/sex shows are inextricably linked to and inform its power relations and modes 
of representation, it is crucial to consider the normative regulations of the freak show 
narrative beyond the economic context, and to look at the performative aspects of 
freakery. Freak show performers generally inhabit bodies that are culturally 
constructed as ‘abnormal’ or ‘unnatural.’ Robert Bogdan asserts that “being a ‘freak’ 
[...] is not [...] a physical condition that some people have [...]. ‘Freak’ is a way of 
thinking about and presenting people – a frame of mind and a set of practices” 
(Bogdan 1996: 24). Recent studies of freak shows claim that “the body of the ‘freak’ 
functions as a stage for playing out various pressing social and political concerns” 
(Stephens 2005). Elizabeth Grosz notes that performers who stage their (actual or 
pretended) gender ‘ambiguity’ “occupy the impossible middle ground between the 
oppositions dividing [...] one sex from the other” (Grosz 1996: 57), hinting at the 
unintelligibility of such subjects outside the show context. 
The principles of dominant ideology that control the narrative structure represent 
the white male authority as the bearer of the look of the spectator, and the intersex 
individual as the spectacle to be looked at.18 The visualization practices, and their 
regulatory mechanisms that constitute their conditions, at work in the medical context 
are apparently reproduced in the freak show context. In the clinic, Callie’s intersex 
body is the object of the authorities’ gaze – the white, male, heterosexual, non-
intersex gaze – and subjected to normative judgment. In medical textbooks, the 
genitalia of the objects of study are exposed while their faces are made invisible, 
which not only makes them anonymous but strips them of their individuality and 
humanity. This practice of fragmenting, and thereby hyper-dramatizing intersex 
bodies is iterated in the show context, where Cal keeps his head out of the water and 
his face remains unseen by the audience. On display are only those body parts that 
are considered as ‘deviating’ from the established norms and as such are constitutive 
of the category of the ‘freak’ – and therefore must bear up against the scrutinizing 
gaze of a collective audience who judge the body parts with regard to the normative 
standards. At first, the idea of facing the spectators (“voyeurs”) unnerves Cal: “I don’t 
think I could have performed in a regular peep show, face-to-face with the voyeurs. 
Their gaze would have sucked my soul out of me” (MS 484). Cal’s referring to the 
audience as “customers” and at the same time to their scopophilic practices construes 
the practice of gazing as a form of consumption: the show “was the sexual equivalent 
of Trader Vic’s. Viewers got to see strange things, uncommon bodies, but much of 
                                                             
18   See Laura Mulvey, “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema” (1975) for a discussion of the 
concept of ‘the male gaze,’ which has been a central idea of feminist film and media 
criticism. 




the appeal was the transport involved. Looking through their portholes, the customers 
were watching real bodies do the things bodies sometimes did in dreams” (MS 486). 
Despite its reproduction of “images of exploitation and prejudice for 
consumption” (Graham 2009), the novel’s freak show narrative presents several 
strategies of resistance to the objectifying gaze. Performative resistance within the 
freak show context can effectively operate by employing basically two different 
strategies: the counter-gaze and refusal of interaction with the audience. Traditionally 
“the freak represents an existence that barely looks back. [...] freaks invite looks and 
stares from audiences and researchers. They don’t stare back” (Mitchell and Snyder 
2005). The staging of bodies considered as freakish affirms normalcy as it presents 
subjects against which a spectator is able to identify themselves as ‘normal’ against 
a ‘deviant’ Other. Moreover, the show context and its setting draw a clear 
demarcation line between seer and seen, between self and other, which facilitates for 
the audience to distinguish themselves from the ‘deviant’ object, and at the same time 
to unite with fellow spectators in their perceived ‘normalcy.’ 
The dominant subject position of the show’s audience is called into question by 
the performer returning the gaze. The spectator’s body becomes fragmented in the 
eye of the performer; since the spectator looks through a peephole into the tank their 
body remains invisible to the performer except for their face. Water distorts both the 
spectators’ and the performers’ visions, and the peephole allows only for a limited 
field of vision. The mode of moving inside the water is different from that outside 
water: bodily motions are slowed down and the underwater law of gravitation enables 
a distinct corporeal representation. The performers in Octopussy’s Garden confront 
their audience with their gaze in different ways and not only with their eyes.  
Zora is probably the most likable gender variant character in Middlesex, although 
– or maybe precisely because – her intelligibility as an intersex individual is 
represented as precarious and fraught with uncertainties. Zora is introduced in the 
novel as antagonistic to Cal both with regard to an affirmative self-identification as 
an intersex person and with regard to images of intersex corporeality. The first 
instance of her appearance in Middlesex is her performance as Melanie the Mermaid 
in the sex freak show. She has an intriguing effect on the audience, but even more so 
on Cal, through whose gaze she is constructed in the first place, or almost exclusively. 
Zora appears to be a stunning beauty,  
 
“her long blond hair flowing behind her like seaweed, tiny air bubbles beading her breasts like 
pearls, as she kicked her glittering emerald fish tail. She performed no lewdness. Zora’s beauty 
was so great that everyone was content merely looking at her, the white skin, the beautiful 
breasts, the taut belly with its winking navel, the magnificent curve of her swaying backside 
where flesh merged with scales. She swam with her arms at her sides, voluptuously fluctuating. 
Her face was serene, her eyes a light Caribbean blue.” (MS 485) 
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Zora confronts the spectators with her whole bodily performance: she opens her eyes 
underwater and looks at them, smiles at them, and uses her beautiful body in a 
voluptuous manner to enthrall the audience. Her mermaid performance might not be 
a coincidence here: cultural representations of intersex subjects and mermaids have 
in common, throughout history, a profound anxiety of the unknown, the other-than-
human, the transgressive, of that which resists bodily, speciesist and/or gendered 
unity by exceeding boundaries of the body and identity. This anxiety manifests in 
representing both mermaids and intersex subjects as living outside or at the margins 
of the civilized, cultural human realm of reason and order; as being threatening to 
this order by either entering the human realm which offers no explanations for their 
existence, or by luring humans away from the cultural realm and into the depths of 
transformative, unknown spaces, which leads to the dissolution of stable identities.19 
In directly facing her audience and performing the mermaid myth, Zora seeks to 
resist the spectator’s hierarchical observation and normalizing judgment of her 
intersex body. However, while she privately identifies as intersex (MS 488), the 
intersex features of her body remain invisible to the audience. In addition, her 
apparent normative beauty prevents the spectators from being appalled or disgusted 
by her body. The novel does not comment extensively on the spectators’ reaction to 
Zora’s performance apart from that “everyone was content merely to look at her” 
because of her beauty, as Cal claims (MS 485). The audience shows no anxiety or 
terror of the ‘deviant’ body. Within the freak show context, Zora is not able to 
be/come recognizable as intersex because others fail to identify her as intersex; 
instead the heterosexist notions implied in this gazing at a perceived female body that 
complies with the system’s coercive beauty standards are inscribed into her body. As 
a consequence Zora fails to disrupt or even subvert the modern system of disciplinary 
power and its system of thought.  
Both within and outside the freak sex show context, Zora’s body is constructed 
through Cal’s perspective. In some respect, she embodies a clichéd image of women 
with Androgen Insensitivity (AIS), whose bodies are despite XY chromosomes 
immune to ‘male’ hormones and consequently develop ‘female’ external bodily 
                                                             
19  The mermaid figure is associated with l’homme différent, a creature which lives in a world 
parallel to that of human society, usually located on the boundaries of the known world. 
According to Lucian Boia, the ‘other’ of ‘human’ – that which is not human, the ‘animal’ 
– is imagined as a fantastic creature, which can embody traits of animals or spirits. 
L’homme différent resembles humans in most instances but possesses one characteristic 
which makes it fundamentally different from human beings. Humans feel simultaneously 
awe and abomination about l’homme différent – a fascination but also horror of the other-
than-human, of a creature that is akin to them but is at the same time deviant. Boia 
elaborates the concept of l’homme différent in Entre l’ange et la bête: Le mythe de l’homme 
différent de l’Antiquité à nos jours (1995). 




characteristics. Cal’s comparison between himself and Zora leads him to the 
conviction that despite their similar bodily variation Zora benefits from her intersex 
variation:  
 
“Aside from being blond, she was shapely and full-lipped. Her prominent cheekbones divided 
her face in Arctic planes. When Zora spoke you were aware of the skin stretching over these 
cheekbones and hollowing out between her jaws, the tight mask it made, banshee-like, with her 
blue eyes piercing through above. And then there was her figure, the milkmaid breasts, the 
swim champ stomach, the legs of a sprinter or a Martha Graham dancer. Even unclothed, Zora 
appeared to be all woman. There was no visible sign that she possessed neither womb nor 
ovaries. Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome created the perfect woman, Zora told me. A number 
of top fashion models had it.” (MS 487)  
 
The reference to fashion models with AIS points to the sexualized notion of a very 
specific type of intersex women, who despite/because of their intersex variation 
embody the female beauty ideal to its extreme. This notion of women with AIS is 
ambivalent. On the one hand, in a cultural context in which gender nonconformity is 
negatively connoted and violently rejected, it appears all the more surprising that the 
result of an intersex variation is regarded as positive and beautiful. On the other hand, 
this image is problematic. First, the sexualization of women with AIS denies to a 
certain extent the dangers of cis-hetero-male violence directed at many gender variant 
individuals, in particular trans women and intersex women, which is motivated by 
homo-, trans- and interphobia. Second, the differentiation made between ‘acceptable’ 
and ‘non-acceptable’ intersex individuals based on their appearance and level of 
gender normative attractiveness serves to further render gender nonconforming 
persons at the whim of the majority and to reaffirm the normative conditions for 
gender intelligibility. The representations of intersex individuals’ social 
‘acceptability’ in Middlesex seems to revolve around an intersex person’s ability to 
measure up to cultural requirements of female beauty standards – while Callie seems 
to have failed in this regard, Zora’s extraordinary beauty serves to mark Callie’s 
‘failure’ even more crucially. The different representations of two intersex characters 
and the commentaries provided on their ability to perform the ‘proper’ modes of 
femininity can be interpreted as the novel’s comment on how cultural imperatives on 
normative femaleness is implicit in validating or prohibiting intersex intelligibility. 
Yet it is important to note that Zora’s body and comment on her femininity is 
completely constructed via Cal’s gaze. He describes Zora’s body in great detail, 
mostly in an eroticizing way. This strategy serves to express his perceived difference 
from her in terms of gendered appearance and (hetero-) sexual attractiveness: “[W]e 
looked nothing alike. [...] On the street people took me for a boy. Zora turned heads. 
Men whistled at her” (MS 492). In Cal’s perception his, or rather Callie’s ostensible 
‘failure’ to perform satisfyingly as a ‘woman’ is due to her lack of normative 
194 | INTERSEX NARRATIVES 
 
femininity and heterosexual appeal. This estimation, which has been articulated at 
earlier instances in the novel during Callie’s teenage years, becomes now even more 
obvious when contrasted to another intersex woman’s embodiment of the ‘ideal 
woman.’ 
On another level, Cal’s descriptions of Zora testify to his own sexual attraction 
to her. Although he asserts that she has a sexual effect on many men, both in the sex 
show and outside, it becomes obvious how Cal himself perceives her as an object of 
desire. He even admits his attraction to her when he states that “I never felt sisterly 
around Zora. [...] I was always aware of her figure under the robe. I went around 
averting my eyes and trying not to stare” (MS 492). Looking at Zora, however, is 
what he does extensively. However, while Zora, as previously noted, embodies a 
specific cultural idea(l) of a woman with AIS that might be clichéd, Cal’s 
construction of Zora involves more than just a superficial image of her normative 
beauty rendered through the perspective of a non-intersex, cisgender, heterosexual 
majority. Unlike the visitors of the sex show or past male lovers, Cal’s perspective 
on Zora is a perspective from an intersex person on another intersex person. This shift 
in perspective is both a result of and creates moments of intimacy and solidarity. Zora 
is recognized as desirable by an intersex person who actually knows about her being 
intersex – in contrast to everyone else who fail to recognize her as intersex – which 
allows for moments of Zora’s intelligibility as an intersex person.  
Zora’s repeated misrecognition as female stands in contrast to how she perceives 
herself as a gendered and sexual subject. Zora contends that she does not “want to be 
anything in particular” (MS 487), seeking to defy culturally imposed gender 
determinacy. Despite her perceived ‘successful’ performance as “the perfect woman” 
(MS 487), she refuses to identify as female and prefers to identify as intersex (MS 
488). The unrecognizability of Zora’s gender, and consequently her involuntary 
‘passing’ as a non-intersex heterosexual woman, crucially threatens her intelligibility 
as an intersex and lesbian individual. In representing Zora’s ostensible failure to be 
intelligible as intersex, the novel exposes the intricate ways in which normative 
idea(l)s about femininity/femaleness and female beauty, ideas of sexuality, and ideas 
of intersex are interrelated in the constitution of the conditions for gender coherence. 
However, with the character of Zora, Middlesex presents not only the apparent 
impossibility of constructing a viable intersex subject position, but also moments of 
resistance to the threat of intersex unintelligibility. Zora tries hard to be recognized 
as intersex. She is represented as an early pioneer of intersex activism before the 
intersex movement began to organize in the early 1990s. Her most significant power 
tool for the production and transference of knowledge about intersex is writing and 
education. On a metatextual level, the character of Zora functions as an educational 
instance in Middlesex, by which readers are educated on the history of intersex. On a 
narrative level, Cal is also equipped with crucial knowledge, which offers significant 
moments of intersex bonding: “Mainly, her politics consisted of studying and writing. 




And, during the months I lived with her, in educating me, in bringing me out of what 
she saw as my great midwestern darkness” (MS 488); “After all my troubles, wasn’t 
it my right to expect some reward in the form of knowledge or revelation? In Zora’s 
rice-paper house, with misty light coming in at the windows, I was like a blank canvas 
waiting to be filled with what she told me” (MS 489). The socializing with another 
intersex person effects a moment of epiphany for Cal which causes him to come to 
terms with his intersex variation, at least temporarily. This home which Zora provides 
becomes a symbol for Cal’s internal and bodily transition: the bungalow shared with 
Zora “was a refuge for me, a halfway house where I stayed, getting ready to go back 
into the world. My life during these six months was as divided as my body” (MS 
491). What is more, Zora’s friendship – and by extension, the show staff – functions 
as an alternative familial bonding, and thus challenges normative concepts of the 
legal core family and North American middle-class values. 
In the end, despite Zora’s repeated gender (and sexual) misrecognition, her failure 
to publish her book on intersex history The Sacred Hermaphrodite, and her 
difficulties in making her intersex body visible as such in her mermaid performance, 
she refuses to submit to the politics of intersex erasure within the system. She even 
imagines a future society in which intersex people embody a new form of intelligible 
gender: “[W]e’re what’s next” (MS 490). Thus, while Zora’s diverse interventions 
into normative gender constructions and power relations seem to miss their purpose, 
the representation of her character not only reveals the limits of being/becoming 
intelligible as intersex but introduces crucial intersex interventions and produces 
moments of intersex intelligibility – both for Zora herself and also for the intersex 
protagonist, Cal. Or, to appropriate Butler’s words, Zora “emerges at the limits of 
intelligibility, offering a perspective on the variable ways in which norms 
circumscribe the human” (Butler 2001: 635). 
Middlesex offers another representation of a gender variant person, more 
precisely, a transgender woman. Carmen’s femininity is juxtaposed to both Cal_lie’s 
and Zora’s femininity, and thereby subjected to problematic judgment. Carmen’s 
femininity and her femaleness are defined as not ‘authentic,’ as an obvious 
“over[doing] [of] the femme routine”: “There was entirely too much hip swaying and 
hair flipping in Carmen’s airspace,” as Cal sardonically comments (MS 486). The 
notion of trans women not being ‘real’ women, who need to exaggerate cultural codes 
of normative femininity in order to be recognized as female, iterates transmisogynist 
language and reasoning. The racialization of Carmen as a “Hawaiian girl” “from the 
Bronx” (MS 486) adds the dimension of ‘race’ to her gender representation that 
further serves to exoticize her. Moreover, Zora’s suggestion that Carmen’s 
boyfriends are latent homosexuals and/or that men fetishize her as “impure” (MS 487) 
further denies Carmen (or any trans woman) ‘real’ womanhood and perpetuates 
biologist relations between gender, body, and sexuality. The stigmatization of trans 
women as ‘fake’ women, or as fetish objects, puts them at a high risk of (sexual) 
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violence. “This pervasive ideology,” Janet Mock argues, “says that trans women are 
shameful, that trans women are not worthy of being seen and that trans women must 
remain a secret – invisible and disposable” (Mock 2013). The novel reaffirms this 
problematic and transphobic (and racist) ideology in its representation of its only 
transgender character, without any hint of self-reflexivity. This problematic 
fetishized and exoticized rendering of Carmen is iterated in her freak sex show 
performance. 
Carmen’s performance as Ellie contains moments of subversion of normative 
gender concepts. In her show, her body returns the spectator’s gaze, too, albeit in a 
different way. At first sight she is perceived as a feminine woman, but at second sight, 
“there it was on the slender girl’s body, there it was where it should not have been, a 
thin brown ill-tempered-looking eel, an endangered species,” i.e. a penis (MS 486, 
emphasis added). In Cal’s narrating the spectators’ point of view, Cal either alleges 
or himself renders an implicit normalizing judgment on Carmen’s body by defining 
its gender ‘ambiguity’ as an ‘impossible’ corporeality, with the imperative should 
referring to the enforced adherence to a norm established by the system’s regulatory 
forces. This notion is reiterated in Cal’s description of the exchange of gazes: “it was 
the eel’s moment to shock. [...] it stared at the customers with its cyclopic eye; and 
they looked back at her breasts, her slim waist, they looked back and forth from Ellie 
to eel, from eel to Ellie, and were electrified by the wedding of opposites” (MS 486).20 
Although Carmen/Ellie returns the spectator’s gaze with her penis and effects a 
moment of gender ‘ambiguity,’ a destabilizing of gender norms is complicated. The 
spectators’ visual reassurance of Carmen’s gender operates on a binary, the 
supposedly ‘female’ (breasts) and ‘male’ (penis) signifiers are constructed as 
oppositional and are supposed to be mutually exclusively found on one body; the 
“wedding” between these two signifiers hints at a cultural practice rather than a 
‘natural’ process constituting the body. Outside the freak show context, Carmen’s 
story “followed the traditional lines better than” Cal’s – the “born into the wrong 
body” rhetoric attests to the novel’s stereotype representations of gender variant 
bodies and identities by producing not only a one-dimensional account of transgender 
and recognition (“traditional lines”) but also a normative notion of bodily 
“wrongness” (MS 487). The binary ultimately stays intact, the spectators remain 
electrified – by shock rather than pleasure – and the ‘ambiguity’ is soon to be 
dissolved by Carmen’s impending gender reassignment surgery.  
Cal usually does not return the spectators’ gaze, but one time, while performing 
as Hermaphroditus underwater, he has a moment of epiphany:  
 
                                                             
20  The term cyclopic contains a double reference to Greek mythology (Cyclops) and a 
congenital disorder (cyclopia), reiterating the interaction between medicine and myth that 
structures the narrative. 




“I opened my eyes underwater. I saw the faces looking back at me and I saw that they were not 
appalled. I had fun in the tank that night. It was all beneficial in some way. It was therapeutic. 
Inside Hermaphroditus old tensions were roiling, trying to work themselves out. Traumas of 
the locker room were being released. Shame over having a body unlike other bodies was 
passing away. The monster feeling was fading. And along with shame and self-loathing another 
hurt was healing.” (MS 494) 
 
The cause of this ostensibly dramatic change in Cal’s perception of his intersex body 
remains unclear and seems implausible to explain with his gazing encounter. The 
only reaction of the spectators experienced by Cal is that they are not appalled – yet 
on what this conviction is based remains obscure to the reader. Cal’s narration of the 
freak show audience’s alleged reaction iterates his narration of Dr. Luce’s reaction to 
the exposure of his genitalia: “He didn’t look shocked or appalled” (MS 412). Implicit 
in both narrative accounts is less an actual reaction of the spectators but rather Cal’s 
self-perception of his intersex body – which is primarily constituted by his own 
rejection of it – from which he draws conclusions about the supposed reactions of 
others, in particular authorities. Graham points to the fact that “his work at ‘Sixty-
Niners’ can only be undertaken in a state of intoxication and with a consequent 
dissociation from his scrutinized body” (Graham 2009). It remains unclear whether 
Cal’s gazing has an effect on the spectators, effects a moment of confrontation, or 
destabilizes the hierarchical quality of visualization practices within the freak show 
context. Ultimately, Cal’s claim of the therapeutic effect of his intervention is 
undermined by the novel’s continuing perpetuation of his shame about his intersex 
body, even up to his adult life. 
At this point in the novel, Cal still does not embrace an identification as intersex. 
The novel presents at best one halfhearted, semiconscious attempt to find a way out 
of rigid bodily and gender classifications: “I waited for my soul to leave my body. I 
tried to fall into a trance state or become an animal” (MS 495). His wish to transcend 
the material, the human (gendered) body, or to become an animal rearticulates the 
principal motif of Ovid’s Metamorphoses, the creative power of bodily 
transformations and transmigration of souls; a repetition of the rebirth motif from the 
novel’s opening paragraph. There is no fixed identity, neither in terms of species, nor 
gender, nor otherwise; the soul can inhabit any form, and form changes ceaselessly 
(Ovid, Metamorphoses XV: 143-175). While this repeated narrative displacement to 
the realm of mythology might seem like a viable alternative to medical constructions 
of intersex, the transcendence of his (intersex) body remains a phantasma, given the 
reality of social constraints that condition intelligibility. The reiteration of mythology 
in the novel cannot provide a livable space for intersex intelligibility as it always 
refers to an imagined past and remains always a mythical and hence unattainable and 
impossible space. 
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In the end the possibilities of producing Cal’s gender intelligibility in the ‘middle’ 
are not realized. Cal’s self-identification after he leaves San Francisco rather implies 
that there is only an either-or possible: since his father died before Cal’s return, 
“[w]ith respect to my father I will always remain a girl” (MS 512), while to his 
mother, Cal is not a daughter anymore but a son, “at least by looks” (MS 519), and 
Cal’s brother refers to Cal as “bro’” in response to Cal’s suggestion to “[c]all me 
whatever you want” (MS 515). This apparent incoherence of (his narrative about) his 
gender identity is constituted by a process Judith Butler refers to as the “relationality” 
of the self, by which “[t]he very ‘I’ [who seeks to tell the story] is called into question 
by its relation to the one to whom I address myself. This relation to the Other [...] 
clutter[s] my speech with signs of its undoing” (Butler 2004: 19). On the narrative 
level, Cal’s sense of coherent self is complicated by his relations to his family (and 
later to his potential lovers); even the way his mother sees him is contradictory (“son” 
vs. “daughter”). On a metatextual level, for the reader, the incoherence of Cal’s 
identity construction is further complicated and at the same time ostensibly resolved 
by Cal’s self-affirmative identification as a heterosexual man (yet his insecurities 
about his corporeality towards female lovers again questions this coherence). The 
novel closes with an ambivalent final negotiation of gender indeterminacy:  
 
“Did Calliope have to die in order to make room for Cal? [...] After I returned from San 
Francisco and started living as a male, my family found that, contrary to popular opinion, 
gender was not all that important. My change from girl to boy was far less dramatic than the 
distance anybody travels from infancy to adulthood. In most ways I remained the person I’d 
always been. Even now, though I live as a man, I remain in essential ways Tessie’s daughter.” 
(MS 520) 
 
This statement is contradictory in its claim of gender as being not really important: 
Cal_lie changes from one end of the gender binary to the other one (of only two 
legitimate gender categories, i.e. male and female), and ends up living as a self-
identified man, not as (openly) intersex. Cal’s statement that he is struggling for 
“unification, for Einheit” (MS 106) signifies both Cal’s and the novel’s need for 
coherence and closure, which seems to be achieved by the integration of the different 
and conflicting aspects of his gender into a coherent sense of self. Even Cal’s 
placement in Berlin, “a city historically associated with division and duality,” which 
could be read as symbolizing his “comfort with inbetweenness,” eventually affirms 
his, and the narrative’s, anxiety to mend the ruptures: “Cal lives in post-reunification 
Berlin, so any sense of a divided past – for Cal and for the city – has been replaced 
with a newly whole, coherent ‘self,’” as Sarah Graham argues (2009). The 
(re)establishing of Cal’s gender coherence is paralleled by a narrative closure. Even 
Cal’s musing on the last page of the novel that Middlesex is “a place designed for a 
new type of human being, who would inhabit a new world. I couldn’t help feeling, of 




course, that that person was me, me and all the others like me” (MS 529) cannot belie 
the fact that he and all the others like him are denied recognition of their intersex 
bodies and self-identification in the novel and are instead relegated to a constrained 
heteronormative subject position.  
 
5.2.4 Is there a Moral Obligation to Write a Particular Story           
of Intersex? 
 
Returning to the initial question of how Middlesex’s narrative and metanarrative 
strategies negotiate intersex representations and work to acknowledge, allow for, or 
prohibit intersex intelligibility, what can be ascertained is that an unambiguous 
reading is complicated by the novel’s at times contradictory statements and moments 
of representation. Within literary criticism it has been widely suggested that 
Middlesex cannot live up to its own claims of productive indeterminacy. Critical 
readings of the novel “as a book that endorses a narrative of heteronormativity and 
ethnic assimilation” (Lee 2010: 32), and as “put[ting] intersexuality in a position that 
can be thought of as located in the ‘I’ of the norm” (Koch-Rein 2005: 250) attest 
Middlesex a pessimistic stance on the possibilities of constructing a viable intersex 
subject. Holmes contends that “Caliope’s [sic] peculiar form of embodiment is 
assumed to be a kind of paradox that carries the burden of contradictory stances 
regarding monstrosity and incest, while at the same time Eugenides makes a plea for 
the tolerance of difference in the basic humanity of the monster” (Holmes 2008: 94). 
The trouble with this construction is that in order to become recognizable as human 
in Middlesex, the intersex subject needs to become intelligible, and the only way 
her_his intelligibility can be produced is by becoming male (and heterosexual) – or 
so the novel seems to suggest. 
Can the novel be held accountable for producing a heterosexual male subject, 
instead of an intelligible intersex (and lesbian) subject? While Morgan Holmes argues 
“that neither Eugenides nor anyone else was morally obliged to write a particular 
story of intersexuality” (2008: 93), the novel, as a piece of fiction, could have 
functioned as a space of possibility for alternative subject constructions, as a 
‘heterotopia’ (Kilian 2014). Yet in its anxiety to represent Cal as an intelligible 
subject, the narrative resorts to strategies of assimilation and ‘normalization’ of its 
protagonist. Despite moments of incoherence and contestation, the character never 
slips into an unintelligible state; every ‘lapse’ is immediately prevented, explained or 
counteracted. The narrative strategies to represent Cal’s self-affirmative claim of his 
gender indeterminacy are inconsistent with and undermined by other strategies that 
affirm his problematic self-perception, his “persistent[...] communicat[ion] [of] 
discomfort with his disunited state, always seeking to escape it” (Graham 2009). The 
sense of the protagonist’s coherent subjecthood is to a considerable extent the result 
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of the first-person narration: at least as the narrator of this – his own – story, he 
remains always intelligible within the narrative and to the reader. The novel’s attempt 
at producing Cal’s intelligibility hence must be considered on several (meta-) 
narrative/metafictional levels. 
The question how ‘authentic’ a literary representation of intersex lives should be 
becomes, in the face of the social, political and legal discrimination against intersex 
persons, a question of fair representation. While one might or might not agree 
whether an author has a moral obligation to tell a particular story about intersex, 
harmful (mis)representations of a group of people that is constantly at danger to be 
culturally and physically erased, mutilated, or disowned, who are subjected to 
violations that have become acknowledged as human rights violations, have 
necessarily an ethical dimension. In that respect, literature – or authors – can be made 
accountable for their perpetuation of normative representations, as they inevitably 
reaffirm the naturalizing of the relationship between body, gender, and sexuality 
(what Butler refers to as the “heterosexual matrix,” 1990: 151, fn6), which has 
provided, and continues to provide the arguments for physical and psychological 
‘normalization’ procedures. Critics’ opinions are divided with regard to Middlesex’s 
rendering of an ‘authentic’ account of (an) intersex character(s). While Hillman finds 
fault with Eugenides’ neglect to interview intersex persons before writing the novel, 
instead “us[ing] intersex as a metaphor,” and being “in no way an advocate for 
intersex people” (Hillman, in Roth 2008), she gives the author credit for his credible 
portrayal of an intersex character and their struggle: 
 
“One of the most powerful things Eugenides did was illustrate the dilemma many intersex 
people face: while they might accept and enjoy their body as it is, people around them want to 
‘fix’ their body so it matches some mythical ideal. I think Eugenides’ depiction creates empathy 
for the intersex character in the reader, and gives credibility to the perspective of the intersex 
person who doesn’t understand the horror their body may incite in others.” (Hillman, in Roth 
2008) 
 
Graham disapproves of this all too positive assessment, arguing that while the novel’s 
strategies “may reflect the difficulties” of individuals who live at the margins of 
intelligibility due to their gender nonconformity, they at the same time “affirm the 
validity” of that unintelligibility (Graham 2009). Middlesex’s integration of different 
discourses on intersex can be read as an attempt to challenge the hegemonic medical 
narratives, by opening up alternative narrative spaces that allow for more affirmative 
and diverse rearticulations of intersex subjecthood. Thereby, however, the novel 
resorts to narratives and metaphors that themselves denote ‘unlivable’ intersex 
‘identities,’ such as mythological figures, ‘freaks’ or ‘monsters,’ without being able 
to utilize their subversive potential for a successful reclaiming of the category of 
intersex; hence the novel remains in a normative loop of iteration that constitutes the 




“place[s] of not-being” to be occupied by “that which is neither fully negated nor 
acknowledged as being, acknowledged [...] into being” (Butler 2001: 622). 
The constantly iterated rhetoric of shame that Cal feels about his body perpetuates 
the highly problematic notion of (surgically/hormonally unaltered) intersex bodies as 
‘abject’ and ‘deviant,’ and thus implicitly supports the logic inherent in the medical 
argumentation that intersex bodies need to be surgically and/or hormonally altered in 
order to enable a ‘livable’ life for the person. While Cal asserts that “we 
hermaphrodites are people like everybody else” (MS 106), he still maintains for a 
large part secrecy about his intersex corporeality: “I’m closeted at work, revealing 
myself only to a few friends. [...] Only a few people here in Berlin know my secret” 
(MS 107). His intersex corporeality, or rather, his shame thereof, seems to foreclose 
a fulfilling love and sexual relationship; in anticipation of his first date with Julie, he 
sees “[n]o reason to mention my peculiarities, my wandering in the maze these many 
years, shut away from sight. And from love, too” (MS 107). As a consequence, Cal 
“lives in an exile that is both self- and socially-imposed” (Graham 2009), for the most 
part out of self-protection. Instead of allowing him to overcome his shame, the novel 
resolves his problematic self-perception by asserting that Cal is decidedly male and 
heterosexual, ultimately privileging an assimilationist closure over a more radical 
production of (gender) indeterminacy that defies a final closure.  
  
 
5.3 HOW TO MAKE A LIFE IN YOUR BODY WHEN YOUR 
BODY FEELS UNINHABITABLE: ANNABEL AND THE 
SEARCH FOR SPACES OF RECOGNITION 
 
Eight years after the mainstream success of Jeffrey Eugenides’ Middlesex, Canadian 
author Kathleen Winter takes up the theme of intersex in her novel Annabel (2010), 
and sets the narrative in the cold, harsh environment of Labrador in the 1960s. The 
novel was widely critically acclaimed; in 2011 it won the Thomas Head Raddall 
Award and was shortlisted for several other Canadian literary awards. It was also 
adapted as a radio play for BBC Radio and served as inspiration for the song 
“Annabel” (2013) by the British band Goldfrapp and its accompanying music video 
clip (Bailey 2014). The relative success of the novel has served to bring the issue of 
intersex, once again, to the attention of a mainstream audience and thus contributes 
to the literary body of work on intersex and to the cultural negotiation of intersex 
themes. 
The analysis of Annabel is based on the same preconditions regarding the 
questions of intersex intelligibility as outlined in the chapter on Middlesex: how does 
the novel’s intersex character reconcile their own sense of self with the conditions of 
their recognizability available to them? Does the novel provide conditions of intersex 
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intelligibility; does it establish narrative spaces for intersex rearticulations? Does the 
novel offer metatextual criticism of the regulatory practices and norms that govern 
the recognizability of personhood and gender? In which ways does Annabel take up 
the popular cultural renegotiation of the category of intersex initiated by Middlesex, 
and how does it contribute to the contemporary cultural reimagination of intersex? 
My discussion of the novel proceeds from these questions, bearing in mind the 
potential of the text for offering alternative representations of intersex realities. I 
argue that despite the novel’s obvious implausibilities, at times sensationalist plot 
devices, often stereotypical gender conceptions, and its slightly idiosyncratic 
characters, Annabel accomplishes to create, by and large, a believable narrative about 
an intersex child and their relation to their parents and the complexities of an intersex 
life, that cannot be accounted for by a theory of intelligibility alone.  
Annabel interrelates several narratives, discourses, and motives of intersex which 
inform and construct the novel’s coming-of-age story of its intersex protagonist, 
Wayne/Annabel Blake,21 thereby articulating their quest for intersex intelligibility 
throughout their childhood to young adult life. The novel interweaves medical 
discourses, Greek mythology, discourses on (gendered) beauty and aesthetics, sexual 
violence, and the motif of transformation and rebirth, among others; this multiplicity 
of diverse narratives creates a dense narrative that at times appears overloaded with 
signification. Among the various interrelated themes, the significance of spaces 
stands out as one of the major tropes in the novel. In Annabel, specific spaces/places 
are connected to, or embodied by, specific characters: Labrador’s nature and 
wilderness (Treadway, the ‘male’ sphere), Croydon Harbour (Jacinta, the ‘female’ 
sphere of the domestic), hospitals (the creation of Wayne and the erasure of Annabel), 
St. John’s (Jacinta’s youth, Wayne/Annabel’s gender transformation), Boston (Wally 
Michelin’s recovering of her voice), bridges (symbolizing the gender transition of 
Wayne/Annabel), travelling (Thomasina’s acts of freedom and independence), and 
the university campus, particularly the Technical University of Nova Scotia 
(signifying freedom of gender expression and allowing Wayne/Annabel to craft 
his_her own narrative). The particular spaces are clearly gendered, or gender and 
sexed corporeality are “spatialized” (Neuhaus 2012: 124), whereby some of the 
spaces are regulated by rigid gender norms, and simultaneously function as regulative 
systems that construct, perpetuate and enforce gender norms through social 
constraint, while other spaces function as representational spaces for ‘alternative,’ 
                                                             
21  I mostly refer to the character Wayne Blake and use the pronoun ‘he’ when referring to 
Wayne as it occurs in Annabel. I want to point out, however, that the novel’s references to 
the intersex character (almost) exclusively in ‘male’ terms is not unproblematic and seems 
implausible to some extent as this narrative strategy fails to do justice to the complexities 
of the character’s gender (self-) identification and transformation(s). I refer to the character 
as Wayne/Annabel when it seems apt. 




non-normative gender concepts, and hence can be conceived as counterspaces, or 
spaces of resistance “to the dominant order arising precisely from their subordinate, 
peripheral or marginalized positioning” (Edward Soja, quoted in Neuhaus 2012: 
126). 
The following analysis of the novel starts from the argument that the 
recognizability of Wayne/Annabel is negotiated within the interpersonal 
relationships and the intimate connections between the characters. The quest for 
recognition is inextricably linked with the social relations between the individuals; it 
concerns in particular Wayne/Annabel’s longing to be recognized as a non-binary 
gendered subject, for him_her the precondition to become intelligible as intersex, but 
the issue of recognition is not restricted to Wayne exclusively. At issue are the 
relationships between Wayne and his parents, between Wayne and Thomasina, and 
between Wayne and Wally, but also the relationship between Jacinta and Treadway 
Blake, and the characters’ relations to their surroundings (friends, classmates, 
doctors, etc.). The moments in which these relations are challenged, damaged, 
severed, lost, and reconciled in specific ways indicate the relativity and the 
precariousness of Wayne/Annabel’s intelligibility. 
Annabel is narrated from a third-person omniscient perspective, thus marking a 
significant contrast to both Middlesex and fictional and non-fictional intersex first-
person narratives. While in the latter, the first-person narrative mode is employed to 
convey the inner thoughts and feelings of (real or fictional) intersex protagonists, 
hence producing a certain sense of (narrative) ‘authenticity’ when it comes to intersex 
matters, the eschewal of the (intersex) first-person perspective in Winter’s novel 
effects a certain emotional detachment between the intersex character and the reader. 
While this sentiment is not exclusively or foremost the effect of the narrative mode, 
the emotional distance created between protagonist and narrator enforces the sense 
of the character of Wayne as ‘uninhabited’ to some degree. Winter explains her 
choice of not narrating the story from Wayne’s perspective with a reluctance to 
appropriate the intersex character and their experiences: 
 
“I know more about the people and communities surrounding Wayne than I could possibly 
know about his inner life. Perhaps I could have tried, but I don’t know if I really felt I had the 
authority. I was attuned, throughout the writing, to an idea that anything I wrote about being 
between genders would have to be personal knowledge, of which I do have some, but not 
enough to fully inhabit that character. To write from the point of view of one character is, for 
me, to inhabit that person.” (Winter, in an interview with Bailey 2014) 
 
Despite Winter’s reservations about ‘inhabiting’ her characters, Annabel’s narrative 
mode provides insights into several main characters’ state of mind, and into their 
emotional attachments they have to each other. Hence this strategy allows the 
renegotiation of intersex from multiple perspectives on an intersex child, thus not 
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only from the intersex individual’s point of view but from those of their parents, 
friends, and other persons close to them. As a result, in Annabel intersex becomes a 
contested category that, at times, defies coherence. 
 
5.3.1 The Cultural Parameters of Gender Construction:     
Medicine, Aesthetics, and Sexual Violence 
 
The narrative of Annabel follows at first glance the ‘traditional’ lines of many 
intersex narratives: when a baby with ‘indeterminate’ gender is born to Jacinta and 
Treadway Blake, the father insists on raising the child as a boy; a medical assessment 
legitimizes this decision on the basis of biologist claims about gender (the 
‘phallometer’); genital surgery (sewing up the ‘vagina’) to medically confirm the 
gender assignment (a “believable” male, Annabel 48)22 follows; and the child’s 
intersex variation subsequently has to be maintained a secret at any cost. The 
reinforcement of the assigned gender is a common plot in intersex accounts. 
Treadway’s attempt at socially ‘masculinizing’ his ‘son’ relies on the notion of 
gender as a rigid and normative binary, informed by gender stereotypes, biologist 
essentialisms, and distinctly separate spheres: the community of Croydon Harbour 
“is one of rigid conformity and outright sexism, where men are ‘kings outside their 
houses’ and women ‘queens of inner rooms and painted sills... and carpet cleaners.’ 
Men hunt, fish, trap, build things and are mostly really bad in bed; women marry 
young, have babies, suffer quietly and long inchoately for more” (D’Erasmo 2011).  
The questions of and the different perspectives on gender in the novel, offered by 
several characters, are central to the negotiation of Wayne/Annabel’s intelligibility 
as an intersex person. What is anticipated at an early point, and will manifest itself 
throughout the narrative, is not only Wayne’s struggle to come to terms with his 
intersex corporeality, or rather, with the (attempted) erasure thereof, but also his 
striving for a non-binary gender identification. The novel makes it unmistakably clear 
at various moments and throughout the narrative that Wayne’s gender 
nonconformative sense of self is a result of his intersex variation. This causality might 
not be problematic in itself, as a person’s gender identification and sense of sexed 
embodiment can correlate to different degrees. However, the heteronormative and 
binary ideas of gender on which this correlation between Wayne’s intersex body and 
his sense of gendered self relies is not unproblematic and raises questions as to the 
novel’s intentions regarding the representation of its intersex character. The novel 
appears adamant in its attempt to convince the readers, and the characters themselves, 
of Wayne’s ‘male’ and ‘female’ parts of his gender along the lines of characteristics 
deemed unquestionably ‘typical’ for boys and girls (or men and women), 
                                                             
22  The following page numbers in this chapter refer to the paperback edition of Annabel 
published in 2010 by Black Cat. 




respectively. In consequence, what the novel really claims is that Wayne’s 
supposedly gender-specific characteristics and acts are, in fact, a result of his intersex 
variation – thereby making biologist-essentialist assumptions about gender –, while 
these acts are rather socially marked as gendered. 
Before turning to the analysis of the negotiation of Wayne’s intersex intelligibility 
through (his relationships with) particular characters, it is crucial to scrutinize the 
cultural parameters of gender construction in the novel. The dominant parameters 
that determine the alleged difference between normative dichotomous genders are 
medicine, aesthetics, and sexual violence. Constructing gender according to these 
parameters is not unproblematic, as they reference and reiterate profoundly normative 
and deeply troubling signifiers for gender. The question is whether the novel is (self-) 
reflective of the problematic implications of these constructions and of its own 
strategy to make use of them. 
Annabel’s noticeable departure from Middlesex’s extensive, detailed repre-
sentation of the medical establishment and its power over the intersex protagonist, 
their body, and the definition of their gender can be interpreted as a decentering of 
the relevance of medicine for the intersex person’s life and their sense of self. 
However, the actual authority held by medical practice (and practitioners) over 
Wayne/Annabel and his_her sexed body becomes all the more obvious and 
significant in the compressed representation of the medical scenes in Annabel. The 
categorical, de-individualized power of medicine is highlighted by the novel’s 
introduction of several, changing doctors who treat Wayne, instead of concentrating 
on one specific doctor and their relationship with him; a narrative strategy that makes 
these doctors interchangeable representatives of the medical establishment.  
Medical episodes and interventions recur at several stages in Wayne’s childhood 
and coming of age throughout the narrative. Wayne/Annabel is not born in a hospital, 
but in his_her parents’ house in Croydon Harbour, with only three of Jacinta’s female 
friends present. Thomasina Baikie, who acts as the midwife and delivers the baby, is 
the first who notices the baby’s ‘ambiguous’ sex characteristics (penis, one 
descended testicle, labia, vagina). Thus, the initial ‘diagnosis’ of the newborn’s 
intersex variation is made by a family friend, not by medical authorities. Yet the first 
reactions to the baby’s intersex body parallels the rhetoric of ‘medical emergency’ 
commonly used by doctors: “Thomasina caught sight of something slight, flower-
like; one testicle had not descended, but there was something else. She waited the 
eternal instant that women wait when a horror jumps out at them. [...] What 
Thomasina knew [...] was that something can go wrong, not just with the child in 
front of you, another woman’s child, but with your own child, at any time, no matter 
how much you love it” (Annabel 15f). This instance not only invokes a sense of horror 
about an unexpected ‘anomaly’ of the baby’s body, but equates a child’s intersex 
body with the death of a child, as this passage foreshadows the death of Thomasina’s 
own daughter Annabel. The language of ‘wrongness’ and horror of the infant’s 
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intersex body is reiterated by Jacinta, who compares her child’s intersex variation to 
a case of conjoined twins, whose mother’s determination to raise them joined sounds 
at first unthinkable to Jacinta: “she thought the woman would come to her senses one 
day and allow the babies to die” (Annabel 23). The strategy of secrecy about the 
infant’s intersex variation, recommended by doctors as a rule, is also followed by 
Jacinta, who keeps the baby’s bodily state a secret even from her husband in the 
beginning. 
While the baby’s first weeks pass without medical definition and intervention, as 
soon as Treadway learns about the intersex variation he decides his baby’s gender as 
male, and to have ‘him’ examined by a doctor. Jacinta brings Wayne/Annabel to the 
hospital despite her internal conflict about the impending ‘normalizing’ surgery. She 
even considers running away from the hospital and the surgery, and contrasts western 
medical practices with the culture of the Innu, the indigenous inhabitants of certain 
areas of Quebec and Labrador, she had once encountered: “He [a baby of an Innu 
woman] had been born with a genetic anomaly but his mother had held him and sung 
to him, a lullaby in Innuaimun, and no one had tried to take that baby to the Goose 
Bay General Hospital and maim him or administer some kind of death by surgery. 
No one had found fault with him at all” (Annabel 43). While this statement appears 
to oversimplify indigenous cultural practices, and ignores the real-life conditions of 
Innu people in Canada (e.g. the mainstream/non-Innu health care system’s lack of 
understanding of Innu culture and their own definitions of health as a possible reason 
for not bringing the baby to the hospital), juxtaposing indigenous cultures’ notions of 
gender (in opposition) to western gender concepts is a common strategy employed 
by western academics and writers (Qwo-Li Driskill points out that the appropriation 
of concepts like Two-Spirit for western concepts of queer, transgender or intersex is 
problematic, Driskill 2010). In Annabel, Jacinta’s comparison exposes the western 
cultural practices of dealing with intersex infants as violent and cruel, referring both 
to the surgical intervention into bodily integrity and to the defining power over gender 
categories she experiences as destructive mechanisms: “Everyone was trying to 
define everything so carefully, Jacinta felt; they wanted to annihilate all questions” 
(Annabel 45). 
Nevertheless, Jacinta brings Wayne/Annabel inside the hospital to the surgeon 
Dr. Simon Ho, who will perform the surgery attempted at making Wayne/Annabel 
look more ‘male,’ and hence medically affirm Treadway’s gender assignment of his 
son. It is noteworthy that the intersex baby’s ‘maleness’ is determined and reinforced 
by men (the father, the male doctor), while the baby’s ‘femaleness’ is nurtured by 
women (the mother, the female friend). The representation of Dr. Ho is ambivalent. 
The instance in the hospital occurs primarily through Jacinta’s perspective, hence the 
doctor appears as experienced by the mother of the intersex child he is about to treat. 
His figure has only a small part in the narrative and thus necessarily remains sketchy 
and simplified, yet his reductionism represents the central conflict all the more 




pointedly. Jacinta has mixed feelings about the doctor: “Jacinta noticed the 
seriousness of Dr. Ho. She liked that he looked at her steadily, that he was young and 
slim and not aggressive” (Annabel 48); “She felt that in Dr. Ho’s presence any 
thought, any fear or wish, was understandable. He would not dismiss her” (Annabel 
50). The doctor’s perceived trustworthiness is however relativized: “Dr. Ho took 
Wayne from her arms so gently she thought he must love babies, even if he did 
merciless things to them. He must have bad dreams. He must wake up in the middle 
of the night just before the part of the dream where he cuts the baby. [...] But maybe 
not. Maybe he didn’t care. Maybe he only looked like he cared” (Annabel 51f). 
Jacinta’s ambivalent judgment of the doctor’s humanity as a prerequisite for acting 
ethically and medically responsible signifies the complicated relationship between 
doctor, patient, and parent, and the parents’ (or mother’s in this case) difficulty of 
leaving the decision about the medical interventions into their child’s body to the 
medical authority’s discretion.  
Dr. Ho’s medical assessment of Wayne/Annabel’s sexed corporeality and his 
subsequent suggestion of medical intervention follow the traditional medical protocol 
and a frequently found narrative plot in intersex narratives. Within only a few pages, 
the narrative evokes all common motives and strategies related to the medical 
rendering of intersex as an unintelligible category. The attempted ‘normalization’ of 
Wayne/Annabel’s intersex body into a ‘coherent’ ‘male’ body draws on the rhetoric 
of a person’s ‘true sex’ (or ‘true gender’), of the ‘believability’ of the sexed body in 
social situations, and on the penis size as the ultimate marker of a person’s maleness, 
or femaleness by default. Without any introduction or preliminary talk the doctor 
comes straight to the point of the planned surgery: “‘The point,’ the doctor said, ‘is 
to create a believable masculine anatomy. [...] we try to make the baby comfortable 
as a male in his own mind, and in the minds of other people who are in his life now 
or will be in the future’” (Annabel 48f). The justification for irrevocably surgically 
altering the baby’s genitals is to make Wayne/Annabel an intelligible social subject, 
in fact, a human subject: “‘We want to give him a chance. As soon as possible after 
the birth’” (Annabel 50), as if Wayne’s ‘monstrosity’ is bound to grow with every 
day he stays in his intersex body. According to the medical view, Wayne’s very 
humanness is threatened by his intersex body, which displaces him to the realm of 
the unconceivable, unreal and monstrous, as Jacinta infers: “‘You think,’ she said, ‘a 
child’s sex needs to be believable. You think my child – the way he is now, the way 
she is – is unbelievable? Like something in a science fiction horror movie? And you 
want to make her believable. Like a real human’” (Annabel 50). Jacinta’s query hints 
at the constraints of the production of personhood by binary normative gender notions 
that are inevitably bound to the notion of the human implicit in the medical logic. Her 
use of both male and female pronouns when referring to her child is significant here 
and can be considered as a way of resisting the doctor’s definition of Wayne/Annabel 
as male. 
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The ‘normalizing’ surgery is phrased in terms of the only acceptable and 
responsible reaction to an intersex variation, as Dr. Ho assures: “‘what we are doing 
today is the normal medical response. [...] And I think it’s the most compassionate 
one. We try to decide the true sex of the child’” (Annabel 50). As mentioned earlier, 
the rhetoric of ‘true sex/gender’ relies on an essentialist notion of an ‘innate,’ firmly 
fixed sense of self that is inextricably linked to, or ‘expressed’ by a ‘coherently’ sexed 
body. The surgical production of such a ‘coherently’ sexed body is in fact not, as 
often claimed by medical authorities, the ‘detection’ of an already existing gender, 
but the construction of a gender. In what follows, the procedure suggested by Dr. Ho 
to determine Wayne/Annabel’s gender resorts to an oversimplified sketch of the 
medical protocol of treating intersex variations, up to the point that it could pass as a 
parody. Naturally the phallometer out of the medical textbooks is cited as the apt 
instrument to measure Wayne’s ‘maleness’ (the chapter is aptly titled “Phalometer” 
[sic]):  
 
“It’s a tiny ruler.” 
 
“It is. See?” He pointed to a mark three-quarters of the way down the phalometer [sic]. “If the 
penis reaches or exceeds this length, we consider it a real penis. If it doesn’t meet this 
measurement, it is considered a clitoris.” 
 




“What happens if it’s less than that?” 
 





“Yes. When it’s less than that, we remove the presentation of male aspects and later, during 
adolescence, we sculpt the female aspects.” 
 
“What if it’s right in the middle? Right straight, smack dab down the precise centre? One point 
five centimetres with no seven hundredths.” 
 
“Then we make an educated guess. We do endocrinological tests but really, in a newborn, as 
far as endocrinology goes, we’re making a best estimate. Penis size at birth is the primary 
criterion for assigning a gender.” (Annabel 51) 




While this exchange between Jacinta and Dr. Ho exposes the absurdity of the 
phallometer for determining a child’s gender and the arbitrariness with which crucial 
decisions that affect the integrity of the child’s body are made (“educated guess”), it 
becomes obvious how much power medical authority even has for/over the mother. 
Although Jacinta attempts resistance to this authority by continuing calling her baby 
‘she,’ against the gender definition of Dr. Ho, and by questioning his methods to 
determine her baby’s gender (“‘I can’t even see the numbers. They’re so tiny,’” 
Annabel 52), she eventually submits to the doctor’s assessment, affirming 
Treadway’s decision to raise her child as a boy. The novel at this point does nothing 
to substantially challenge the medical authority over Wayne/Annabel’s subject 
construction. 
In the course of the narrative and Wayne’s growing up process, there is for a 
longer period no considerable incident with doctors or hospitals. He sees changing 
‘specialists,’ and needs to take his daily medication to prevent his body from 
‘feminizing,’ but he is unaware of the true reason he has to take the pills. He even 
fears that he is diabetic, has leukemia or a brain tumor. At one point, Wayne asks his 
mother about his ‘condition’: “‘Is what I have,’ Wayne said now, ‘called something?’ 
He did not like to have an ailment for which there was no word. He had never heard 
of anyone in his class having a nameless medical condition. Even the things that 
killed you had a name” (Annabel 154). The conflation of intersex variations and 
diseases is produced here not by the use of medical terminology but by the omission 
or refusal to name the intersex variation, in combination with the (supposed) need of 
medication. Since even terminal diseases are denoted, an unspeakable ‘condition’ 
obviously must be even worse than a fatal condition. 
A medical emergency marks a drastic watershed in Wayne’s narrative. Up to this 
point, he is still unaware of his intersex body. His womb fills with menstrual blood 
that cannot drain off his body, since his vagina has been sewed up in the course of 
the surgery he had as an infant. Thomasina, who is his teacher at this time, rushes 
him to the hospital without informing his parents, and is about to tell Wayne the truth 
about his intersex variation, but backs off last-minute, and leaves the revelation to the 
doctor in charge, Dr. Lioukras: “‘Dr. Lioukras is the one who should talk to you. I’m 
no good at the facts’” (Annabel 211), she tells Wayne – obviously the truth about his 
intersex body is all about medical ‘facts’ that need to be articulated by someone who 
is ‘authorized’ to define and deliver these facts. Before the incident, when Wayne 
had seen Dr. Lioukras, he “had not explained anything. In fact, the doctor had put 
him to sleep” (Annabel 204), hence acting in a paternalistic, authoritarian way, 
without having to rely on informed consent – wielding unrestrained medical power 
over the sedated patient and his body. His unethical behavior seems to go 
unchallenged, even unquestioned, due to his self-assertive demeanor: “Dr. Lioukras 
took pictures of the children he saw in his surgery, and nobody minded, as he was 
such an optimist. Nobody ever said, ‘Hey, Dr. Lioukras, make sure you get the 
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parents to sign a release form’” (Annabel 211). The novel appears indecisive as to 
whether the doctor’s authority is problematic. While it is pointed out that his authority 
is not questioned, his performance is explained by his unconventional nature and even 
more justified by the way he treats Wayne’s intersex variation as something 
‘standard,’ even beautiful:  
 
“Wayne lifted his Trans-Labrador Helicopters T-shirt. His breasts were like tinned apricots that 
have not broken the surface tension in a bowl of cream. No flicker of alarm or warning crossed 
the doctor’s face. He looked at Wayne’s chest as if it were the most ordinary boy’s chest in the 
world. Thomasina loved him for it. She could not have looked directly at Wayne’s chest without 
Wayne’s knowing she felt there was a deep, sad problem. When Dr. Lioukras looked at 
Wayne’s breasts, he saw beauty equal to that which he would have seen in the body of any 
youth, male or female. It was as if he saw the apricots growing on their own tree, right where 
they belonged.” (Annabel 212) 
 
Dr. Lioukras’ reaction is mediated by Thomasina’s perspective on the examination, 
conveyed by an omniscient narrator, creating a triply mediated gaze on Wayne’s 
body. Thus, what this passage reveals about the characters’ feelings towards Wayne’s 
intersex body is not easy to disentangle: at first glance, the doctor is represented as 
appreciative of the beauty of Wayne’s body, of his breasts/chest foremost, while 
Thomasina seems to find the appearance of ‘breasts’ on his body as somehow 
‘abhorrent’; the averting of her eyes is perhaps also a sign of feeling guilty about 
having kept Wayne’s intersex variation a secret from him. Instead, she directs her 
gaze on Dr. Lioukras’ face, who is looking at Wayne. What Dr. Lioukras really thinks 
about Wayne’s breasts/chest remains speculative. The novel wants to make believe 
that the doctor finds no fault with Wayne’s body; yet in the context of the passage, 
“Dr. Lioukras managed to suggest that he deadened areas and drained fluids out of 
boys’ abdomens every day, and that nothing could be more normal or upbeat” 
(Annabel 212), his reaction is rather revealed as a strategy of concealment, or at least 
as medical professionalism and rationality. The metaphor of apricots for Wayne’s 
breasts indicates an aestheticization of and a simultaneous detachment from the 
corporeal realities of the intersex body. Whether it is in fact Dr. Lioukras, or 
Thomasina, or the narrator who imagines the apricots remains unclear; however, 
Wayne’s body is transformed from a medical object into an aesthetic object in the 
examination situation, displacing the conditions by which the intersex subject is 
recognized. 
After the surgery to drain the menstrual blood out of Wayne’s body, Dr. Lioukras 
eventually reveals Wayne’s intersex variation to him. This scene reveals the 
limitations of language, in particular medical language, to account for the category 
of intersex, and the novel provides a narrative and a metanarrative critical 
commentary on both the significance and the inadequacy of language available for 




the production of gender intelligibility. Dr. Lioukras’ choice of vocabulary – and his 
inevitable failure – to define Wayne’s complex corporeality operates under the 
premise that there are “ways of knowing, modes of truth, that forcibly define 
intelligibility” (Butler 2001: 621): “Dr. Lioukras had done his best. [...] he had tried 
to use words that were true. The limitations of medical language were no greater, in 
his mind, than those of language as a whole. Science, medicine, mythology, and even 
poetry shared a kind of grandeur, as far as he saw” (Annabel 235f). The doctor’s 
language of ‘truth’ contains mythological references on the one hand and 
oversimplified medical terminology on the other hand, which makes up a narrative 
about intersex as a “story of [a] male body and the female body inside it” (Annabel 
237). This language of ‘truth’ conflates myth and science and creates a ‘scientific 
myth’ about the intersex body: “‘This is one time,’ [Dr. Lioukras] told Wayne [...], 
‘when medical science has given itself over entirely to mythical names. A true 
hermaphrodite’ – he said it as if the state were an attainment – ‘is more rare than all 
the other forms. It means you have everything boys have, and girls too. An almost 
complete presence of each’” (Annabel 236). This statement is not only biologically 
inaccurate – no human can have equally and fully formed ‘male’ and ‘female’ bodily 
characteristics – but displaces the medical treatment of intersex to the mythological 
realm (while the term ‘hermaphrodite’ was still in use in medical discourses around 
1980, at the time this incident takes place in the novel, the term ‘intersex’ was already 
in use) and thus connotes an ‘unreal’ subject “for which there is no place in the given 
regime of truth” (Butler 2001: 621). 
The remainder of Dr. Lioukras’ attempt to explain his bodily state to Wayne 
further reaffirms the category of intersex as an unintelligibly category, as intersex is 
articulated in terms of the collapsing of the girl/boy dichotomy within Wayne’s body: 
without medication, he tells Wayne, “‘[y]ou would become more like a girl than you 
are now. You’re already a girl inside’” (Annabel 236). Naturally, Wayne reacts with 
confusion: “‘Inside?’ How could he be a girl inside? What did that mean? He pictured 
girls from his class lying inside his body, hiding. What girl was inside him? He 
pictured Wally Michelin, smaller than her real self, lying quietly in the red world 
inside him, hiding” (Annabel 237). This comment exposes not only the limitations of 
the doctor’s use of language but its absurdity; his language of ‘truth’ thus signifies a 
necessary failure to account for Wayne’s intersex body, and for the category of 
intersex in general. The novel, however, seems aware of this failure: 
  
“So it was with names – suture, true hermaphrodite, menstrual blood, gynecological 
intervention – that the doctor had done his best to acquaint Wayne with the story of his male 
body and the female body inside it. Dr. Lioukras was not happy with the talk. He had wanted 
it to be about life, and possibility, not blood and stitching and cutting. He had to remind himself 
that the work of a surgeon is poetry of a kind, in which blood is the meaning and flesh is the 
text.” (Annabel 237f)  
212 | INTERSEX NARRATIVES 
 
The possibility of an intelligible life cannot be provided by normative language; 
intersex intelligibility fails here. Yet subsequently, “Wayne felt the power of names 
in a new way. [...] You explained away the mystery” of something “by naming its 
parts” (Annabel 238). While Dr. Lioukras’ story of intersex might be deficient, it at 
least provides Wayne with a term from which he can start to reconceptualize his 
gendered and sexed reality.  
Involved in this medical emergency is an incident of self-fertilization and its 
resulting in an embryo trapped within Wayne’s fallopian tube, which was 
consequently aborted by Dr. Lioukras. This is later disclosed to Wayne by 
Thomasina, together with the (pseudo-scientific) explanation that self-impregnation 
can happen “‘[w]hen the male and female reproductive organs are adjacent in the 
same body’” (Annabel 305). This process is, however, physiologically impossible. 
The reason why the novel introduces an implausible sub-plot like this other than for 
sensationalism is disputable. Sassafras Lowrey considers the “use [of] medical drama 
as a plot device” as “the largest weakness of the book” as it “makes the whole book 
take an unnecessary turn towards the sensational in a text that otherwise does such a 
great job of avoiding those pitfalls” (Lowrey 2011). Casey Stepaniuk goes even 
further with her criticism and asserts that the inclusion of this sub-plot overshadows 
the by and large insightful representation of intersex issues in the novel: “In an 
otherwise realist and perceptive book, this sensational and implausible plot device is 
not only unnecessary but offensive. I was really disappointed that Winter chose to 
include a physiologically impossible pregnancy instead of exploring some of the 
actual complexities or realities of intersex folks’ lives” (Stepaniuk 2013).   
The implausibility of the process of self-fertilization aside, the fetus can be read 
as a metaphor for Wayne’s internal gender struggles and the ‘female’ identity of 
Annabel that stays submerged within Wayne, a part of him that haunts him, like the 
ghost of Thomasina’s drowned daughter Annabel, his namesake, and the girl Annabel 
inside him whom he feels will ‘die’ if he does not prevent it: “Where was the fetus 
now? It had eyes, and the eyes had watched him. He had been in the red world and 
the fetus and he had looked at each other. Had it wanted him to save it? If he had not 
lost it, if it had grown into a person, who would that little person be now?” (Annabel 
308). This passage is reminiscent of Wayne’s musings about the ‘girl inside him’ that 
Dr. Lioukras has evoked. Wayne/Annabel, however, still lacks the conditions by 
which Annabel becomes knowable, and hence s_he is not able to fully ‘grasp’ his_her 
gendered sense of self: “But Annabel ran away. Where did she go? She was inside 
his body but she escaped him. Maybe she gets out through my eyes, he thought, when 
I open them. Or my ears. He lay in bed and waited. Annabel was close enough to 
touch; she was himself, yet unattainable” (Annabel 252). The elusiveness of Annabel 
signifies Wayne/Annabel’s “occupy[ing] the place of not-being within the field of 
being, living, breathing, attempting to love, as that which is neither fully negated nor 
acknowledged as being, acknowledged, we might say, into being” (Butler 2001: 622). 




In terms of plot advancement, this moment marks a significant turning point, as 
it displaces the narrative to a different geographical place. The image of the dead 
fetus haunts Wayne up to the point where it makes him leave Croydon Harbour and 
move to St. John’s, where he is later again haunted by the incident: “he remembered 
the fetus that had formed in him before. He imagined its eyes and he easily imagined 
its face looking at him now. [...] What was to stop him being haunted by one pair of 
eyes after another, just the same as that first pair?” (Annabel 365f). Significantly, this 
passage is set in a context where Wayne tries to deal with his gender nonconformity 
after he decided to stop his medication, which causes his body to ‘feminize.’ The 
inclusion of the motif of self-fertilization thus appears to serve more than a 
sensationalizing of an intersex variation, but can be interpreted as symbolizing the 
struggle to become recognizable as Wayne and Annabel. However, this motif has 
been rightfully criticized by many reviewers as it renders a harmful representation of 
intersex as a ‘horrifying’ ‘condition.’ 
Wayne’s last confrontation with the medical establishment exposes their 
dehumanizing procedures and at the same times marks a moment of intersex 
resistance against them. When his abdomen once more fills with menstrual blood, he 
goes to the Grace General Hospital, where he is treated as a study subject for training 
the medical students: “a doctor named Haldor Carr came in with two more doctors 
and seven interns. These observers all watched carefully, hoping to learn a great deal 
from Haldor Carr about a kind of case most interns never got to see. [...] Haldor Carr 
was a teaching physician, and he was teaching now. Wayne was an exhibit” (Annabel 
369). This scene reiterates the many similar scenes in various intersex narratives, 
fictional and non-fictional, in which intersex individuals become the objects of 
medical study, examination, and scrutiny, and are depersonalized and dehumanized 
in the process. Wayne is patronized and reprimanded by the doctors for having “taken 
matters into his own hands” (Annabel 369) when he discontinued his medication, 
since only a medical authority is eligible for making medical decisions, and the 
claiming of this authority by a patient is considered a disobedience and has severe 
consequences, or so the doctor alleges: “They could not guarantee the safety of any 
medical intervention from now on, and had Wayne considered this before he had 
acted so rashly, they would not now all be in a position of risk” (Annabel 369) – at 
risk here is obviously the medical establishment’s supremacy over the intersex body.  
Wayne is rendered powerless and terrified in the face of being subjected to the 
medical arbitrariness. He fears that Dr. Carr might remove some of his sexed body 
parts, or make a wrong decision about Wayne’s body that conflicts with his own 
wishes. Then suddenly Wayne realizes he must intervene to regain control over his 
situation and his body: “he forced himself to sit up and use the only thing of influence 
that he owned: his voice. His voice did not want to come out of hiding, but he knew 
he had to exercise it or Haldor Carr would choose one of the surgeries and perform 
it” (Annabel 370). He demands from the doctor that his vagina should not be closed 
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again and that no body part should be removed; so that he can return to his initial 
state and recover his ‘real’ sense of self: “This way, Wayne thought, he would 
become who he had been when he was born. At least he would have that. The truth 
of himself, who he really was. [...] Wayne had spoken up, and now he had done so, 
he knew he had spoken with his whole self: with the voice of Annabel and not only 
that of Wayne” (Annabel 370f). The stay at the hospital, which is Wayne’s last one 
(within the scope of the narrative), then, marks again a significant turning point in his 
story: not only does he challenge medical authority over himself and his body, he 
moreover reclaims his intersex body of which he was disowned by medical 
intervention. With this reclaiming, he also fully embraces his ‘male’ and ‘female’ 
parts, Wayne and Annabel, together at the same time. Annabel becomes the voice of 
resistance, the voice that has been subdued is now released. Dr. Carr’s medical 
verbiage becomes consequently meaningless and cannot define Wayne/Annabel 
anymore.  
In one empathic intern s_he finds a moment of recognition as Annabel: “‘I see 
you. I see there was a baby born, and her name is Annabel, and no one knows her.’ 
The intern said this, and Annabel, inside Wayne, had been waiting for it. She heard 
it from her hiding place” (Annabel 373). The intern’s recognition of Annabel signifies 
a subversion of the hegemonic visualization practices and terminology traditionally 
exerted over intersex persons. Her assertion, “I see you,” verbalizes the (medical) 
gaze and subverts its power to dehumanize and depersonalize its subjects into the 
recognition of the intersex subject as human, as an individual – an intersex individual 
no less. Her use of the name Annabel to address Wayne/Annabel stands in contrast 
to the various medical terms Dr. Carr uses to refer to him_her in the same scene, and 
thus counteracts the depersonalizing scientific discourse that constitutes the category 
of intersex as a medical yet unintelligible category. Ironically, it is in the space of the 
hospital that Annabel is enabled to surface, and the possibility of Wayne/Annabel’s 
intelligibility as intersex is provided. 
While medical parameters are the most salient and radical signifiers for the 
demarcation between ‘male’ and ‘female’ genders in Annabel, aesthetics or questions 
of beauty are also crucially, though perhaps less drastically, involved in the processes 
of the performativity of gender. The motif of beauty is inextricably linked with the 
intimate relationships between the characters in the novel; a theme that will be 
scrutinized in more detail below. Beauty, however, is also related to certain 
characteristics, acts, and objects, which demarcates gender for the most part, but 
eventually comes to (re)signify intersex. The novel’s language itself is characterized 
by an aesthetic style which is used not only for creating sensuous pleasure, but to 
convey social and critical messages: “Most of the descriptive prose is melodically 
poetic, marrying spare lucidity and sage observation. [...] Even mundane tasks are 
illuminated by harmonious language [...]. [...] Winter’s flair for capturing atmosphere 
is not confined to the harsh land and its inhabitants’ arduous labour. She is equally 




adept at using her idiosyncratic eye to create charming images,” as Leyla Sanai puts 
it (Sanai 2011). 
The beauty of Annabel’s language is iterated on the content level; 
Wayne/Annabel in particular is concerned with the messages and value of beauty. 
Beauty is often found in symmetry and closely associated with perfection. The beauty 
of synchronized swimmer Elizaveta Kirilovna becomes a seemingly unattainable 
ideal for young Wayne – he, as a boy, is not allowed to be a synchronized swimmer 
and to wear a glittering bathing suit –, and the symmetry of the figures made by her 
and other (female) synchronized swimmers becomes a recurring motif of fascination 
with perfection which translates as beauty. The concept of symmetry-as-beauty is 
repeatedly iterated in the motif of bridges. Thomasina sends Wayne postcards from 
various bridges from different countries to which she travels, and Wayne is fascinated 
by their architecture; he is even inspired to build his own bridge with the help of his 
father, an endeavor that is at first approved of by Treadway as he wants to teach his 
son craftsmanship which is marked as a ‘male’ skill, but when he finds out that 
Wayne decorates the bridge in the style of the Ponte Vecchio and uses it as a place to 
hang out with his friend Wally, Treadway dismantles the bridge. The juxtaposition 
of the symmetry of the bridges associated with beauty and the perceived ‘asymmetry’ 
of his own body establishes a definition of what qualifies as an aesthetic object, and 
hence marks Wayne’s body as an unaesthetic body-object. However as the symbol 
of the bridge can also interpreted as uniting gender differences, and hence reconciling 
the notion of aesthetics and corporeal beauty, the bridge can function as a heterotopia 
for acting out alternative concepts to conventional gendered beauty. 
Beauty as inextricably linked to the ideas of ‘order’ and ‘flawlessness’ is also 
reiterated in the medical narrative space. Intersex variations were, and still are, 
considered as ‘disorders’ (as the term ‘Disorders of Sexual Development,’ or DSD, 
demonstrates), i.e. the non-orderly, that which has come undone, the norm that is 
disturbed. Given the equation of order and beauty, intersex signifies as the non-
beautiful. Interestingly, in the narrative this equation is not challenged by dismissing 
the equation, but by the resignification of one of its variables. “I wouldn’t call what 
you have a disorder. I’d call it a different order. A different order means a whole new 
way of being. It could be fantastic. It could be overwhelmingly beautiful, if people 
weren’t scared,” Thomasina tells Wayne (Annabel 208f). Even Dr. Lioukras sees 
“beauty equal to that which he would have seen in the body of any youth, female or 
male” when looking at Wayne’s intersex body (Annabel 212). The resignification of 
intersex from a bodily (and gender) ‘disorder’ to a (different) ‘order’ allows for 
Wayne/Annabel’s intersex body to be marked as beautiful, not by aligning her_his 
body with the norm, but by critically positioning him_herself in relation to the norm, 
thus pointing to the norm’s limitations to be representative of all subjects and bodies. 
As noted earlier, notions of normative beauty inform medical perspectives on the 
gendered body and hence medical practices to produce a body that conforms to 
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normative aesthetics; surgery becomes the physical tool for culturally ‘aestheticizing’ 
(gender) nonconformative bodies. The marking of Wayne/Annabel’s intersex body 
as beautiful subverts the logic inherent in this reasoning and the premises of this 
equation, and thus effects a destabilization of the absolutism of this distinction (Butler 
2001: 634) without giving up on the idea of bodies as aesthetic objects. 
Yet the intricacies of having an (intersex) body that undergoes transformations – 
due to medication and later discontinuing medication – are more complicated than 
simply redefining a ‘disorder’ as a ‘different order.’ Wayne/Annabel questions 
his_her own beauty, and the question of beauty’s definition(s) becomes entangled 
with notions of bodily ‘realness’ whereby ‘constructed’ body images and ‘authentic’ 
body images seem impossible to be distinguished:  
 
“Years of hormones had made him angular, and it occurred to him that he wished he could stop 
taking them. He wanted to stop swallowing them every day and having them alter his body 
from what it wanted to be into what the world desired from it. [...] He wanted to throw the pills 
away and wait and see what would happen to his body. How much of his body image was 
accurate and how much was a construct he had come to believe? [...] his body wanted to be 
water, but it was no water. It was a man’s body, and a man’s body was frozen. Wayne was 
frozen, and the girl-self trapped inside him was cold. He did not know what he could do to melt 
the frozen man.” (Annabel 343) 
 
The narrative suggests that for Wayne/Annabel, (at least) two body images exist that 
compete for prevalence and recognition: the intersex body in its ‘natural,’ or 
‘original’ state (‘natural’ referring here to the body unaltered by surgery and 
medication) and a culturally/medically constructed body whose constructed maleness 
overlies the femaleness of his ‘original’ body. This ‘natural’ body is endowed with a 
kind of agency or will (“what it wanted to be,” “his body wanted to be water”), but 
at the moment when Wayne/Annabel still takes his_her medication, this body is 
deprived of its agency, or freedom of action, and hence remains in a (trans)fixed state.  
When Wayne moves to St. John’s and stops taking the medication, his body starts 
to transform, but again Wayne has no control over his body (image) which becomes 
increasingly harder to define in terms of a coherent gender: “everytime he passed 
through one of [St. John’s] clearly defined spaces he felt that he did not fit into it. His 
body, or the idea of his body, had grown amorphous and huge” (Annabel 356). The 
significance of spaces for the articulation of corporeality becomes apparent in 
Wayne’s relation to the Battery, a district in St. John’s that is different from the rest 
of the city: “The Battery was, like himself, part one thing and part another. [...] It was 
unregulated [...]. [...] The night on the Battery was a necklace of floating light, a world 
of dreams, part city and part ocean, a hybrid, like Wayne himself, between the 
ordinary world and that place in the margins where the mysterious and undefined 
breathes and lives” (Annabel 356f). This passage can be interpreted in terms of Judith 




Butler’s theorizing of marginalized places in the context of the questions of the 
conditions and the limits of intelligibility: “What happens when I begin to become 
that for which there is no place in the given regime of truth?” (Butler 2001: 621). 
While the Battery is not exactly a non-place, or a place of not-being, it exists at the 
“limits of the conceivably human” (Butler 2001: 627), that is constantly in a state of 
flux, shifting between reality and imagination – just like Wayne/Annabel’s body.  
Although the medical and aesthetic parameters take up more narrative space to 
account for the demarcation of genders than others, the most disturbing and 
problematic marker for gender in Annabel is the motif of sexual violence. After 
Wayne/Annabel has decided to discontinue medication, and as a result appears 
increasingly feminine, s_he is sexually assaulted by a group of men. The sexual 
assault is triggered by Wayne’s new friend Steve’s remark to Derek Warford and his 
friends that Wayne had a “sex-change operation” and changed her_his name to 
Annabel (Annabel 374). When Warford and his gang attack Annabel/Wayne, they 
call her_him a “little girl” over a dozen times throughout the whole assault (Annabel 
377-81). The sexual violence scene reiterates a specific narrative of sexual violence 
towards gender nonconforming individuals already mentioned in the chapter on 
Middlesex, i.e. a sexually motivated attack that involves the stripping of the person’s 
clothes in order to ‘inspect’ the seemingly ‘ambiguous’ sexed body parts, followed 
by normative judgment of the body, and an exaggerated violent attack and/or rape. 
The attackers are always exclusively cis men. While in the majority of these 
narratives of violence, the aim of the attack is to ‘expose’ the gender nonconforming 
person as something other than they present and/or self-identify, in Annabel the 
sexual assault is interrelated with Wayne/Annabel’s femaleness, and his_her 
(supposed) desire to be/come a girl translates as the desire to “get fucked” by men 
(Annabel 381). Casey Stepaniuk argues in a similar direction: she interprets the 
sexual assault  
 
“as some kind of marker of ‘essential femaleness.’ Throughout the novel, Winter uses only the 
name Wayne and the personal pronoun ‘he’ to refer to her protagonist; understandably it might 
be difficult for some readers to visualize this character’s later feminine gender identification 
and presentation. Because of this, I saw the sexual assault as a way to convince readers of 
Wayne/Annabel’s femaleness. The implication that only women are sexually assaulted and that 
this kind of assault is somehow proof of the female nature of the character readers have known 
as ‘Wayne’ up until this point is deeply problematic. [...] as a feminist I find it very offensive.” 
(Stepaniuk 2013) 
 
While I would not go as far as to claim that the sexual attack was included (only) to 
convince readers of Wayne/Annabel’s femaleness, the problematic connection 
between gender and victimization Stepaniuk points to correlates with the normative 
gender concepts in Annabel. Another point that substantiates this reading is the 
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evocation of beauty at various moments throughout the sexual attack: “The bottle 
hovered over his face and Wayne thought about beauty, and how he never had it, and 
he realized he had been hoping for it to come. He didn’t want a lot of it but he was 
hoping for some. Just once to look in the mirror and see a beautiful face, even if the 
beauty was subdued. Even if no one could see it but himself” (Annabel 377f). Apart 
from the implausibility of a victim of sexual violence musing about issues of beauty 
while being attacked, and even considering the broken bottle with which they are 
threatened as beautiful, this kind of beauty Wayne/Annabel thinks about refers to a 
female gendered beauty, perhaps that of Annabel, which s_he feels subdued in 
Wayne, in the same way s_he feels the ‘girl inside him,’ Annabel, subdued. The 
connection between female beauty and the sexual attack reinforces the deeply 
problematic notion of female attractiveness as a motivation behind sexual violence. 
In the moment the attackers are about to strip him_her naked, Wayne/Annabel’s 
immediate thought is that “[b]eauty is gone and beauty is never coming back and it 
has not even been here yet” (Annabel 380). Another possible interpretation of this 
evocation of beauty in the violent situation is that beauty refers to, or signifies, 
Wayne/Annabel’s state of intelligibility. Wayne has been hoping to become 
intelligible as an intersex subject, with the surfacing of Annabel and the 
representation of both Wayne and Annabel inside him, and on the outside – this 
intersex intelligibility is not reached at this point, and Wayne fears that with/after the 
sexual attack, which could even involve his death, he will never achieve it: “A thing 
could depart before it reached you in the first place” (Annabel 380). This scene can 
be read as a reiteration of the equation of beauty and the intersex body within the 
narrative, and thus as an affirmation of intersex – although, paradoxically and 
problematically, during a moment of intense pain and exposure.  
The three crucial narrative paradigms of gender construction and demarcation in 
Annabel, medicine, aesthetics, and sexual violence, are intricately interrelated in the 
production of the conditions for intersex intelligibility in/by the novel. Thereby the 
narrative reiterates specific discourses (such as the medical discourse as well as its 
renegotiations and/or contestations by intersex first-person narratives, activist texts, 
and cultural productions), motifs (corporeal beauty standards as antithetical to 
intersex bodies), and narrative plots (sexual violence against and stripping of a gender 
variant person triggered by the desire to destroy – both visually and physically – any 
perceived gender ‘ambivalence’) frequently found in narratives about intersex, and 
hence involves processes of repetition of the normative aspects of the production of 
the category of intersex. Yet at the same time, these narrative reiterations open up 
possibilities of refusing and/or challenging normative intersex narratives. 
 
 




5.3.2 A Parent-Child-Relationship: Lost Daughters and             
Sons of Nature 
 
The analysis of the negotiation of Wayne/Annabel’s intersex intelligibility through 
specific characters and their relationships with him_her starts off with the observation 
that the coherence of (the character) Wayne/Annabel is produced by various different 
perspectives in the novel (including his_her own), due to the narrative mode of third-
person omniscient; as a result the narrative coherence of the intersex character is 
constantly contested and necessarily remains fragmentary and at times implausible. 
As aforementioned, this narrative mode allows for multiple (re)configurations of 
intersex. Annabel not only produces the conditions for the contestation of the 
category of intersex, but accounts for the motivation behind the parents’ decision to 
raise their intersex child in an ‘unambiguous’ gender and the struggles that they feel 
that accompany their decision.  
In Annabel, the parents of Wayne/Annabel cannot be considered as a narrative 
entity (‘parents’) but need to be considered separately and individually, as Jacinta 
and Treadway Blake. This does not mean, however, that their relationship with and 
behavior toward their child are never enacted as a parental entity; but despite the fact 
that some of their decisions regarding Wayne/Annabel are made in unison, the way 
they perceive and treat their intersex child and enforce or counter their child’s gender 
assignment is very different from one another. Divergent notions of gender and social 
norms are the main point of contention between Jacinta and Treadway. In the 
following, the focus is on the production of Wayne/Annabel’s intelligibility as a 
gendered subject through his_her mother’s and father’s actions, and on the real or 
imaginary spaces Jacinta and Treadway respectively envision for their child to live a 
‘livable life,’ which potentially offer heterotopias of intersex renegotiations. 
The parent-child-relationship in the novel is characterized by secrecy and 
contesting claims on Wayne/Annabel’s gender assignment and performance. The 
narrative follows the conventional patterns of the majority of (publicly 
known/available) intersex (auto-) biographies: when the baby of the Blakes is born 
with an intersex variation, the first reaction is to make a decision about the gender 
assignment. The erasure, silencing and invisibilization of intersex by medicine and 
cultural constraints are recurring motifs in personal intersex narratives. The motif and 
strategy of secrecy about the child’s intersex variation run like a common thread 
through the narrative: for days after the infant’s birth, Jacinta keeps its intersex body 
a secret even from her husband. When Treadway eventually learns about their baby’s 
intersex variation, he insists on a quick and pragmatic decision not only on behalf of 
the child, but in conformity with their social surroundings: “He knew his baby had 
both a boy’s and a girl’s identity, and he knew a decision had to be made. [...] There 
was only the fact of which sex organ was the most obvious, which one it would be 
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most practical to recognize, the easiest life for all concerned. For if there was one 
thing Treadway Blake considered with every step, it was how a decision of his 
affected not just himself but everyone” (Annabel 26f). In contrast to Jacinta, who has 
come to accept her child’s intersex corporeality and secretly imagines raising it 
“exactly as it was born” (Annabel 26), Treadway considers this option as socially 
irresponsible: “It never occurred to Treadway to do the thing that lay in the hearts of 
Jacinta and Thomasina: to let his baby live the way it had been born. That, in his 
mind, would not have been a decision. It would have been indecision, and it would 
have caused harm. [...] he refused to imagine the harm in store for a child who was 
neither a son nor a daughter but both” (Annabel 27).  
The language used in Annabel to represent the parents’ struggles with their 
intersex child iterates the language of and the logics inherent in processes of enforced 
‘normalization’ of intersex subjects, namely, the evocation of the ‘monstrosity’ of an 
‘ambiguously’ sexed body, the subsequent ‘necessity’ to erase this perceived 
‘abomination’ as the reconstruction of cultural normativity, and the strategies of 
concealment and lies in order to produce a ‘coherent’ normative gender narrative. 
The different ways in which Jacinta and Treadway imagine a viable future for their 
child point to the difficulty to clearly define what intelligibility means and for whom 
it is important that a person becomes intelligible:  
 
“Everything Treadway refused to imagine, Jacinta imagined in detail enough for the two of 
them. Whereas he struck out on his own to decide how to erase the frightening ambiguity in 
their child, she envisioned living with it as it was. She imagined her daughter beautiful and 
grown up, in a scarlet satin gown, her male characteristics held secret under the clothing for a 
time when she might need a warrior’s strength and a man’s potent aggression. Then she 
imagined her son as talented, mythical hunter, his breasts strapped in a concealing vest, his 
clothes the green of striding forward, his heart the heart of a woman who could secretly direct 
his path in the ways of intuition and psychological insight. Whenever she imagined her child, 
grown up without interference from a judgemental world, she imagined its male and female 
halves as complementing each other, and as being secretly, almost magically powerful. It was 
the growing up part she did not want to imagine. The social part, [...] the part that asks how 
will we give this child so much love it will know no harm from the cruel reactions of people 
who do not want to understand.” (Annabel 28, emphasis added) 
 
The insights into Jacinta’s and Treadway’s emotional states and reasoning about their 
child’s intelligibility reveals the force of social constraints that regulate the conditions 
of intelligibility, and that threatens the cultural viability of intersex. While 
Treadway’s notion of gender complies with and perpetuates normative cultural and 
social ideas of gender, Jacinta’s imagination offers a possibility of the 
reconceptualization of gender and potentially provides a space for an intersex subject 
to be/come intelligible. The binary gender notions inherent in her considerations 




aside, immanent in her idea of her child as a gender nonconforming individual is a 
‘magical power’ that stands in contrast to the ‘frightening’ quality of intersex bodies 
envisioned by Treadway. However, it becomes obvious that the conditions for 
intersex intelligibility can only be provided within the realm of the imaginary, a space 
outside of cultural and social constraints. Even in Jacinta’s imagined space, gender 
nonconformity needs to be concealed to a certain extent, and its power can only have 
an effect secretly. Eventually, it is the father who decides that the child will be a boy, 
that he will call him Wayne, “after his grandfather” (Annabel 29), to continue the 
male family tradition, and that medical intervention needs to be performed. The 
father’s decision to assign the child a male gender is reminiscent of a godlike power: 
“After Treadway had spoken, there was a holy lull in the house” (Annabel 30), which 
signifies even more the arbitrariness with which the child is constructed as a gendered 
being.  
After the decision is made and affirmed by medical interventions, the inevitable 
disintegration of the relationship between Jacinta and Treadway commences. Their 
differing views on their child grow continually apart the older Wayne gets. 
Throughout the narrative, Jacinta mourns the loss of her daughter, is even haunted by 
the specter of her ‘dead daughter’ (Annabel 142), and is torn between keeping 
Wayne’s intersex variation a secret from everyone including Wayne himself and 
nurturing her child’s ‘female’ side. Jacinta’s struggle symbolizes the power of the 
social constraints that either allow for or prohibit certain forms of being and living: 
“her tormented wish for a world in which her child did not have to be confined to 
something smaller than who he was” (Annabel 94). The longing for this ‘alternative 
space’ that allows for the resignification of gender is iterated in Wayne’s desire to 
find or create a space where he can be recognized as an intersex subject, for instance 
the building of the bridge where he can pursue his passions he usually has to keep a 
secret from his father or his classmates, together with his only friend Wally.  
Jacinta blames herself for being responsible for the (symbolic) ‘death’ of her 
daughter, and she feels that she is not able to prevent Treadway from pressuring their 
child into an exclusively male identity, to the effect of “a kind of annihilation by 
Treadway of some part of his own child’s soul” (Annabel 140). Guilt towards her 
child and sadness about the ‘lost daughter’ continually consume her, but she keeps 
her imagining Wayne/Annabel as a daughter to herself. Jacinta’s narrative is the 
narrative of a mother of an intersex child who feels coerced to adhere to a ‘coherent’ 
story of a non-intersex child that relies on the strategies of concealment, secrecy, and 
lies. Her efforts to sustain this created narrative, paradoxically, leads to its gradual 
disintegration: “She wished she had not locked the secret inside her, where it 
clamoured to get out. [...] This is my problem, Jacinta thought. I am dishonest. I never 
tell the truth about anything important. And as a result, there is an ocean inside me of 
unexpressed truth. My face is a mask, and I have murdered my own daughter” 
(Annabel 142). Again, she tries to conceive of a place where her child can exist 
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without the potential consequences of social ostracism: “was there a place where she 
could live with truth instead of lies? [...] You told the truth or you lived with the 
consequences like these. If you held back truth you couldn’t win. You swallowed 
truth and it went sour in your belly and poisoned you slowly” (Annabel 151). Jacinta’s 
inner turmoil marks a self-reflective moment in the novel, both on the narrative and 
on the metanarrative level. Her conflict corresponds to the dilemma of intelligibility, 
the conflict between compromising (a part of) oneself in order to become 
recognizable as a gendered subject and social or cultural ‘death’ by refusing or being 
unable to become recognizable by the terms available, and hence becoming 
unintelligible. The narrative displacement of this conflict to the figure of the mother 
reveals the extent to which the parents of an intersex child are involved in the 
production of the conditions of intelligibility for their own child. 
The motif of secrecy is reiterated in the mother-child-narrative, but there are 
moments of breaking up the silence about Wayne/Annabel being born intersex. After 
the incident in the hospital, where Wayne learns about his intersex variation, a change 
occurs in Jacinta’s behavior towards him: “it was the first time since he was a baby 
that she could allow love unimpeded to escape her heart and flow to her child. [...] 
She had not freely loved the girl part of Wayne, as the girl had not been acknowledged 
to exist” (Annabel 230). It seems that now that Wayne was provided with the terms 
of his corporeality, and the secret has been disclosed to him (by a doctor), Jacinta 
now has the ‘permission’ to talk about the ‘lost daughter’ with her child. The invented 
narrative of the boy Wayne and the silencing and erasure of the girl Annabel is 
gradually replaced by narrative pieces of the daughter Jacinta always had imagined: 
“It had not occurred to her that Wayne would want to hear about those times [she saw 
Wayne/Annabel as her daughter], as if they were beautiful stories. It had never 
entered her mind that the countless lost moments could be recovered by speaking 
about them” (Annabel 239). This speaking out is an act of recognition of 
Wayne/Annabel and creates for the first time a verbalized mother-daughter moment, 
that had been rendered impossible by the narrative of the boy Wayne, and hence 
changes the mother-son relationship to a crucial extent. Jacinta recounts certain parts 
of Wayne’s body that were like a girl’s parts to her; thereby she retrospectively 
produces a fragmented image of her child’s intersex body. Yet this fragmented 
narrative still needs to remain subdued – “Memories of when Wayne was a girl 
became a secret conversation held while Treadway prepared for his winter on the 
trapline” (Annabel 241) – and hence fails to fully materialize. 
Despite Jacinta’s efforts to ‘revive’ her daughter, she feels she has failed her. 
After Wayne leaves Croydon Harbor, “she felt sadder for the lost girl than if the lost 
girl had been herself” (Annabel 315). While Wayne/Annabel stays in St. John’s, 
Jacinta feels the absence of both her child and her estranged husband: “she now 
floated in an existence in which she remained untouched. No one touched her body, 
and now that Wayne had gone away, no one touched her soul. She had become unreal, 




she thought, to anyone outside herself. And as a result she was losing a sense of her 
own effect on the world” (Annabel 390). Her perceived disembodiment and 
emotional detachment to other people parallels Wayne/Annabel’s experience of 
her_his changing body that starts to reflect more and more her_his intersex 
corporeality, which causes a situation of loneliness, isolation, and lack of physical 
contact. This parallelism marks the emotional connection between mother and child, 
but at the same time symbolizes Jacinta’s guilt towards Wayne/Annabel. They do not 
meet each other again within the scope of the novel’s narrative, and hence there is no 
(explicit) reconciliation in the end. While Jacinta opposes Treadway’s decision to 
coerce upon their child a male gender, and tries to nurture the child’s gender variance, 
the novel represents her as being (partly) responsible for Wayne/Annabel’s struggles 
with gender expectations and limitations, and hence seems to punish her with the 
disintegration of her emotional state and her social relations, delivering a moral 
judgment of her actions. 
In contrast to Jacinta, who is more accepting of her child’s female identification, 
Treadway not only decides to raise Wayne as a boy but enforces this decision by 
toughening him up through activities that are typically considered masculine, and 
simultaneously trying to nip his son’s ‘feminine’ interests in the bud. The division of 
feminine/masculine labor, spaces, and interests is, as already pointed out, extremely 
rigid and normative in the novel. Along these normative gender lines, Treadway is 
cautious to maintain Wayne’s gender assignment by perpetuating acts of normative 
maleness, that are supposed to construct Wayne as a male subject: “normally he 
would have waited until a son was four or five before he trained him in the ways of 
how to become a man. But with this child Treadway did not want to take a chance” 
(Annabel 68). This process of iteration of a ‘male’ gender, in order for the subject to 
become a ‘male’ subject, is particularly precarious for intersex individuals (children), 
and, as suggested by Treadway (and the novel), requires especially forceful processes 
of iteration, as “[t]here were so many ways Wayne could fail” to perform masculinity 
right (Annabel 134); thus the processes of reiterating the masculinity of an intersex 
subject need to exceed, in their enforcement, the processes of reiterating the 
masculinity of an (already) ‘male’ subject (Treadway “wanted to dismantle what he 
saw as a deterrent to his son’s normal development” [Annabel 135]). By making this 
assertion, the novel is reflexive of the performativity of gender and hints at the 
constructivist character of the very gender norms it seems to claim as a given.  
Despite, or rather as a result of this enforcement of masculinity, Wayne feels this 
gender assignment not to be his “authentic self,” as he experiences his “authentic 
self,” or sense of his lived reality, as also female (Annabel 71). The performativity of 
gender, as represented in Annabel, however does not contradict that a person’s sense 
of gendered self can be/feel, subjectively, ‘real.’ Hence, while the novel makes an 
argument for the constructedness, or performativity of gender, perhaps best 
represented by the character of Treadway himself and his efforts to ‘make’ Wayne a 
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‘man,’ Wayne/Annabel’s sense of (gendered) self reflects this performativity and at 
the same time asserts itself as ‘authentic,’ i.e. both male and female. 
Yet, the character of Treadway represents not only the maintenance of this strict 
division between genders and gendered spaces, but also the dis/continuities between 
nature and the human. By his incessant wandering between nature/wilderness and the 
social space/his family he not only connects these two spaces but blurs the clear 
demarcation line between supposedly ‘male’ (the trapping line) and ‘female’ spaces 
(the home of his family): “The wilderness of Labrador was home to him” (Annabel 
423). In the course of the narrative, Treadway comes increasingly to symbolize nature 
itself. He not only communicates with animals when seeking their advice – in 
contrast, he hardly communicates with or connects to other people –, but becomes 
himself (like) an animal, especially in Jacinta’s mind on the brink of their 
disintegrating relationship: “[S]he [Jacinta] thought he had begun to think like the 
animals he trapped. He had begun to walk like them, and sleep like them. He had 
become wild, and there was no way you could send a message to him if you did not 
know the wild language” (Annabel 254). Treadway’s self-imposed solitude he finds 
in the woods brings him to reflect on social norms and their implications. He 
conceives of the space of the wood/wilderness as an ‘alternative’ space that provides 
the conditions for Wayne/Annabel’s intelligibility, which the social space (especially 
of Croydon Harbour) fails to provide. Treadway reconsiders his choice to assign his 
child a male gender, seeking the advice of an owl: 
 
“‘I should have let well enough alone,’ Treadway said. ‘I think that now. What would have 
happened if I had let Wayne become half little girl?’ The owl allowed Treadway to see Wayne 
as a girl child. So Treadway stood there in the woods and saw a vision of his daughter. [...] 
Treadway loved her. ‘You’re a beautiful child.’ But the child could not hear him as the owl 
could. [...] Treadway felt, for the first time since his wife had given birth, pain flow out of his 
heart and into the moss. It sank into the moss and became part of the woods. [...] If only the 
world could live in here, deep in the forest, where there were no stores, roads, windows, and 
doors, no straight lines. The straight lines were the problem. Rulers and measurements and lines 
and no one to help you if you crossed them. [...] ‘I wish,’ Treadway told the owl, ‘I could bring 
him in here with me for good six months. Longer. Forget about the medicine that keeps him 
being a boy. Hospital medicine, no. The medicine is in these trees. [...] What would happen? 
[...] We could live here.’ The owl had its back to the man.” (Annabel 215f) 
 
While Treadway seems to be, as Dan Hartland argues, “very much a product of [a] 
world [‘where every person, or plant, or animal, or any entity whatsoever, has an 
explanatory ticket on it,’ Annabel 203], and [...] can see – perhaps has – no real way 
out of it,” and ostensibly “remains the plain personification of a blinkered, restrictive 
worldview” (Hartland 2011), he gradually begins to seek a way to imagine a situation 
where his child can live unrestricted by social norms. Nature, more specifically the 




wilderness of Labrador, which previously has come to signify the male (dominated) 
space in Annabel, now seems to be the only space Treadway can imagine from where 
to rearticulate Wayne/Annabel’s intelligibility as an intersex subject. However, he 
becomes aware of the unfeasibility of this idea, and the wilderness hence has to 
remain the imaginary alternative space outside, or at the margins of, social life and 
its regulative system of norms – and, above all, he becomes aware of his own inability 
to “handle having a son in the house who was openly changing into someone [he] 
could not explain to himself or to anyone in the community” (Annabel 353). 
Treadway’s disconnection from his child has a tremendous effect on how Wayne 
perceives himself. The constant feeling of ‘failing’ as a boy/man haunts Wayne 
throughout his childhood and adolescence, until he leaves his home in Labrador and 
moves to St. John’s. Wayne/Annabel perceives him_herself to be in a state of 
undefined subjecthood, uncertainty, and transformation, with his father’s 
expectations functioning as a reminder of his_her inability to live up to male gender 
norms: “now that you had left things behind that confused you, that defined you as a 
man when you weren’t a man. Not the son your dad wanted. Not a son who kept up 
family traditions. [...] Instead you were ambiguous, feminine, undecided” (Annabel 
333). Wayne/Annabel gradually emancipates him_herself from his_her father’s 
authority over his_her gender identity and his_her body, which becomes most explicit 
in her_his decision to stop the medication (Annabel 351). Yet Wayne/Annabel is still 
in a state of gender and bodily transitioning, and this process involves feelings of a 
loss of authenticity or a coherent sense of self, and the iteration of secrecy and lies 
concerning his_her gender and sexed corporeality. His_her father still has the power 
to “evoke[...] in Wayne’s mind the beast he was afraid of becoming. The beast was 
vicious. She hurtled and would not back up. [...] Her pain threshold was high. She 
was not pretty. She prowled, animal-like, uncivilized. [...] She was without language” 
(Annabel 352). Wayne/Annabel experiences a profound anxiety of becoming 
unintelligible, not recognizable by the terms and cultural categories available to 
him_her, of losing her_his state as a subject (of language), when s_he is no longer 
recognizable as a male subject. Annabel has not yet become ‘socialized,’ not visible, 
and not nameable. She needs to be hidden from Wayne’s social surroundings, since 
she is not yet recognizable. But she cannot be contained anymore within Wayne, or, 
what s_he feels, within the ‘disguise’ of a male identity: “if he was going to grow 
into the softness of Annabel, he did not want to have a man’s barbered head or face. 
He did not know what he wanted, but he knew he did not want to continue to pretend 
to be a man” (Annabel 403); at the same time Wayne/Annabel feels that the make-up 
applied to her_his face is a “façade and a lie,” that it “exaggerated something and 
diminished something at the same time” (Annabel 420).  
Wayne/Annabel’s struggle with the dilemma of intelligibility – becoming 
intelligible as a gender nonconforming subject without having to compromise his_her 
sense of self – that runs like a common thread through the narrative becomes most 
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explicit in the moment s_he tries to give an account of her_himself, but lacks the 
language and terms by which s_he can define her_himself. When Wayne/Annabel 
runs into the former principal of her_his school, Victoria Huskins, the inadequacy of 
the language available to him_her makes it impossible to tell a coherent story of 
her_himself. 
 
“Wayne felt his own story amass as a cloud. He could not be coherent about it. He wanted to 
talk to someone but he did not know how, because somehow the facts, with their tidy labels 
and medical terms, reduced his whole being to something that he did not want it to be. How 
could he sit here and tell Victoria Huskins what the doctors had labelled him without reducing 
himself to the status of a diagram [...]? He could not begin to explain, so he sat without words. 
[...] he could not explain his whole being with words. The cloud rose in him and reached his 
throat, where it amassed as a blockage that felt leaden and sorrowful. He felt it as a lump that 
threatened to silence him.” (Annabel 417f) 
 
Wayne/Annabel feels that the way s_he is/was ‘constructed’ by a medical discourse 
misrepresents how s_he perceives him_herself; the terms provided, and imposed, by 
the specific medical discourse on intersex fail to acknowledge intersex subjects as 
individual and human subjects and fail to represent Wayne/Annabel as something 
other, or more, than a medical subject. However, while the social construction (or the 
assignment) of a person’s gender can potentially conflict with the person’s own sense 
of self, the idea of social construction also contains the possibility to either transform 
the available terms and concepts to fit the person’s own subject formation, or to refuse 
them altogether. At this point in the narrative, Wayne/Annabel already challenges 
his_her gender assignment, by rejecting the terms that constitute him_her as 
something s_he strongly feels to be inadequate and hurtful. Yet s_he still has not been 
able to formulate the terms by which s_he wants to be known.  
Eventually, Wayne/Annabel starts to reconnect with her_his father who visits 
her_him in St. John’s after the sexual attack. Treadway now finally recognizes his 
child not only as a son, but also as a daughter: “Though Treadway had never called 
Wayne anything but a son, he knew and had always known that within his son lay 
hidden a daughter. He had seen this daughter in the past day here in St. John’s. He 
had seen Annabel in Wayne’s face” (Annabel 440). Although Treadway had seen the 
feminine traits of his child’s intersex body at earlier moments, he never 
acknowledged them openly, and instead continued the enforcement of his son’s 
masculinity. It seems disturbing to some degree that he recognizes his child’s gender 
nonconformity only after s_he was sexually assaulted (Annabel 425f) – an incident 
that can easily be read as an affirmation of Wayne/Annabel’s femininity, as argued 
above.  
The novel’s sympathetic representation of Treadway and the cautiousness with 
which he is portrayed as a ‘good’ man who is, as Mark Callanan puts it, “a character 




that is no brute stereotype of maleness – it would have been easy for [Winter] to 
reduce him to a caricature of machismo – but a man capable of sensitivity who is 
simply unable to deal with the complication of having a child of indeterminate sex” 
(Callanan 2010), creates a more complex picture of a father who struggles with acting 
ethically responsible on behalf of his intersex child. Although the ending of the novel, 
with the conclusion that “[o]nly in wind over the land did Treadway find the freedom 
his son would seek elsewhere. Treadway was a man of Labrador, but his son had left 
home as daughters and sons do, to seek freedom their fathers do not need to inhabit, 
for it inhabits the fathers” (Annabel 461), remains strangely vague and still refuses to 
acknowledge Wayne/Annabel as both a son and a daughter to Treadway, Treadway’s 
financial support of his child and his encouragement of Wayne/Annabel to go to 
university can be interpreted as a father imagining a future for his child where s_he 
is enabled to “work toward subverting the dominant ideologies of space” and gender, 
as Mareike Neuhaus argues (Neuhaus 2012).  
 
5.3.3 “Make a Life for Yourself any Way You Want, in any Place”: 
Thomasina and the Crossing of Spatial and                  
Gender Boundaries  
 
Thomasina Baikie is easily the most ‘radical’ transgressor of social conventions and 
gender norms in Annabel – “[y]ou got the feeling something radical could happen 
with her around,” we are told (Annabel 168) – and the person who encourages 
Wayne/Annabel’s intelligibility as a gender nonconforming subject most 
emphatically. Even her name hints at someone who defies social as well as gender 
expectations. In the novel, her name is explained as a reference to the Doubting 
Thomas, as her mother wanted to call her if she was a boy, “‘after the disciple who 
wanted to see Christ’s nail marks with his own eyes. But [she was] a girl,’” so her 
mother called her Doubting Thomasina (Annabel 34). Her name hints to her 
disposition to take nothing for granted or as a given, and to always question or 
challenge norms and their underlying premises. In the context of a novel about an 
intersex character, the name Thomasina can also be read as a reference to 
Thomasine/Thomas Hall, who, throughout her_his life, was crossing back and forth 
between male and female genders.23 The motif of crossing or transgression structures 
Thomasina’s narrative within the novel and crucially influences Wayne/Annabel’s 
(gender) trajectory. 
The motif of transgressing or crossing boundaries and/or spaces can be identified 
in Thomasina’s traveling to various countries, after the death of her husband and 
daughter, and in her affinity for bridges, of which she sends selected postcards to 
                                                             
23  Hall’s case was registered in the Minutes of the Council and General Court of Colonial 
Virginia in 1629 (edited by H. R. McIlwaine, 1924). 
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Wayne/Annabel. The travel motif is a very common trope found in transgender 
narratives, symbolizing the sexed bodily ‘transitioning’ of trans persons or 
characters, as already discussed in the Middlesex chapter. In Annabel, it is one of the 
most dominant leitmotifs, signifying not only Thomasina’s independence (from a 
man and social expectations) but Wayne/Annabel’s journey to come to figure out 
her_his sense of self, by moving first to St. John’s, then traveling to Boston to 
reconnect with Wally, and finally going to the Technical University of Nova Scotia 
to study architecture. Crossing spatial boundaries has also significance for other 
characters: Jacinta reminisces her past as a young woman in St. John’s and struggles 
with her life as a wife and mother in Croydon Harbour, which differs drastically from 
the city life; Wally Michelin moves from Croydon Harbour to Boston in order to 
recover her injured singing voice; and Treadway roams between his family home and 
the woods. All central characters are on their own journeys, alone and with one 
another. Their journeys come to symbolize the intimate connections between each 
other, the loss or damage to these connections, and (in some cases) their 
reconciliation, but also the reconciliation with themselves, in terms of (mutual) 
recognition.  
“To Thomasina people were rivers, always ready to move from one state of being 
into another. It was not fair, she felt, to treat people as if they were finished beings. 
Everyone was always becoming and unbecoming” (Annabel 41). Thomasina’s 
concept of the human condition makes a reference to Ovid’s mythological narrative 
of the Metamorphoses and reiterates other intersex narratives’ renegotiations of 
mythological motifs (e.g. medical discourses on intersex, Middlesex, to name a few). 
A more explicit intertextual reference to mythology is the homework of researching 
the figure of Hermaphroditus which Thomasina, who by then has become 
Wayne/Annabel’s teacher, gives to him_her, with the aim of letting her students 
“enjoy playing roles they normally hid” (Annabel 174). Her approach to offer an 
alternative model of identification and vocabularies through mythological narratives 
(“She saw all tradition as metaphorical. It was, in her mind, all about story, character, 
psyche,” Annabel 173) clashes with Treadway’s worldview, who strongly objects to 
her intervention in his method of parenting, as “the rest of us have to live in the real 
world. Wayne has to live in the real world” (Annabel 180), cautioning against the 
social consequences of a disruption of ‘the real world’s’ norms. Neuhaus argues that 
the “intertextual allusion in Annabel to Hermaphroditus achieves two things, then: 
one, it points to another discourse, if one that did not have any impact on the social, 
cultural, and political realities in antiquity; and two, it suggests that norms are subject 
to change; they may be modified, if not entirely abolished” (Neuhaus 2012: 132). To 
deduce the dis/continuities or changes of norms from idealized mythological 
narratives, however, is a problematic move and it is therefore questionable whether 




the myth of Hermaphroditus can really serve as a point of reference for a viable 
alternative reconceptualization of contemporary intersex personhood.24   
The naming of the intersex child as Annabel by Thomasina marks the crucial 
moment in the narrative that determines Wayne/Annabel’s ensuing gender trajectory 
from infancy to young adulthood. The baby is born while Thomasina’s own daughter 
Annabel and her husband, Graham Montague, drown. Instead of grieving for long 
over their deaths, Thomasina dedicates herself to guard “that little baby of Jacinta’s, 
Wayne, whom no one wanted to call a daughter” (Annabel 41) against the harsh 
enforcement of his_her ‘masculinity’ by Treadway, as “Thomasina believed the 
child’s difference was a strange blessing that had to be protected. That it was a 
jeopardized advantage, even a power” (Annabel 29). Hence, when the minister 
baptizes the child as Wayne, Thomasina intervenes: “With greater skill than his 
[Reverend Julian Taft], Thomasina whispered, ‘Annabel,’ so low he could not hear. 
Thomasina believed there was power in a name. The name Annabel settled on the 
child as quietly as pollen alongside the one bestowed by Treadway” (62). As Judith 
Butler has argued, the giving of a name constitutes a person as a subject (of language) 
(Butler 1997b: 2), and so the intersex child ‘comes into being’ as Wayne and 
Annabel, albeit secretly.  
Thomasina’s act of naming the Blakes’ child after her own lost daughter seems 
only comprehensible in the light of her grieving for her own child, in an effort to 
preserve her memory (Annabel 171). Yet this act bestows the narrative, and 
Wayne/Annabel’s story, with a ghostlike quality: Annabel is like a specter haunting 
not only Wayne, who has recurring dreams about being a girl and sees Annabel’s 
reflection when he looks into the mirror, but also Jacinta, who “seems to feel that she 
has murdered her daughter by raising her child as conventionally ‘male.’ In this sense, 
her secret nurturing of Annabel appears almost like a communion with the dead,” as 
James Bailey has argued (Bailey 2014). Annabel, in her association with a dead girl, 
a ghost, or a shadow self, becomes an ‘unreal’ identity, a disembodied entity who 
                                                             
24  Neuhaus points out that the mythological narrative of Hermaphroditus differs widely from 
the lived realities of intersex persons in ancient Greece and Rome: “Thomasina’s idealist 
approach to Wayne’s situation [...] romanticizes intersexuality based on a rather one-sided 
reading of ancient history. Wayne is not a deity celebrated in a cult; his life is not myth. In 
fact, his story resembles the reality of intersex people in Greek and Roman antiquity more 
than it resembles the myth of Hermaphroditus. The longing for a primordial form of being, 
the original androgynous sex, finds expression in antiquity only in mythology (Brisson 41-
71; see Ovid’s Metamorphoses and Plato’s Symposium). The reality of intersex people in 
the Greek and Roman world was rather brutal: up until the Roman Republic, intersex 
children were regarded as ominous public prodigies and were therefore killed. Such 
superstition was eventually challenged during the Roman Empire, but intersex children 
continued to be abused as a form of entertainment (Brisson 7-40)” (Neuhaus 2012: 132). 
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almost seems to ‘inhabit’ the body of the ‘boy’ Wayne; she is a non-subject for she 
cannot be recognized outside the confines of Wayne.  
Interestingly, there are different interpretations of the personhood of the intersex 
character. Sassafras Lowrey considers not Wayne to be the novel’s central character, 
but Annabel (as Annabel is also the title of the novel), and reverses the perspective 
on the character’s gender trajectory: “The character Annabel is born into a quiet rural 
community ruled by the seasons, hard work, and conformity. She comes of age in the 
shadow of Wayne, the name she was given when the doctors determined she was to 
be raised male” (Lowrey 2011). Stacey D’Erasmo questions the dichotomization of 
Wayne/Annabel itself: “Winter is [...] working from the same binary model she is 
purporting to overturn: the idea that Annabel is a ‘girl’ – and that this means someone 
softer, sweeter, gentler, more emotional – is a given here. But what if the inner 
Annabel were a little butch? Or what if she changed from day to day? Or what if she 
and Wayne were less distinguishable from each other?” (D’Erasmo 2011). Lowrey 
and D’Erasmo definitely have a point here. Lowrey’s reading reverses the conditions 
for the intersex subject to be/come intelligible, and thus complicates the conditions 
of the whole narrative. By reversing the intersex infant’s initial gender assignment, 
conceiving of the child as a girl on whom a male identity is forced upon, the focus is 
directed towards the arbitrariness of assigning an intersex child a clear-cut, normative 
gender and the potential consequences that might arise from any decision. It also 
serves as a reminder that Wayne – i.e. the gender assignment as a boy – is a 
construction of not only medical definitory power and interventions but also of 
paternal authority. Lowrey’s statement, therefore, should not be read as conceiving 
of the intersex protagonist’s ‘real’ or ‘authentic’ gender to be female, but rather as a 
challenge of the idea that anyone, be it author, narrator, other characters, or reader, 
should make an assumption about Wayne/Annabel’s ‘true’ gender. It is also a 
commentary on the implausibility of consistently using male pronouns when 
referring to the protagonist even in the stages where s_he considers her_himself as a 
non-male gendered person. 
D’Erasmo’s criticism of the duality of Wayne/Annabel identifies the main 
paradox in the novel when it comes to the construction, and the (intended) 
deconstruction, of gender. As argued earlier, Annabel’s representation of gender 
relies on a rigid and normative binary construction along the heteronormative matrix 
(Butler). The character of Wayne/Annabel is, apparently, supposed to challenge the 
strict division line between male and female, because s_he has an intersex variation. 
So, according to the novel, naturally an intersex person (to clarify once more: a 
person who is born with “congenital physical traits or variations that lie between 
ideals of male and female,” Carpenter 2012) must also identify as both male and 
female (i.e. as a combination of neatly separated ‘male’ and ‘female’ gender 
characteristics), must challenge the gender binary as they already challenge the binary 
of sexed corporeality, and must live in a liminal place in society. While an intersex 




person can identify as both male and female (or as male, or female, or neither, or as 
some other gender altogether), the novel represents Wayne/Annabel’s being 
positioned in-between two genders as a necessary result of having an intersex 
variation. I argue that Annabel pursues this strategy in an effort to always keep Wayne 
intelligible – and in order to be intelligible at all, normative genders (male and 
female) need to serve as points of reference for the representation of Wayne’s gender. 
While several characters and his social surroundings may at times react with 
confusion to the protagonist’s gender nonconformity, which threatens 
Wayne/Annabel’s intelligibility on a narrative level, e.g. in his_her social context, 
the narrative is cautious to present Wayne (to the reader) continuously as an 
intelligible subject – Wayne remains, in his refusal to conform to an assigned gender 
norm, a coherent character, because it is this refusal that defines him and makes him 
always recognizable. 
The character of Thomasina renders, perhaps unintentionally, a metanarrative 
commentary on this difficulty to provide the conditions for Wayne/Annabel to 
be/come an intelligible subject, not only in the environment of Labrador, but within 
the cultural system. She is the one person in the narrative who endorses gender 
nonconformity and reflects on the social constraints as well as on the possibilities of 
self-determination. When she tells Wayne/Annabel, “‘I wouldn’t call what you have 
a disorder. I’d call it a different order. A different order means a whole new way of 
being. It could be fantastic. It could be overwhelmingly beautiful, if people weren’t 
scared’” (Annabel 208f), she picks up Butler’s question: “What, given the 
contemporary order of being, can I be?” (Butler 2001: 621). Yet Thomasina is also 
aware of the crucial point that is missed by this question, a point that touches upon 
questions of responsibility that comes with revealing new information and 
possibilities to a child while the conditions for these possibilities do not yet (fully) 
exist, when she hesitates to tell Wayne the truth about his intersex variation: “But 
what would Wayne do with the truth? He would need more than the truth. He would 
need a world that understood” (Annabel 209). Thomasina reminds us that the 
conditions of intelligibility for intersex individuals are precarious. Even when she 
eventually reveals to Wayne that he was born intersex, it becomes clear that the truth 
about Wayne/Annabel cannot be contained within a word: “Thomasina was a good 
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5.3.4 “Building a Voice up from the Ruins”: Wally, Annabel,       
and the Quest for Vocal Self-Determination 
 
Wally Michelin25 is somewhere between a main and a minor character in Annabel, 
but can best be defined as a ‘supporting’ character in the literal sense. While she has 
her own storyline, this storyline as well as her character per se have several functions 
within the narrative which serve as points of reference for Wayne/Annabel’s 
narrative. The first of her two most important narrative functions is related to the 
motif of voice. Wally personifies the power of voice to assert one’s right to define 
oneself and exemplifies the strong interdependency between using one’s voice and 
the production of identity in the face of the voice’s precarious state: Wally uses her 
singing voice to express herself and what she wants to be, then (temporarily) loses it 
and with it an important, defining part of her sense of self, and eventually recovers 
her voice and with it the ability to speak (sing) her self again. Wayne/Annabel follows 
a parallel trajectory, whereby voice becomes a symbol for the silencing of his_her 
being intersex and the gradual recovery of his_her gender variant personhood. 
Secondly, Wally can be interpreted as an embodiment of Wayne’s female identity 
part, and hence as a flesh-and-blood version of Annabel. 
Wayne and Wally become friends as both of them are outsiders in a way: while 
Wally is at first very popular in school, in contrast to Wayne, her popularity wanes 
when a new girl, Donna Palliser, comes into their class. It is, however, not the lack 
of popularity that connects them; it is rather Wally’s ambition of becoming a 
professional alto singer and the determination with which she pursues her goal that 
sets her apart from their classmates. Wayne is deeply impressed by Wally’s certainty 
about and definition of a clear goal in her life; a clearly defined goal he himself 
misses. Wayne’s attraction to Wally is neither strictly sexual nor nonsexual, it is “an 
excitement he could not name” (Annabel 113). He feels drawn towards Wally in a 
constant ambiguity of wanting to be with her and wanting to be her. His desire to be 
close to her translates as a desire to unite with her corporeally; he alternately imagines 
being inside her body, or Wally being inside him: “Wayne was in love with her from 
the moment he heard her crumbly voice. If there was a way he could make himself 
into a ghost without a body – a shadow – or transparent like the lures his father used 
to catch Arctic char, he would have done it. He would have transformed into his 
father’s lure, slipped under Wally Michelin’s divinely freckled skin, and live inside 
her, looking through her eyes” (Annabel 99). When Dr. Lioukras tells Wayne that he 
                                                             
25  It is noteworthy that Wally’s mother named her after Wallis Simpson, who herself has been 
speculated about to be intersex (Sebba 2011). While the novel contains no reference to 
Wally being intersex, in view of her close relation to Wayne and association with Annabel, 
the choice of her name adds to her construction as a ‘projection surface’ for intersex 
representations in the novel. 




is “a girl inside,” Wayne imagines this girl to be Wally, “smaller than her real self, 
lying quietly [...] inside him, hiding” (Annabel 236f). The motif of aesthetics is a 
structuring principle of their relationship, and Wayne’s desire to be (like) Wally can 
be interpreted as his desire to be beautiful, whereby beauty is strongly related to 
femininity: “if he turned his face a certain way his cheekbones looked almost like the 
cheekbones of Wally Michelin, still easily the most beautiful girl in the school, in 
Wayne’s mind” (Annabel 265f). Wally serves as a point of reference for Wayne when 
he tries to imagine his own femininity. This physical attraction seems to be onesided; 
Wally’s sexuality is scarcely addressed and in fact seems irrelevant, which hence 
reinforces the argument that she serves mainly as a projection surface for Wayne to 
act out his own desires – the imaginary testing of transgressing bodily and gender 
boundaries, without having to actually transgress any boundaries.   
The relationship between Wayne and Wally contains a reference to the Greek 
myth of Hermaphroditus, who was the son of Hermes and Aphrodite. According to 
myth, the water nymph Salmacis fell in love with Hermaphroditus due to his 
handsomeness, and asked the gods that they should be forever united, upon which 
their two bodies were transformed into one body with both male and female 
characteristics (Ovid, Metamorphoses IV: 346-388). Wayne is driven by a similar 
desire as Salmacis, which gives Annabel’s adaption of the mythological narrative an 
additional twist in terms of gender roles. While this intertextual reference to 
mythology is more implicit, the novel’s use of it iterates its other, more explicit 
reference to Hermaphroditus in the context of Thomasina’s homework assignment. 
Again, mythological conceptions of intersex serve to imagine alternative figures for 
identification that are not medical. However, while the figure of Hermaphroditus, 
and/or the term hermaphrodite, can be chosen by intersex persons who like to define 
themselves as such, their uncritical use by non-intersex people to define intersex 
persons has been contested.26 Therefore, mythological references to intersex still 
remain problematic when used in fictional or nonfictional works written by non-
intersex people about intersex people. 
The connection between Wally and Annabel is strong and complicated. While 
Annabel remains for the most time subdued in Wayne, both physically and 
identitarian, and thus is invisible and unrecognizable, Wally serves for Wayne as an 
intelligible model after which to imagine his own femaleness. Wally is the only 
person in whom Wayne confides his recurring dreams of being a girl, and wishes her 
to recognize Annabel and become her best friend. Annabel, it seems, can only 
materialize through the figure of Wally – either by ‘borrowing’ her body, or by 
Wally’s recognition of her existence. There comes a moment in the narrative when 
the strong connection between Wayne and Wally is severely damaged. When Wayne 
                                                             
26  A discussion of the use of the term ‘hermaphrodite’ in intersex contexts can be found in 
Viloria 2013. 
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tells his classmates about his dream of being a girl at a party, Wally gets into a fight 
over this with Donna, during which her vocal chords are lacerated by a piece of glass. 
The rupture of Wally’s vocal chords – and hence the likely destruction of her aspiring 
singing career – marks a rupture in their relationship, and leaves Wayne feeling 
guilty. Just like Wally distances herself from Wayne, Annabel escapes from inside 
his body (Annabel 252). With the (temporary) loss of Wally, Wayne/Annabel feels 
disconnected not only from their shared intimacy, but also from his_her sense of 
bodily reality, and from their shared spaces where Wayne can also be Annabel. When 
Treadway dismantles the bridge where Wayne and Wally had spent time together and 
shared their deepest passions, it was like “a kind of annihilation [...] of some part of 
[Wayne’s] soul” (Annabel 140); after the accident with Wally’s vocal chords Wayne 
tries to reconnect with her by reentering their “own world” in which anything is 
possible (Annabel 277), but this space fails to materialize for the time being. 
The symbolic significance of the voice as asserting one’s existence is most 
obvious in Wally’s storyline. Wally’s voice is so closely interrelated with her own 
sense of self, and with her existence within the novel, that it becomes representative 
of her whole self, so that by losing her singing voice, her identity is threatened. Her 
voice, even after the injury, is constantly associated with beauty; a motif that is 
reiterated throughout the narrative in Wayne’s musings about his own beauty (or, that 
of Annabel), the loss of beauty, and beauty as the seemingly unattainable ideal for 
him. The long rupture in Wally’s ability to sing marks the period of disconnection 
from Wayne, and parallels Wayne/Annabel’s disconnection from his_her own 
corporeality and sense of gender identity. Wally’s involuntary silence mirrors the 
years of silence kept about Wayne/Annabel’s intersex variation by his_her parents, 
and thus reinforces the symbolism of voice as a tool to become an intelligible subject. 
At approximately the same time – although in difference places, Wayne in St. John’s 
and Wally in Boston – Wally decides to visit a voice clinic in the hope to have her 
vocal chords repaired, Wayne/Annabel uses his_her voice to speak up against the 
doctors in the clinic and against their authority over his_her body and gender identity: 
“he knew he had spoken with his whole self: with the voice of Annabel and not only 
that of Wayne” (Annabel 370f). The attempt to use one’s own voice as a strategy of 
self-assertion, in order to (re)gain the authority over one’s own life, and hence, over 
one’s identity, is a crucial statement the novel makes. 
In the end, it is the recovering of voices, for both Wally and Wayne/Annabel, 
what reconciles them with each other. Wayne/Annabel visits Wally in Boston to 
attend her performance in a choir. She is able to sing again, even the piece she has 
always wanted so sing since she was a child, and her voice is now part of a choir’s 
sound: “‘It was never meant as a solo piece,’ Wally said, ‘It was always a piece for 
four parts, for a choir, and that’s only one of the things I didn’t realize’” (Annabel 
453); and it is this polyphonic voice that reconnects the two friends: “The sound 
insinuated itself underneath all the other sounds, and this sound, alone in the room, 




entered Wayne’s body” (Annabel 454). Wally provides the (space of) recognition for 
Wayne/Annabel which finally allows him_her to become an intelligible subject (and 
the reader is assured of Wayne/Annabel’s intelligibility by his_her assertion that 
Wally recognizes her_him): 
 
“He felt they recognized each other in a way that no one else recognized either of them. Other 
people could look at him but they did not see what Wally Michelin saw, and perhaps others 
saw in her the same thing he did, but he did not think they saw it. What it was was limitlessness. 
When you were with an ordinary person, you could draw a line around the territory the two of 
you covered, and Wayne had found that the territory was usually quite small. It was smaller 
than a country and smaller than a town and sometimes smaller than a room. But this room, the 
room they were in, did not really exist. [...] The way he responded to Wally’s presence was that 
he felt as if life at this minute was blossoming inside him instead of lying dormant. He felt the 
electric presence of his own life, and he did not want that feeling to end, although he knew it 
had ended in the past and that it would end again.” (Annabel 452) 
 
This passage articulates the felt dis/continuities between Wayne/Annabel’s and 
Wally’s bodies, and reiterates his_her ambiguous desire of intimacy and merging 
with Wally. Yet it becomes also clear that Wayne/Annabel cannot remain forever in 
this non-existent space and needs to find a spatial equivalent within his_her social 
context in order to become intelligible outside the intimate heterotopic symbiosis 
with Wally. 
Annabel closes with placing Wayne/Annabel into a ‘real’ space where s_he can 
be/come intelligible, among the students on the university campus, where s_he “did 
not feel out of place because of his body’s ambiguity [...]. [...] He felt he was in some 
kind of a free world to which he wanted to belong” (Annabel 455f). More precisely, 
s_he starts to study “not only the design of bridges but also the architecture, design, 
and planning of whole cities, [...] to understand not just the surfaces but also the 
underpinnings of a city’s character” (Annabel 459). Wayne/Annabel is now able to 
literally build bridges, to construct unifying devices which symbolize the 
‘unification’ of his_her gendered reality. Neuhaus argues that Wayne/Annabel is now 
able to leave his_her place at the margins of society, by using the city’s potential to 
provide for counterspaces: 
 
“Studying city design, Wayne explores and analyzes conceived space, those discourses that 
determine people’s perceived and lived spaces. Criticizing dominant social discourses, Wayne 
may thus claim a position from which he may alter cities and thereby facilitate change, 
producing real spaces for himself and the various Others of contemporary society [...]. Hence, 
lived space, the space of social conflict and struggle, becomes in Annabel also a ‘counterspace’ 
from within which Wayne may affect the social change that will allow him to be recognized as 
a person [...].” (Neuhaus 2012: 130) 
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With the help of Wally, Thomasina, and her_his father, Wayne/Annabel is now able 
to conceive of a world for her_him to live a ‘livable’ life.  
 
5.3.5 Does an Intersex Story Have the Obligation  
  to be Subversive? 
 
When seeking to find answers to the question of how a fictional work on intersex 
negotiates the intelligibility of its intersex character, the question seems to be 
inextricably linked with the notion that an intersex story has to be subversive or 
challenging. But what exactly is it that needs to be subverted or challenged, in order 
to render the intersex subject intelligible? Proceeding from Butler’s claim that the 
“conditions of intelligibility [are] composed of norms, of practices, that have become 
presuppositional, without which we cannot think the human at all” (Butler 2001: 
621), the most obvious and the most logical answer is that a challenging or a 
subversion of sociocultural norms, more precisely of gender norms and norms of 
sexed corporeality, is at issue here. Annabel provides the apt preconditions for a 
challenge of gender and bodily norms, by establishing a context in which gender is a 
rigid binary construct and gender norms are forcefully maintained. Into this rigidly 
heteronormative context, the novel introduces a character who is supposed to 
challenge this binary: an infant born intersex, and since s_he happens to have a body 
that defies ‘standard’ notions of male and female corporeality, what would seem more 
natural than asking of this person (a child, for the most part of the narrative) to gladly 
and emphatically defy normative gender notions as well? Or so the novel seems to 
suggest.  
Is Wayne/Annabel a subversive character who challenges gender and sexed 
bodily norms? Two questions (at least) arise from this question: first, can the 
character become intelligible as an intersex subject without having to challenge 
normative ideas of gender and corporeality, and second, is it the task of the intersex 
person to be challenging and disruptive of these norms as a requirement for the novel 
to challenge the norms in question? At the beginning of the chapter I argued that 
Annabel accomplishes to create an overall believable narrative about the complexities 
and realities of the life of an intersex child/adolescent that seems to find a way out of 
the dilemma of being/becoming (un)intelligible. I want to come back to this symbolic 
survival, the intersex character’s surviving the threat of their symbolic/social ‘death’ 
that is caused either by becoming unintelligible due to their gender and/or bodily 
nonconformativity or by compromising (a part of) their self in order to become 
culturally intelligible, both alternatives that would lead to an ‘unlivable life,’ in 
consideration of the survival strategies the novel provides for its intersex protagonist.  
The novel oscillates between marking Wayne/Annabel as an ‘impossible,’ 
unintelligible being and continually reassuring his_her intelligibility. This 




establishing of the intersex protagonist’s intelligibility, especially for the reader, is 
not accomplished by a first-person narration, hence the narrative has to rely on 
several other strategies. One obvious strategy of keeping the character intelligible is 
to refer to them as Wayne and with male pronouns exclusively, and to continue to do 
so even after Wayne decides to stop his medication and let his body reflect his 
intersex corporeality and identifies as non-male. The novel validates this strategy by 
representing Wayne as a boy – even though it is made clear that this is only one of 
the possible gender assignments and that Wayne himself rejects this assignment – 
who has a girl ‘living inside of him.’ This ‘girl-inside-boy’ narrative allows for the 
character to be still perceived as a boy, rather than a person who cannot be recognized 
in terms of male and/or female gender. This specific narrative is further affirmed by 
the constant reference to supposedly ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ acts performed by 
Wayne. Thus, while Wayne is neither exclusively male nor female, his gender and 
sexed body still remains recognizable by normative gender and corporeal standards, 
and the reader is provided with detailed description of body parts and acts of behavior 
that can each be marked as either male or female. In Wayne, even during and after 
his transitioning, nothing remains really unmarked, or is marked as something other 
than male or female. This strategy of asserting the intersex character’s intelligibility, 
however, leads to some extent to the invisibilization of an integral part of 
Wayne/Annabel’s gender, and thus to a misrecognition of her_his gender. This 
specific kind of intelligibility that is attempted to be established unfortunately comes 
at the expense of the recognition of Wayne/Annabel as a person with intersex 
corporeality and a non-binary gender. 
Another strategy of rendering Wayne/Annabel continuously intelligible relies on 
the affirmation of his_her recognizability by others. No matter what processes of 
struggling with his_her gender identification and bodily changes Wayne/Annabel is 
going through, s_he remains at all times defined by his_her relations to his_her 
surroundings: s_he remains Treadway’s son until Treadway consciously decides to 
see Wayne also as his daughter, s_he remains Jacinta’s official son and secret 
daughter, s_he remains Annabel for Thomasina, s_he remains Wally’s best friend, 
and so on. Even the other characters seem, at least most of the time, very sure about 
what Wayne is to them – and hence, they validate Wayne/Annabel’s recognizability 
for the reader. As argued in detail above, Wayne/Annabel is rendered, his_her own 
struggles (and at times others’ struggles) with his_her gender assignment and the 
rejection thereof notwithstanding, intelligible through his_her relationality in the 
novel. 
Returning to the question of whether Annabel’s intersex protagonist subverts or 
challenges gender and bodily norms, and to the consequential question whether s_he 
can become intelligible as intersex without disrupting these norms, what can be 
ascertained is that the novel’s strategy to first set up a rigid gender binary and then 
introducing an intersex character who is supposed to dismantle said binary has fairly 
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missed its aim. The representation of Wayne/Annabel relies itself on strict binaries 
and gender stereotypes, in an effort to always keep him_her intelligible, and to 
provide for her_his coherent subjecthood. However, the novel’s negotiation of 
Wayne/Annabel’s intelligibility must be considered on several (meta-) narrative 
levels. While Wayne/Annabel generally remains intelligible as a fictional character 
in the novel, and is mostly recognizable to the persons close to him_her, 
Wayne/Annabel is threatened to become unintelligible at various moments in the 
narrative both to him_herself and to his wider social surroundings. The narrative of 
a young person who has to come to terms with the secrecy and (attempted) erasure 
of her_his intersex body, its eventual revelation, and the subsequent difficulties to 
make a decision for him_herself about who s_he wants to be, how to align his_her 
body with his_her own sense of self, and how s_he wants to be recognized by others, 
accomplishes to capture the insecurities, fears, shame and sense of loss, but also the 
feelings of relieve and joy about finally being able to reclaim self-determination, in 
quite insightful and (mostly) believable ways. Moreover, by making Wayne/Annabel 
subjected to various forms of power and violence – medical interventions and 
definitory power, sexual violence perpetrated by cis men, the risk of losing a job, etc. 
– the novel draws attention to the realities of intersex persons (or any gender 
nonconforming person, for that matter) for whom society at large does not (yet) have 
the terms by which to recognize and accept someone who does not fit into a clearly 
defined, normative male or female category. 
In closing, I argue that whether Wayne/Annabel is a subversive character in the 
sense of dismantling gender and bodily norms is not the most crucial question when 
seeking to ascertain whether intersex becomes intelligible in the narrative. The 
potential of the novel to offer affirmative representations of intersex seems to be 
located somewhere else, and not in the first place in the disruptiveness of 
Wayne/Annabel itself. In presenting a story about an intersex character who comes 
of age as intersex without being incessantly threatened by unintelligibility, and 
without having to be exceptionally radical in terms of dismantling the gender binary 
(Thomasina, for instance, seems overall fairly more ‘radical’ in transgressing social 
conventions and gendered boundaries than Wayne/Annabel), Annabel manages to 
provide an intersex narrative that functions both as an alternative to medical intersex 
narratives, and as an alternative to Eugenides’ Middlesex, by establishing a kind of 
narrative closure exactly by allowing Wayne/Annabel to find a space where s_he can 
become intelligible as an intersex subject. In that sense, Annabel defies a narrative 
closure that seems to have become mandatory in cultural productions about intersex, 
namely a closure that is reached by establishing the intelligibility of the intersex 
character through assigning them a clearly defined male or female gender. While 
many intersex persons in real life identify as either male or female, the narrative 
gender assignment of intersex characters along heteronormative lines in fictional 
texts has, as elaborated in the analysis of Middlesex, other implications: this gender 




assignment (and the narrative closure that comes with it) made by non-intersex 
authors iterates the non-consensual gender assignment made by doctors (and parents) 
with the aim of ‘normalizing’ the intersex subject; in a similar way, the fictional 
narratives seek to ‘normalize’ their intersex characters to render them intelligible in 
the narrative, for a mainstream audience in the first place. I conclude with giving 
Kathleen Winter credit for resisting this kind of narrative closure by a ‘normalization’ 
of Wayne/Annabel, and instead asking of her readers to acknowledge that intersex 
people have a right to refuse normative gender assignments and the right of self-




6. Screening Intersex at Prime Time        
     Intersex in/as a State of Emergency and Popular Culture’s   




6.1 MAINSTREAMING INTERSEX II:                             
MEDICAL DRAMA SERIES BETWEEN ENTERTAINING  
AND EDUCATING THE MASSES 
  
Over the last years, the theme of intersex has increasingly aroused public interest and 
mainstream media attention, indicating its significance beyond the scope of intersex 
activist communities and the medical establishment. While mainstream media 
coverage still is not overall accurate in its representations of intersex, it however 
provides a platform for intersex activists to promote their own views on intersex. 
Intersex themes have been covered in a number of American television and radio 
shows, documentaries, newspapers and magazines. Mainstream media formats 
increasingly rely on expert opinions from representatives of intersex activist 
organizations when featuring intersex themes. Hida Viloria, chairperson of OII and 
director of OII USA, is frequently invited to talk about intersex on North American 
television and radio shows and appeared in several documentaries on the topic.1 
Members of Inter/Act, an intersex youth organization, produce their own educational 
video clips and act as media consultants on intersex representation, particularly on 
social media platforms. One of the positive consequences of the public attention paid 
to intersex themes is the growing visibility of intersex individuals within society. A 
carefully researched program has the potential to educate its viewers about intersex 
and to correct common, often harmful, misconceptions. 
While the last decade has witnessed a gradually emerging discussion of intersex 
themes in the mainstream media, intersex subjects still suffer from an under-
representation in fictional popular culture formats, particularly in films and television 
                                                             
1  For an overview see Viloria’s homepage at http://hidaviloria.com/category/video. 
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series. To date, there exists not one single mainstream film produced in the US or 
Canada that features an intersex character or addresses the topic of intersex.2 The 
conspicuous absence of intersex characters on the big and the small screens suggests 
that such a theme is considered either too intricate, too particular, or simply not 
interesting enough to attract a broader audience. Yet one particular genre in popular 
culture has featured intersex storylines remarkably often: the medical drama. Over 
the last two decades, four of the most popular American medical drama television 
series running between the mid-1990s and the present each featured an episode 
dealing with an intersex ‘case’: Chicago Hope, Emergency Room, House, and Grey’s 
Anatomy. The fact that the theme of intersex is to date almost exclusively featured in 
medical series reveals much about the general notion of intersex as a ‘medical 
problem’ that needs to be ‘dealt with.’3 As such, the (fictional) hospital seems to be 
the ‘appropriate’ place for accomplishing this task, and hence the site of cultural 
renegotiations of intersex representations. 
In the ensuing chapter, I analyze the four episodes of said medical series and their 
representations of intersex characters and themes, focusing on the episodes’ narrative 
and visual representational strategies, and interrogating how specific narratives and 
discourses about the constitution of sexed corporeality and gender are interrelated, 
and how these narrative intersections provide the conditions for the intelligibility of 
intersex. The question of intersex (resisting) representations becomes all the more 
central for visual representations of intersex, where representational strategies have 
to be considered on several levels. Whereas in textual narratives, visual 
representations have to be achieved by narrative means solely, the visuals in 
television productions add another layer of representation, which might either affirm 
or contradict the textual/verbal messages. Hence, I seek to investigate to what extent 
the television series offer meaningful interventions in the context of intersex (and) 
representation. 
                                                             
2  An exception is the independent film Both (2005) directed by Lisset Barcellos, a co-
production between USA and Peru. While the film was screened at various LGBTQ film 
festivals around the US and Canada, it is relatively unknown beyond the intersex and queer 
scenes.  
3  One episode of the American crime drama television series Law & Order: Special Victims 
Unit, “Identity” (season 6, episode 12, original airdate: January 18, 2005), features a plot 
based on the true story of the ‘John/Joan’ case made famous by psychologist John Money. 
In the SVU episode, a pair of twins, a boy and a girl, is involved in a sexually motivated 
crime, and during the investigation it is revealed that the girl was born as a boy who after 
a circumcision accident was raised as female. However, while the ‘John/Joan’ case had 
tremendous consequences for the treatment of intersex infants, the character in the SVU 
episode is not intersex and the episode does not deal directly with the theme of intersex.  




I proceed from the claim made by bell hooks that “cultural studies’ focus on 
popular culture can be and is a powerful site for intervention, challenge, and change” 
(hooks 1994: 4). The question of television programs’ or producers’ responsibility 
for the ideological messages they convey is indispensable for a discussion of how the 
framing of intersex representations within mass culture can contribute to a 
mainstream understanding of intersex, and how such a framing might be beneficial 
or harmful to fair and equal intersex representations on TV. In her discussion of 
primetime television dramas, Carlen Lavigne contends that “[i]n the light of the 
popularity of television [...] dramas, it seems prudent to investigate the political 
nature of their prime-time messaging” (Lavigne 2009: 383). Katherine Ann Foss 
argues that medical dramas have an influence on public perceptions of health issues 
and have, at least to some extent, a certain educational effect on viewers (Foss 2008: 
5). Foss further notes that “[a]s media portrayals of health professionals shifted over 
time, viewers’ perceptions also changed,” specifically with regard to representations 
of the diversity of doctors, as well as their ethical responsibility for health and their 
fallibility (Foss 2008: 7).  
A common point of contention is whether fictional medical series just reveal 
cultural norms prevailing in North American culture and society, or whether they 
have a stake in their reaffirmation and the production of dangerous images and ideas 
of intersex. Equally controversial is the question of the responsibility of medical 
series to convey ‘accurate’ (medical) information, and of educating viewers on health 
related matters. Picking up on bell hooks’ “conviction that ‘many audiences in the 
US resist the idea that images have an ideological content’” (Marie-France Alderman, 
in hooks 1994: 39), I argue that TV representations of intersex now more than ever 
have a responsibility for the norms they convey, and (potentially) reaffirm and 
reproduce. Hence my analysis of the four episodes under consideration takes into 
account the ethical dimensions of their intersex representations, in particular in the 
light of the actual human rights violations of intersex individuals. I interrogate how 
the episodes’ narratives problematize medical representations of intersex, as well as 
the episodes’ levels of self-reflexivity regarding their own perpetuations of the 
‘violence of representation.’ 
The narrative strategy of positioning characters within the inevitable 
doctor/patient structure of the series forecloses, or at least delimits, the possibility to 
imagine intersex outside these either/or categories. The structure of the medical series 
casts every character who is not a member of the medical staff as a patient (or 
relatives of either the patients or the staff). This strategy is problematic, as generally, 
fictional medical staff does not include intersex persons. Characters who are relatives 
of patients are largely underdeveloped, flat characters; lovers or spouses of medical 
staff either remain marginal, or are medical staff themselves (as romantic 
involvements often take place among medical staff). In order to challenge these 
dominant and superficial ideas of intersex, television series need to include and 
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explore recurring intersex characters more in depth. To date, this vision has not 
materialized. Yet the representations of intersex characters as patients require more 
careful scrutiny. I argue that despite the seemingly unavoidable doctor/patient 
framework, these representations cannot be entirely dismissed as mere reiterations of 
hegemonic power relations between medical establishment and the intersex 
individual. Hence, my analysis turns its focus on the conditions for intersex 
intelligibility within this framework. 
Questions of intersex representations intersect with several aspects that are more 
indirectly related to intersex themes. It is striking that all the intersex characters 
(infants or adolescents) and their parents are white and apparently lower middle class. 
An obvious reason for the exclusive whiteness of intersex characters is the general 
underrepresentation of Black characters or people of color in mainstream film and 
television. While most medical series have at least one or several medical doctors or 
staff who are people of color, apparently a character can only either be intersex or 
Black/of color (or so the reasoning of TV producers seems to be). On the other hand, 
the fact that all the series’ intersex characters are white shows that genital mutilation 
is (also) a western/white issue, and hence undermines problematic western cultural 
notions of female genital mutilation as an (exclusively) ‘African’ practice. The 
representations of class obviously aims at a juxtaposition of medical practitioners as 
educated, possessing the relevant (i.e. medical) knowledge, and parents who are not 
completely uneducated but neither educated enough to challenge medical authority 
and hegemonic knowledge.4 
The representations of intersex are furthermore selective in that three of the four 
episodes deal with a very specific intersex variation, namely a form of Androgen 
Insensitivity Syndrome (AIS), or some related variation resulting in a ‘female’ genital 
development, XY chromosomes, and undescended testes.5 In all three cases, a 
teenager assigned female at birth comes into the hospital, where the undescended 
testes in their bodies are discovered. The reason for this homogenous representation 
of intersex remains speculative; however, the reiteration of this very specific 
                                                             
4  The assumptions about class I make here are not only based on aspects of education; but 
moreover on the fact that the parents can afford health insurance (which means they are 
not poor), their behavior towards medical authorities, and visual signifiers such as the way 
they dress, etc. The fact that the issue of class or economic status is never thematized further 
affirms the notion of class, education, and access to health-related resources and 
information as not relevant, which of course only conceals the actual relevance of these 
factors when it comes to the doctor-parent relationship and the decision-making processes 
regarding the treatment of the intersex child. 
5  Due to the at times inaccurate medical information delivered in the series, I refer here to 
representations of AIS rather than to the actual genetic syndrome. Moreover, the term AIS 
is not used in every episode. 




representation of the intersex body reaffirms cultural notions of intersex, and of the 
interrelatedness between sexed embodiment and gender, and simultaneously opens 
the category of intersex up for its resignification. Only one episode (Chicago Hope, 
which is the earliest episode in the selection) deals with the birth of an infant with 
‘indeterminate’ sex and the decision-making process of assigning the child a gender. 
The scarcity of representations of this scenario in medical series is conspicuous, as 
the birth of an intersex child is a highly controversial issue in activist discourses and 
in medical practice.  
The specific foci of the series’ narratives result from the influences of other 
intersex discourses, narratives, and the knowledge they convey. Each episode 
renegotiates medical treatment practices, ethical issues, the relationship between 
doctors, patient, and parents and their conflicting interests, and cultural ideas of 
normative sexed embodiment and gender. The context in which the respective 
episodes were produced plays a significant role in which aspects and discourses are 
privileged over others. However, it will become clear that the specific intersex 
representations can only be accounted for by intertextual references to a certain 
extent; there are obviously other factors which are relevant for the production of the 
series (such as the general concept of the series, the images of the main characters, 
etc.). 
The time gap between the first two episodes (Chicago Hope, 1996 and Emergency 
Room, 1998) and the latter two episodes (Grey’s Anatomy and House, both 2006) 
marks a significant period in which intersex discourses shifted considerably. The two 
first episodes, “The Parent Rap” and “Masquerade,” were produced only a few years 
after the founding of ISNA and the emergence of first-person intersex accounts. 
Criticism of medical practices, debates about ethical treatment standards, and the 
challenging of the category of intersex are possible and detectable factors which 
influenced the two series’ intersex narratives. In fact, these two episodes appeared 
prior to any other significant literary or cultural work focusing on intersex themes, 
which makes non-fictional points of reference all the more relevant (of course, the 
featuring of an intersex storyline in Emergency Room can as well be explained by the 
preceding thematizing of intersex in Chicago Hope). Yet it is striking that the two 
representations vary to a considerable extent not only with regard to the plot, but with 
regard to ethical questions, critical awareness, and self-reflexivity about the series’ 
own reproductions of hegemonic intersex narratives. 
The context in which “Begin the Begin” and “Skin Deep” were produced and 
aired is one constituted by several influences regarding intersex. It is probably not a 
coincidence that the Grey’s Anatomy episode “Begin the Begin” aired only one 
month earlier in the US than the House episode “Skin Deep.” Certainly Jeffrey 
Eugenides’ bestseller novel Middlesex, which was published in 2002 and won the 
Pulitzer Prize, had sparked the public interest in intersex themes and has significantly 
shaped the cultural imagination about intersex, to date uncontested in its popularity 
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as a novel focusing on an intersex character. Middlesex’s fame might well have 
contributed to the decision of the producers of both House and Grey’s Anatomy to 
feature an ‘intersex case,’ and it is likely that they sought to profit from the new 
popularity of intersex themes and instrumentalized intersex for the series’ own 
sensationalist ends. Apart from the (popular) cultural influences on the two episodes, 
one crucial shift in medical paradigms of intersex which took place in 2005/2006, 
namely the DSD debate, might have had an impact on the production of “Skin Deep” 
and “Begin the Begin.” While both medical discourses on intersex and first-person 
accounts of intersex experience with the medical establishment are already inherent 
in Middlesex’s production of intersex (Eugenides explicitly references 
Hermaphrodites with Attitude and medical texts as sources for the novel), the 
medical/political discourse surrounding a redefinition of intersex as ‘disorders of sex 
development’ provides immediate information from which medical drama series can 
draw. The reproduction of knowledge about intersex thus has a circular and cross-
referential quality. 
In the following, I analyze the four medial drama episodes’ renegotiations of 
intersex issues and the resignification of the category of intersex in the cultural 
imagination, ascertaining whether their narratives “resolve the tensions of difference, 
of shifting roles and identity, by affirming the status quo,” to say it in bell hooks’ 
words (hooks 1994: 62), or by allowing for difference in terms of sexed embodiment, 
for intersex to be/come recognizable, and for the intersex characters to be intelligible 
persons. I scrutinize the series with regard to their prioritizing of complex 
representations of intersex over resolutions that are socially acceptable for the 
mainstream, their critical and self-reflexive interrogations of normative notions of 




6.2 CHICAGO HOPE’S PARENTAL DILEMMA, OR: 
PRODUCTION NOTES ON A BABY IN                           
“THE PARENT RAP” 
 
The episode “The Parent Rap” from Chicago Hope’s second season (episode 20) 
constitutes the first part of the selection of medical drama television series which will 
be under scrutiny in this chapter. Its original airdate was April 29, 1996 on CBS. As 
such, Chicago Hope was the first fictional television series that directly addresses the 
theme of intersex, bringing it to mainstream attention. As the series’ “cases are 
usually ethically complex, highly sensationalistic, and very melodramatic” 
(Dibbern), the birth of an infant with an intersex variation seems to provide adequate 
material for this scheme. The intersex storyline of “The Parent Rap” revolves around 




the birth of an infant whose sex is ‘indeterminate,’ the parents’ difficulties in deciding 
how to deal with their child’s intersex variation, and the doctors’ authority over the 
medico-cultural gender assignment. 
What is remarkable about “The Parent Rap” is its focus on a scenario that is 
supposed to represent a ‘typical’ situation of an ‘intersex birth’; in contrast to the 
other three episodes under discussion: the intersex storylines in “Masquerade,” 
“Begin the Begin,” and “Skin Deep” each deal with cases of teenagers whose intersex 
variation was not revealed until adolescence. The complexity of the Chicago Hope 
episode’s narrative lies in its references to medical discourses on intersex on one hand 
and to intersex first-hand experience and activist claims on the other hand. It is 
probably not a coincidence that the episode was produced only three years after the 
foundation of ISNA, which had by 1996 managed to gain attention from medical 
practitioners and the public.6 These contrasting views are renegotiated in the Chicago 
Hope episode, and hence provide a quite differentiated perspective on intersex.  
The leitmotif of “The Parent Rap” are the strained relationships between parents 
and their children, as already indicated by the episode’s title. The reference to the 
film The Parent Trap (1961), a story about teenage twin sisters separated at birth and 
on a mission to reunite their parents, the pun in the title (it sounds like “parent trap”), 
and the meaning of ‘rap’ (‘mistake,’ [unfair] ‘punishment’) together hint at family 
constructions or parent-child dynamics that are somehow disrupted, but will be 
(possibly) reconciled in the end. Parallel to the intersex storyline, two of Chicago 
Hope’s doctors struggle with their respective relationships with their parents, thus 
interweaving medical issues with the doctors’ personal matters. The intersex 
narrative constitutes one of the main storylines, making up approximately one fourth 
of the episode’s overall running time (ca. 12 minutes out of 46 minutes), and is 
covered in ten distinct scenes. 
The intersex storyline in “The Parent Rap” begins with a scene set in a hospital 
room in the Chicago Hope Hospital, the series’ (fictional) private charity hospital, in 
which Gail and Bob Broussard are about to deliver their first child. Further present 
are Dr. John Sutton, the doctor in charge, and the nurse Camille Shutt. From the very 
beginning, the importance of having a child for the completion of their family is 
stressed by the emotionally charged atmosphere created by Bob’s hectic filming with 
his hand camera while his wife is in labor. The alternating between point of view 
shots produced by Bob’s monochrome camera and the shots showing him filming, as 
well as Gail and the doctor, is used to represent different perspectives on the event, a 
technique which foreshadows the contrasting viewpoints on the theme, represented 
by the parents on the one hand and by the doctors on the other hand, in the subsequent 
process of the episode. It is hardly a coincidence that the parents’, especially the 
                                                             
6  In 1996, intersex activists picketed the American Academy of Pediatricians’ (AAP) annual 
meeting in Boston (Chrysalis 1997/98: 1).  
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father’s perspective is cast in black-and-white, hinting at his/their binary approach to 
questions of gender, while the more stable, chromatic perspective represents that of 
the medical institution, expressing not only their institutionalized authority, but their 
more progressive and nuanced approach, which apparently stands in accordance with 
Chicago Hope’s claimed ethics. The first scene of the intersex storyline thus 
introduces and anticipates the episode’s representations of different nuances of the 
ensuing conflict. 
The importance of the birth of their first child for the Broussards is further 
underlined by Bob’s assertion that they “waited a long time for this, [...] the big 
moment” (6:25).7 Although the couple has thought of both boys’ and girls’ names, 
indicating that their baby’s gender is not of primary importance to them, the next 
scene reveals quite the opposite. When Dr. Sutton delivers the child, Bob looks in 
awe at his baby, and both parents seem happy. Yet after the initial moments of 
parental bliss and Dr. Sutton’s congratulations on their “beautiful baby” (9:42), 
anticipation turns quickly into irritation, when it is the doctor’s turn to announce the 
infant’s gender. While Gail immediately senses that “something [is] wrong” (9:48), 
and Bob reveals his preference for a son (“It is a boy, right? A little baby boy,” 9:49), 
Dr. Sutton defers his answer, creating a moment of suspense, until he finally has to 
admit that he “can’t tell” the baby’s gender from the appearance of the genitals (9:55). 
Both medical staff and parents are left confused and virtually speechless in the scene. 
This speechlessness, together with the suspension of an answer to the question of the 
baby’s sex, signifies the unspeakability of intersex, the lack of representational points 
of reference for this kind of sexed embodiment. 
This ‘revelation scene’ bears both similarities and differences to the three other 
episodes’ ‘revelation scenes.’ Parental distress is an issue prevalent in all four 
episodes; however, in “The Parent Rap” the entire communication concerning the 
intersex issue takes place between doctors and the parents, the father in particular. 
Since the intersex child here is an infant, it is not involved at all in the decision-
making process, in contrast to the older intersex children or teenagers in the three 
other episodes. In this case, the parents have the sole responsibility and authority as 
they act on behalf of their child regarding medical decisions, and hence occupy the 
‘patient’ position in place of the intersex child. What remains a constant across all 
episodes is the confusion and the insecurity about the intersex variation. Questions 
of ethical conduct and the role of the medical establishment in resolving the central 
conflict surrounding the presence of an intersex variation are as well recurring and 
structuring motifs in all four series.  
The subsequent scene, which immediately follows the revelation scene, focuses 
on a dialogue between Dr. Sutton and Bob Broussard, in which the determination of 
the baby’s sex and gender is at stake (at this point in the narrative, sex and gender are 
                                                             
7  All following timecode numbers in this chapter refer to the timecode of “The Parent Rap.” 




conflated, or gender represented as ‘naturally’ resulting from the sexed corporeality). 
As it turns out, there is far more at stake than the baby’s sex. The conversation is 
fraught with insecurities and tension. Bob reacts with bewilderment to the news that 
the doctor fails to determine whether his child is a boy or a girl: “No, I don’t 
understand, what do you mean, you can’t tell what sex it is, you skipped that part at 
medical school? Boys have penises, girls don’t, it seems real simple to me, real 
simple, it’s not that hard to tell the difference!” (10:00-10:11). His understanding of 
sex and gender is not only a binary one; moreover his definition of maleness and 
femaleness is cast in terms of penis/absence of penis. A girl’s/woman’s sex is defined 
by lack (of the phallus) and thus not only constructed in relation to (normative) 
maleness, but as its negative image. There is no definition of femaleness in terms of 
presence and positive signifiers or as independent from maleness. This misogynist 
conception of normative femaleness and maleness is further emphasized by the 
importance of the size of the phallus. Dr. Sutton refers to the size of the infant’s 
genitals as the primary indication of the presence of an intersex variation: “Your child 
has what is called ambiguous genitalia. It is possible for an enlarged female organ to 
be indistinguishable from a small male organ” (10:12), and, when questioned by Bob 
Broussard about just how small its size is, delivers the unmistakably clear judgment 
“small” (10:25), which can be translated into “too small to qualify as a ‘proper’ 
penis.” Bob’s reaction reveals his more fundamental concerns with his child’s gender, 
namely the continuity of his family line: “my family name goes back 250 years, now, 
I’m the only son, I’m supposed to care…” (10:28). 
The conflict about the baby’s ‘indeterminate’ gender is further dramatized by the 
sudden emergency caused by complications affecting Gail Broussard, incessant 
uterine bleeding. She is rushed to the operating room and Bob is left devastated. The 
next scene of the intersex storyline brings initial relief insofar as the doctors were 
able to save Gail’s life; but the next blow is about to hit her husband hard. The 
dialogue between Dr. Sutton and Bob is accompanied with melancholic music, which 
serves to accentuate the sadness of the loss Bob has to experience. Dr. Sutton explains 
that in order to stop Gail’s uterine atony and prevent her from dying, he had to 
perform a complete hysterectomy (18:30-19:00). Bob is devastated at the realization 
that she cannot have any more children, and that the only child they will have together 
has still an indeterminate gender: “So, I have a he-she for a child” (19:39). Dr. 
Sutton’s objection that the child is not a ‘he-she’ is angrily countered by Bob’s 
demand, “Then tell me I have a son. Give me some good news” (19:58). Yet the 
doctor is unable, or unwilling, to accommodate his request. 
The next scene focusing on the intersex storyline provides a meaningful insight 
into the medico-cultural constructedness of sexed bodies as envisioned by medical 
practitioners. This kind of constructedness becomes most evident in the medical 
treatment of genitalia that are not classifiable according to a distinct sex/gender 
binary: genitalia are surgically modified, or removed partly or wholly to create 
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genitalia considered as ‘appropriate’ for a male or a female. In “The Parent Rap,” this 
reasoning is taken to its extreme to the point of absurdity, as it is suggested that the 
making of a ‘girl’ or a ‘boy,’ i.e. a surgical, hormonal and, by extension, a social 
gender assignment, is accomplished as easily as the drawing and wiping off of 
genitals with a non-permanent marker on a whiteboard. This scene can be interpreted 
as a parody on medical practitioners who often strive for the most practical and 
technically feasible solution, and who resort to medical verbiage, instead of 
considering the human behind the medical ‘problem.’ While the scene appears absurd 
and even has a comical effect to some extent, it reveals how casually and carelessly 
doctors often deal with bodily alterations in intersex infants and children, which 
permanently effect their physical and psychological integrity. Dr. Sutton discusses 
the Broussards’ baby’s intersex variation and options with regard to a gender 
assignment with two other doctors, a man and a woman, who appear to be 
pediatricians or pediatric surgeons. To illustrate their explanations for Dr. Sutton, 
they draw a highly simplified graphic of the baby’s body and the genitals with a 
marker on a whiteboard. The two specialists begin with visually and verbally drawing 
a picture of the gendered bodily makeup: “The chromosomes are XY. Genetically, 
the child is a boy” (23:43); “Internally, it has male organs, testes, undescended of 
course,” “Wolffian duct remnants” (23:47); “No ovaries, no uterus, no vagina” 
(23:59). The enumeration of genetic, genital and gonadal characteristics that are 
supposedly ‘male’ bodily characteristics and the lack of what are perceived the most 
relevant ‘female’ organs, i.e. organs necessary for reproduction, allegedly proves the 
baby to be ‘really’ a ‘boy.’ However, a crucial factor seems to prohibit a gender 
assignment as male: “But on the outside, it’s closer to a girl. Presently, the child is a 
boy, that looks like a girl” (24:00), the female doctor explains, jokingly adding, “Not 
a big deal in Manhattan’s West Village,” a reference to the queer history of this 
particular New York City area.  
Yet the solution to this ostensible ‘dilemma’ is quick at hand, as the male 
specialist assures: “What we have to do is: make this child into a girl. Remove the 
testes,” hereby he wipes them off the whiteboard, “create a vagina,” while drawing a 
triangle with the marker, “turn the ambiguous organ into a clitoris,” here he draws a 
tiny ‘v’ – “a piece of cake” (24:10). Surgically (re)constructing – literally making – 
a baby’s sex is, at it seems, a triviality – from the medical point of view. The human 
rights violation and the physical and emotional damage inflicted on a person who 
cannot even consent to this treatment are completely ignored. Moreover, there is a 
strong gender bias in the doctors’ line of argumentation, which is common and widely 
practiced in actual medical treatment of intersex infants and children. The notion of 
‘female’ bodily characteristics as easily constructable implies a view of the female 
body, and by extension, female sexuality, as being reducible to the reception of 
‘male’ sexuality and to simple aesthetics at best. 




However, this reduced, misogynist perspective is slightly countered by the female 
doctor’s assertion that by assigning and surgically producing a ‘female’ sex for the 
baby, ‘she’ will be “orgasmic” (24:24), thus providing a counter-argument to Dr. 
Sutton’s objection that ‘she’ would be “infertile” (24:23). It is probably not a 
coincidence that a female doctor places more emphasis on a satisfying female 
sexuality, which is also commented on by Dr. Sutton. Dr. Sutton tries to literally draw 
a different scenario of sexing, weighing the possible outcome for “an infertile female 
versus a potentially fertile male. Bring down the testes, create a penis from the skin 
of the arm, transplant it to the groin” (24:25). Surgically assigning the child as a boy, 
however, is a “bad idea” (24:40) in the eyes of the two specialists: “If we make this 
child into a boy, it’s gonna be a boy with a limp, small, nonfunctioning genital and 
testes with a high rate of malignancy” (24:43). As noted earlier, the ultimate signifier 
for ‘maleness’ is not merely the presence, but the size of the phallus. The sexual, 
functional, and visual performance of the penis is more important to ‘maleness’ and 
‘male’ sexuality than fertility. The premise seems to be: better a mutilated girl/woman 
than a boy/man without a ‘proper’ penis.  
The scene’s interpretation proves to be ambivalent with regard to its critical 
function in the episode. Read as a parody of the medical establishment, it provides 
an ethical commentary on the treatment standards of intersex variations. The 
interpretation of the scene as an ironic re-enactment of medical practices and medical 
authority is further substantiated when taking into account the information material 
provided by intersex activists, which was made publicly available at the time of the 
episode’s production.8 Thus, the representation of the medical practices of intersex 
treatment might draw its references from medical texts, as well as intersex accounts’ 
criticism of these texts. The renegotiations of different sources and sorts of texts and 
their different perspectives renders Chicago Hope’s representation of intersex 
‘management’ more multilayered as it might seem at first sight. However, the 
episode’s subsequent course of events and the final resolution of the ‘case’ leads one 
to question the ironic/parodic and self-reflexive quality of the scene, and can be 
interpreted as, in fact, reaffirming the current medical protocol of intersex treatment 
and its ethical justification. 
This premise is continued in the logics of argumentation when Dr. Sutton 
discusses the options with Bob Broussard in the subsequent scene. It is telling that 
two men – a medical professional and the child’s father – are the ones who determine 
the child’s gender, while the mother is (initially) not involved in the decision-making 
process. Different interests are at stake in this process: paternal self-interest and 
surgical practicability, both having the preservation of traditional, normative 
maleness as their goal. Bob Broussard’s main interest lies in the continuity of his 
                                                             
8  In particular the first issues of Hermaphrodites with Attitude, but also critical academic 
texts on intersex, including Kessler 1990 and Fausto-Sterling 1993. 
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family line, and more precisely, the continuity of male offspring which will carry on 
the family name. Hence he clings desperately to the possibility that his child could 
be (surgically made into) a boy: “You just said the tests show it’s a boy, now I don’t 
have to explain what it means to me to have a boy” (24:56), considering the child’s 
potential fertility if the ‘male’ organs would be preserved. Apparently, Broussard 
gives preference to ‘male’ fertility over ‘female’ sexuality.  
Yet the definition of the alleged ‘female’ sexuality advocated by Dr. Sutton 
remains questionable. It seems yet again that ‘female’ sexuality is simply the default 
of ‘male’ sexuality. In fact, Dr. Sutton seems more concerned about the potentially 
unsatisfying sex life of a future boy/man: “The surgery to make your child male 
would be prohibitive. Your son would have a nonfunctioning penis. As he got older 
he might be able to have a pump, surgically implanted, in order to achieve an erection, 
but… although he’ll be able to have sex, he may never achieve orgasm” (25:00). In 
contrast, as a girl, “she would be able to enjoy her full sex life,” despite the fact that 
she “would be sterile [and] would have to take hormones for the rest of her life” 
(25:38). It is hard to believe that a cis man, who moreover appears vehemently trivial 
about the easiness of surgically constructing ‘female’ organs, is the adequate person 
to decide over what constitutes ‘female’ sexual pleasure. Obviously for him and his 
colleagues, a vagina is not much more than an opening suitable for accommodating 
a penis, and a clitoris a chopped off remnant of a penis.  
Dr. Sutton even claims potential medical risks in order to corroborate his 
normative convictions about female and male sexed embodiment and sexuality: “In 
addition, most likely, his testicles would develop a malignancy that could prove fatal” 
(25:25). The alleged higher susceptibility to cancer in nonfunctioning gonads is 
another common scare tactic applied by doctors to argue for their surgical removal; 
yet there is no definite medical proof for this claim (Duhaime-Ross 2013). By linking 
cancer inextricably to an intersex variation, intersex is again pathologized. Moreover, 
as cancer is often consider as a punishment (Sontag 1978), the intersex variation, and 
as a consequence the intersex baby, become a ‘punishment’ for both the child and the 
parents (the ‘parent rap’).  
The scene closes with no resolution regarding the gender assignment of the 
Broussards’ baby. Bob feels helpless and appears guilt-ridden over the birth of their 
intersex baby. He vainly tries to figure out the reason for what he considers as some 
sort of metaphysical punishment: “I don’t know what I did. Or what Gail did, or what 
this child could possibly have done to deserve something…” (25:55), but Dr. Sutton 
cautions him to not “consider what’s happened as a punishment” (26:00). The 
punishment, for the Broussards and in particular for Bob, consists in the disruption 
of the traditional family ideal. Patricia Hill Collins argues that the nuclear family is 
‘naturalized’ in terms of procreation and heteronormativity: “Defined as natural or 
biological arrangement based on heterosexual attraction, a normative and ideal family 
consists of a heterosexual couple who produce their own biological children” (Collins 




1998: 220). Intersex persons challenge these arrangements, and offspring who is 
intersex threaten to interrupt the processes of reproduction, and hence the continuity 
of the family. As a consequence of the efficacy of the concept of the ‘traditional’ 
family ideal, parents often feel compelled to take any steps deemed necessary, 
including irreversible genital surgery, to ensure their child will have an intelligible, 
i.e. male or female, gender. This decision is always articulated in terms of the child’s 
‘best interest,’ which means, to conform to normative gender conceptions, and to 
engage in heterosexual relationships in the future, in an effort to preserve the family 
ideal and the continuity of the family. Likewise, for Bob Broussard, their child’s 
conformity to gender normativity seems to be indispensable for a ‘livable life’: “I sit 
there given me these choices. How are Gail and I supposed to decide for this child? 
How are we supposed to know what to do, to give this child a normal life?” (26:10). 
The next scene continues the question of what the Broussards are supposed to do 
with regard to their intersex child. This time, both Bob and Gail talk to Dr. Sutton. 
The conversation is once again accompanied with melancholic music, this time in 
order to emphasize the emotional struggle of the parents and the potential loss of their 
baby. When Dr. Sutton reminds them of the importance of being close to the baby, 
the Broussards refuse to see their baby. They seem to be unable to cope with the 
situation and to find the right solution: “We went over and over this. Every choice 
seems cruel. We’re sorry this happened” (Gail, 28:10); “We can’t force an unnatural 
life on this child. It’s not our choice to make. Maybe there are people out there who 
can deal with this better than we can” (Bob, 28:28). Their rejection of their child goes 
even so far that the parents come to the conclusion that “the one thing we can do 
that’d be the least hurt for everyone around” is giving the baby up for adoption 
(28:17). While the Broussards are obviously desperate and sad about the situation, 
their reaction to give away their baby because it has an intersex variation is more than 
selfish. The well-being and ‘best interests’ of the child are at first glance the crucial 
reasons for giving it away. However, Bob Broussard has already made it quite clear 
that he wanted to have a son; the birth of their intersex child is experienced as the 
‘loss’ of their boy or girl child. The ISNA Handbook for Parents (2006) argues in a 
similar direction: 
 
“A lot of parents of children with DSDs [disorders of sex development] have said that they felt 
a sense of loss when they found out about the DSD, because they felt like they had lost the 
child that they were expecting (that is, the child without a DSD). [...] Especially if the DSD is 
diagnosed when the baby is a newborn, you may feel yourself grieving the loss of the ‘wished-
for’ child.” (2006: 5f) 
 
The rhetoric evokes a sense of ‘damage’ to the traditional family ideal caused by the 
child’s intersex variation, and thus seeks to rationalize parents’ distress about their 
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intersex child. It is exactly this conflict that the Broussards seem to experience, and 
keeping their intersex child seems to come close to giving their child away.  
Dr. Sutton is convinced that the Broussards make a mistake in giving their baby 
up for adoption (28:36). In the next scene, he discusses the case with Nurse Shutt and 
Sutton’s own investment in (his) masculinity is revealed. First, Camille Shutt seeks 
to put into perspective the Broussards’ choice and Dr. Sutton’s harsh judgment about 
it: “You can’t blame the Broussards for this. They’re trying their best to deal with the 
difficult situation” (33:48). The language of “dealing with a difficult situation” is 
repeated throughout the conversations between Dr. Sutton and the Broussards about 
what decision to make with regard to their intersex baby. The “difficult situation” or 
“problem” to be “dealt with” relates to the intersex variation in the first place, a 
rhetoric that associates intersex with a medical emergency which needs to be urgently 
brought under control, or ‘fixed.’ However, during the scenes in which the gender of 
the baby remains ‘ambiguous,’ or ‘unresolved,’ the intersex variation becomes 
representative of the baby itself. In the initial scenes of the intersex storyline in “The 
Parent Rap,” when the baby was not delivered yet, the Broussards already talk about 
their child’s possible name. The baby becomes personalized and gendered by the 
naming (even pre-birth). In contrast, from the very moment the baby is revealed to 
have an intersex variation, the naming is abandoned, or delayed – only a normatively 
gendered baby, so the message, can be named, can obtain personhood, and can obtain 
the status of a ‘proper’ human being. As Judith Butler argues, “[b]eing called a name 
is [...] one of the conditions by which a subject is constituted in language” (Butler 
1997b: 2). Until the question of gender is resolved in conformity with the 
heteronormative gender binary, the naming and hence personalizing and humanizing 
of the baby is delayed. Until then, the baby is referred to as “the baby,” “the child,” 
or “it.” Initially considered a happy event, the birth of their baby becomes a 
misfortune for the Broussards, and the baby a problem to be “dealt with.” It is no 
longer sufficient to find a ‘remedy’ for the intersex variation – by means of surgery 
and hormone treatment – but now the need to abandon the baby altogether in order 
for the parents to find relief (from anything that has to do with intersex and threatens 
their normative binary thinking) has become overwhelming.  
Hence, Nurse Shutt’s attempt at relativization by referring to the rhetoric of 
“dealing with a difficult situation” not only serves to excuse the parents’ irresponsible 
behavior, but to reinforce the language of pathologizing the intersex baby from a 
representative of the medical establishment (a nurse). Dr. Sutton, however, accuses 
the Broussards of avoiding their responsibility and moreover seeks to challenge the 
premises on which the pathologizing of the baby rests, by attacking Bob Broussard’s 
notion of normative maleness: “Broussard defines a man according to the number of 
sons, fertility, the size of his penis” (33:55). Nurse Shutt’s response, “well, most men 
do” (34:09), once again relativizing the violence of representation inherent in 
normative ideas and language, serves to bridge the conversation to a personal level, 




with Dr. Sutton’s own performance of maleness at stake. On being asked by Shutt 
why he does not have children of his own, Dr. Sutton is confronted with a questioning 
of his ability to meet the standards of normative maleness defined by sexual 
performance and fertility: “Not that I don’t want to [have kids]… It’s just that I… 
can’t have them” (34:20). He is however quick to assure Camille Shutt that his 
genitals and his sexual performance satisfy women and heteronormative standards: 
“Don’t misunderstand me… everything’s in place, everything works, I can have 
sex… I had three wives, it was never a problem with them. I just couldn’t give them 
children” (34:30). Dr. Sutton’s own possible infertility is apparently the reason for 
his prioritization of sexual functionality over fertility when it comes to the 
Broussards’ baby. While this stance might seem at first glance as an espousal of a 
female sexuality independent of a woman’s reproductive capacities, the real reason 
why Dr. Sutton argues vehemently for assigning the baby as a girl is the prospect of 
an unsatisfying sexual life for a boy with a ‘wee’ penis. 
The next scene has Dr. Sutton making a plea for the Broussards to give their baby 
a chance. When Bob Broussard is hesitant that “even if we could learn to accept this, 
our, child as a girl, she had no reproductive organs” (36:07), the doctor seeks to 
convince the parents that gender is not exclusively biologically determined or 
essentialist, taking up the motif of the defining parameters for gender touched on in 
the previous scene: “That’s what I’m trying to tell you. A person is so much more 
than chromosomes and reproductive organs! There are men and women, so many 
more than you’ll guess, who are unable to have children. I see them in my practice 
every day, and they are no less masculine or feminine for it” (36:13). While this line 
of argument seeks to de-essentialize the naturalized coherence of gender and 
reproductive capacities, it refers to and reproduces at the same time a naturalizing of 
heteronormative and binary constructions of gender. The whole point of Sutton’s 
appeal seems to revolve around the question of fertility; obviously more motivated 
by his own fear of ‘failure’ than by the baby’s well-being. His concern of relativizing 
the importance of female fertility is in fact concealing his preoccupation with the 
importance of male sexual performance and genital appearance.  
Sutton’s next strategy to convince the Broussards of keeping their baby involves 
drawing on the rhetoric of the ‘family ideal’: 
 
“Any child you had would have trouble figuring out who they are, what they are. That’s what 
growing up is all about! You’re right. She’ll need more nurturing, more loving, but isn’t it why 
you two wanted to become parents in the first place? I can’t believe it was solely to carry on 
your name? This is an opportunity some people never get. The chance to love a child of their 
own. Don’t give that up.” (36:33-37:06) 
 
The doctor’s reasoning refers to a very specific image of the idealized family, and his 
proposed strategy to deal with the situation works to reproduce this very family 
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concept. He suggests that the perceived ‘loss’ or ‘damage’ the birth of their intersex 
child poses to the Broussards’ idea of ‘traditional’ family can be overcome by 
creating the ‘right’ familial arrangement for the child, so that there is a good chance 
that it will grow up feeling as ‘normal’ as possible. Interestingly, Sutton refrains here 
from advising ‘normalizing’ surgery; however, his reasoning reiterates the logics 
inherent in arguments for ‘normalizing’ medical treatment. 
The last scene of “The Parent Rap”’s intersex storyline shows Dr. Sutton looking 
from outside into the hospital room where the Broussards are together with their 
baby. Sentimental music accompanies the touching scene, while the parents finally 
seem to accept their child, holding and feeding it, and looking happy. Dr. Sutton’s 
perspective on the Broussard family alternates with takes focusing on him, the 
Broussards however unaware of his presence and gaze. The viewers see the doctor’s 
content smile as a sign of his approval of how matters turned out for the Broussards 
and their baby. When Bob addresses the baby with “Adeline Ally Broussard, you are 
one beautiful ittle girl!” (42:40), it becomes clear to both Dr. Sutton and the viewers 
that the parents decided in favor of assigning the infant a female gender and seem to 
have made peace with this resolution. In the end, the baby not only becomes 
(normatively) gendered, but obtains a status as a person and a full human being with 
being given a name – not just any name, but the name the Broussards have initially 
intended for their daughter, Adeline Ally. The giving of the last name furthermore 
signifies her parents’ acceptance of her as a member of the family. With the naming 
and the gendering, the intersex storyline comes to a closure, with gender intelligibility 
safely restored. Whether Adeline Ally will undergo genital surgery and hormone 
therapy remains unknown within the scope of the episode, but from the discussions 
about the gender assignment and its implications throughout the several scenes it can 
be inferred with reasonable certainty that she will have to undergo these 
‘normalization’ procedures. The last take concluding the intersex storyline is a shot 
of Dr. Sutton who seems to have a relieved look on the family scenario, suggesting a 
closure to the narrative that is authorized by medical authority.   
“The Parent Rap”’s intersex narrative’s central conflict – parents confronted with 
an intersex child – and the tensions resulting from it – how to deal with the gender 
‘ambiguity’? – are finally resolved by the doctor and the father determining the 
child’s gender as ‘unambiguously female.’ Intersex is established as unintelligible 
from the very start, its unintelligibility enforced throughout the episode, and 
eventually resolved to remain forever unintelligible by abandoning its possibility to 
the realm of medical waste, erasing its existence together with any bodily 
‘ambiguity,’ or markers of ‘maleness.’  
The production of the child’s intelligibility remains, however, debatable. Intersex 
organizations such as ISNA and OII recommend parents to give their intersex child 
a gender assignment as a boy or a girl, without performing surgery. Their argument 
against genital surgery, or hormone and other treatment, is based on the assumption 




that these interventions are not medical necessities for the infant but rather follow a 
cultural imperative, which seems to be more important to the parents than for the 
child’s well-being: “parental distress should not be treated with ‘normalizing’ surgery 
on children” (ISNA, “What does ISNA recommend”). Both ISNA and OII explicitly 
advocate(d) to not raise the child in a gender outside the male/female binary, as the 
consequences would be a lack or loss of intelligibility resulting in trauma for the child 
(ISNA, “How can you assign a gender”; OII USA 2013). While this position might 
be interpreted as conforming to and perpetuating normative ideas of gender from a 
queer theoretical perspective, it can also provide a reasonable option for parents who 
seek to integrate their child as best as possible into their social environment until the 
child can make up their own mind about their gender identity. The recommendations 
are generally open towards non-normative concepts of gender and sexuality, and 
promote the parents’ support of their child’s gender self-identification (OII USA 
2013). With their demand that “[i]n cases of intersex, doctors and parents need to 
recognize [...] that gender assignment of infants with intersex conditions as boy or 
girl, as with assignment of any infant, is preliminary,” ISNA makes a compelling 
case for the prohibition of ‘normalizing’ treatment: 
 
“That is a crucial reason why medically unnecessary surgeries should not be done without the 
patient’s consent; the child with an intersex condition may later want genitals (either the ones 
they were born with or surgically constructed anatomy) different than what the doctors would 
have chosen. Surgically constructed genitals are extremely difficult if not impossible to ‘undo,’ 
and children altered at birth or in infancy are largely stuck with what doctors give them.” 
(ISNA, “How can you assign a gender”)  
 
Adeline Ally’s intelligibility as a gendered subject is produced, or rather, re-
established by the end of the episode’s intersex narrative. Assigning her as a girl does 
not per se make intersex an unintelligible category. It is the ‘normalization’ 
processes, by which the gender assignment is to be produced, that erase intersex as a 
knowable category.  
While Chicago Hope’s intersex narrative is decidedly unambiguous with regard 
to its representation of intersex intelligibility, the narrative still manages to be 
ethically complex to some degree. The position of the doctor in particular has to be 
read on different levels: as a character in the series, who holds certain ethical 
convictions and beliefs in norms (regarding gender, sexuality, family, etc.); as a 
figure who acts both as a representative of the medical establishment within the 
series’ framework and in inter- and metatextual reference to actual medical practice; 
and as a figure through which the series delivers metafictional moral commentary. 
The episode, through the character of Dr. Sutton, provides moral commentaries about 
the parents’ mindset and actions, apparently a strategy to represent the doctor and the 
medical establishment as more progressive about gender issues. Moreover, the scene 
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in which a gendered body is literally constructed exposes the cultural ideas inherent 
in medical reasoning and practice regarding intersex bodies – and by extension, sexed 
corporeality in general –, as well as the questionable carelessness with which 
decisions about infants’ physical and emotional integrity are made; this scene hence 
creates a self-reflexive moment in the narrative (in medical series, medical decision-
making processes are frequently represented in a quite similar manner). However, by 
scrutinizing the episode’s narrative strategies more closely, it becomes clear that 
Chicago Hope’s investment in gender normativity is by far more complex.  
To close my analysis of “The Parent Rap,” what can be ascertained is that the 
narrative manages to incorporate important debates of the medical treatment of 
intersex infants sparked by the intersex movement at that time. The inclusion of these 
discussions and, implicitly, intersex activists’ criticism, is all the more remarkable 
considering that in the mid-1990s, “very few medical professionals recognized 
ISNA’s critiques as legitimate. Many responded that the standard of care was 
necessary, successful, and justified [...]. Those at the top simply tried to ignore ISNA” 
(ISNA, “History”). The series’ renegotiation of these discourses and its at times 
critical perspective on the practice of ‘normalizing’ treatment and its underlying 
normative notions of sexed embodiment, gender, and sexuality attest the potential of 
“The Parent Rap” to contribute to a cultural debate and rethinking of ‘intersex’ in a 
productive way. The medicalization of intersex almost seems unavoidable in a 
medical drama series, and the constant perpetuation of the unintelligibility of intersex 
is definitely a shortcoming. The episode’s conclusion would have benefitted from a 
narrative closure that involves the Broussards’ acceptance of their intersex child, and 
realizing that assigning them a female gender does not necessitate ‘normalizing’ 
surgery and hormone treatment. However, as the episode ends before it becomes clear 
whether medical treatment of any kind will ensue or not, the ending can be interpreted 
as (re)establishing the intelligibility of a child who has an intersex body – and can 
stay with this embodiment – and a female gender. Hence, I close my analysis with 
ascertaining that while the narrative perpetuates the sense of intersex as a ‘case of 
emergency’ throughout the storyline, the last scene reconciles, and even challenges 
to some extent, this representation, by establishing the acceptance of the intersex 
child by its parents – and hence, offers some hope for imagining the child’s future 









6.3 DECEIVING GENDER: INTERSEX FEMININITY AS A 
“MASQUERADE,” OR: THE VIOLENCE OF 
(MIS)REPRESENTATION IN EMERGENCY ROOM 
 
“Masquerade” is the 5th episode of Emergency Room’s 5th season and originally aired 
on October 29, 1998 on NBC. Emergency Room (ER) was the longest-running 
primetime medical drama in North America (1994-2009); as such, it was one of the 
most influential medical series, with an extremely large and diverse viewership. The 
series interweaves storylines involving the personal affairs of the medical staff and 
often spectacular medical cases. ER is also known for focusing on a variety of social 
issues and addressing ethical questions concerning medial practices.  
The following analysis of “Masquerade” focuses on the representation of intersex 
in a medical series in the late 1990s and on the medical and cultural discourses of the 
time which structure the series’ narrative of the gendered body. Two years after the 
theme of intersex was first covered in a primetime medical series, Chicago Hope, 
which focuses on the birth of an intersex infant, ER presents the case of a child whose 
intersex variation went undetected for eleven years. Although the point of departure 
for both doctors and the patient and her parents is a different one, this scenario 
implicates similar issues such as ethical questions regarding medical practices and 
parental acceptance of an intersex child. The episode provides a popular cultural 
commentary on medical intersex discourses of the 1990s on one hand and on 
discussions of gender and gender transgression – largely as a result of academic 
renegotiations of gender and sexuality – on the other hand. 
The ER episode “Masquerade” takes place on Halloween and involves besides 
personal matters of the doctors mainly cases of children who come to the ER for 
several reasons. The celebration of Halloween provides the context in which the 
several parallel storylines are set; they are interconnected by the leitmotif of 
‘masquerade,’ or ‘disguise.’ One of these cases focuses on the character of Barbie 
Kligman, an 11-year-old girl, who comes to the ER because of her involvement in a 
car accident, suffering from abdominal pain as a result of a seat-belt contusion. In the 
course of her treatment the doctors find out that Barbie has Androgen Insensitivity 
Syndrome (AIS), which triggers a series of critical ethical decisions and questions of 
‘appropriate’ medical actions. The episode illustrates how an intersex variation is 
constructed as a ‘medical emergency’ by medical treatment standards that were in 
effect at the time, how the objectifying medical gaze operates to dehumanize an 
intersex individual, and how doctor-patient-parent interaction is conducted in such a 
case. The format of the series and the narrative structure of ER episodes also raise 
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questions with regard to the series’ capacity to represent the topic of intersex in a 
reasonable way.9  
The framing of “Masquerade” by the theme of Halloween proves to be highly 
problematic when discussing intersex. The episode begins and ends with images of 
various persons and groups of persons (among them medical staff, patients, visitors) 
in – more or less scary – costumes rushing through the halls of the (fictional) County 
General Hospital in Chicago, where ER is set. In the very first scenes, some members 
of the medical staff are seen wearing costumes, against the clear announcement 
banning costumes in the ER. While the staff temporarily abandons their costumes, in 
the very last scenes they are again back in their masquerades – in particular, two of 
the doctors who treat Barbie –, providing a circular quality and a closure to the 
episode’s leitmotif. Apart from the more serious implications of the theme of 
disguise, the costuming of the doctors also undermines to some extent the seriousness 
of the episode’s representations of its themes and cases, and disguises the actual 
power held by medical practice and its severe consequences. 
When Barbie first appears in “Masquerade,” she is rushed into the ER after she 
was involved in an automobile accident. She is introduced by a doctor as “Barbie 
Kligman, 11-year-old, MVA, back-seat passenger with a lap belt, complains of 
abdominal pain” (17:44).10 The way the character of Barbie is introduced in her first 
scene constitutes her as a patient from the outset, and moreover as a patient whose 
physical condition signifies an emergency, which is further emphasized by the 
symbolic space of the emergency room in which she is initially seen. Barbie’s 
construction as a patient, an emergency case, is realized through the medical context, 
more particularly, the medical gaze, the verbal denotation by the doctor, and the 
medical setting (i.e. the hospital, the ER, the acting of the medical staff, the medical 
instruments, etc.). The references to medical and technical details of her bodily 
condition (i.e. injuries) and the circumstances of the accident result in a 
depersonalizing of the character from the very start.  
On a visual level, this medicalization and depersonalization of Barbie is 
countered by her visual representation, as she wears what appears to be a Halloween 
costume. This costume consists of a pink fairy princess dress, glitter eyeshadow and 
a tiara. Barbie’s costuming stylizes her as an overtly feminine girl; her name bears an 
obvious reference to the fashion doll (herself a popular object of feminist criticism); 
her female gender identification is signified by her choice of the costume and thus is 
represented as seemingly unambiguous, stable, and unquestioned. Yet the fact that it 
is Halloween and her outfit is just a masquerade, i.e. only put on for a special 
                                                             
9  The ‘intersex storyline’ is covered in five non-sequential scenes with an overall screening 
time of approximately five minutes (out of the episode’s approximately 43 minutes running 
time). 
10  All following timecode numbers in this chapter refer to the timecode of “Masquerade.” 




occasion, already hints at a potential disruption of her female gender. The 
establishing of the figure of Barbie in “Masquerade” relies on a juxtaposition of a 
medical (visual and verbal) and a non-medical (visual) presentation. Her 
dramatization as a medical emergency anticipates her later representation as a ‘social 
emergency,’ amplified by Dr. Benton’s comment “she may need exploratory 
surgery” (18:13) at the close of the first scene covering the intersex storyline, while 
her costuming bears a reference to the problematic idea of ‘gender deception.’ Thus, 
both aspects of her subject construction foreshadow a problematic intersex 
representation. 
Shortly after the introductory scene with Barbie, four male doctors are performing 
the suggested exploratory surgery on her. The doctors are Dr. Romano, Chief of 
Surgery, Dr. Benton, sixth year surgical resident, Dr. Edson, third year surgical 
resident, and an anesthesiologist. The scene begins with the surgery in medias res and 
Romano asking about Barbie’s age and “the glitter on her face” (20:00). Benton’s 
answer, “she is supposed to be a princess,” is, on a superficial level, stating the 
obvious and leads to a brief small talk about the doctors’ Halloween party plans. 
However, the – medically irrelevant – question about Barbie’s costuming while the 
surgery is in progress again hints at some relevance in Barbie’s case, as will become 
obvious in the further course of events. Only a few seconds later, the doctors detect 
intrarenal mass on both sides, that “looks like a lumbar node” and “doesn’t feel right” 
(20:40). Now, both the doctors and the viewers are alert, as what appears to be an 
ordinary case of an injury resulting from a car accident takes an unexpected turn. In 
order to find out what is exactly ‘wrong’ with the piece of mass, the doctors send for 
a biopsy: “We just biopsied an abnormal lymph node on Barbie here. Why don’t you 
take this specimen to Pathology and wait on the results” (20:52), Dr. Edson asks Dr. 
Elizabeth Corday, who has just entered the Surgery. The use of technical terminology 
(“biopsy,” “specimen,” “pathology”) has the effect of dehumanizing the subject who 
is talked about, but at the same time delivers a normative judgment, disguised in 
seemingly neutral language: the lymph node is defined as “abnormal” and 
“pathological,” even before the results come back to prove the assertion or otherwise. 
The initial insinuation that something is “not right” with Barbie’s body is 
substantiated by medical evidence in the next very short scene, where the doctors are 
still operating on Barbie and Dr. Corday reappears with the results of the biopsy. 
Apparently in a not-too-concerned mood, she plays a guessing game with her 
colleagues, who have to make several wrong guesses before she breaks the news to 
them: “seminiferous tubules” (22:19), which are usually located in testes. The doctors 
and staff look at her stunned, and although they are wearing operation masks which 
cover most of their faces, their shocked expressions can be noticed in their eyes. The 
only verbal reaction, “you’re kidding?” is reaffirmed by Corday’s assertion: “you 
biopsied two testicles. It seems that Barbie is a boy” (22:24). The doctors’ 
consternation is expressed through their speechlessness and perplexed looks, and this 
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ensuing silence strengthens the impression of the horror implied in the revelation. 
Thus, while Corday’s guessing game undermines the seriousness of the results and 
their consequences to some extent, and even takes on a sensationalist quality, this 
sentiment is counteracted by the virtually speechless reactions – speechless with 
horror – of the other doctors on one hand, and by the crucial implications with regard 
to Barbie’s intelligibility on the other hand. Corday’s conclusion, “she is a boy,” 
which she draws from the presence of testicles in Barbie’s body, is in the first place 
biologist as it relies on gonads (‘sex organs’) as the defining parameter for gender 
identity, which implies an essentialist and dichotomous notion of the body. 
Moreover, Barbie’s involuntary – initially verbal – gender reassignment made by 
Corday attests to the often insensitive and ignorant behavior of medical authorities 
(which is a recurring theme in nonfictional autobiographical intersex accounts), and 
to their tremendous defining power over their patients.  
In the next scene of the intersex storyline, Dr. Edson and Dr. Corday talk to 
Barbie’s parents about their findings. For the most part, Edson is speaking. His 
explanations consist mainly of medical verbiage and are delivered in a deadpan, 
clinical manner. The whole scene lasts about less than two minutes; hence, due to 
limited time resources, the crucial information – provided both for the Kligmans on 
a narrative level and for the audience – needs to be broken down into concise terms 
and messages. Edson’s statement delivering Barbie’s ‘diagnosis’ is a 15-second-
summary of what appears to be a highly distorted and inaccurate description of the 
Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome (AIS), its causes, and embryological development: 
“Barbie has a condition called testicular feminization. Genetically, she’s a male with 
XY chromosomes. But during development, the fetal tissue was resistant to 
testosterone, and the external genitalia developed as female” (24:55). This assertion 
employs several problematical discursive strategies. First of all, the use of the 
outdated term ‘testicular feminization’ instead of the accurate term AIS was probably 
intended to make the ‘condition’ sound more spectacular, to intensify the shock effect 
for Barbie’s parents and the sensationalist value for the viewers. Its stigmatizing 
impact on individuals with AIS is simply not taken into account or is even approved 
of, as many of the members of the AIS support group (AISSG) have pointed out in 
their viewer responses.11 The medical claim that human individuals with XY 
chromosomes are ‘genetically male,’ i.e. claiming chromosomes to be the defining 
parameter for gender distinctions, marking bearers of XY for a male gender, is 
presented by the doctor as an undisputed scientific fact, but fails to acknowledge the 
cultural constructedness of such a definition of gender.12 Edson also refers to the often 
                                                             
11  The responses and e-mails to the producers of ER and/or the NBC network from members 
of AISSG can be found at http://www.aissg.org/debates/ER.HTM. 
12  Alice Dreger (1998) and Anne Fausto-Sterling (2000) provide detailed discussions about 
the historical conditionality of the parameters of gender construction. 




employed medical script of doctors to explain an intersex variation to the parents, 
which involves an explanation of the processes of ‘normal’ embryonic sex 
differentiation and of the ‘divergence’ from the standard development in the case of 
the intersex child (Fausto-Sterling 2000: 49f). In Edson’s account, the fetal tissue is 
described as ‘resistant’ to testosterone, i.e. resistant to what is medically considered 
the typical development for infants with XY chromosomes – the tissue is attributed a 
metaphorical value of a ‘resistance fighter’ against a norm, and thus becomes ‘unruly’ 
from the perspective of the medical standard.13 
Barbie’s mother’s disbelieving objection to Edson’s statement, “there’s gotta be 
a mistake” (25:10), is retorted by medical authority: “No mistake. The vagina’s 
nothing but a blind pouch. No uterus or ovaries. She’ll need to be on estrogen 
replacement therapy” (25:12). Again, alleged medical facts are delivered in a way 
that makes unmistakably clear who has the defining power over Barbie, Barbie’s 
gender, and Barbie’s body. There is no reason provided for the necessity of additional 
estrogen and how this would affect her body. The language used by the doctor marks 
Barbie’s sexed corporeality, and by extension, her gender performance, as defective, 
insufficient and useless: the ‘blind pouch’ which was supposed to be a ‘vaginal 
opening’ leads into a ‘dead end,’ and the lack of a uterus and ovaries leads to her 
inability to “menstruate or bear children” (25:42). Hence, the ultimate function of a 
woman, namely being able to get penetrated (by a penis), and so sexually satisfy men, 
and bearing children, is something Barbie is not capable of; hence she ‘fails’ as a 
woman from the medico-cultural point of view. 
When the father questions the doctor’s opinion, “my little girl has testicles?” 
(25:21), the parents are again corrected by Edson: “Actually we had to remove them 
because of the high incidence of malignant transformation” (25:24). The casualness 
of how this information is given belies the severe implications of this act. The surgical 
removal of the testes without the informed consent of either the patient or her parents 
attests to the doctors’ highly unethical behavior. Performing a ‘castration’ under the 
guise of the cancer scare is not only controversial from the medical perspective – as 
the cancer risk resulting from undescended testes at that age is not very high 
(Duhaime-Ross 2013) – but moreover incapacitates her body from producing 
estrogen on its own. As a result, Barbie will “have to undergo a chemically-induced 
puberty via HRT [hormone replacement therapy]” (an AIS 49 year-old, in an e-mail 
to NBC, AISSG 1998) – paradoxically, the surgical intervention into Barbie’s body 
first destroys her capacity to ‘naturally’ perform a function only to medically 
intervene for a second time to ‘fix’ what has been destroyed by medicine’s own 
means before. 
                                                             
13  Susan Sontag comments in Illness as Metaphor (1978) on how a specific rhetoric of illness 
draws on warfare metaphors. 
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Yet on another level, the actions and statements made by the doctors function as 
commentaries on the question of gender. Against Dr. Edson’s gender claims with 
regard to Barbie, her parents hold on to their daughter’s femaleness. “I don’t 
understand. I changed her diapers. I know every inch of her” (25:28), her mother 
exclaims desperately in another attempt to refute the doctors’ claims, and her father 
asks, “she’s a boy?” (25:33), not willing to let go of their girl’s assigned birth gender. 
They are eventually reassured by Dr. Corday, who speaks for the first time in this 
scene and in the doctor-parent interaction: “The genetics don’t matter. You’ve raised 
her as a girl. Barbie is a girl. It’s what she looks like. It’s her identity. Nothing will 
change that” (25:35). At first glance, Corday’s statement contradicts the logics of the 
medical defining parameter for gender, i.e. genetics, and thus counters her 
colleague’s medical opinion. She emphasizes the importance of the gender of rearing, 
i.e. the sociocultural significance for the constitution of Barbie’s gender. However, 
her reasoning has two crucial implications: first, she fails to consider the 
interrelatedness of a person’s corporeality and their sense of gender. Second, she 
seems to imply that Barbie’s feminine appearance is a crucial signifier for her 
femaleness, as if less feminine or even masculine girls or women were somehow less 
female. Moreover, the statement “it’s what she looks like” suggests that Barbie is not 
‘really’ a girl/female, but only appears to be a girl, while ‘in reality’ her bodily 
condition proves otherwise (a lack of primary ‘female’ sex organs, the presence of 
‘male’ chromosomes, etc.). In fact, Corday has announced earlier that “Barbie is a 
boy” (22:24), on the basis of the results of the biopsy. 
Sure enough, Edson intervenes into Corday’s assertion, pointing out again the 
cultural significance of Barbie’s bodily ‘failures’ in medical terms: “But you have to 
understand that she’ll never menstruate or bear children” (25:42). At this point, the 
parents finally break down, the mother starts to cry, the father is visibly disturbed. 
Corday, in closing the doctor-parent interaction, seeks to reassure them: “Obviously 
this has come as a shock. You’ll need time to adjust. Barbie’s recovering. We’ll refer 
you to a genetic counselor. They’ll help you decide when and how to tell her” (25:52). 
While it seems odd that the parents should be referred to a genetic counselor rather 
than a psychologist, further counseling is at least offered, and the prospect that Barbie 
will be eventually told the truth about her intersex variation seems like an ethical 
decision. The father nods and thanks the doctors, and the conversation between 
doctors and parents is over.  
However the scene’s last take shows Corday and Edson leaving the room and 
Edson complimenting Corday on the “nice job” she did, adding: “you forgot to 
mention that they’ll have to change Barbie’s name to Ken” (26:20). Corday’s 
disapproving look does nothing to seriously challenge this final act of violence, the 
violence of language and of representation. The Barbie/Ken line, supposedly meant 
to be a joke, received widespread criticism within the AIS community. As the main 
argument for their anger, the commenters (mainly women with AIS) refer to the 




general misconception of AIS girls/women ‘really’ being male, or girls/women with 
AIS being not ‘real’ females: “Women with AIS often live in fear of such crass 
misunderstandings by society and some doctors (such as your medical advisors, 
perhaps) concerning this condition. The sort of cheap laugh invoked by your actor is 
an example and it will have done a lot of harm to the thousands of women with AIS, 
and their families and friends, who may have been watching,” a 48 year-old AIS 
woman writes in an e-mail to NBC (AISSG 1998). It needs to be noted that not all 
individuals with AIS might identify as female, and that the opinions expressed in the 
viewer responses published on the webpage of the AISSG only represent a small 
number of persons with AIS. Yet these comments make the crucial point that the self-
identification of persons with AIS is oftentimes completely ignored and overruled by 
medical authorities – or, in this case, the writers of ER and their medical advisors,14 
and by extension, their fictional doctors –, and medical or biological ‘facts’ are 
frequently considered more relevant in the determination of a person’s gender than 
the person’s own sense of gender identity. As another member of AISSG phrases it: 
 
“I realize that the Barbie/Ken comment was completely in character for Dr. Whathisname, the 
jerk. But you had a responsibility to counteract his cruel stupidity with some kind of epiphany 
on the part of Dr. Corday, a realization that chromosomes (and even undescended testes) do 
not in all cases a man make, and that the real locus of gender is in the individual’s sense of self, 
not in the organs or the chromosomes.” (An AIS 45 year-old, in an e-mail to NBC, AISSG 1998) 
 
The insensitive and ethically problematic representation of AIS persons hence must 
not only be ascribed to a specific character in ER, who is known for his 
condescending and questionable ethical behavior, but needs to be considered as a 
structuring principle of intersex representation in the episode (as a part of the series).  
This argument of a problematic intersex representation as a systematic mis-
representation becomes even clearer in the context of the episode’s framing, the 
Halloween theme. The Halloween theme of masquerading and disguise does not only 
come full circle at the end of the episode but also in the last scene of the intersex 
storyline. Corday checks on Barbie, who is apparently still unaware of her intersex 
‘diagnosis.’ Barbie asks the doctor whether it is still Halloween, and that she will not 
be able to go trick-or-treating. She does however not feel too sorry about this: “The 
best part was making the costume anyway. Me and my mom made it together” 
(30:47). She then asks Corday for her tiara, which is part of her costume, at which 
Corday puts the tiara on Barbie’s head. On Barbie’s question, “How do I look?” she 
answers, “like a beautiful fairy princess” (31:16), accompanied by a smile that seems 
forced, but probably is meant to be reassuring. The scene concludes here and with it, 
the intersex storyline of “Masquerade,” leaving open many questions, first of all the 
                                                             
14  In fact Joe Sachs, one of the writers of “Masquerade,” is an M.D.  
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question of whether Barbie will be told the truth about her intersex variation and how 
she reacts to the revelation.  
Interpretations of this scene and the ending of ER’s intersex narrative prove to be 
ambivalent. The motif of disguise and putting on ‘false’ identities with costumes is 
very obvious in the last scene. Yet the meaning of Corday’s final symbolic act can 
be interpreted as either reaffirming Barbie’s female gender identification, or as 
‘exposing’ Barbie’s sense of gendered self as not ‘real.’ Corday’s statement about 
Barbie’s female gender as not defined by her genetics, which also reassesses her 
earlier comment that “Barbie is a boy” because of her testicles, is indicative that the 
doctor (now) advocates a non-biologist approach to the concept of gender. With this 
attitude she presents, at least to some extent, a counter-perspective to the traditional 
medical view that enforces a biological essentialist gender conception upon its 
subjects (i.e. patients). The latter, more conservative medical approach is represented 
by Dr. Edson (and other male doctors) in ER. It is probably no coincidence that the 
traditional medical, that is, scientifically legitimized and thus (more) relevant 
perspective is held by a male doctor, while the advocate of an approach influenced 
by gender and queer theory is a female doctor. While the latter seems to be the more 
progressive one, in 1998, gender/queer theory was still considered as not presenting 
scientifically valid results. The distribution of gender roles with regard to ER’s 
doctors is reinforced by the hospital hierarchy in which Dr. Edson and Dr. Corday 
are positioned in season five: he is her superior, after she was obligated to repeat her 
surgical internship in order to get a license to practice as a surgeon in the US, hence 
she experiences a career setback, and the tasks she has to fulfill are way below her 
expertise and considered as mostly trivial. As a consequence, it is questionable 
whether Corday’s potential reaffirmation of Barbie’s femaleness can prevail over the 
medico-cultural misrepresentations of AIS persons in “Masquerade.” 
The last ‘intersex scene,’ as pointed out, still conveys ambiguous messages. In an 
e-mail sent to NBC, a member of AISSG comments on the scene’s equivocal 
narrative strategy:  
 
“Was [Corday] affirming the girl’s femininity, or was the director just going for some cheap, 
heart-tugging irony: Barbie looks like a girl, she thinks she’s a girl, but Dr. Corday and you, 
dear viewer, knows that she’s an impostor. I strongly suspect that you had the latter in mind. 
Shame on you.” (An AIS 45 year-old, in an e-mail to NBC, AISSG 1998) 
 
Another person with AIS voices a similar concern with regard to the producers’ 
intentions: 
 
“I thought the whole gist of that was: okay you folks out there in TV-Land, get the pathos – 
here’s this kid who thinks she’s a girl and looks like a girl, and even wants to wear her 




Hallowe’en tiara, but, by golly, she isn’t really a girl. A little Hallowe’en trick for y’all.” (e-
mail reaction of an AIS 45 year-old, AISSG 1998) 
 
This impression that the episode’s narrative strategies represent Barbie as a ‘gender 
impostor’ refers to the widespread cultural notion of intersex individuals as taking on 
‘false’ gender identities and so intentionally deceiving others.15 Such a representation 
is highly problematic as it alludes to and reinforces interphobic and transphobic ideas 
and creates a dangerous atmosphere and precarious living conditions for intersex (and 
transgender) persons within society. The image of being ‘gender deceivers,’ which is 
inextricably linked with transphobia and homophobia, is the reason why gender 
nonconforming individuals are attacked and many are murdered at extremely high 
rates (Hammer). The constant threat of having their physical and emotional integrity 
damaged is a reality for everyone who supposedly violates the rules of the gender 
binary and heteronormativity. These severe consequences faced by many intersex 
persons are completely omitted in ER’s discussion of the topic. What is moreover 
ignored to a large extent is the fact that LGBTQI youth is very susceptible to being 
rejected by their families or even to experiencing violence in their families, and as a 
consequence make up approximately 40% of homeless youth in the US (Durso and 
Gates 2012: 3). “Masquerade” only vaguely hints at the parents’ distress concerning 
Barbie’s intersex variation, but it remains unclear how they will react on facing their 
child, whether they will be honest to her, or whether her AIS will remain a family 
secret. 
Moreover, the episode not only neglects to address the fact that intersex 
individuals are highly susceptible to violent attacks by others, but also ignores the 
internal struggles many intersex persons have to deal with as a consequence of their 
medical treatment. “Masquerade”’s representation of intersex perpetuates the shame, 
secrecy, and stigmatization that are inherent factors in the traditional medical 
                                                             
15  The notion of intersex persons as gender impostors, willfully deceiving the public, dates 
back to the 17th century. Before the 18th century, the problem with gender ambiguous 
individuals was less the anatomical ambiguity but rather acts of ‘gender deception’ which 
threatened to disrupt the gendered foundation of American society. The state authorities 
who regulated gender-transgressive behavior were the judicial authorities rather than 
medical experts. ‘Cross-dressing’ was considered as a crime, as is best exemplified by the 
case of Thomas/Thomasine Hall (documented in the Minutes of the Council and General 
Court of Colonial Virginia, 1629), who throughout their life was crossing back and forth 
between male and female genders. While the court accepted Hall as a person embodying 
both sexes, Hall was ordered to wear a strange mix of clothes considered to be partly male 
and partly female “to preclude future acts of deception, to mark the offender, and to warn 
others against similar abomination. The dual-sexed Hall embodied an impermissible 
category of gender” (Reis 2005: 419). 
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‘management’ of intersex persons; hence, in the view of several viewers with AIS, 
ER and NBC are held responsible for the harmful representation of intersex/AIS on 
mainstream television: 
 
“Your representation of AIS was worse than insensitive....it was sensationalistic and ethically 
irresponsible. ‘You should have told her [sic] (the parents) that they will have to change 
Barbie’s name to Ken.’ ‘This girl is really a boy.’ These are a few of the comments made during 
your program by people playing doctors. What do you suppose would be the response from a 
girl with AIS when she saw that on TV? On a show like ER? Pride? Validation? I don’t think 
so. Try shame....embarassment [sic]....or just flat out horror. [...] This could have been a real 
turning point in getting the word out and ratifying the traditional handling of AIS. But as it 
turns out....you just continued the legacy of deceit, secrecy and shame. Frankly, you blew it.” 
(An AIS 28 year-old in an e-mail to NBC, AISSG 1998) 
 
It is debatable whether a popular fictional series like ER is to be held accountable for 
inaccurate portrayals and presentations of ‘facts,’ and for the possible consequences 
for and reactions of the persons or groups which are portrayed, and viewers in 
general. To deny the cultural power and influence of prime time programs and the 
ideological messages they convey would be irresponsible; and I argued earlier that in 
the light of severe violations of intersex persons’ human rights, intersex 
representations (in particular representations that situate intersex persons in a medical 
context) cannot be disentangled from their ethical implications. The question that 
arises, however, is the question of how a fictional program can represent an intersex 
storyline in a critical, reflective way without perpetuating certain images, ideas, and 
strategies that are harmful. Furthermore, what is implied when asking for ‘accurate 
representations’ of intersex in a medical drama? 
While the representation of an intersex/AIS ‘case’ in “Masquerade” is 
problematic in many ways, it is not overall inaccurate. In fact, it conveys specific 
aspects of the treatment of intersex patients which reflect the, often negative, real-life 
experiences of many intersex persons with the medical establishment. Performing 
surgery on intersex children or infants without informed consent – either of the child 
or their parents – is a case in point. The violation of an intersex patient’s right of self-
determination and bodily integrity is a major issue in intersex narratives and intersex 
activism. Doctors behaving in a condescending manner towards patient and parents, 
withholding critical information, and acting without consent has a long tradition in 
the (collective) intersex experience. Their disregard of an intersex person’s own 
gender identification is a particularly striking example of doctors’ routinely exerted 
violence against intersex patients.  
The ER episode “Masquerade” aptly represents the medical authorities’ 
tremendous power over their patients, although, I argue, without any indication of 
critical self-reflexivity. This assessment of the series’ lack of self-reflexivity is 




substantiated by another storyline in the episode, which demonstrates that doctors are 
rarely held accountable for their actions in ER, even if these turn out to be mistakes. 
At the beginning of the episode, a woman is delivered into the ER who claims to be 
pregnant. As it turns out, she has been diagnosed with schizophrenia, and hence Dr. 
Greene, the attending physician, questions her credibility and prescribes her Haldol 
without further examination. When a pregnancy test later confirms the woman’s 
actual pregnancy, Greene supports her in her considerations to end the pregnancy – 
albeit for different reasons: she wonders whether her schizophrenia and going off 
medication would enable her to be a good mother, and he is worried that the Haldol 
would result in a malformation of the baby’s limbs, and that he and the hospital would 
get sued for mistreatment as a consequence. Although the storyline is not continued 
after this point and it is not known what happens afterwards, the way the conflict is 
presented strongly suggests that she will have an abortion and the doctor will be ‘off 
the hook,’ as his colleague notes. The apparently uncontested power of medical 
authority and their at times unethical behavior recurs at a later point in the intersex 
storyline, where the doctors are not held accountable for removing Barbie’s testes 
without her or her parents’ knowledge, let alone consent. What is more, this action is 
not even presented as ethically questionable in the series, in contrast to Greene’s 
obvious mistake with the pregnant woman. 
“Masquerade”’s intersex narrative remains largely unresolved in the end. The 
narrative’s framing and structuring by the themes of Halloween and masquerading 
conveys a deeply problematic image of girls/women with certain bodily 
characteristics that are classified as male (XY chromosomes, testes) as being not 
‘real’ girls/women. This representation fails to acknowledge that the sexing of bodies 
is a cultural act, and that particular body parts cannot entirely determine what a person 
feels about their gendered self. This image of a girl with AIS being ‘really’ a boy is 
reiterated throughout the narrative, thereby using several narrative strategies: both 
Dr. Edson and initially Dr. Corday claim Barbie to be a boy, even in the interaction 
with Barbie’s parents; Barbie’s alleged ‘maleness’ is accounted for in biologist-
essentialist terms claimed to be scientific ‘facts’; the fairy princess costume is used 
as a symbol for Barbie’s femininity as a disguise (i.e. disguising her alleged ‘male’ 
body). The doctors are not held accountable for the sterilization of Barbie without 
her or her parents’ consent or even knowledge, and their actions are not ethically 
questioned in the episode. There is no moment in which this representation is 
effectively counteracted, or at least challenged. 
Moreover, “Masquerade” perpetuates specific narratives that construct intersex 
as a ‘social emergency,’ which is displaced to the level of and articulated in terms of 
a medical emergency in the episode, and which needs to be taken care of as soon as 
possible. The title of the series itself, Emergency Room, already connotes a dealing 
with only severe and urgent medical cases, generally matters of life and death. ER’s 
metanarrative is a narrative about the precariousness of bodies, and about the role of 
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medical authority in restoring bodily integrity where it is in danger of being lost. To 
situate an intersex storyline into such a narrative context is difficult in itself, but it is 
particularly problematic when the narrative fails to critically interrogate its own 
representational mechanisms.  
“Masquerade” fails not only to acknowledge the debates on gender performativity 
and the cultural constitution of sex that took place at the time, but to relate to current 
discussions of the medical treatment of intersex and the criticism voiced by intersex 
activists. The Chicago Hope episode “The Parent Rap,” which was produced two 
years earlier, demonstrates that a more differentiated representation of intersex is 
possible when it integrates different discourses and critical challenges to the 
traditional medical protocol. Narrative closure of the intersex storyline in 
“Masquerade” is achieved by reaffirming the status quo of both hegemonic intersex 
narratives and of normative notions of sexed embodiment. Thus it offers a resolution 
of the intersex ‘case’ that is socially acceptable for many ER viewers and the 
mainstream. Critical commentaries by viewers with AIS however demonstrate that 
the episode’s representation is not acceptable for everyone. “Masquerade” establishes 
conditions of intelligibility within its narrative framework that constrain the 
intelligibility of intersex to the point where ‘intersex’ is hardly recognizable. The 
narrative’s dull negotiation of intersex raises the question of why the screenwriters 
and producers chose to include an intersex storyline at all, other than for 
sensationalist purposes, and for shaming girls and women whose bodies do not 
conform to medico-cultural standards of femaleness. I conclude my analysis with 
pointing once again to the reactions by viewers who are women with AIS and parents 
of girls with AIS, who voiced massive concern about the stigmatization of AIS 
girls/women perpetuated by the ER episode. Taking the criticism of those who are 
immediately affected by harmful representations of intersex/AIS into account, I 
hence conclusively argue that “Masquerade”’s intersex representation can be 
considered as the ‘violence of representation’ in the sense of Toni Morrison’s claim 




6.4 DECEIVING GENDER, REVISITED:                       
INTERSEX FEMININITY IS ONLY “SKIN DEEP,” OR: 
HOUSE’S CASE OF INTERSEX MISOGYNY 
 
Almost a decade after Chicago Hope and Emergency Room each featured intersex 
storylines in one of their episodes, two extremely successful medical drama series, 
House and Grey’s Anatomy, both took up the theme of intersex for their 
renegotiations of the topic in popular culture in the same year, 2006. Considering the 




timespan between the first two and the latter two episodes, one particular point of 
interest in my analysis is the question of how the shifts in intersex discourses and the 
developments of intersex activism have affected mainstream popular cultural 
representations of intersex. Between the mid-1990s and 2006, some major changes 
in North American intersex activism had taken place. I discuss the development of 
intersex activism and the shift in the movement’s agenda in more detail in chapter 
two; hence I am content here with pointing to the most significant processes during 
that time period. The shift from activism that focused on self-help, to the challenging 
of medical treatment practices, to efforts to develop new health care guidelines, and 
eventually to the focus on human rights issues has occurred in less than fifteen years 
of contemporary intersex activism. My analysis of intersex representations in medical 
drama series hence continues with the questions of how popular culture reacted to 
these changes, and what other cultural discourses are interrelated in their intersex 
representations.   
The episode “Skin Deep” of House’s second season (episode 13) originally aired 
on February 20, 2006 on the Fox network. In this episode, Dr. Gregory House and 
his team treat Alex, a 15-year-old girl working as a teenage supermodel, who displays 
symptoms such as double vision, cataplexy, twitching, and nausea, among others. 
The team comes up with several differential diagnoses – side effects from heroin 
withdrawal, neurological conditions, juvenile multiple sclerosis, Parkinson – and 
conducts tests to check and eventually dismiss their hypotheses. House is convinced 
that her symptoms prove she is suffering from posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) 
resulting from sexual abuse by her father. Although Alex’s father eventually admits 
that he had sex with his daughter, further tests also rule out PTSD as a valid diagnosis 
which would explain the symptoms. Eventually House suspects that Alex must have 
cancer, and it is revealed that she in fact has a tumor on one internal testicle. 
In commentaries provided by intersex community members, “Skin Deep” was 
unanimously received as unacceptable regarding its representation of intersex. The 
Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome Support Group (AISSG) calls the portrayal of AIS 
in the House episode “as ridiculous as the 1998 ER [Emergency Room] episode 
[“Masquerade”]” and attests the producers of House and the TV production company 
Fox substantial lack of thorough background research on intersex: “One can only 
assume they go out of their way to present as distorted a view as possible” (AISSG 
2006). April Herndon of ISNA even describes “Skin Deep” as “painful” to watch and 
“without a doubt, one of the most offensive and hurtful portrayals of people with 
intersex conditions that I’ve ever seen” (Herndon 2006). In her opinion, “this episode 
mocks both people with Disorders of Sex Development and the work that the intersex 
community has done to end shame. [...] We believe that such wrongheaded and 
insensitive portrayals are harmful to individuals with Disorders of Sex Development 
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and to our work to better educate the public” (Herndon 2006).16 In the view of the 
intersex community’s public voices, the series, as part of a larger mainstream 
television program, obviously has missed the opportunity to inform a broader public 
about intersex, by failing to provide a sympathetic and more accurate representation 
of an intersex person and her intersex variation, in favor of a sensationalist 
representation of a “pseudohermaphrodite,” an archaic product of the cultural 
imagination. 
The following analysis of “Skin Deep” will interrogate how intersex, embodied 
by the character of Alex, is constructed through the episode’s narrative and visual 
representational strategies, and how cultural narratives of the sexed body and gender 
intersect with medical discourses on intersex.17 The guiding question is if and how 
the intersex subject’s (Alex) intelligibility is produced in the House episode, by 
investigating how the cultural norms and practices that condition gender 
intelligibility operate in “Skin Deep.” The processes of producing intelligibility prove 
to be in a sense reversed or twisted in the episode’s narrative, as will be discussed 
below.   
I start my analysis with pointing out that the series House and its narrative 
strategies, and in particular the character of House, can be read on several levels, 
including an interpretation of House/House as being inherently self-reflective, ironic, 
and functioning as a popular cultural commentary on contemporary social debates 
and the state of US-American society. Such a reading is supported by the stylization 
of the figure of House as a sardonic, misanthropic, and narcissistic character whose 
antagonism and unorthodox behavior as a doctor is compensated by his ingenious 
medical skills. His mantra, “everybody lies,” signifies the deconstructive strategy on 
which the narrative framework of House operates. The character of House enjoys 
great popularity, which can be, to a considerable extent, explained by the ideological 
messages he conveys, that it is acceptable to be unethical, to perpetuate all kind of ‘
However, I argue that despite a possible reading of specific narrative strategies as 
                                                             
16  Note here that Herndon herself uses the term ‘disorders of sex development’ to refer to 
intersex individuals and the term intersex ‘condition’ rather than intersex ‘variation.’ While 
the usage of the terms ‘condition’ and especially ‘DSD’ is highly controversial among the 
intersex communities, and even seems to contradict the logics of Herndon’s argument, her 
claim about the damaging and counterproductive effects of “Skin Deep” on both intersex 
individuals and the communities’ efforts of educating the public still appears valid. 
17  The cultural and medical discourses exist, of course, not independently from one another, 
as medical discourses are always already cultural discourses. The distinction made at this 
point is to be understood as a distinction between medical discourses related to the medical 
realm of the hospital and broader cultural discourses that are (supposedly) unrelated to the 
institution of medical practice. 
-isms,’ as long as it serves the ‘greater good’ (i.e. the saving of people’s lives). 




intended to convey the series’ irony and critical commentary, these and other 
narrative strategies ultimately undermine the series’ own claim of self-reflexivity. 
Several of these strategies perpetuate harmful ideas, making them seem ‘acceptable,’ 
and hence can be considered as a form of narrative violence of representation. I will 
specify my arguments in the concrete analysis of “Skin Deep.” 
“Skin Deep” uses a double strategy working towards the tacit construction of 
intersex until the solution of the medical mystery, the eventual revelation of Alex’s 
intersex variation. The typical scheme of House involves the presentation of a patient 
with strange, even ‘mysterious’ symptoms and the subsequent medical quest to find 
a solution to the problem in a Sherlock Holmes style,18 and ultimately the saving of 
the patient’s life. Several diagnoses having proved wrong and all medical 
interventions having failed, House, in the nick of time, has an epiphany which leads 
him to the correct diagnosis. The solving of the case usually occurs in the last few 
minutes of the episode, followed by a quick medical intervention without further 
discussion and (in the majority of cases) the last-minute saving of the patient. This 
formula however proves to be problematic in the case of representing intersex in 
“Skin Deep.”  
The double strategy employed in “Skin Deep” is to present the medical symptoms 
in a way that sets both the characters in the episode and the viewers on the wrong 
track with regard to the eventual solution, the tentative diagnoses assumed by the 
doctors being completely unrelated to intersex variations. The only time a faint hint 
is given in this direction occurs when the doctors wonder that she has not menstruated 
yet, but the issue is immediately explained by either a possible “drug addiction,” 
“bulimia,” or “her age” and not taken up again (7:45-7:51).19 From the medical point 
of view, nothing seems to hint at a troubled sexed corporeality, let alone gender 
issues. Simultaneously, from the very beginning Alex is represented in a highly 
sexualized manner, her femininity is overemphasized throughout the episode, and her 
female body stylized as “the sexual ideal” (7:03). This strategic move of distracting 
the viewers’ attention from any suspicions about intersex on a medical level, while 
on a parallel level drawing their attention to Alex’s highly gendered performance 
serves to raise the viewers’ expectations about the figure of Alex, only to shatter these 
very expectations in a final revelation at the climax of the plot.  
The episode’s representation of gender is informed by heteronormative notions 
of femaleness/maleness, by sexism, and by homophobia. “Skin Deep” opens with a 
scene at a fashion show, where Alex works as a model. She wears heavy make-up, a 
                                                             
18  For a discussion of the similarities between Sherlock Holmes and House, see House M.D. 
Guide and House Wiki. 
19  All following timecode numbers in this chapter refer to the timecode of “Skin Deep.” 
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tight, short dress, has long, blond hair and definitely looks older than fifteen.20 
Although she is exhausted, anxious, and feels sick, she needs to ‘function’ as a 
‘woman,’ which means, as a pretty object, in the service of the beauty industry, forced 
into this performance by her father who also acts as her manager, and if necessary 
with the help of drugs and alcohol. After she collapses on the runway, she is delivered 
to the Princeton-Plainsboro Hospital in New Jersey (the fictional hospital where 
House is set), where her sexualization continues perpetually.  
House’s use of the supermodel stereotype to represent a woman with Androgen 
Insensitivity Syndrome (AIS) was also most certainly influenced by the increased 
accounts of ‘suspecting’ several female supermodels of having AIS.21 This 
stereotypical representation of AIS women as extraordinarily attractive and virtually 
embodying the female ideal is also a motif in Middlesex, epitomized by the character 
of Zora, whose AIS “created the perfect woman” (Middlesex 487). The description 
of Zora, as “blond, [...] shapely and full-lipped. Her prominent cheekbones divided 
her face in Arctic planes. [...] And then there was her figure, the milkmaid breasts, 
the swim champ stomach, the legs of a sprinter or a Martha Graham dancer. Even 
unclothed, Zora appeared to be all woman” (Middlesex 487), is reminiscent of the 
visual representation of Alex in “Skin Deep.” The references to fashion models 
presumably having AIS, which is only sketchily touched upon in Middlesex, is 
practically the leitmotif in the House episode, in a most blatant and literal way as 
Alex’s job is modeling. Obviously both the media’s speculations about ‘AIS models’ 
and Eugenides’ taking up of this idea might have served as an inspiration for the 
producers of House. In contrast, first-person accounts of individuals with AIS 
virtually never address the topic of modeling. Yet, the sexualization of people with 
AIS obviously is far more interesting than accounts of AIS persons pursuing 
‘ordinary’ jobs and lives. It is the fascination with female supermodels ‘really’ being 
‘male’ (i.e. having XY chromosomes and/or testes) or intersex, and the idea of 
‘exposing’ what appears to be female beauty and perfection as in fact an ‘illusion’ 
(or, as ‘skin deep,’ as the House episode’s title suggests), that have shaped the cultural 
imagination of intersex. The House episode reiterates a very specific representation 
of girls/women with AIS that is also employed in the Emergency Room episode 
“Masquerade” (the parallels of the two titles’ signification is also striking).  
When Alex’s case is introduced at the hospital, she is immediately denoted as 
“teenage supermodel” (5:02); her symptoms – and thus her status as a patient – are 
obviously less important to House than her physical appearance. The term ‘(teenage) 
                                                             
20  The actress who plays Alex, Cameron Richardson, was age 26 at the time of filming. 
Richardson has also worked as a model and appeared on several men’s magazines’ top 100 
“sexiest women” lists (Stuff 2002, Maxim 2005 and 2009). 
21  Annie Richards’ article “Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome” (2003) compiles various 
sources about the issue. 




supermodel’ is more frequently used by the doctors to refer to her than her name, 
Alex, is used and even more frequently than the term ‘patient’ is used. On seeing 
Alex for the first time, House comments on her appearance with, “wow. You should 
be a model. Are you really fifteen? [...] I probably should stop staring and check out 
the file” (5:20-5:41). This remark already indicates that the doctor-patient-
relationship is displaced to a sexual level, with the subject position of ‘doctor’ being 
occupied by the ‘sexual predator’ and the subject position of ‘patient’ being occupied 
by his ‘sexual object.’ 
The whole process of finding a medical diagnosis is informed by unmedical and 
uncalled-for commentaries, rendered by both House and Dr. Chase, a younger male 
team member, about Alex’s bodily characteristics: “The perfectly-sculpted, bountiful 
breasts” or “love apples” (House, 7:54, 8:06), which are in Chase’s opinion 
“implants” (7:58) because they appear too big and too perfect. The only doctor who 
disapproves of the sexism is Dr. Allison Cameron, a younger and the only female 
member of House’s team, who considers Alex actually as a patient and seeks to 
concentrate on her health, and also as still a child who needs protection from abusive 
actions. 
When Cameron disapproves of House’s sexual interest in Alex (“She’s fifteen. 
[...] This is creepy, even for you”), he replies, “She’s a fashion model, on the cover 
of magazines. We hold her up as the sexual ideal. The law says we can’t touch her 
for three more years. How hypocritical is that?” (6:50-7:07). This statement already 
introduces the theme of sexual abuse and constructs Alex even more as a sexual 
object. In fact, the sexual use/abuse of her even seems to be justified by her 
embodying the ‘sexual ideal,’ and legislature which ensures her protection is 
debunked as allegedly ‘hypocritical.’ House’s comment can be read as an ironic 
social commentary on the sexualization of girls and women in the US and its inherent 
double standards, what hence marks a moment of metacritical reflexivity in the 
episode. I argue that despite a possible reading of this instance as a metacritical 
commentary, the narrative’s own strategies undermine its claim of self-reflexivity. 
Child abuse is not only trivialized but becomes a tool in the quest of the right 
diagnosis. House’s hypothesis that Alex suffers from PTSD as a consequence of her 
father sexually abusing her is, in House’s view, substantiated neither by medical 
evidence (such as physical signs of rape), nor by Alex’s statements or behavior, but 
rather by the fact that she is attractive: “You saw that tokus? Would the fact that she’s 
your daughter really stop you?”, House justifies his theory when discussing it with 
his team (16:04-16:07). He also obviously sees no point in handling the sensitive 
issue with more decency or even professionality, when he confronts Alex’s father 
with his suspicion, screaming in front of other patients and medical staff: “Are you 
doing your daughter?” (18:14). Again, sexual abuse seems to be explicable by the 
victim’s beauty: “She is a babe” (18:30).  
276 | INTERSEX NARRATIVES 
 
This becomes even more obvious when House talks to the father in private and 
tries to make him admit his sexual abuse: “Hard to imagine anyone not wanting to 
nail her” (19:24). The father’s angry reaction is assuaged by House’s insistence that 
“It’s a compliment!” (19:27). The backward, heavily sexist assumption that men 
viewing and using women as sexual objects, commenting on their physical 
appearance and deeming them as ‘fuckable’ is to be considered a ‘compliment’ only 
reveals the inherent and blatant sexism of not only House the character, but House, 
the drama series. His assumption is in fact taken up later by the representation of 
Alex’s reaction to the confrontation with the sexual abuse issue. For now, House gets 
the father to admit having had sex with his daughter “one time.”  
The trivialization and instrumentalization of child sexual abuse is temporarily 
countered when Cameron insists on calling Child Protective Services, against 
House’s refusal to do so, because he wants the father to stay at the hospital in order 
to get more ‘medically relevant’ information from him. There seems to be a radical 
disagreement concerning the significance and the interpretation of child sexual abuse 
along gender lines: while the female doctors Cameron and Lisa Cuddy are not willing 
to accept the “shielding [of] a child abuser” (Cuddy, 24:57) and understand the 
necessity to protect Alex since she is still a child (Cameron, 25:20), the male doctors 
consider Alex not only to be mature enough to take care of herself, but even ascribe 
the responsibility for her being sexually used/abused to her (sexual) precociousness: 
“She dropped out of high school to make millions of dollars. Why does she need 
more protection than some crack whore shivering in the clinic waiting room?” 
(Chase, 25:21). Chase’s comment is informed not only by sexist and violent 
language, but in equating Alex with what he refers to as “some crack whore” he 
simultaneously constructs Alex as a (depersonalized) sexual object who sells her 
body to men and for drugs, and discredits (female) sex workers as subhuman subjects 
not worth of being protected by either the law or by the medical establishment. 
Obviously, the blame for being sexual(ized) objects is in both cases on the women’s 
side.  
This inherently sexist attitude towards women in general and Alex in particular 
presented in House cannot be simply attributed to the character traits displayed by 
some individual characters in the series, most particularly House, but is revealed to 
be a structuring principle of the whole show by “Skin Deep”’s representation of the 
character of Alex. To begin with, the casting of a 26-year-old woman for the role of 
a 15-year-old girl is deeply troubling in itself. I argue that this visual representational 
strategy undermines and relativizes the seriousness of both the sexualization of Alex 
and the issue of child abuse. Even though her age is revealed, the visual image of 
Alex contradicts the information given about her age. The other characters in House, 
as well as the viewers, see an adult woman when they look at her. No 15-year-old 
girl, no matter what variations in sex characteristics she might have, has the body of 
a 26-year-old woman. This level of representation undermines any claim of irony or 




self-reflexivity House might make or be attributed. The repeated questioning of her 
age on a verbal level (“Are you really fifteen?”) and the intentional overlooking of 
her age in her sexualization (by the male characters) is not only pointless, considering 
that the casting of Cameron Richardson was deliberate, but is misleading the viewers 
in their perception of Alex as a girl/woman – it is highly doubtful that the 
representation of Alex as it functions in the episode would have worked in the same 
way if a 15-year-old actress had been cast for the role.     
The sentiment expressed by both House and Chase, that Alex herself is 
responsible for men sexually using/abusing her due to her beauty, is strongly 
emphasized by stylizing Alex as the manipulative, precocious ‘seductress’ who uses 
her attractiveness to reach her goals. In a conversation between Alex and Cameron 
about the sexual abuse, Alex gives an account of herself as a female subject. Butler 
notes that the “act of self-reporting and the act of self-observation take place in 
relation to a certain audience [...] for whom a verbal and visual picture of selfhood is 
produced” (Butler 2001: 629). On the plot level, Alex confides in Cameron, whom 
she considers as a confidant as she is also a young woman and whom she believes to 
understand and even associate herself with Alex’s actions. Simultaneously, Alex’s 
act of self-reporting implicitly takes place in relation to the viewers as the (implied) 
intended audience for whom her subjecthood is constructed. While Alex’s self-
reporting does not entail an explicit statement about her gender identification, it 
conveys implicit references to her gender, and to those gender norms that predispose 
her own sense of femaleness. The conversation between Alex and Cameron thus has 
the double function of presenting Alex’s own narrative about her self-conception as 
a girl/woman and of legitimizing, on the basis of Alex’s narrative, the use/abuse of 
her as a sexual object by men. This process is further substantiated by the moral 
commentary implicit in “Skin Deep”’s representational strategies, by juxtaposing 
Alex’s sense of morality to Cameron’s, marking Alex as the ‘immoral’ (in the sense 
of unchaste), tempting ‘Lolita’ type of woman.   
While Cameron insists on the father’s responsibility for the sexual abuse, Alex 
claims that she has seduced not only him but also her photographer, her financial 
manager, and her tutor for her own benefit. Alex is not only convinced that she is in 
the active role when having sex with adult men, but that it is alright, even justified 
that they have sex with her. Even when Cameron reminds her that she is smart and 
does not have to trade her sexuality, Alex’s response, “I am not that smart. I am that 
beautiful” (34:20), exposes the ways in which Alex is predisposed by the cultural 
discourses on women. She has so deeply internalized the culturally established idea 
of women using their beauty and their bodies to get what they want from men, the 
notion of trading sex for other benefits, that the sexualization of women has become 
normalized (and trivialized) in her view, and consequently has been incorporated into 
her performance of femaleness. This scene is telling on many levels and reveals how 
closely intertwined the issues of sexuality, sexism, abuse, victim-blaming, 
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femaleness, beauty, and power are in western culture – which are the defining 
parameters of ‘rape culture’ – and in cultural representations such as in a prime time 
drama series like House. 
Shortly before the plot eventually is about to reach the climax, the ‘epiphany 
scene,’ the moment in the plot when House suddenly has a revelation about the 
solution to the medical problem, the correct diagnosis, takes place. This scene shows 
a clinic patient whom House has treated at an earlier moment in the episode, a man 
who displays symptoms of Couvade syndrome (a ‘sympathetic pregnancy’), along 
with his pregnant wife who is about to give birth. When the woman complains about 
her husband, House comments: “You’ve got yourself the perfect man. A woman. 
He’s got more estrogen coursing through his veins than…” (35:00). This is the 
moment which triggers House’s epiphany regarding Alex’s condition. In the 
following scene, House insinuates during a consultation with Cameron that 
something might be wrong with Alex’s sex, substantiated by the fact that she has not 
much pubic hair and never had her period. When Cameron infers, “You’re thinking 
this is hormonal?”, House suggestively replies: “I’m thinking she’s the ultimate 
woman” (35:20-35:30). The juxtaposition of the ‘pregnant man’ to a girl with AIS 
can be read as a comment on the prevailing and normative medico-cultural marker of 
femaleness, namely pregnancy/motherhood. The episode’s strategy to juxtapose two 
hegemonic, normative signifiers for femaleness, beauty and motherhood, serves to 
simultaneously deconstruct and reaffirm cultural ideas of female sexed embodiment 
and its relatedness to gender. According to House’s logic, the definition of the 
‘perfect woman’ as having a body that has the capacity for pregnancy is negated 
(through the corporeality of Alex), but is at the same time replaced by a definition of 
femaleness that relies on aesthetic signifiers. Moreover, the definition of the ‘ultimate 
woman’ in terms of the amount of estrogens (and the degree of insensitivity to 
androgens) in the body relies on biologist-essentialist notions of sexed embodiment. 
Hence, the reiteration of normative concepts of femaleness in this scene does nothing 
to substantially challenge these very norms.  
This short dialogue is immediately followed by a scene in which House and 
Cameron do an MRI of Alex’s pelvis, and Cameron states that an oncologist already 
did an ultrasound and found that Alex’s ovaries were ‘undersized.’ House replies, 
already anticipating the result, that “the ultrasound would be the way to go if you 
were looking for ovarian cancer.” This scene is interposed between the ‘epiphany 
scene’ and the climax, with the double intention to substantiate House’s assertion 
with medical ‘evidence’ and to intensify the suspense for the viewers before the final 
revelation, by presenting Cameron’s shocked reaction to their findings, which are not 
yet given away to the viewers (35:50-36:16). 
The revelation scene appears in the last few minutes (36:17-38:54), as is typical 
for House’s structure and strategic conception. House enters the hospital room where 
Alex lies in bed, in presence of her father. House confronts them with the results, that 




they found a tumor. On the father’s question, “she has cancer?”, House replies: 
“Technically, no. [...] It’s cancer, but… he has cancer… on his left testicle.” When 
Alex protests, “I don’t have testicles,” and her father objects that Alex is not male, 
House disputes Alex’s (and her father’s) gender claim in an authoritative and 
condescending, even sarcastic manner, resorting to medical verbiage, which is 
moreover inaccurate: 
 
“His DNA says you’re wrong. Frogs and snails and puppy dog tails. You’ve got male 
pseudohermaphroditism. You see, we all start out as girls and then we’re differentiated, based 
on our genes. The ovaries develop into testes and drop. But in about one in every 150,000 
pregnancies, the fetus with an XY chromosome, a boy, develops into something else, like you. 
Your testes never descended, because you’re immune to testosterone. You’re pure estrogen. 
Which is why you have heightened female characteristics, clear skin, great breasts. The ultimate 
woman is a man. Nature’s cruel, huh?” 
 
The ‘solution’ of the case is hastily followed by House’s announcement of a medical 
intervention: “I’ll schedule him for surgery.” While the ostensible reason for the 
surgery, the removal of the testicles, is a medical one, namely to remove the tumor, 
the excising of the testicles is to be considered an act of cultural significance. In 
response to Alex’s angry challenge, “No! You’re wrong! I’m a girl!”, House 
ultimately settles the issue with the knife so to speak: “We’re gonna cut your balls 
off. Then you’ll be fine.” The actual diagnosis, cancer, is conflated with the intersex 
variation, and ultimately with gender issues. The surgical removal of the testes thus 
becomes not only the remedy for the medically relevant problem, i.e. the tumor, but 
also the ‘remedy’ for the intersex variation, and by extension, for the gender 
‘confusion’ (ironically Alex did not experience gender issues before House’s 
confrontation). The cancer motif is a frequently reiterated theme in intersex 
discourses, as can be also observed in the Chicago Hope’s representation of intersex; 
in both cases, the cancer becomes a metaphor for a form of ‘punishment,’ which is 
inextricably linked to the intersex variation. 
This scene is problematic in many respects. House, as a doctor, acts not only 
unprofessionally and insensitively towards his patient, but his representation of 
intersex is offensive and inaccurate on several levels. House uses male pronouns to 
refer to Alex, insists that she is ‘really’ male, and refuses to accept Alex’s claim that 
she is female. What is problematic here is both the disrespect and violence he displays 
towards Alex in that he rejects listening to her and defines her gender against her 
clearly stated disapproval of his definition, and of the basis on which his sex, or rather 
gender claims rest. By ignoring, or rather overruling her own gender identification, 
he denies her autonomy and the right of self-determination about her own sense of 
gendered self. After the revelation scene, when Cuddy asks House how Alex is doing 
after the operation, House’s answer again proves to be ignorant about intersex issues: 
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“They sent him/her [him slash her] up for a psyche visit.” Cuddy’s objection, 
“Calling her a ‘him/her’ [him slash her] isn’t really helping” (39:00-:10), does not 
much to do justice to Alex’s own claim of her selfhood, or to compensate for the lack 
of sensitivity and accuracy the episode has displayed by then, or to raise more 
awareness about intersex and related gender issues. 
House’s redefinition of Alex’s gender relies on the notion that one’s ‘true’ sex is 
based on one’s chromosomes or DNA, and with the revelation of the undescended 
testes in her body, her ‘true’ sex, i.e. male sex, is allegedly ‘revealed.’ April Herndon, 
in her discussion of “Skin Deep” on the ISNA homepage, refers to House’s 
description of Alex’ condition as “what appeared to be an incredibly bungled and 
inaccurate explanation of AIS [Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome]” and also 
criticizes the under-estimated number of intersex variations he provides (Herndon 
2006). The controversial and outdated term ‘male pseudohermaphroditism’ is used 
instead of AIS, which would not only be more accurate but moreover would 
acknowledge the efforts made by intersex activists to replace hurtful, outdated 
terminology with more adequate and respectful terminology.22 House’s 
representation of sex differentiation in utero is also utterly inaccurate, since it is 
wrong that every embryo is ‘female’ from the beginning and that, based on the genes, 
‘ovaries’ differentiate into ‘testes.’23  
The gendering of ‘sex’ organs or tissue as ‘female’ (ovaries) or ‘male’ (testes) is 
a medico-cultural construction House/House fail to recognize; this failure to realize 
and to admit that medical ideas about the sexed body are heavily informed by cultural 
notions about gender and other factors such as ‘race,’ ethnicity, class, age, ability, 
etc., however, is persistent in western medical thinking.24 House’s reference to the 
early nineteenth century nursery rhyme “What Are Little Boys Made Of?”, the line 
“Frogs and snails and puppy dog tails,” adds to the cultural constructivist character 
of his notion of gender. It seems all the more paradox that this quote follows his 
insistence that the DNA determines ‘sex.’ The ‘scientific’ explanation of what he 
conceives as ‘sex’ is juxtaposed to a cultural (and traditional) representation of 
gender: the question, “what are little boys made of?” must be understood as a question 
that can only be posed and answered in the context of “those relations of power that 
circumscribe in advance what will and will not count as truth, that order the world in 
                                                             
22  See ISNA’s FAQ entry “Is a person who is intersex a hermaphrodite?” for a discussion on 
intersex terminology and references to further information; and OII Australia’s chairperson 
Gina Wilson’s article “Intersex and Medicine: The Fourteen Days of Intersex.” 
23  It is rather the case that embryos develop by progressive divergence from an 
undifferentiated zygote, i.e. a genderless common point of origin (Fausto-Sterling 2000: 
49f). Note how House uses the same rhetoric of explaining embryonic sex differentiation 
as the doctor in the Emergency Room episode “Masquerade,” discussed in chapter 6.3.  
24  See e.g. Fausto-Sterling (2000). 




certain regular and regulatable ways, and that we come to accept as the given field of 
knowledge” (Butler 2001: 621). The supposed defining parameter for ‘sex,’ i.e. 
DNA, hence turns out to be the defining parameter of gender.  
House’s/House’s negotiation regarding the ‘truth’ of gender contains a (probably 
unintentional) reference to the controversy about the paradigms of gender between 
early social constructivist theorists, most prominently John Money, who argues for 
the malleability of gender (Money and Ehrhardt 1972), and proponents of a ‘natural’ 
basis of gender, like Milton Diamond, who argues that the possession of a Y 
chromosome marks male sex (Diamond and Sigmundson 1997). Judith Butler has 
contended that in both cases, gender coherence yet needs to be forcefully 
implemented when subjects’ gender intelligibility seems to be threatened: “the norms 
that govern intelligible gender for Money are those that can be forcibly imposed and 
behaviorally appropriated [...]. And the ‘nature’ that the endocrinologists defend also 
needs assistance and augmentation through surgical and hormonal means” (Butler 
2001: 628). 
“Skin Deep” seems to seize on these two seemingly conflicting ideas about the 
genesis and knowledge of gender, which is allegorized in the revelation scene. The 
construction of Alex’s femininity is accomplished by the forceful imposition of 
gender norms, which culminates in the sexual use/abuse of her. At the same time, 
House’s (re)definition of Alex’s gender relies on the presence of a Y-chromosome, 
which is however followed by surgery to remove the testes – a seemingly paradoxical 
move, since the removal of the testes, as the marker for maleness, stands in opposition 
to House’s gender claim made about Alex being a boy. While usually, surgery on 
intersex persons is to be understood as “the clinical enforcement of meaning upon 
intersexed bodies” (Holmes 2000: 100), aimed at medically constructing femaleness 
or maleness, in Alex’s case the diagnosis and the treatment seem to be contradictory 
as well as internally invalid. 
The medical authorities’, most importantly House’s investment in the intersex 
subject, Alex, does not strictly follow the usual medical protocol of intersex 
treatment. In the case of Alex, her (apparently) coherent personhood, defined along 
gender norms, is safely established. The medical inspections and inquiries exerted by 
the medical staff are aimed at finding the correct medical diagnosis (which is 
supposedly unrelated to intersex), but not, as is generally the case with intersex 
patients, at identifying the ‘correct’ gender. Ironically, House’s and his team’s 
scrutinizing of their patient does not lead to the accomplishment of Alex’s coherent 
gender identity, but rather to the failure or breakdown of her gender coherence which 
was established in the first place. 
Alex’s femininity is under scrutiny, yet this scrutiny and practices of surveillance 
come from another, non-medical direction. As a fashion model, she is constantly 
monitored with regard to her embodiment of the female ideal in relation to a specific 
norm of femininity: is she beautiful enough, is she skinny enough, are her breasts 
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perfect enough, do the dresses fit (or, does her body fit the dresses), and so on; in 
short: does she function as a woman, does she embody the female ideal properly? 
The gazes of the beauty industry are displaced to the medical realm, as Alex is 
scrutinized by the (male) medical authorities not as an intersex person but only as a 
model, as a sex object.  
The inspecting gaze is reproduced on the level of the viewers, who mainly occupy 
the gazing position of the medical authorities, in particular that of House. Intersex 
bodies are generally defined in the medical discourse as ‘inconceivable,’ hence 
intersex subjects are considered as unintelligible and as such as no subjects at all. 
Since Alex signifies not merely normative femaleness, but, in exceeding or 
outperforming the norm, even ‘ideal’ or ‘ultimate’ femaleness, her intelligibility as a 
woman is unquestioned; in fact, it is the inconceivability of intersex which allows for 
Alex’s uncontested intelligibility as female – that is, until the very end of the episode, 
the supposed ‘deconstruction’ of the ‘ultimate woman’ by the authoritative power of 
medicine. 
The practices of doctors’ surveillance of their intersex patients are in a way 
destabilized or subverted by Alex’s demand, “look at me!”, and the voluntary 
exhibition of her naked body. While usually intersex patients are forced to strip 
before the medical staff and to be exposed to the authoritative gaze, in order to be 
‘identified’ as their ‘true’ sex/gender, in this scene House does not want to see Alex 
naked as a proof for her ‘correct’ gender. To the contrary, it is Alex who shows her 
naked body as to prove her perceived gender coherence, i.e. her femaleness. In doing 
so, and with the accompanying command directed at House to turn his gaze at her, 
she reclaims to some extent the authoritative role in the surveillance process, and for 
a brief moment the usually passive, looked-at object position becomes occupied by a 
more active, self-determined subject/agent. Her intervention however fails, as House 
declines to accept her rules of the surveillance game and hence the outcome of the 
surveillance as a valid basis of her female gender claim. 
Alex’s reaction to the revelation that she is intersex is a crucial moment in the 
episode, and crucial for the production of intersex intelligibility in House. The 
representation of Alex is ambivalent here in that it both affirms cultural notions of 
femaleness and challenges the medical definitory power regarding gender. When she, 
upset by House claiming her to be male, rips off her gown and presents her body as 
‘evidence’ for her femaleness, and screams, “Look at me! How could you say I’m 
not a girl? See, they’re all looking at me, I’m beautiful!”, she refers to her femininity 
and her body which conforms to cultural beauty ideals as the ultimate signifier for 
femaleness. The perpetual stylization of Alex as the ‘supermodel’ seems to be 
internalized by her, and when her femaleness and her female gender identification 
become threatened by medical, allegedly scientific ‘evidence,’ the only strategy to 
counter this threat is to rely on the most obvious and most familiar markers of her 
femaleness.  




Alex’s sense of being female is apparently drawn from her hyperfeminine 
physical appearance. While her claim “I’m a girl!” is to be considered as a valid self-
description by which she seeks to be recognized as a woman/girl, to re-establish her 
intelligibility, it is “a description of a self that takes place in a language that is already 
going on, that is already saturated with norms, that predisposes us as we seek to speak 
of ourselves” (Butler 2001: 630). The norm which predisposes Alex’s claim of 
femaleness, the norm of femininity, is already established before Alex speaks, even 
before Alex herself becomes a subject of language, and already has established her 
as a feminine subject or a subject who is able to live up to cultural expectations of 
femininity. Her statement, “how could you say I’m not a girl? [...] I’m beautiful,” 
makes it clear that she is aware of the norm of femininity by which she has been 
constituted as a female subject. On the one hand, by referring back to this norm she 
reaffirms the western cultural discourses on normative femaleness. On the other hand, 
her claim signifies a refusal to the medical authority’s definitory power over her 
gender identity. The renegotiation of different but interrelated normative claims 
signifies the attempt to maintain or reaffirm the individual’s own version of an 
intelligible self, which inevitably needs to refer to a cultural point of articulation 
hinged on already accepted categories. 
Alex’s refusal to accept his medical definitory power and the correctness of his 
conclusion about her gender (“No! You’re wrong! I’m a girl!”) effects a moment of 
resistance to House’s unquestioned medical competence and authority he usually 
enjoys. The structure of House generally allows for no further argumentation after 
the ultimately ‘correct’ diagnosis is reached by House, which is then quickly followed 
by a medical intervention that solves the case. Unfortunately, this holds also true for 
“Skin Deep,” and despite the patient’s insistence on the incorrectness of the 
resolution, she is left incapacitated by the medical authority embodied by House. 
With the “cutting off of her balls,” everything “will be fine” – not only regarding the 
cancer but the ‘gender trouble’ – as perceived by House – in the first place.  
“Skin Deep”’s intersex narrative remains ambivalent and fragmented. The 
episode’s juxtaposition of medical discourses on intersex represented by House and 
the narrative of Alex’s subject construction as the ‘ultimate woman’ functions as a 
reaffirmation of hegemonic discourses on gender and sexed corporeality, in that both 
discourses substantiate each other in their normative claims. The violence of 
language from which Alex suffers is a persistent structuring principle of “Skin 
Deep”’s narrative, and is exercised by House as its master user, his male team 
member Chase, Alex’s father, and indirectly by Alex herself in/through her narrative 
about her own sense of female subjectivity. The ambivalence of Alex’s narrative 
allows for a momentary destabilization of the hegemonic medical discourse; yet when 
Alex seeks to reclaim the tools of power/language, she is not able to dismantle the 
discursive mechanisms that regulate the conditions of her intelligibility. Alex, now 
marked as an unintelligible subject, lacks the subject position from where she is 
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allowed to speak and to be heard (by the authorities). Her subjugation ultimately 
reaffirms House as the (medical) authority, and intersex remains an unintelligible 
category outside the normative framework of House.  
House’s obvious refusal to relate to and incorporate current intersex discourses 
from an intersex activist perspective into its own intersex narrative results in a 
representation that is not only not very differentiated, but moreover deeply 
problematic. The treatment of Alex by the medical staff could be read, albeit in a very 
restricted way, as an exaggerated representation of real life treatment situations, and 
thus as a possible reference to intersex individuals’ personal experiences with the 
medical establishment. I argue, however, against this reading. First, in order to 
function as a critical commentary, it lacks the necessary self-reflexivity, which shows 
itself in the constant use of narrative strategies that produce an image of a girl with 
AIS as not ‘really’ being female, as a ‘fake’ woman, who only appears to be female 
but whose hyperfemininity turns out to be nothing more than “skin deep” – much to 
the dismay of all men involved. This kind of representation cannot be justified by 
declaring it as ‘irony’ conveyed through the character of House, but needs to be 
considered as being produced in an interplay of various narrative strategies, as argued 
above. 
Second, if it is supposed to be a parody of the traditional medical protocol of 
intersex treatment, it misses the point of the ‘normalizing’ treatments, which are 
intended to bring the intersex person’s body in coherence with a clearly distinct 
gender along prevailing norms; the logics of House, however, contradicts itself, as 
discussed earlier. Third, a reiteration of problematic aspects and practices per se does 
nothing to challenge them, even when they are claimed to be ironic. Quite to the 
contrary, the perpetuation of problematic images, without any instance that seriously 
challenges them or at least marks them as problematic and unethical, leads to the 
perpetuation of the very violence of representation a supposed parody seeks to 
deconstruct. And lastly, the intertextual intersections of intersex discourses and 
discourses of gender normativity, including sexist representations of women and 
using strategies that reiterate the mechanisms inherent in rape culture, produce a 
narrative about girls/women with AIS as fetishized objects, a narrative that further 
denies them any form of agency about their bodily integrity and self-determination 
concerning their gender realities, and thus perpetuates harmful misrepresentations of 
intersex individuals – more specifically, female intersex individuals. I conclude my 
analysis of “Skin Deep” with contending that the episode’s featuring of an intersex 
‘case’ serves exclusively sensationalist ends, and has no other value – as a parody it 
misses its intended purpose, for having an educational function it is too inaccurate, 
and its supposed critical social commentary is undermined by its own strategies. 
House’s representation of intersex is unnecessary and only contributes to the 




perpetuation of intersex misogyny,25 hence its contribution to a cultural 
resignification of intersex remains highly problematic.    
 
 
6.5 GREY’S ANATOMY’S ETHICAL DOCTORS AND 
RESISTANT TEENAGER, OR: RENEGOTIATING 
‘NORMALCY’ IN “BEGIN THE BEGIN” 
 
“Begin the Begin,” the 13th episode of Grey’s Anatomy’s second season, originally 
aired on January 15, 2006 on ABC. One of several cases featured in the episode 
involves the case of Bex, a 14-year-old teenager, who has been admitted to the 
(fictional) Seattle Grace Hospital for an ultrasound-guided biopsy on an enlargement 
of a pelvic lymph node. Bex is treated by Dr. Addison Shepherd, an obstetrician and 
gynecologist, and Dr. George O’Malley, a surgical intern, who takes a special interest 
in Bex and her26 case. The enlarged lymph node turns out to be a tumor, which is first 
believed to compress an ovary, but further examinations reveal that the ovary is a 
testis. For the remainder of the intersex storyline, the focus is on the gender issues 
both Bex and her parents have to deal with, and on medical ethics with regard to the 
doctor-patient-parent-relationship. 
The analysis of “Begin the Begin” takes a similar point of departure as the 
discussion of “Skin Deep,” in that it will examine how intersex intelligibility, 
allegorized by Bex, is produced by the episode’s narrative and representational 
strategies. A closer focus lies on the intersections between discourses on gender 
normativity and the medical protocol for intersex individuals. In contrast to the House 
episode, “Begin the Begin” juxtaposes from the start the questions of gender 
intelligibility to the medical treatment paradigm of intersex and the ethical questions 
that result from it. “Begin the Begin” seems to be informed not only by popular 
cultural representations of intersex or medical texts, but renegotiates narratives of 
intersex first-person experience and critical perspectives on the medical 
establishment’s practices. Grey’s Anatomy’s doctors in charge appear to pursue a 
                                                             
25  I borrow for my definition of ‘intersex misogyny’ from the concept of ‘transmisogyny,’ 
“the negative attitudes, expressed through cultural hate, individual and state violence, and 
discrimination directed toward trans* women and trans* people on the feminine end of the 
gender spectrum” (Kacere 2014). 
26  I use the gender pronouns to refer to Bex as they are used in “Begin the Begin.” 
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more patient-centered approach to the treatment of their intersex patient and mostly 
refrain from an enforced imposition of gender norms on Bex.27  
“Begin the Begin” is framed by the theme of new beginnings, symbolized by the 
literal beginning of a new year, as Dr. Meredith Grey’s comment in voice-over 
indicates: “Put your past behind you and start over” (2:24).28 The several storylines 
in the episode, both those focusing on medical cases and private affairs of the hospital 
staff, are bearing references to this theme: a patient waiting for a heart transplant, a 
patient who is a writer and ate his loathed novel in order to put it behind him, new 
clinic regulations on working hours, Dr. Bailey’s pregnancy, Dr. Stevens’ break-up 
with Dr. Karev, Dr. Grey getting over Dr. Shepherd, and Bex coming to terms with 
her gender issues. The motif of transitioning, leaving the old behind and beginning 
something new and changing in the process, is frequently found as a structuring 
principle in transgender narratives. Bex’s narrative is not exactly a trans narrative, as 
her gender trajectory is not informed by her desire to transition from one intelligible 
gender (female) to another intelligible gender (male), but rather her (inner) transition 
is facilitated by the revelation that she is intersex, which will be discussed in detail 
below.  
The character of Bex is introduced in the context of the presentation of her 
medical problem, an enlarged lymph node in her pelvic area which is assumed to be 
cancer. Bex is fourteen years old, her visual representation and the presentation of 
her behavior is age-appropriate:29 she wears a hoodie, a ski cap over long hair, she is 
drawing a comic, and appears to be withdrawn and sad. She is accompanied by her 
parents who act concerned but loving. When O’Malley calls her Rebecca, Bex asks 
him to stop calling her this name, and her father explains that she prefers to be called 
Bex. Moments later, when O’Malley pulls up Bex’s sleeve to take blood from her 
arm, he notices little cutting scars on her wrist. While the initial scene contains no 
explicit references to a (possible) intersex variation, the representation of Bex as sad, 
possibly depressive as her self-cutting suggests, and rejecting her ‘female’ name hints 
vaguely at some yet undefined gender trouble. 
This intuitive sentiment is substantiated by medical clues in the next scene, when 
O’Malley informs Shepherd about Bex’s lab results, namely that “her hormone 
levels, estrogen, progesterone are sky-high” (10:53). Shepherd assumes that Bex 
must have taken birth control pills, which would explain the unusually high hormone 
levels in her body, and this assumption is confirmed when O’Malley questions Bex 
about it. The question about her reasons to take the pill is triggered by a medical 
                                                             
27  ISNA has recommended such a patient-centered approach to intersex treatment, seeking to 
replace the traditional, what they call “concealment-centered model,” with a new treatment 
paradigm (“Shifting the Paradigm of Intersex Treatment”).   
28  All following timecode numbers in this chapter refer to the timecode of “Begin the Begin.” 
29  Becca Gardner, the actress who plays Bex, was age 15 at the time of filming. 




cause, but is inextricably linked to the question of gender. Bex reveals that she wanted 
her breasts to grow: “I’m as flat as a board. I took like five of those pills a day, and 
nothing’s different” (11:58). Her desire to make her body more feminine-looking 
translates as a desire to be more ‘normal’: “I wanted to be normal for once in my life” 
(12:12). This attempt at conforming to normative gender standards refers to her 
physical gender markers on the one hand and to her frustration of no one wanting to 
have sex with her on the other hand. Bex sees a causal relationship between the two 
aspects in that her perceived sexual undesirability results from her ‘unfeminine’ 
physique. When O’Malley asks her if she has been feeling different, her answer, “I 
feel like I always feel,” which is accompanied by a shot to her scarred wrist from 
O’Malley’s perspective, further indicates her troubled feelings that seem undoubtedly 
to be related to her perceived gender issues. 
Shortly afterwards, another conversation between Bex and O’Malley takes place 
which is not related to medical concerns but again deals with Bex’s sense of feeling 
‘different.’ The sight of the scars on her wrist, mediated through O’Malley’s gaze, is 
once more the trigger for addressing the theme of a problematic sense of self. The 
doctor appears to be more concerned with her emotional state than with her actual 
medical diagnosis. This representation of the doctor-patient-relationship marks a 
significant departure from the majority of first-person accounts of intersex persons’ 
experiences with medical practitioners, who are presented as not being much 
interested in their intersex patients’ emotional condition but almost exclusively 
focused on the medical ‘fixing’ of the intersex ‘condition.’ O’Malley’s interest in 
Bex turns out to be motivated by his own (former) sense of being different.  
The comic book Bex is drawing is about herself and her best friend Jen when they 
were kids. To O’Malley’s question whether Jen writes it with her, Bex’s answer that 
Jen has a boyfriend, “just like everyone else,” again marks Bex as being different, 
and moreover being all alone with her perceived difference: “I get to be a freak all by 
myself" (16:15). Difference, or ‘freakishness,’ is repeatedly related to her perceived 
failure to live up to normative conceptions of gender and sexuality, which leads in 
turn to her feelings of being isolated and disconnected from others. This feeling of 
being the only one who is ‘different’ in terms of gender, sexed corporeality, and 
sexuality is a recurring motif in intersex narratives. In these narratives, the feeling of 
being isolated in such ways is usually resolved when the intersex individual meets 
other intersex persons and/or becomes part of an intersex collective. In “Begin the 
Begin,” it is, quite ironically, the figure of the doctor who, at least to some extent, 
helps Bex out of her isolation, in solidarizing with her in her sense of being different.  
O’Malley’s statement, “A freak. That’s not the easiest thing to be in high school, 
is it?” (16:20), alludes to the threat of unintelligibility for a subject who is not exactly 
outside the norms that govern intelligible gender, but who feels she cannot be 
represented by those norms available to her. The questions put forward by Butler, 
“Who can I become in such a world where the meanings and limits of the subject are 
288 | INTERSEX NARRATIVES 
 
set out in advance for me? By what norms am I constrained as I begin to ask what I 
may become? What happens when I begin to become that for which there is no place 
in the given regime of truth?” (Butler 2001: 621), are the questions that are troubling 
Bex, although she is, at the moment, not really able to grasp them in definite terms. 
Her reference to herself as a potential ‘freak’ denotes the only subject position she 
can envision for herself to occupy. Butler assumes that in the moment when a subject 
perceives themselves as “something nameless, freakish, something between the 
norms,” they are “in question as a human, [...] the specter of the freak against which 
and through which the norm install[s] itself” (Butler 2001: 631). Thus the subject 
position of the ‘freak’ is one that is not representable by the norms, not recognizable 
by the norms or only as a ‘deviation’ from the norm, and consequently would mark 
the subject as unintelligible. 
Yet Bex’s apprehension, “I get to be a freak all by myself" (emphasis added), 
implies that she has not yet arrived at being a ‘freak,’ and thus signifies a possibility 
of becoming something different, something human, something intelligible. Her 
drawing of the comic of herself and her best friend Jen as kids signifies a desire to 
return to a (past) state of happiness, a state without gender troubles and a state in 
which Bex and her best friend could be united, and not separated by the 
non/conforming to gender norms. The production of the comic can be considered as 
her own (re)construction of an alternative space, in which ‘difference’ does not exist 
or has no significance. However, her attempt to escape the realities of her gender 
trouble is not quite successful, and she realizes that she has to establish her gender 
intelligibility in the ‘real world.’  
It is O’Malley’s (retrospective) account of himself as ‘freakish,’ or ‘different’ 
when he was in high school, that serves as a point of reference for Bex’s own subject 
reconstruction. Although O’Malley’s narrative of his younger self does not contain 
explicit references to gender issues, his activities – being the secretary and treasurer 
of the Dungeons and Dragons Club, a Mathlete, and winner of the blue ribbon in the 
biology club – were presumably considered by others as not ‘boyish’ enough, as his 
failure with regard to dating girls suggests. O’Malley’s narrative of being different 
ultimately conveys the hope of overcoming one’s sense of not fitting in: “You just 
have to get through high school, because high school sucks for anyone who’s the 
least bit different. But then there’s college, and then out in the real world, you will 
find where you fit in” (16:52). Bex’s hopeful question, “you think so?” is reassured 
by O’Malley’s affirmation, “yeah, I know so.” This positive affirmation of finding a 
place for oneself not despite, but precisely because of one’s perceived difference 
makes Bex smile for the first time, as it conveys a silver lining for the reevaluation 
of her own subjecthood. 
“Begin the Begin” alternates between medical and emotional or personal 
representations of intersex issues, both discourses reaffirming each other. The next 
scene of the intersex storyline again confirms the hitherto suggestive allusions to 




Bex’s gender trouble with medical evidence. Shepherd and O’Malley discuss the 
results of Bex’s biopsy, which they made to find out whether the tumor is cancerous 
in the first place. Shepherd asks O’Malley to arrange a meeting with Bex’s parents 
and to request for the on-call psychiatrist to join them. She then reveals to him that 
the biopsied ‘ovary’ is in fact a ‘testis.’30 From this, O’Malley concludes, “Bex is a 
hermaphrodite?” (19:27), which Shepherd confirms. The use of the term 
‘hermaphrodite’ by both doctors is irritating; however, this is the only time the term 
‘hermaphrodite’ is used in the episode, and the psychiatrist later uses the accurate 
term ‘intersex’ when talking to Bex’s parents. This scene is faintly reminiscent of the 
scene in House’s “Skin Deep” in which House shows Cameron the results of Alex’s 
MRI, looking for a tumor, and find that her ‘ovaries’ are ‘testicles,’ which are 
subsequently considered as a marker for intersex. What is different is that in “Begin 
the Begin,” the ‘revelation’ is given right away and the viewers have an information 
advantage on the intersex patient; the gender roles of the doctors are reversed as the 
female doctor is the male doctor’s superior; and the doctors make sure that the parents 
get immediate professional counseling.  
Next the doctor’s meeting with the parents takes place, and a psychiatrist is 
attending. The parents are upset: “You’re telling me that our daughter might actually 
be a boy?” (20:02). This statement denotes the implications for the following course 
of the conversation, which is informed by absolutist, biologist, and gender binary 
affirming claims. Shepherd explains: “Externally, Bex has female genitalia. She 
looks like a girl, but internally she has both female and male sex organs” (20:15). The 
classification of genitals as ‘sex organs’ according to a binary of male/female (ovaries 
are ‘female,’ testes are ‘male’ sex organs) is claimed to be a ‘natural’ fact, but is 
rather a medical construction informed by cultural gender norms that relies on a 
heteronormative gender classification of humans according to their reproductive 
capacities. The idea that one testicle might determine a person’s gender or how the 
person identifies is grounded in a biological determinist claim about gender. Thus, 
while the finding of Bex’s internal testicle and its social consequences seem 
overdramatized by both the doctors and the parents, their reactions are 
comprehensible in the light of their belief in a biological determinist basis for gender. 
This absolutist and biologist notion of the constitution of gender identification is 
amplified by the doctor’s comments made during the counseling session. The call in 
of a psychiatrist and Shepherd’s recommendation of family therapy are first of all 
constructive moves. Several intersex organizations and specific self-help groups have 
pointed to the necessity of providing professional counseling for both the intersex 
                                                             
30  Some intersex variations involve gonadal variations, i.e. a combination of ovaries and 
testes, either the presence of both an ovary and a testis, or an ovo-testis, containing both 
ovarian and testicular tissue. Quite often, at least one of the gonads is functional (Fausto-
Sterling 2000: 51).  
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person and their parents.31 However, the way the ‘revelation’ is represented in “Begin 
the Begin” evokes a sense of ‘social emergency.’ When Shepherd announces that 
“the best news is that the lymph node tumor is benign. So physically, Bex is going to 
be just fine, but emotionally, psychologically, I strongly recommend therapy” for the 
whole family (20:28), the announcement that their daughter does not have cancer is 
completely ignored by the parents. Their reaction is reminiscent of the scene in “Skin 
Deep,” where the revelation of Alex having testicles outweighs the fact that she has 
cancer, for both Alex and her father. 
This sense of dramatizing the finding of a testicle and stylizing this revelation as 
a social and psychological state of emergency is further reinforced when Shepherd 
tells the parents that the adjustment they and Bex will have to make is not going to 
be easy, and the psychiatrist explains: “Many intersex people begin to identify very 
strongly with one sex. And it’s not necessarily the sex they’ve been raised” (20:50). 
So far, his comment appears valid. When he however states, in a deadpan and 
absolutist manner that “biologically and emotionally speaking, she has a choice to 
make” (21:05), the social imperative of gender binarism and having to identify and 
live as an ‘unambiguous’ gender (either male or female) becomes explicit.  
Bex’s parents emphatically seek to defend their daughter’s femaleness, even by 
resorting to violent means. They conceive of their daughter’s gender as an 
incontrovertible truth, a static state of being rather than a process that can be subjected 
to changes: “She is a girl. She looks like a girl. She has always been a girl” (20:55); 
“Fourteen years. Fourteen years, we have raised a daughter. And in one afternoon, 
you expect us to – what? What is Bex supposed to do? How is she supposed to go 
home and tell the other kids? What?” (30:03). Conforming to gender norms is phrased 
in terms of both a requirement for the individual’s own emotional well-being and as 
mandatory in social relations. It seems as if the parents are more concerned with their 
own unease and the possible reactions of others to Bex being intersex than with Bex’s 
right of self-determination.  
Yet the justification for violently “fixing” (father, 23:26) their child’s intersex 
body, and by that, her gender identification, is articulated by the parents in terms of 
Bex’s own sense of being not ‘normal,’ as not ‘fitting in’: “All she’s said all her life 
is that she wants to be normal. She doesn’t feel normal” (father, 23:46); thus, the 
elimination of her “boy part” (mother, 23:38) is legitimated as to “put an end to her 
agony” (mother, 23:50). Bex’s parents do not only want to keep the finding of the 
testicle a secret from Bex, they moreover ask Shepherd to “remove whatever boy part 
she has” (23:38) off-protocol during the surgery to remove the tumor, in order to 
“keep her more of a girl” (23:39). As intersex activists and many intersex people have 
argued, the idea of producing gender normalcy by surgical means is completely 
                                                             
31  See, for instance, ISNA’s recommendations on their homepage, “What Does ISNA 
Recommend for Children With Intersex?”, and in their Handbook for Parents (2006). 




absurd, as the results of these medical interventions often produce mutilated and 
dysfunctional bodies. The ‘normalization’ procedures are rather a response to the 
intersex body’s disruption of gender norms, which is conceived as a threat to the 
social segregation of human beings into two distinct gender categories. 
Shepherd however tells the parents in no uncertain terms that she will not perform 
“sexual reassignment surgery” on Bex: “To do surgery and alter her body 
permanently is… I just would never do that on someone who is unaware of the 
procedure, and you’re gonna be hard-pressed to find a surgeon who will” (24:02). 
Shepherd’s reaction to the parents’ request marks a positive development in medical 
practice of treating intersex patients, as it signifies a departure from traditional 
medical treatment protocols. While until the 1990s, it was common for intersex 
infants or children to get their genitals surgically altered (or rather, mutilated) without 
their knowledge and consent, intersex activists have achieved some success in 
changing the traditional treatment protocol and practices of infant genital 
mutilation.32 Both Shepherd’s and O’Malley’s behavior towards their intersex patient 
is informed by ethical standards, as they insist on the patient’s informed consent to 
any treatment, and argue for the disclosure of the information regarding Bex’s 
intersex variation to Bex. It is likely that the recent developments in how medicine 
views intersex and the achievements of intersex activists have had an influence on 
the writers of the Grey’s Anatomy episode. 
The idea that the revelation of having one testicle or a combination of ovarian and 
testicular tissue in her gonads might have an impact on Bex’s gender identification is 
a structuring principle of the episode’s intersex storyline. O’Malley, who tries to 
persuade the parents to reveal their findings to Bex, is convinced that “this at least 
helps explain why she feels so different” (20:59). It is suggested that Bex’s 
knowledge about her intersex corporeality will certainly affect the way in which she 
experiences her gendered and sexed reality: “You’re not gonna tell her? But this 
could help her. You can’t not tell her what she is” (23:13, emphasis added). Again, 
an intersex variation supposedly accounts for ‘difference,’ both difference as to how 
the individual perceives herself and in the view of others. This (gender) difference is 
opposed to ‘normalcy,’ which is phrased in terms of Bex’s own sense of feeling ‘not 
normal’ or ‘freakish.’ That this feeling of being ‘not normal,’ which has been 
integrated into the individual’s self-understanding and self-reporting, is constituted 
within a regulatory power regime is not given any consideration. When Bex’s parents 
request from Shepherd to remove Bex’s testis with the intended aim of producing the 
conditions of normalcy for her own sense of self, and so ending her presumed 
                                                             
32  This relative success does not mean, of course, that the medical practice of surgically 
altering intersex infants’ or children’s bodies without informed consent is not in effect 
anymore today. The fight against infant genital mutilation has still top priority on intersex 
activism’s agenda. 
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“agony,” the doctor answers: “removing her male sexual organs may not do that. In 
fact it could just do the opposite” (23:53). This statement has two crucial 
implications. First, it challenges the logics of a biological basis of gender, and the 
resulting conviction that with the elimination of Bex’s “boy parts,” the ‘male’ part of 
her gender identification will likewise be eliminated. Second, it points to the potential 
damage that genital surgery can inflict on the intersex person, both physically and 
emotionally. It is in particular the latter point which has been raised in almost all 
accounts by intersex persons, addressing explicitly the traumatic and harmful 
consequences of unwanted medical interventions.   
The revelation scene, in which Bex learns about her intersex variation, 
perpetuates the notion of ovaries/testes as signifiers for gender. Shepherd, O’Malley, 
and Bex’s parents have gathered in Bex’s hospital room shortly before the surgery 
scheduled to remove the tumor. Bex senses that something strange is going on and is 
frightened. She asks O’Malley, whom she considers as a confidant by now: “I’m 
having surgery to remove a tumor that’s compressing my ovary. Right, George?” 
(28:34). O’Malley experiences an ethical conflict about telling Bex the truth, as her 
parents decided against it, but he cannot reconcile the withholding of this information 
with his conscience: “What, am I supposed to lie to her?” (28:50). Shepherd asks him 
to leave the room, but Bex begs him to tell her the truth: “Tell me what’s wrong with 
me. What is wrong with me?” Obviously the behavior of the adults, trying to keep 
Bex’s intersex variation a secret, has produced a feeling of fear and insecurity in Bex, 
so that she even thinks she is going to die. “What is wrong” with her must be 
something so abominable that it is absolutely unspeakable, and inconceivable, and 
hence needs to be to ‘dealt with,’ i.e. ‘fixed’ clandestinely. 
Yet her parents, feeling compelled by O’Malley’s insinuation, eventually reveal 
to Bex that her tumor is not compressing an ovary but a testis. Shepherd wants to 
soothe Bex, but she does not seem upset: “I’ve had [the testicle] my whole life? Oh 
my God. Does this mean... does this mean I could be a boy?” (29:28). The adults look 
at each other and no one answers the question; but Bex knows the answer, and she 
flashes a contented smile as she whispers: “Yes.” With this, the scene is cut and ends 
here, relatively unspectacular. Bex’s reaction to the revelation that she has an intersex 
variation is completely different compared to Alex’s reaction in “Skin Deep”: while 
Alex perceives this revelation as a threat to her (gendered) subjecthood, for Bex it 
means a possible answer to the questions about her gender identity. 
Later when O’Malley checks on Bex, she thanks him for making her parents tell 
her and asks: “Do I have to be a boy now?” (37:02). When O’Malley says she does 
not, she asks, “but I can if I want to?”, and he answers, “Yeah, you can. If you want.” 
Bex asks him to bring her some scissors. At that moment, Meredith Grey comments 
in voice-over: “Who gets to determine when the old ends and the new begins? [...] 
It’s an event. Big or small. Something that changes us. Ideally, it gives us hope” 
(37:20-38:10). On the last sentence, the scene cuts back to Bex and O’Malley. Bex 




looks at herself in a mirror as George cuts her hair. Her parents enter the room, and 
her mother asks O’Malley for the scissors. She smiles and goes on cutting Bex’s hair; 
this act apparently indicates an acceptance of her child’s own gender identification. 
Meredith’s voice-over fits the scene: “A new way of living and looking at the world.” 
In the end of “Begin the Begin,” the theme of new beginnings, of changing, is coming 
full circle.  
The ending leaves open whether Bex identifies as a boy now, or still as a girl, or 
as in-between genders; the point of departure and, even more so, the place of arrival 
of Bex’s gender trajectory are ambiguous, hence the question of gender identification 
remains unresolved within the confines of the Grey’s Anatomy episode. Yet it appears 
as if Bex integrates her intersex difference into her sense of gendered self. She takes 
intersex as her point of departure from where she seeks to understand her own sense 
of being and feeling different, and from where she begins to (re)construct her 
intelligibility. Taking the presence of a testicle as a signifier or ‘proof’ of 
masculinity/non-femininity, and as a trigger for the subsequent readjustment of Bex’s 
own sense of gendered self might seem like a biologist essentialist idea at first sight. 
However, in order to find an answer to the question that has been troubling Bex, put 
by Butler in terms of “What, given the contemporary order of being, can I be?” 
(Butler 2001: 621), Bex needs to relate to a social norm by which she can be 
recognized, and on which her intelligibility depends.   
While intersex signifies traditionally an unintelligible subject position, as the 
medical history of intersex has violently demonstrated, in Grey’s Anatomy, intersex 
becomes a knowable category. The doctors do not intend, even refuse to enforce 
gender norms upon the intersex subject in an attempt to erase the intersex variation. 
The intersex variation is preserved and thus functions as an “alternative, minority 
version of sustaining norms” (Butler 2004: 3). It is not really the testis which defines 
Bex’s potential male gender identification, or the mixture of ovary and testis which 
would define her gender somewhere in-between female and male. When she seeks to 
position herself within the “contemporary order of being,” she needs to refer to 
existing categories of recognition. The ‘ovotestes’ thus need to be understood as 
allegorizing the ‘alternative norm’ according to which Bex can be recognized as an 
intelligible person. But how does the articulation of such an alternative version of 
norms work here? 
To rephrase Bex’s gender trouble prior to the revelation once again in Butler’s 
terms: “I may feel that without some recognizability I cannot live. But I may also feel 
that the terms by which I am recognized make life unlivable” (Butler 2004: 4). It is 
this double bind of recognition, and hence of intelligibility, that is troubling Bex. She 
is perceived as a girl by others, but feels misrecognized by the norms on which her 
intelligibility depends. At the same time, she is lacking the appropriate categories of 
recognition for her sense of self, the terms for her self-description. So what does 
intersex signify for Bex? It contains the possibility of gender transformation: being 
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or becoming a boy is not a social imperative, but it is an option. The cutting of her 
hair symbolizes her inner change rather than marking her transition to a male 
subjectivity. This inner change refers to her coming to terms with her gender troubles: 
she realizes that ‘difference’ is not necessarily negative but can have a positive value 
for her own sense of self and the constitution of her subjecthood. In Bex’s mind, the 
intersex variation opens up this possibility for her. Intersex is an intelligible category 
in “Begin the Begin,” because it not only enables Bex to “figur[e] out how to live 
with and against the constructions – or norms – that help to form” her (Butler, in 
Williams 2014), but because her intersex body stays as it is, intact, and does not 
undergo a ‘normalization’ process. 
To conclude the analysis, Grey’s Anatomy’s intersex narrative seems at some 
points naive, in that it trivializes to some extent the consequences of the revelation of 
an intersex variation for the individual. However, the representation of doctors facing 
an ‘intersex case’ marks a positive development which relates to and negotiates 
intersex activists’ accounts and demands. The representation of Bex as an intersex 
adolescent who has to deal with her gender issues and her troubles to meet social 
requirements of adult femaleness is sympathetic and quite convincing. While the 
resolution might come too easily, it subtly pleads for a more humanized, patient-
centered medical approach to intersex variations and for the acknowledging and 
appreciation of sex and gender difference.  
 
 
7. “We Exist, We Are Human, We Are 





In the special issue of Chrysalis, ‘Intersex Awakening’ guest editors Cheryl Chase 
and Martha Coventry write:  
 
“When we first came together, we were still too filled with shame to allow our pictures to be 
published, or in many cases even our real names. Now, we are finding our pride and finding 
the strength to show our faces. [...] we have complemented this issue with a gallery of pictures 
of us. Pictures of our childhoods, of our lives today, and of the joyful changes that breaking 
silence has made possible for us. These pictures are our gift to ourselves and to our intersexual 
brothers/sisters and their parents who have not yet begun their healing journey. And to the 
world, to declare that we exist, we are human, we are everywhere among you.” (Chase and 
Coventry 1997/98: 4)  
 
Narratives that renegotiate intersex lives, intersex experiences, and the cultural 
meaning of the category of intersex from an intersex person’s perspective have the 
power to challenge hegemonic medico-cultural narratives, to reject the definitions 
and terms through which intersex was and is understood, and to provide the 
conditions for a resignification of intersex. The intersex movement that began in the 
early 1990s has worked to give intersex a face, in fact many different faces, and has 
been gradually replacing dehumanized, depersonalized images and narratives of 
intersex subjects with personal accounts and representations. The strategy of 
providing intersex narratives with visual signifiers of humanness, intended to 
challenge the “conditions of intelligibility [...] by which the human emerges, by 
which the human is recognized, by which some subject becomes the subject of human 
love” (Butler 2001: 621), has been a significant strategy of resistance in the intersex 
movement. Personal accounts and other texts written by intersex individuals and 
activists, which have appeared in newsletters, magazines, articles, collections of 
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essays, and guidelines for medical practitioners, parents and allies, are often 
accompanied by pictures of the narrators, mostly photographs that show them in a 
private context, which are meant to represent intersex persons as ‘ordinary people,’ 
as human beings. This strategy allows intersex individuals, in particular those who 
were subjected to nonconsensual, forced medical treatment, to reclaim their 
subjecthood and agency, to reinscribe themselves into history, into culture, to declare 
their existence, and their humanity. In fact, the intersex movement’s recent 
declaration that intersex rights are human rights both implies and requires the 
recognition of intersex individuals as humans, as intelligible subjects. This means 
that since the early 1990s, the starting point of the shifts and processes of the 
resignification of the category of intersex, until today, processes that enable the 
conditions of intersex intelligibility must have taken place.  
The autobiographical, literary, and visual cultural narratives about intersex that I 
analyzed in this book have effected, both individually and collectively, some to a 
greater extent and some to a lesser extent, significant processes of resignification and 
contestation of the category of intersex, through chronological and achronological, 
cross-referential, intersecting, interrelated movements. I have argued that the 
narratives offer different ways and strategies through which intersex becomes an 
intelligible category, how these different narratives provide, or at times constrain or 
prohibit, the conditions of intelligibility for (their) intersex subjects. Intersex 
intelligibility needs to be understood as always contextual and individual, but also as 
relating to an existing framework of norms and practices that govern the conditions 
of intelligibility of gender and sexed embodiment, and hence of intersex. Intersex 
intelligibility is a question of survival, a survival that takes place on several, 
interrelated levels: as a survival in a physical, bodily sense, as a survival on a cultural 
and linguistic level, and also as a survival in economic terms.  
Intersex intelligibility can mean many different things. A clear indication of the 
unintelligibility of intersex is an attempted ‘normalization,’ which is considered as a 
requirement for producing an intelligible subject; this involves a gender assignment 
of an intersex subject as male or female, and the medical construction of a sexed body 
that is supposed to conform to this gender assignment according to prevailing cultural 
norms. Any narrative that rejects or challenges these processes of ‘normalization’ 
opens up the possibility for intersex to become intelligible. More specifically, an 
intersex protagonist or character can become intelligible as intersex when they do not 
have to undergo nonconsensual medical treatment to alter their bodies, when they are 
allowed to keep/have their intersex corporeality and at the same time to identify as 
the gender that they feel they are (male, female, both, neither, genderqueer, intersex, 
etc.), when they do not have their self-identified gender questioned by others on basis 
of their intersex corporeality, when they question and challenge the ‘normalizing’ 
procedures they were subjected to, when they reject the normative gender assignment 
that others made for them, when they become visible, audible, readable, and in a 




variety of other ways. Intersex individuals do not automatically compromise their 
sense of sexed and gendered selves when they reject to “willingly and gladly inhabit 
a space of resistant unintelligibility” (Holmes 2008: 16). I want to point once more 
to Morgan Holmes’ contention that “the point is not to live perpetually where it is 
troubling to deal with the body, but to get to a place where there can be some 
breathing room for difference” (Holmes 2008: 15f).  
In my work, I have investigated the narrative spaces that open up some “breathing 
room for difference,” offered by the specific narratives under consideration, and the 
narratives’ accomplishments regarding the development of new paradigms of 
intersex intelligibility. OII USA director Hida Viloria writes:  
 
“When our minds don’t have a way to categorize new information, we’ll either invent 
something or just try to ignore it. [...] I lacked the language to define myself to the outer world, 
but I did have ways that I secretly identified in the privacy of my own mind. And to my surprise, 
some of the intersex folks I’ve met over the years had the very same ones! Back when we were 
all roaming around a presumably male/female-only world, without a publicly recognized label, 
we sometimes thought of ourselves as ‘mutants’ or ‘aliens.’ These terms were obviously 
inaccurate and a huge exaggeration [...]. But this is what happens when you live in a culture 
where being you is socially unacceptable and unacknowledged: you become something else.” 
(Viloria 2014) 
 
Viloria’s comment on the ways intersex people have always sought to find new terms 
for themselves in order to become recognizable in some way, to themselves in the 
first place, have sought, to put it in Butler’s words, “to live with and against the 
constructions – or norms – that help to form” them (Butler, in Williams 2014), 
demonstrates that there have always existed counter-narratives to hegemonic 
narratives, whether they have existed in the “privacy of [one’s] own mind,” within a 
small group of other intersex persons, or within an intersex and/or queer community, 
or in larger social contexts. The refusal to accept categorizations made and 
vocabularies defined by others in accordance with prevailing social norms, Butler 
argues, “opens the way for a more radical form of self-determination, one that 
happens in solidarity with others who are undergoing a similar struggle” (Butler, in 
Williams 2014). This refusal, and the simultaneous development of other 
constructions and terms for intersex subjectivities, thus can create points of reference 
for other intersex individuals or an intersex collective, and takes place in reference to 
other cultural movements with a similar trajectory, for instance the queer movement, 
as Viloria points out (Viloria 2014). Viloria comments that “way before the 
LGBTQIA community existed, we [queers] still had our own names for ourselves, in 
addition to the ones thrust upon us” (Viloria 2014). Viloria’s assertion points to a 
multiplicity of narratives that exist and have always existed parallel and in intricate 
interrelations to each other. 
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Iain Morland has likewise argued that there exists not one “correct story of 
intersex,” where older intersex narratives are simply replaced by new ones, but rather 
a “plurality of [intersex] narratives” which is constituted through processes of 
interdependencies and intertextual references (Morland 2009: 193). Hence, the shifts 
in intersex narratives that have occurred since the early 1990s cannot be understood 
as processes of supersession of narratives, but as cross-referential movements of 
resignification of the category of intersex, through which hegemonic knowledge 
about intersex is not simply abandoned and replaced by new knowledge that is ‘more 
right’ or ‘more accurate’ or ‘more ethical,’ but through which hegemonic knowledge 
is scrutinized, challenged, and integrated into new forms of knowledge about 
intersex. The autobiographical, literary, and visual cultural narratives I analyzed in 
my study are inextricably involved in the production of such a ‘narrative plurality.’ 
These narratives and their representations of intersex reaffirm each other at times, are 
at times contradictory, but always acknowledge other existing narratives to which 
they relate and which they renegotiate.  
The ways in which the intersex narratives under consideration provide, or 
constrain, the conditions of intersex intelligibility are diverse, as already pointed out. 
The early, short first-person accounts of intersex experiences started from the 
perceived need to speak out against the violence of medical practices the intersex 
narrators were subjected to. While this move also implies intersex persons’ need of 
new narratives about themselves, the development of new narratives rather came as 
a result of the response to hegemonic narratives. These early intersex narratives 
positioned themselves in a clear relation to existing intersex narratives, i.e. medical 
narratives that prevailed and had become the dominant narratives about intersex, not 
only within medical discourses but within the cultural imagination of intersex. Thus, 
the new intersex narratives that relied on autobiographical, personal knowledge rather 
than on scientific knowledge still referenced the medical constructions and 
terminology of intersex for their own renegotiations of the category.   
This becomes perhaps most obvious in their reclaiming and reappropriation of 
the term ‘intersex’ itself, which originally was and still continues to be a medical 
term. The fact that the medical term was not simply replaced by another, different 
term through autobiographical and activist intersex narratives demonstrates that a 
resignification of a hegemonic term is possible, and moreover, that different 
meanings of the term can coexist. These different meanings might challenge each 
other, contradict each other, or also reaffirm each other to some extent; yet, they 
always exist in interrelations to each other. Intersex individuals’ and activists’ 
reappropriation of ‘intersex’ ends, of course, not with the resignification of the 
medical term. Inherent in their narratives is not only a criticism of and a refusal to 
accept hegemonic medical definitions and constructions; their narratives have sought 
to affect, and have indeed affected, medical treatment practices, in particular the 
‘normalizing’ procedures and the violation of intersex individuals’ bodily and 




emotional integrity and their right of self-determination. Thus, the early intersex first-
person narratives have not only effected discursive shifts, but can be considered as 
practical interventions into hegemonic practices that literally sought and seek to 
inscribe norms of sexed embodiment and gender into intersex bodies. The challenge 
of medical practices, which was in fact the primary motivation for raising intersex 
voices, and the challenge of terminology and definitions are hence inextricably 
linked.  
The length of the first autobiographical intersex narratives that emerged in the 
1990s, which rarely exceeded two or three pages, can be read as signifying the lack 
of words and terms available to intersex individuals for their own representations at 
that time. The texts’ frequent references to medical terminology and medical 
practices did not only result from the narrators’ intentions to criticize the medical 
treatment protocol of intersex, but from the unrecognizability of intersex itself. The 
narratives themselves point to the unavailability of words; the titles often contain an 
explicit comment on this unavailability: “Is Growing Up in Silence Better than 
Growing Up Different?” (Holmes 1997/98), “Finding the Words” (Coventry 
1997/98), “Silence = Death” (Alexander 1997/98), and “Learning to Speak at 36” 
(Carden 1995), among others, hint both at the (threat of) unintelligibility that results 
from the silence about, or the unspeakability of intersex, and at the processes of 
developing new terms in order to speak their intersex realities. The narrative strategy 
of simultaneously stating the absence of vocabularies and concepts for representing 
personal, human stories of intersex experience, and reinscribing oneself into cultural 
discourse, produces in consequence a very specific kind of narratives that bear traces 
of the norms they reference and entail their narrators’ emergence as speakable, 
linguistically recognizable, and hence intelligible subjects. 
The fact that book-length intersex autobiographies are still rare, and that the only 
published modern intersex memoir in North America to date has only appeared in 
2008, is an indicator for this lack of cultural and linguistic representation. In Intersex 
(For Lack of a Better Word) Thea Hillman seeks to find answers to the question, 
“what is intersex?” in a “search for self in a world obsessed with normal” (Intersex 
back cover). Her narrative endeavor is positioned in a context where the intersex 
movement had been active for about 15 years, where activist challenges to medical 
treatment practices showed first effects, and where activism began to articulate their 
demands in terms of human rights issues. Hillman’s narrative thus provides (self-) 
critical reflections on the intersex movement and the shifts in paradigms of intersex 
discourses from a perspective that comes from within the movement itself. This shift 
in perspective, in that the intersex movement scrutinizes its own practices of intersex 
representations and of establishing the conditions of intersex intelligibility, hence 
creates an introspective narrative that both reaffirms and challenges the newly 
emerged personal and activist intersex narratives. Hillman’s narrative interrelates and 
renegotiates other cultural and medical texts about intersex; for example, it 
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interrogates the intersex representation of Jeffrey Eugenides’ novel Middlesex not 
only on a content level, but also the conditions of the production of the novel and its 
reproduction of hegemonic knowledge about intersex through strategies of ignoring 
or silencing real intersex persons’ voices. Intersex builds on several narrative 
strategies employed, as well as on the knowledge produced by earlier intersex first-
person narratives, which in the process of narration are transformed and integrated 
into Hillman’s introspective. Hillman’s conclusion of her memoir with the insight 
that the processes of creating the conditions of (her) intelligibility as an intersex 
subject need to be constantly interrogated, reevaluated, and reestablished and are 
necessarily a collective endeavor makes it clear that ‘intersex’ was, is, and will 
always be a contested category, that no individual narrative can claim absolute truth 
about intersex, but rather that different intersex narratives have to be conceived as 
coexistent and inextricably interrelated.  
Eugenides’ Middlesex and Winter’s novel Annabel picked up the theme of 
intersex at two distinct moments within the shifts of discourses of intersex. Middlesex 
was published in 2002 – Eugenides states having worked on the novel for nine years, 
which has the writing process coincide with the beginning and the early development 
of the intersex movement – and contains various intertextual references to specific 
intersex narratives and discourses, including medical texts, mythology, and accounts 
from Hermaphrodites with Attitude. Eugenides claims that he was inspired by 
Herculine Barbin’s memoir (who lived 1838–1868), and wanted to write his novel to 
represent what, in his opinion, was missing from Barbin’s account, namely details 
about her_his intersex corporeality on the one hand, and insights into her_his 
emotions on the other hand (Goldstein 2003). Middlesex is a fictional literary text 
that is informed by, and renegotiates different narratives on intersex, which 
themselves underwent processes of renegotiation and transformation. The 
juxtaposing of different genres (scientific texts, articles, memoirs, mythology, etc.) 
in the novel effects a multilayered narrative that reimagines intersex between 
phantasm and medical reality. 
Annabel, too, integrates and renegotiates medical discourses, mythology, 
contemporary discourses on gender and sexed embodiment, and autobiographical 
narratives into its own intersex narrative. Published in 2010, it provides a more recent 
literary commentary on the category of intersex in the cultural imagination. Both 
Middlesex and Annabel temporally displace their starting points, the births of their 
respective intersex protagonists, to the 1960s. This temporal displacement enables 
literary reevaluations of the ways in which intersex was recognized and dealt with 
40-50 years prior to the time of writing/publication, which are put into perspective in 
the light of contemporary intersex representations. Despite the two novels’ similar 
intertextual references, they ways in which these texts are renegotiated, and 
integrated into the novels’ production of the conditions of intelligibility for their 
intersex characters are quite different. I argued that fictional texts have possibilities 




of reimagining intersex that non-fictional texts do not have. I also discussed the 
questions of whether authors have a moral obligation to write a particular story of 
intersex, and whether an intersex story has the obligation to be subversive. I 
concluded my analysis of the literary representations of intersex with the observation 
that both novels offer, to some extent, conditions of intelligibility for their intersex 
characters. While Middlesex seems to choose a closure by ‘normalizing’ its intersex 
character along heteronormative notions of gender, in order to render him_her 
intelligible in the narrative and for the mainstream readers, Annabel allows its 
intersex character to refuse his_her normative gender assignment and to live in a 
nonconformatively sexed body. However, a clear-cut resolution of intersex 
differences in terms of a subversive/assimilationist dichotomy is problematized by 
the narratives’ various strategies of representation. Yet, it is arguable that Annabel’s 
narrative closure might have been influenced not only by more recent debates of 
intersex persons demanding their human rights and the right of self-determination 
about their sexed and gendered modes of being, but also by contemporary cultural 
discourses on queer and trans issues, and by increasing media representations of 
genderqueer and gender nonconforming subjects. 
My analysis of intersex representations in popular visual culture, exemplified by 
four episodes of primetime medical drama series, has demonstrated that despite 
similar points of departure, themes, and intertextual references, intersex 
representations in the cultural imagination are far from homogenous. I have argued 
for a certain degree of ethical responsibility on the part of the writers and producers 
of mainstream television programs for the ideological messages their narratives 
convey. Whether the series’ narratives offer or prohibit their intersex characters’ 
intelligibility as intersex, whether their representations of intersex are ethically 
acceptable or problematic, depends crucially on their narrative and visual 
representational strategies and the ways in which specific intersex narratives are 
intersected with other discourses in the episode. All episodes reference, in some way 
and to some extent, different intersex narratives, in particular medical texts, and 
juxtapose them to normative cultural ideas of gender and sexed embodiment. A direct 
comparison between the Chicago Hope and the Emergency Room episodes, which 
first aired in 1996 and 1998, respectively, reveals that while certain narratives and 
discourses were available at the time, from which their narratives could have drawn, 
only the narrative of Chicago Hope renegotiates intersex activists’ criticism of 
aspects of medical treatment, and hence shows a level of (self-) reflexivity. As a 
result, the narrative is much more differentiated and closes with the parental 
acceptance of the intersex child. In contrast, Emergency Room’s narrative perpetuates 
harmful ideas of intersex bodies and intersex persons, hence reaffirming hegemonic 
medical narratives about intersex, which makes its intersex representation, as I 
argued, while acceptable for the mainstream, ethically irresponsible.  
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A similar contrast can be ascertained when comparing the intersex narratives of 
House’s and Grey’s Anatomy’s episodes, which both aired in 2006. The House 
episode closely interrelates its representation of intersex with discourses about 
normative femininity. I have argued that the episode’s narrative and, in particular, its 
visual representational strategies perpetuate highly problematic ideas of female-
identified intersex individuals, which results in narrative violence, which translates 
in actual violence against girls/women whose bodies do not conform to cultural 
norms of femaleness, also called intersex misogyny. I argued why this intersex 
misogynist representation cannot be accounted for in terms of irony and self-
reflexivity. In comparison, Grey’s Anatomy’s intersex representation clearly shows a 
renegotiation of the criticism of traditional medical treatment protocols, and provides 
a metatextual ethical commentary on medico-cultural ‘normalization’ practices. The 
episode’s narrative strategies provide the conditions for the intersex character to 
become intelligible, as intersex, and allows for her self-determination regarding her 
sexed embodiment and gender identity. The narrative’s closure consists in defying a 
definite closure of the intersex character’s self-definition, which offers the option of 
several possibilities – possibilities that will be up to the character, and not defined by 
and within the narrative itself. In comparing all four episodes, what can be ascertained 
is that a linear, chronological development of popular cultural intersex represen-
tations, from ostensible ‘ethically unacceptable’ to more differentiated, ‘acceptable’ 
representations did not take place. Rather, the differences in intersex representations 
demonstrate popular culture’s prevailing investment in normative resolutions of 
perceived gender and sexed ‘difference’ and the reaffirmation of the status quo, but 
also that resistance to these normative conceptualizations has always been possible. 
As a result, different intersex narratives coexist within popular culture, and coexist 
with other discourses about intersex. 
In closing my final evaluation of my findings regarding the shifting paradigms of 
autobiographical, literary, and visual cultural intersex narratives between 1993 and 
2014, I want to come back to the premise from which I started my analysis, namely 
the claim that these narratives produce new knowledge about or paradigms for 
understanding intersex, and thus effect processes of resignification of intersex in the 
cultural imagination. I combine my considerations here with the question of whether 
we are moving toward a ‘post-intersex’ moment. In his afterword to Critical Intersex, 
Robert McRuer asserts that the “spaces of intersexual futurity [...] are populous, even 
if the figures we will encounter there are, as Jacques Derrida might put it, not always 
or not yet recognizable. [...] for Derrida, this always-anticipated figure ‘exceeds any 
determinism.’ [...] The unforeseeable freedom that will arrive in a future-to-come, in 
other words, depends upon a relinquishment of determinism, which in turn allows us 
to risk welcoming the unexpected” (McRuer 2009: 245). McRuer goes on arguing 
that intersex activism and cultural studies work on intersex have consistently worked 
toward ‘exceeding determinism,’ where in the context of medico-cultural ‘normali-




zation’ practices, ‘determine’ comes to signify both “to ascertain by investigation” 
and “to cause to come to a resolution” (Cheryl Chase, quoted in McRuer 2009: 246).  
I argue that the autobiographical, literary, and visual cultural narratives about 
intersex discussed here, together with the many other existing intersex narratives and 
discourses, resist determinism, in that their different intersex representations, their 
various ways of providing the conditions for intersex bodies to become recognizable, 
and intersex subjects to become intelligible, effect constantly shifting processes of 
resignification of the category of ‘intersex.’ Hence, these intersex narratives, as a 
cultural body of work on intersex, renegotiate determinism on a metanarrative level. 
They also renegotiate determinism, in the two senses defined by Chase, within their 
narrative confines, yet always in interrelation with other cultural points of reference. 
In these processes, they arrive at different conclusions, which might reaffirm, 
challenge, or disrupt each other. Even when a narrative seems to arrive at a closure 
by establishing a seemingly coherent, or intelligible subject position for their intersex 
narrator, protagonist or character, this closure always needs to be considered in its 
historico-cultural contingency, which makes it susceptible to potential renegotiations 
and (temporal) shifts in meaning.  
In consideration of the ongoing, continually shifting processes of the resig-
nification of intersex, but also in the light of the human rights violations against 
intersex individuals that still take place, it seems difficult to imagine that we will 
arrive at a ‘post-intersex’ moment in the near future. Iain Morland contends that 
“intersex treatment in the present should always be considered, paradoxically, in the 
light of what may come after it” (Morland, quoted in McRuer 2009: 246), referring 
to the severe consequences for intersex individuals who are/were subjected to 
‘normalizing’ treatments. Resistance to determinism needs to be effected in and 
through critical interventions into hegemonic – particularly medical and activist – 
narratives and practices; these interventions can take place on several levels and in 
many different ways. Every time an intersex individual survives, finds a mode of 
living that resists an assimilation to norms and still enables the individual to be 
recognized according to their sense of gendered self, against the odds, it is a moment 
of resistance. This survival is always directed toward a livable future. In fact, the 
“intersex future-to-come,” as McRuer argues, does not only involve the exceeding of 
determinism, but the simultaneous “welcoming ‘what may come after’” (McRuer 
2009: 246).  
I want to conclude my thesis with asserting the power of resistance of intersex, 
its potential to disrupt normative ways of thinking about sexed embodiment, and of 
gender, in, by and through diverse narratives that allow not only for a ‘breathing room 
for difference,’ but challenge and change the conditions for livable lives for gender 
nonconforming individuals in more fundamental ways. Morgen Holmes asks us to 
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“consider adopting as a positive identifier/sign the ‘ambi’ in the ‘ambiguous’ character of 
intersex, and the intersex as interjection, as interlocutor, and as many simultaneous interstices 
(of embodiment, gender, inter-subjectivity, interdependent deferral of meaning, etc.). It is an 
inter I aim to use to disrupt the male/female sex binary upon which the (hetero)sexual difference 
model is built [...]. [...] ‘Intersex’ then, is not a final term, nor the most appropriate term, but a 
powerful term whose historical, social and political import remains critical as a tool for 
interrogating heteronormative and bionormative presuppositions about proper embodiment.” 
(Holmes 2009: 7)  
 
I strongly agree with her claim that intersex is an intervention in normative ideas, and 
in ‘normalization’ practices. I end my work with expressing my wish for more of 
these (narrative) intersex interventions, narratives that will focus in the future, 
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